对Move的更多赞誉

More Praise for Move

“阐明了一系列新的现实……帕拉格·卡纳的举动概述了创造新机遇地理的力量。”

——理查德·佛罗里达，畅销书《创意阶层的崛起》和《新城市危机》的作者

“没有人更了解全球互联互通是如何运作的……卡纳在这里准确地研究了即将到来的大规模移民，远离日益严重的干旱，转向就业机会，如何给人类带来巨大的利益——或者带来巨大的伤害。”

——斯图尔特·布兰德，《全球概览》的创造者

“太棒了…… Move描述了一个不仅由民主或资本主义塑造的世界，而且越来越多地由移民塑造的世界。”

—Balaji S. Srinivasan，企业家、Coinbase 前首席技术官、Andreessen Horowitz 普通合伙人

“一个具有挑衅性的愿景……挑战我们重新思考我们将如何、在哪里以及与谁一起居住在这个星球上。”

——Rahul Mehrotra，哈佛大学设计研究生院教授

“权威且充满事实，但读起来令人愉悦……对人类迁徙历史的彻底调查，对其可能的未来进行了敏锐的估计。”

——马丁·格雷，《神圣地球》的作者和SacredSites.com的创建者

“Illuminates a host of new realities… Parag Khanna’s Move outlines the forces creating a new geography of opportunity.”

—Richard Florida, bestselling author of The Rise of the Creative Class and The New Urban Crisis

“No one knows more about how global connectivity works.… Here Khanna examines exactly how the coming massive migrations away from increasing droughts and toward jobs can play out to humanity’s great benefit—or great harm.”

—Stewart Brand, creator of The Whole Earth Catalog

“Brilliant… Move describes a world shaped not just by democracy or capitalism, but, increasingly, by migration.”

—Balaji S. Srinivasan, entrepreneur and former CTO of Coinbase and General Partner at Andreessen Horowitz

“A provocative vision… Challenges us to rethink how, where, and with whom we will inhabit the planet.”

—Rahul Mehrotra, professor, Harvard Graduate School of Design

“Authoritative and fact filled yet pleasurable to read… A thorough investigation of the history of human migration and a discerning estimate of its probable future.”

—Martin Gray, author of Sacred Earth and creator of SacredSites.com

纪念大卫·赫尔德：学者、导师、世界主义者

In memory of David Held: scholar, mentor, cosmopolitan

序幕：2050 年您会住在哪里？

PROLOGUE: WHERE WILL YOU LIVE IN 2050?

2020 年 4 月将被永远铭记，因为这个月世界静止了。在人类历史上，全球人口从未同时协调过一项单一行动：大封锁。几乎所有办公室和商店都关门了。街道和公园空无一人。汽车、火车和飞机都闲置着。山羊、鹿、狐狸、野猪、鸭子、袋鼠，甚至企鹅在平时熙熙攘攘的城市中自由漫步，从爱丁堡和巴黎到开普敦和堪培拉。《经济学人》用一个词概括了这一点：“关闭”。^我

April 2020 will forever be remembered as the month the world stood still. Never in human history has the global population simultaneously coordinated a single act: the Great Lockdown. Almost all offices and stores shut. Streets and parks were empty. Cars, trains, and planes sat idle. Goats, deer, foxes, boars, ducks, kangaroos, and even penguins roamed freely through normally bustling cities from Edinburgh and Paris to Cape Town and Canberra. The Economist summed it up in one word: “Closed.”^I

随后的一年全球轮流封锁给数十亿人造成了痛苦的损失。在混乱之中，最大的讽刺之一就是我们已经习惯了几乎无摩擦的全球运动。2019 年是旅游业创纪录的一年，国际游客人数突破 15 亿，创历史新高。超过 2.75 亿人被归类为国际移民——从迪拜的印度建筑工人和菲律宾女佣到亚洲各地的美国高管和英语教师——这也是有记录以来最多的人数。然后一切都停止了。

The year of rolling global lockdowns that followed took an excruciating toll on billions of lives. Amid the chaos, one of the greatest ironies that surfaced was just how accustomed we had become to almost frictionless global movement. The year 2019 was a record year for tourism, with international arrivals topping 1.5 billion, the highest figure ever. More than 275 million people were classified as international migrants—from Indian construction workers and Filipino maids in Dubai to American executives and English teachers across Asia—also the largest number ever recorded. Then it all stopped.

封锁并没有导致移民和旅行激增，而是引发了世界人口的突然重置。来自世界各个角落的游客、学生和侨民回到了自己的出生国或国籍。欧洲国家派飞机前往非洲和拉丁美洲遣返本国公民。亚洲学生购买了从美国、英国和澳大利亚回国的单程票。超过二十万印度劳工从沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋等海湾国家空运回国。这种前所未有的人为重新调整的地点和公民身份的回归。第一次有人记得，几乎全世界的人口都在“家”。但持续多久呢？

Instead of migration and travel surging ahead, the lockdowns provoked a sudden reset of the world’s population. From every corner of the world, tourists, students, and expats returned to their country of birth or nationality. European countries dispatched planes to Africa and Latin America to repatriate their citizens. Asian students bought one-way tickets back home from the US, UK, and Australia. More than two hundred thousand Indian laborers were flown back from Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This unprecedented repatriation of peoples artificially realigned location and citizenship. For the first time anyone could remember, nearly the entire world population was “home.” But for how long?

我们的个人和职业生活中有很大一部分取决于流动性：人员、货物、金钱和数据在城市和国家内部以及国际范围内的流动。只有我们能够移动，社会才能正常运转。一旦你停止踩自行车，它很快就会翻倒。我们的文明就是那辆自行车。我们会移动的。

A staggering share of our personal and professional lives hinges on mobility: the movement of people, goods, money, and data within cities and countries as well as internationally. Society only functions normally if we can move. Once you stop pedaling a bicycle, it quickly falls over. Our civilization is that bicycle. And move we will.

2010 年代初，我和我的同事格雷格·林赛 (Greg Lindsay) 开始回答这个问题：“2050 年你会住在哪里？” 答案可能只是“高科技城市”，但是哪些呢？有些将成为掠夺性监视场所，而另一些将允许居民保留一些隐私。其中一些将位于能够抵御气候变化的地区，而另一些则很可能已经被淹没。有些将拥有蓬勃发展的服务经济和活跃的文化，而另一些将成为废弃的“工厂城镇”，例如遍布密歇根州的工厂城镇。当我们在世界各地寻找能够提供丰富淡水、进步治理并能够吸引人才进入创新产业的地区时，我们决定选择……密歇根州。

In the early 2010s, my colleague Greg Lindsay and I set out to answer the question, “Where will you live in 2050?” The answer could simply have been “high-tech cities,” but which ones? Some will be sites of predatory surveillance while others will allow residents to preserve some privacy. Some will be in areas resilient to climate change, while others may well have been submerged by then. Some will have thriving service economies and lively culture, while others will have become the discarded “factory towns” such as those littered across Michigan. As we scanned the world for geographies that offer abundant freshwater, progressive governance, and could attract talent to innovative industries, we decided on… Michigan.

更广泛地说，我们指出了“新北方”的出现，即五大湖地区和斯堪的纳维亚半岛等正在可再生能源、粮食生产和经济多元化方面进行大量投资的地区的集合。经历 2012 年桑迪飓风后不久，格雷格和他的家人从纽约搬到了蒙特利尔。

More broadly, we pointed to the emergence of a “New North,” a collection of geographies such as the Great Lakes region and Scandinavia that are making significant investments in renewable energy, food production, and economic diversification. Not too long after living through Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Greg and his family moved from New York City to Montreal.

这个看似简单的思想实验蕴含着一些宝贵的教训。首先，你无法选择自己面临的危机：新冠疫情、气候变化、经济崩溃和政治动荡可能同时发生，甚至在螺旋式下降中相互放大。另一个要点是，昨天废弃的地方明天可能会恢复活力。五大湖地区的铁锈地带城市是反乌托邦枯萎病的缩影：今天的密歇根仍在失败每年增加的人数是它增加的人数的两倍（并在此过程中失去国会席位）。但底特律很可能成为明天的热门房地产市场。其卷土重来的早期迹象已经显而易见：轻轨、艺术博物馆、精品酒店、手工时装以及丰盛的阿拉伯和亚洲美食。底特律市中心现在有一个城市沙滩，年轻的专业人​​士可以在那里放松身心，享用午餐和饮料。工业公司正在重组密歇根州的工厂以生产电动汽车，Alphabet 的 Sidewalk Labs 正在底特律和安娜堡之间修建一条适合自动驾驶汽车的高速公路。接下来可能会出现用于 3D 打印房屋的植物。在几十年内，美加关系可能会取得进展，使底特律成为无缝且繁荣的芝加哥-多伦多走廊的中点。

This seemingly simple thought experiment holds some valuable lessons. First, you don’t get to choose your crisis: Covid, climate change, an economic crash, and political unrest can unfold at the same time—and even amplify one another in a downward spiral. Another takeaway is that places abandoned yesterday could be rejuvenated tomorrow. Rust belt cities across the Great Lakes region are the epitome of dystopian blight: Michigan today is still losing twice as many people per year as it gains (and losing congressional seats in the process). But Detroit may well be tomorrow’s hot property market. Early signs of its comeback are already visible: a light railway, art museums, boutique hotels, artisan fashion, and sumptuous Arab and Asian foods. In the heart of Detroit there’s now a sandy urban beach where young professionals kick back to enjoy lunch and drinks. Industrial firms are retooling Michigan’s factories to crank out electric cars, and Alphabet’s Sidewalk Labs is building a highway catering to autonomous vehicles between Detroit and Ann Arbor. Next may come plants for 3D-printed housing. Within a couple of decades, US-Canada relations may have progressed such that Detroit serves as the midway point in a seamless and thriving Chicago-Toronto corridor.

相反的极端可能以香港为代表，这座繁荣的国际城市正受到北京的猛烈挤压。这个前英国殖民地已经从亚洲首要的资本主义中心沦为珍惜自由的香港本土青年与要求遵守国家安全法的中国政府之间的战场。早在 2047 年（香港正式与中国大陆完全融合的日子）之前，香港的许多年轻人就会将他们的才能转移到其他地方，并被数百万顺从的中国大陆公民取代。

The opposite extreme could be represented by Hong Kong, a thriving global city being violently squeezed by Beijing. The former British colony has degenerated from Asia’s premier capitalist hub into a battleground between native Hong Kong youth who cherish their freedom and a Chinese government that demands submission to its National Security Law. Long before 2047—the date Hong Kong was officially supposed to be fully integrated with mainland China—many of the city’s youth will have taken their talents elsewhere and been replaced by millions of obedient mainland Chinese citizens.

要预测未来几十年哪些地方会成功或失败，需要全面审视政治、经济、技术、社会和环境因素，预测它们如何相互交叉，并为每个地理区域如何适应这种永无休止的情况构建情景。复杂。未来将面临许多曲折：今天的封锁，明天的大规模移民；今天的封锁，明天的大规模移民；今天的民粹主义民主，明天的数据驱动治理；今天的民族认同，明天的全球团结——或者在某些地方相反，而在另一些地方则反复无常。直到 2050 年，您可能都不知道自己是否做出了正确的举动（或多个举动）。

To forecast which places will succeed or fail in the decades ahead requires taking a holistic look at political, economic, technological, social, and environmental factors, projecting how they intersect with one another, and building scenarios for how each geography may adapt to this unending complexity. Plenty of twists and turns lie ahead: lockdowns today, mass migrations tomorrow; populist democracy today, data-driven governance tomorrow; national identity today, global solidarity tomorrow—or the reverse in some places, and flip-flopping in others. You may not know if you’ve made the right move—or moves—until 2050.

历史上充满了地震性的全球性破坏——流行病和瘟疫、战争和种族灭绝、饥荒和火山爆发。在巨大的灾难之后，我们的生存本能一次又一次地迫使我们采取行动。人类正在着手进行有史以来最广泛的实验：疫情正在慢慢开始过去，边界正在重新开放，人们再次开始流动。他们将离开哪些地方以及搬迁到哪里？我们所有人应对政治动荡和经济危机、技术颠覆和气候变化、人口失衡和流行病偏执等复杂相互作用的最佳方式是什么？这些问题的答案可以用一个词来概括：移动。

History is replete with seismic global disruptions—pandemics and plagues, wars and genocides, famines and volcanic eruptions. And time and again after great catastrophes, our survival instinct compels us to move. Humankind is embarking on the most extensive experiment it has ever run on itself: The pandemic is slowly beginning to pass, borders are reopening, and people are moving again. Which places will they leave and where will they relocate? What is the best way for all of us to cope with the complex interplay of political upheavals and economic crises, technological disruption and climate change, demographic imbalances and pandemic paranoia? The answer to these questions can be summed up in one word: Move.

人类的地图尚未确定——现在不是，永远也不是。在这本书中，我希望你考虑一下我们地理未来发生根本性转变的情景——包括你自己在人类下一张地图上的位置。

The map of humanity isn’t settled—not now, not ever. With this book I want you to consider scenarios for radical shifts in our geographic future—including your own location on humanity’s next map.

我。据《经济学人》封面， 2020 年 3 月 21 日。

I. As per the front cover of The Economist, March 21, 2020.

第1章流动性就是命运

CHAPTER 1 MOBILITY IS DESTINY

地理是我们创造的

Geography is what we make of it

问问 1990 年至 2005 年间从乔治城外交学院毕业的人，哪一门课程他们会一直记住到死。他们的眼睛会发亮，露出一丝傻笑，嘴里会说出一个词：“地图”。一门只有一学分、及格或不及格的课程很快就变得如此传奇，以至于学生们为了参加分班考试而故意不及格。很快，数百名只想坐在里面的本科生也加入了他们的行列，每年都需要更大的礼堂。一切都是为了欣赏查尔斯·皮尔特尔博士的百科全书式、脾气暴躁的雷鸣般的演讲，他是地球上每个国家、首都、水域、山脉和边界争端的著名事实的人类大炮。2005年，《新闻周刊》该杂志在其“受虐狂大学课程”列表中特别介绍了“现代世界地图”。我们还不够。

Ask anyone who graduated from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service between 1990 and 2005 which one course they’ll remember until the day they die. Their eyes will light up, a smirk will appear, and one word will come out of their mouths: “Map.” A mere one-credit, pass-fail class quickly became so legendary that students intentionally failed its placement test just to take it. They were quickly joined by hundreds of other undergrads who just wanted to sit in, requiring larger auditoriums each year. All for the pleasure of witnessing the thunderous lectures of the encyclopedic and cantankerous Dr. Charles Pirtle, a human cannon of notable facts about every single country, capital, body of water, mountain range, and border dispute on Earth. In 2005, Newsweek magazine featured “Map of the Modern World” in its list of “College Classes for Masochists.” We couldn’t get enough.

皮尔特尔的崇高目标有两个：与地理无知作斗争，同样重要的是，证明世界地图是环境、政治、技术和人口不断演变的碰撞。感谢皮尔特尔，分析这些力量的相互作用成为我的职业痴迷。毕竟，20 世纪 90 年代的高中地理课几乎没有什么启发性：它基本上是地球科学（主要是地质学；没有提到气候变化），顶部有一个静态的边界层。对于大多数学生来说，地理研究可悲地默认了这种政治倾向。 地理，就好像我们地图上最任意的线（边界）是最永久的。事实上，国家更像是多孔的容器，由其内部和之间的人员和资源流动所塑造。没有这些，国家还有什么价值呢？

Pirtle’s noble objective was twofold: to combat geographical ignorance and, just as important, to demonstrate that the world map is an ever evolving collision of environment, politics, technology, and demographics. It’s thanks to Pirtle that analyzing the interplay of these forces became my professional obsession. After all, high school geography class in the 1990s was hardly inspiring: It was basically earth science (mostly geology; no mention of climate change) with a static layer of borders on top. For most students, the study of geography sadly defaults to this political geography, as if the most arbitrary lines on our maps (borders) are the most permanent. In reality, states are more like porous containers shaped by the flows of people and resources within and across them. Without these, what is a state even worth?

这是一本关于对我们来说最重要的地理学的书：人文地理学。人文地理学研究人类物种在六大洲 1.5 亿平方公里土地上的分布地点和方式。可以把它想象成气候学，一门研究我们如何与彼此和地球建立关系的深层科学。人文地理学涵盖了人口统计（人口的年龄和性别平衡）和移民（人们的重新安置）等热门话题，但更深入地探讨了我们的民族志构成，甚至是我们对不断变化的环境的遗传适应。气候难民和经济移民、通婚甚至进化——所有这些都是我们人文地理学的宏伟故事的一部分。

This is a book about the geography that matters most to us: human geography. Human geography investigates the where and the how of the distribution of our species across 150 million square kilometers of land on six continents. Think of it like climatology, a deep science of how we relate to one another and the planet. Human geography subsumes hot-button topics like demographics (the age and gender balance of populations) and migration (the resettlement of people), but goes much deeper into our ethnographic composition, and even our genetic adaptation to a changing environment. Climate refugees and economic migrants, intermarriage and even evolution—all are part of the grand story of our human geography.

为什么人文地理学在今天如此重要？因为我们的物种正经历着一段艰难的旅程，我们不能再理所当然地认为我们的地理层之间存在着稳定的关系，例如自然（水、能源、矿产和食物资源所在）、政治（领土边界所在）划分国家）和经济（基础设施和工业所在地）。这些是过去数千年来决定我们人文地理的主要力量之一，而反过来，我们的人文地理又塑造了它们。

Why does human geography matter so much today? Because our species is in for a rough ride, and we can no longer take for granted a stable relationship between our geographic layers such as nature (where the water, energy, mineral, and food resources are), politics (where the territorial borders are that demarcate states), and economics (where the infrastructure and industries are located). These are among the major forces that have determined our human geography for the past thousands of years—and in turn, our human geography has shaped them.

但这些层之间的反馈循环从未如此强烈和复杂。人类经济活动加速了森林砍伐和工业排放，导致全球变暖、海平面上升和大规模干旱。美国最重要的四个城市面临的风险最大：纽约市和迈阿密可能被淹没，洛杉矶缺水，旧金山被野火覆盖。

But never before have the feedback loops among these layers been so intense and complex. Human economic activity has accelerated the deforestation and industrial emissions that cause global warming, rising sea levels, and massive drought. Four of America’s most important cities are most at risk: New York City and Miami may drown, while Los Angeles is running out of water and San Francisco is blanketed by wildfires.

数百万人遭受重创的连锁反应也影响到亚洲数十亿人。想想看：亚洲近几十年来惊人的经济崛起是由人口的惊人增长、城市化、和工业化，所有这些都增加了其排放量。这导致海平面上升，威胁到环太平洋和印度洋沿海特大城市的大量人口。因此，亚洲的崛起正在加速亚洲的下沉，这可能导致更多的亚洲人跨境逃亡并引发资源冲突。我们推动系统，然后系统推动我们。

The chain reactions slamming millions of people in America apply to billions in Asia. Consider this: Asia’s spectacular economic rise in recent decades was propelled by breakneck population growth, urbanization, and industrialization, all of which have spiked its emissions output. This has contributed to rising sea levels that threaten the teeming populations of its coastal megacities on the Pacific Rim and Indian Ocean. So the rise of Asia is accelerating the sinking of Asia—which could cause ever more Asians to flee across borders and spark resource conflicts. We push the system, then the system pushes us.

现在似乎是评估这些地理层已经变得多么严重不同步的合适时机。北美和欧洲的富裕国家有 3 亿人口，加上人口老龄化和基础设施老化，但拉丁美洲、中东和亚洲大约有 20 亿年轻人无所事事，他们有能力照顾老年人和维持公共服务。我们在人口稀少的加拿大和俄罗斯拥有无数公顷的耕地，而数百万贫困的非洲农民因干旱而被迫离开自己的土地。有些国家拥有健全的政治制度，但公民很少，例如芬兰和新西兰，但也有数亿人在专制政权下受苦或生活在难民营中。

This seems an appropriate moment to take stock of how badly out of sync these layers of geography have become. We have wealthy countries across North America and Europe with 300 million and counting aging people and decaying infrastructure—but roughly 2 billion young people sitting idle in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia who are capable of caring for the elderly and maintaining public services. We have countless hectares of arable farmland across depopulated Canada and Russia, while millions of destitute African farmers are driven from their lands by drought. There are countries with sterling political systems yet few citizens, such as Finland and New Zealand, but also hundreds of millions of people suffering under despotic regimes or living in refugee camps.

流动人口数量创历史新高，这有什么奇怪的吗？

Is it any surprise that record numbers of people have been on the move?

二十世纪的孩子们都知道“地理决定命运”和“人口决定命运”这句格言。前者意味着区位和资源决定我们的命运，而后者则表明人口规模和年龄结构是最重要的因素。它们共同告诉我们，我们陷入了困境——最好希望它是一个人口稠密、资源丰富的国家。我们应该继续相信这种决定论吗？当然不是。地理不是命运。地理是我们所创造的。

Children of the twentieth century know the adages “Geography is destiny” and “Demography is destiny.” The former implies that location and resources determine our fate, while the latter suggests that population size and age structure are the most important factors. Together, they tell us that we’re stuck where we are—better hope it’s a well-populated and resource-rich country. Should we continue to buy into such determinism? Of course not. Geography is not destiny. Geography is what we make of it.

在我 2016 年出版的《连通图学》一书中，我提出了第三条公理来解释全球文明的弧线：“连通性就是命运”。我们庞大的基础设施网络——铁路、电网、互联网的机械外骨骼电缆等——使人员、货物、服务、资本、技术和思想在全球范围内快速流动。连通性和移动性是相辅相成的，是同一枚硬币的两个面，它们共同产生了第四条公理，它将定义我们的未来：移动性就是命运。

In my 2016 book Connectography I proposed a third axiom to explain the arc of global civilization: “Connectivity is destiny.” Our vast infrastructure networks—a mechanical exoskeleton of railways, electricity grids, Internet cables, and more—enable the rapid movement of people, goods, services, capital, technology, and ideas on a planetary scale. Connectivity and mobility are complementary, two sides of the same coin, and together they give rise to a fourth axiom that will define our future: Mobility is destiny.

那么是什么阻止我们充分利用我们的连接呢？我们集体惰性的根源在于边界——物理的、法律的和心理的。世界政治地图的呈现方式主要是出于偶然的原因：古代文明在哪里定居，欧洲帝国在哪里征服和分裂，以及自然特征如何将人口分开。边界就在他们所在的地方，因为那是他们曾经去过的地方。但地球是我们的——不是美国、俄罗斯、加拿大或中国的。问题是：我们能否发现一种新的制图实用主义，使政治地理学更符合当今的需要？

So what’s stopping us from using our connectivity to the fullest? The root of our collective inertia lies in borders—physical, legal, and psychological. The world’s political map looks the way it does mostly for contingent reasons: where ancient civilizations settled, where European empires conquered and divided, and where natural features separate populations. Borders are where they are because that’s where they’ve been. But the Earth is ours—not America’s or Russia’s or Canada’s or China’s. The question is: Can we discover a new cartographic pragmatism that brings political geography more in line with today’s needs?

管理大师彼得·德鲁克警告说，“动荡时期最大的危险不是动荡本身，而是按照昨天的逻辑行事。” ¹我们不能再成为人文地理学如何展开的被动观察者。相反，我们必须积极调整我们的地理位置，将人员和技术转移到需要的地方，同时保持宜居的地方适宜居住。这需要全球文明的组织发生划时代的转变，需要世界人口的集体重新安置战略。但如果我们能做到这一点，我们将提高作为一个物种的生存几率，重振陷入困境的经济，并绘制出更明智的人类地图。

The management guru Peter Drucker warned that “the greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence itself but to act with yesterday’s logic.”¹ We can no longer afford to be passive observers of how human geography unfolds. Instead, we must actively realign our geographies, moving people and technologies where they are needed while keeping livable places habitable. This requires an epochal shift in the organization of global civilization, a collective resettlement strategy for the world population. But if we get this right, we’ll strengthen our odds of survival as a species, revitalize floundering economies, and forge a more sensible map of humanity.

大规模移民是不可避免的，而且比以往任何时候都更有必要。在未来几十年里，世界上整个人口过剩的地区可能会被遗弃，而一些人口稀少的地区可能会大量增加人口并成为新的文明中心。如果你足够幸运，来到一个不需要移民的地方——比如加拿大或俄罗斯——那么移民很可能会来到你身边。套用列宁的话：你可能对移民不感兴趣，但移民对你感兴趣。

Mass migrations are inevitable, and more than ever, they are necessary. In the coming decades, entire overpopulated regions of the world might be abandoned, while some depopulated territories may gain massively in population and become new civilizational centers. If you are lucky enough to be someplace from which you do not have to migrate—such as Canada or Russia—then chances are that migrants are coming your way. To paraphrase Lenin: You may not be interested in migration, but migration is interested in you.

明天的世界不仅充满了移动的人们，而且已经被定义通过一切的流动性。人人都有手机，通讯、网络、医疗咨询、金融都可以随时随地实现；没有人去“银行”。工作和学习都迁移到网上；数字游牧者的队伍呈爆炸式增长。越来越多的人住在移动房屋和其他可移动住宅中。甚至“固定”投资也变得可替代：我们可以 3D 打印建筑物，在任何地方建立工厂和医院，利用太阳能或其他可再生能源发电，并让无人机为我们提供所需的任何东西。随着我们的移动，供应链也会随之变化：劳动力和资本可以永远转移到新的土地，产生新的生产力地域。流动性是观察我们未来文明的镜头。

The world of tomorrow is not only full of mobile people but is defined by the mobility of everything. Everyone has a mobile phone, meaning communications, Internet, medical consultations, and finance are all accessible anywhere; nobody goes to a “bank.” Both work and study have migrated online; the ranks of digital nomads have exploded. Ever more people are living in mobile homes and other movable dwellings. Even “fixed” investments have become fungible: We can 3D print buildings, set up factories and hospitals anywhere, generate electricity from solar or other renewable sources, and have drones deliver us anything we need. As we move, so does the supply chain: Labor and capital can perpetually shift to new land, generating fresh geographies of productivity. Mobility is the lens through which to view our future civilization.

移动性的概念融合了物质和哲学。它提出了诸如：我们为什么要搬家，这些转变揭示了我们的需求和愿望的什么？然后还有政治和法律问题需要探讨：谁被允许搬迁？我们的行动面临哪些限制？为什么？最后但并非最不重要的一点是，存在规范性问题：人们应该去哪里？全球人口的最优分布是怎样的？流动性也是一种无形的精神体验。停下来，欣赏我们的解剖结构如何流畅地支撑着我们。移动可以激发创造力，见证生活方式融合的过程。约翰·杜威等哲学家思考了在自然和社会环境中自由移动的美学，雄辩地认为这种互动使生活充满意义。他们邀请了闲逛者。移动就是自由。

The concept of mobility blends the material and philosophical. It raises questions such as: Why are we moving, and what do those shifts reveal about our needs and desires? Then there are political and legal questions to explore: Who is allowed to move? What restrictions do we face on movement and why? And last but not least, there are normative questions: Where should people go? What is the optimal distribution of people around the world? Mobility is also an intangible and spiritual experience. Pause and appreciate how fluidly our anatomy carries us. Moving stimulates creativity, the process of witnessing ways of life coming together. Philosophers such as John Dewey meditated on the aesthetics of moving freely both in nature and the social milieu, eloquently arguing that such interaction imbued life with meaning. Walter Benjamin spent a decade reflecting on the significance of the glass-covered arcades built in mid-nineteenth-century Paris and the wandering flâneurs they invited. To move is to be free.

你准备好搬家了吗？您的福利是否面临政治和经济危机、技术颠覆或气候变化的威胁？其他地方的情况对您和您的家人来说会更好吗？是什么阻止你去那里？不管是什么，你都需要克服它。对于数十亿人来说，永久流动正在成为常态。运动本身可能成为目的：一个人不仅会运动，而且还会运动。人总是会动的。但也许，随着我们的前进，我们会重新发现人类的意义。

Are you ready to move? Is your welfare at risk from political and economic crises, technological disruptions, or climate change? Would circumstances be better for you and your family somewhere else? What is stopping you from going there? Whatever it is, you will need to get over it. For billions of people, perpetual mobility is becoming the norm. Movement may become an end in itself: One won’t just move; one will always be moving. But perhaps, as we move, we will rediscover what it means to be human.

今日人文地理学

Today’s Human Geography

目前人口略低于80亿。亚洲有近 50 亿人，非洲有 10 亿人，欧洲有 7.5 亿人，北美有 6 亿人，南美有 4.25 亿人。

The current human population is just under 8 billion. Nearly 5 billion people reside in Asia, 1 billion in Africa, 750 million in Europe, 600 million in North America, and 425 million in South America.

移动是人之常情

To move is human

人类的故事从一步开始。近200万年前，第一批直立生物走出非洲，跨过一座陆桥，到达今天红海和西奈半岛的欧亚大陆。在接下来的数千年里，我们的原始人类祖先杂交并逐渐成为一个独特的物种——智人——大约30万年前。古生物学家认为，135,000 至 90,000 年前，严重的非洲干旱促使智人从非洲分散到欧洲尼安德特人的地区。但与我们的尼安德特人竞争对手不同，智人在使用骨制（后来是石制）工具狩猎和采集时，利用更轻、更直立的身体来行驶更远的距离。早期的人类比他的对手跑得更快、活得更久。

The story of mankind begins with a single step. The first upright beings set foot out of Africa nearly 2 million years ago, crossing a land bridge to Eurasia in the geography of today’s Red Sea and Sinai Peninsula. Over the thousands of millennia that followed, our protohuman ancestors interbred and gradually emerged as a unique species—Homo sapiens—about 300,000 years ago. Paleontologists believe that between 135,000 and 90,000 years ago, a severe African drought spurred Homo sapiens to fan out of Africa into the terrain of the Neanderthals in Europe. But unlike our Neanderthal competitors, Homo sapiens used their lighter, more upright bodies to cover longer distances when hunting and gathering with their bone (then stone) tools. Early man outran and outlasted his rivals.

我们被告知，言语是人类和其他灵长类动物之间的一个关键区别，但我们为什么要学会说话呢？语言学家认为，人类语言在大约十万年前就已经发展起来，这并非偶然，因为这些迁徙的智人之间的互动日益增多，他们需要在覆盖数百公里狩猎范围的同时进行交流。两万五千年前的末次冰期等气候事件推动人类穿越西伯利亚，越过陆桥到达北美。但随着北纬地区在 11000 多年前再次变得适宜居住，欧亚大陆移民的加剧催生了整个印欧语系，如今拥有 30 亿使用者。

We are told that speech is a key differentiator between humans and other primates, but why did we learn to speak at all? Linguists believe that human languages developed about a hundred thousand years ago, not incidentally because of the increasing interactions among these migrating Homo sapiens, who needed to communicate while covering several hundred kilometers of hunting range. Climatic events such as the Last Glacial Period of twenty-five thousand years ago pushed humans all the way across Siberia and over the land bridge to North America. But as northern latitudes once again became habitable just over eleven thousand years ago, intensifying Eurasian migrations gave rise to the entire Indo-European family of languages that boasts 3 billion speakers today.

大迁徙渗透到所有有记录的历史和我们最古老的神话中。根据希伯来圣经，犹太人在埃及法老的统治下长期遭受奴役，直到大规模的出埃及奇迹般地将他们穿越西奈半岛返回到他们的祖地迦南。我们使用德语术语Völkerwanderung描述公元早期的几个世纪，日耳曼部落、斯拉夫部落和匈奴部落入侵衰落的罗马帝国。面对麦加的迫害，先知穆罕默德的追随者在非洲阿比西尼亚王国寻求庇护，但也成为传教士征服者，建立了早期的哈里发国，并将追随者改信远至东南亚。据称，里海和太平洋之间高达 10% 的亚洲男性声称自己是成吉思汗的后裔，这是因为蒙古人是游牧民族和一夫多妻制的征服者，他们与当地部落通婚。

Great migrations permeate all of recorded history and our oldest mythologies. According to the Hebrew Bible, the Jews suffered a long period of slavery under Egyptian pharaohs, until a great exodus miraculously returned them across the Sinai to their ancestral land of Canaan. We use the German term Völkerwanderung to describe the early centuries AD during which Germanic, Slavic, and Hun tribes invaded the declining Roman empire. Facing persecution in Mecca, the followers of the Prophet Muhammad sought refuge in the African kingdom of Abyssinia, but also became missionary conquerors, establishing the early caliphates and converting followers as far as Southeast Asia. The reason that allegedly up to 10 percent of Asian males between the Caspian Sea and the Pacific Ocean claim lineage to Genghis Khan is because the Mongols were nomadic and polygamous conquerors who intermarried with local tribes.

十四世纪的黑死病估计导致一亿人死亡，并导致庞大的蒙古帝国分裂。在欧洲，农民和劳工搬到了土地质量更好的地方，以及由于劳动力短缺而工资上涨的城镇。在一些阿拉伯领土，高达 90% 的人口撤离了受感染的村庄并逃往城市。在随后长达几个世纪的小冰河时期，冰川扩张和农作物歉收迫使欧亚大陆人口寻找更可靠的农田，也激励荷兰人和葡萄牙人进行海洋航行，刺激了他们的殖民扩张。

The fourteenth-century Black Death killed an estimated 100 million people and led to the splintering of the vast Mongol empire. In Europe, farmers and laborers moved to places where land quality was better and to towns where wages rose due to worker shortages. Up to 90 percent of the population in some Arab territories vacated their infected villages and fled to cities. During the centuries-long Little Ice Age that followed, expanding glaciers and crop failure pushed Eurasian populations to search for more reliable farmland, and also inspired the Dutch and Portuguese to undertake oceanic navigation, spurring their colonial expansion.

殖民时代的移民既有自愿的，也有非自愿的。英国移民在美洲建立殖民地始于十六世纪末。在整个十七世纪，这些早期定居者与寻求利润的朝圣者以及寻求宗教自由的清教徒和贵格会教徒一起加入。在四百年的跨大西洋奴隶贸易中，估计有 1300 万非洲人被运往北美、加勒比海和南美洲。在亚洲，英国和葡萄牙帝国将数百万马来和印度商人运送到印度洋，东亚人则跨越太平洋到达北美和南美。千余年来，华人移民马来半岛，历经唐、明、清朝代，

Migrations of the colonial era were both voluntary and involuntary. English immigration to establish colonies in America began in the late sixteenth century. Throughout the seventeenth century, these early settlers were joined by pilgrims in search of profit and Puritans and Quakers seeking religious freedom. Over the four hundred years of the transatlantic slave trade, an estimated 13 million Africans were shipped to North America, the Caribbean, and South America. In Asia, the British and Portuguese empires moved millions of Malay and Indian merchants across the Indian Ocean, and East Asians spread across the Pacific to both North and South America. More than a millennium of Chinese emigration into the Malay peninsula, across the Tang, Ming, and Qing dynasties, dramatically contributed to making Southeast Asia the ethnic melting pot that it is today.

由于反抗欧洲王朝帝国的民族主义运动，十九世纪被广泛称为“民族主义时代”。然而，这也是大规模移民的时代，工业革命创造了对农业和制造业劳动力的巨大需求。数以百万计的农民被吸引到城市的工厂工作，而轮船和铁路则将数以百万计的工人、奴隶和罪犯运送到大英帝国各地——尤其是跨越大西洋到达北美。6000 万欧洲人集体移居美国，其中 150 万（占人口的 40%）逃离爱尔兰发生马铃薯饥荒，随后数百万意大利人摆脱了农村贫困。

The nineteenth century is widely referred to as the “age of nationalism” due to ethnonationalist movements resisting Europe’s dynastic empires. Yet it was also the age of mass migrations, as the Industrial Revolution created huge demand for both agricultural and manufacturing labor. Millions of farmers were lured to factory jobs in cities, while steamships and railways transported millions of workers, slaves, and criminals across the British empire—especially across the Atlantic to North America. Sixty million Europeans moved en masse to America, including 1.5 million (40 percent of the population) fleeing Ireland’s potato famine, followed by several million Italians escaping rural poverty.

民族主义在二十世纪也取得了巨大的成功，非殖民化运动终结了欧洲的全球帝国，并诞生了数十个新国家。尽管第二次世界大战的结束解决了世界地图上的大部分问题，但它并没有解决世界人民的问题。数以百万计的难民从东欧转移到西欧，从欧洲转移到美洲。大屠杀前后，数十万犹太人逃离欧洲前往美国和巴勒斯坦，1948 年以色列建国后抵达的人数更多。1947 年印度和巴基斯坦的分治导致约 2000 万印度教徒、穆斯林和锡克教徒流离失所。 ——仍然是人类历史上最大规模的大规模迁徙。

Nationalism had a phenomenal run of success in the twentieth century as well, with decolonization movements bringing an end to Europe’s global empires and giving birth to dozens of new countries. And even though the end of World War II settled much of the world map—it did not settle the world’s people. Millions of refugees shifted from Eastern to Western Europe, and from Europe to America. Both before and after the Holocaust, hundreds of thousands of Jews fled Europe to America and Palestine, with even more arriving after the creation of Israel in 1948. The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 displaced an estimated 20 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs—still the largest mass migration in human history.

后殖民关系将数百万印度人和巴基斯坦人带到了英国，也将越南人、阿尔及利亚人和摩洛哥人带到了法国。在战后的几十年里，欧洲严重的劳动力短缺加上土耳其的高失业率吸引了一波又一波的客工来到德国（及其较小的邻国）。在美国，1965 年《移民法》废除了对移民原籍国的配额，导致来自加勒比海和中美洲的拉美裔以及来自中国、印度、越南和其他地方的亚洲人激增。

Postcolonial ties brought millions of Indians and Pakistanis to England, as well as Vietnamese, Algerians, and Moroccans to France. During these postwar decades, severe labor shortages in Europe combined with high unemployment in Turkey lured waves of Gastarbeiter (guest workers) to Germany (and its smaller neighbors). In America, the 1965 Immigration Act repealed quotas on the national origin of immigrants, leading to a surge of Latinos from the Caribbean and Central America and waves of Asians from China, India, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

近几十年来，大规模移民安置的动力进一步增强。内战和国家失败，例如 20 世纪 80 年代的阿富汗以及最近的伊拉克和叙利亚，迫使数百万人成为难民。三十年前苏联的解体继续驱使数百万人流离失所，跨越东欧和中亚的前共和国。海湾石油繁荣将数百万巴勒斯坦人和南亚移民劳工带到了科威特、沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋。移民实际建立了一些当今最现代化的国家。移动和建造——这是人类的本质。

Recent decades have added yet more impetus for large-scale resettlement. Civil wars and state failures, such as Afghanistan in the 1980s and more recently Iraq and Syria, have forced millions to become refugees. The Soviet Union’s collapse three decades ago continues to drive millions of people across its former republics spanning Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Gulf oil boom brought millions of Palestinians and South Asian migrant laborers to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Migrants physically built some of today’s most modern states. To move and to build—this is the essence of being human.

移民让世界运转

Migrants make the world go round

许多人认为，保护主义、民粹主义和疫情意味着我们已经达到了移民高峰，但让我们看看经济情况。在过去的半个世纪中，各国政府借债高达 250 万亿美元（相当于全球 GDP 的三倍多），为从道路到退休计划的各个方面提供资金。尽管这为我们所知的现代文明付出了代价，但老龄化国家现在正面临着经济停滞的困境，除非它们能够吸引移民和投资者，以及它们带来的纳税活动。如果年轻一代无法使用家庭、学校、医院、办公室、餐馆、酒店、商场、博物馆、酒店、体育场和其他设施，许多国家将面临永久性通货紧缩的风险——无论是人口通货紧缩还是经济通货紧缩。

Many believe that protectionism, populism, and the pandemic mean we have reached peak migration, but let’s look at the economics. Over the past half century, governments have borrowed to the tune of $250 trillion (more than triple global GDP) to finance everything from roads to retirement plans. While this has paid for modern civilization as we know it, aging countries are now staring down the barrel of economic stagnation unless they attract migrants and investors, and the tax-paying activities they bring. Without younger generations to make use of homes, schools, hospitals, offices, restaurants, hotels, malls, museums, hotels, stadiums, and other facilities, many countries risk permanent deflation—both demographic and economic.

移民只占世界人口的一小部分，但他们的比重随着时间的推移而不断增加。到 19 世纪末，国际移民占人类总数的 14%，即 16 亿总人口中的约 2.25 亿。然后第一次世界大战和西班牙流感平息了这些浪潮。一个世纪后，我们的移民人数约为 2.75 亿，与数量大得多的人口（80 亿）相比，所占比例较低（3%）。因此，我们似乎还没有取得多大进展，但今天的数字实际上代表了更有意义的成就。为什么？因为与 19 世纪的移民（包括欧洲人和中国人的绝望逃亡）不同，以及英国殖民地臣民在帝国范围内的强制流动——今天，我们在近两百个主权国家中的人民大多是自愿流动的。此外，无论人数多少，今天的移民占全球 GDP 的 10%（略低于中国或美国），其中包括 2019 年每年跨境汇款近 5500 亿美元。（这个数字也使外国援助总额相形见绌，而外国援助总额仍然在自 1980 年以来每年停滞在 1000 亿美元左右。）

Migrants are a small share of the world population, but their weight has only grown over time. By the late nineteenth century, international migrants represented a sizable 14 percent of humanity, about 225 million out of a total population of 1.6 billion people. Then World War I and the Spanish flu flattened those waves. A century later, we stand at approximately 275 million migrants, a lower share (3 percent) of a much larger population (8 billion). It might therefore seem that we have not come very far, yet today’s figure in fact represents a far more meaningful accomplishment. Why? Because unlike nineteenth-century migration—comprised of the desperate exodus of Europeans and Chinese, as well as British colonial subjects forcibly circulated across the empire—today we have mostly voluntary movement of peoples among nearly two hundred sovereign nations. Furthermore, whatever their number, migrants today represent 10 percent of global GDP (slightly less than that of China or America), including almost $550 billion in annual remittances transferred across borders in 2019. (This figure also dwarfs total foreign aid, which has remained stagnant at around $100 billion per year since 1980.)

汇款的兴起

The Rise of Remittances

汇款与国际移民同步增长，而援助却停滞不前。由于金融危机和保护主义政策，外国直接投资（FDI）一直不稳定。

Remittances have been rising in lockstep with international migration, while aid has stagnated. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been volatile due to financial crises and protectionist policies.

不幸的是，人类跨越国界的过程比金钱要困难得多。各国对商品和资本的（相对）自由流动持开放态度，但对人却没有那么开放。移民是主权的主要、也是最敏感的领域之一：控制谁进出自己的领土。美国对寻求庇护者和连锁移民（尤其是拉丁裔家庭）实施了严格限制，澳大利亚在巴布亚新几内亚的丛林中设立了移民处理中心，这些中心已成为半永久性的拘留营。意大利和其他欧洲国家收买了利比亚民兵，以阻止移民穿越地中海。《世界人权宣言》并不保证任何人在另一个国家居住的权利——只有接受国才能决定这一点。

Unfortunately, humans have a much more difficult time moving across borders than money does. Countries have been open to the (relatively) free movement of goods and capital—but people, not as much. Migration is one of the primary, and most sensitive, arenas of sovereignty: controlling who comes in and out of one’s territory. The US has imposed significant restrictions on asylum seekers and chain migration (especially Latino families), and Australia has set up migrant processing centers in the jungles of Papua New Guinea that have become semipermanent holding camps. Italy and other European countries have paid off Libyan militias to keep migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights doesn’t guarantee anyone the right to reside in another country—only the receiving country decides that.

我们没有具有约束力的全球移民框架——而且可能永远不会。但人口流动存在根深蒂固的区域模式，这是由家族历史、商业需求和文化偏好决定的。美国一半的外国人是墨西哥人或拉丁裔；欧盟成员国在彼此国家享有几乎完全自由的移民和其他特权；东南亚的边界基本开放，大多数跨境移民来自该地区内部或来自中国和印度。我们使用“内部”和“外部”等术语来表示民族差异，但实际上，我们的世界已经是区域混合体的集合。

We do not have a binding global migration framework—and probably never will. But there are deeply rooted regional patterns in the flows of people, shaped by family histories, business needs, and cultural preferences. Half of all foreigners in America are Mexican or Latino; members of the European Union enjoy almost fully free migration and other privileges in one another’s country; Southeast Asia has largely open borders, and most cross-border migrants are from within the region or from China and India. We use terms like “insider” and “outsider” to denote national distinctions, but in reality, our world is already a collection of regional mélanges.

流动人口：区域性多于全球性

People on the Move: More Regional Than Global

大多数迁移发生在区域内或相邻区域之间。最大的移民群体仍然是前苏联加盟共和国、东欧和中亚，其次是海湾国家的南亚人口

Most migration takes place within regions or between adjacent regions. The largest migrant stock remains among the former Soviet republics of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, followed by the South Asian population in the Gulf countries

世界上最大的人口流动发生在这些有机区域内。横跨东欧和中亚的前苏联地区是最大的移民群体，有 2500 万人，其次是北美洲和中美洲周围的拉丁裔人口（2000 万）、非洲境内的撒哈拉以南非洲人（1500 万）、南美洲和南美洲的移民。前往海湾国家的亚洲人（1,500 万）、欧盟内的欧盟公民（1,200 万）、中东地区的阿拉伯人和北非人（1,000 万）、前往西欧的东欧人（1,000 万）、东盟内的东南亚人（协会）东南亚国家）集团（不到 10百万），最后是移居欧洲的不到 1000 万阿拉伯人和北非人。³这也表明人类分为“北”（北美和欧亚大陆）和“南”（非洲和南美洲）的两层划分仍然存在。五点五十亿人生活在前景良好的大陆上，而 25 亿人没有计划或机会逃离。大多数移民还没有走得很远。

The largest flows of people in the world are within these organic regions. The former Soviet Union region spanning Eastern Europe and Central Asia represents the biggest migrant pool at 25 million people, followed by the circulation of primarily Latinos around North and Central America (20 million), sub-Saharan Africans within Africa (15 million), South Asians to the Gulf countries (15 million), EU citizens within the EU (12 million), Arabs and North Africans within the Middle East (10 million), Eastern Europeans into Western Europe (10 million), Southeast Asians within their ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) group (just under 10 million), and lastly the fewer than 10 million Arabs and North Africans that have moved to Europe.³ This also suggests that the two-tiered division of humanity into “North” (North America and Eurasia) and “South” (Africa and South America) persists. Five point five billion people live on continents with reasonable prospects, while 2.5 billion don’t have a plan or opportunity to escape. Most migrants don’t make it very far—yet.

用脚投票

Voting with the feet

即将到来的大规模移民时代不仅是延续，而且是加速。当塑造我们人文地理的每一种力量聚集在一起时，人类的漩涡只会变得更加激烈：

The coming age of mass migrations won’t just be a continuation but an acceleration. The swirl of humanity will only get more intense as each of the forces shaping our human geography gathers steam:

• 人口统计：老龄化的北方和年轻的南方（能够提供北方所需的劳动力）之间的不平衡
• Demographics: Lopsided imbalances between an aging North and a youthful South able to provide the labor force the North needs
• 政治：来自内战和失败国家的难民和寻求庇护者，以及逃离种族迫害、暴政或民粹主义的人
• Politics: Refugees and asylum seekers from civil wars and failing states, as well as those fleeing ethnic persecution, tyranny, or populism
• 经济：寻找机会的移民、因外包而下岗的工人、或因金融危机而被迫提前退休的员工
• Economics: Migrants in search of opportunity, workers laid off due to outsourcing, or employees forced into early retirement by financial crises
• 技术：工业自动化取代工厂和物流工作，而算法和人工智能使熟练工作变得多余
• Technology: Industrial automation displacing factory and logistics jobs, while algorithms and AI make skilled jobs redundant
• 气候：气温和海平面上升以及地下水位下降等长期现象，还有洪水和台风等季节性灾害。
• Climate: Long-term phenomena such as rising temperatures and sea levels and falling water tables, but also seasonal disasters like floods and typhoons.

在世界各地的日常生活中，所有这些平行趋势相互放大，以至于我们甚至可以将它们的关系表述为一个等式：

In day to day life around the world, all these parallel trends amplify each other—so much so that we can even state their relationship as an equation:

×

×

=

=

这些变量还以复杂且不可预见的方式相互作用。大流行病在几年之内就消灭了数百万人，而气候变化则通过干旱和其他自然灾害累积起来。两者都会加剧经济和社会的不确定性，从而降低生育率。金融危机和劳动力自动化也是如此，这也迫使人们外出寻找工作和负担得起的生活。最重要的是，一切因素都会推动移民，无论是单独的还是共同的。

These variables also interact in complex and unforeseen ways. Pandemics wipe out millions of people within the span of a few years, while climate change does so cumulatively via droughts and other natural disasters. Both heighten economic and social uncertainty, which drives down fertility. So, too, do financial crises and labor automation, which also force people to move in search of jobs and an affordable life. The bottom line is that everything drives migration, alone and together.

Covid-19 大流行及其后果将强化这些先前存在的趋势。需要明确的是：冠状病毒封锁是近几十年来不断加强的重新安置的一个惊人突破——但这是人为的、暂时的。然而，它确实促使世界各地的人们重新思考他们的居住地点并开始寻找更好的选择。人们正在放弃医疗保健不足的“红区”，转向医疗系统更好的“绿区”和气候适应能力更强的“蓝区”。我们都在寻找纬度和态度的正确结合。

The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath will reinforce these pre-existing trends. To be clear: The coronavirus lockdown was a stunning break from recent decades of intensifying resettlement—but it was artificial and temporary. It did, however, prompt people everywhere to rethink where they live and begin looking for better options. People are ditching “red zones” with inadequate healthcare for “green zones” with better medical systems and “blue zones” offering greater climate resilience. We are all in search of the right combination of latitude and attitude.

人类流动性的未来只指向一个方向：更多。未来几十年可能会见证数十亿人的迁徙，从南方到北方，从沿海到内陆，从低洼地到高海拔地区，从价格过高到负担得起的社会，从失败的社会到稳定的社会。

The future of human mobility points in just one direction: more. The coming decades could witness billions of people on the move, shifting from south to north, from coast to inland, from low-lying to higher-elevation, from overpriced to affordable, from failing to stable societies.

毫无疑问，有数十亿人将在他们出生的国家死去。事实上，让我们假设超过一半的人口最多的国家都久坐、年老、体弱、不愿意或不受欢迎的人离开家乡。这意味着至少有 10 亿印度人、10 亿中国人、7 亿非洲人、2 亿巴西人、同样数量的印度尼西亚人、1 亿巴基斯坦人和另外 10 亿其他人在地理上仍然处于流动状态。仍有40 亿人可能渴望并有能力移民。

No doubt there are billions of people who will die in the countries in which they were born. Indeed, let’s assume that more than half of the most populous countries are too sedentary, old, infirm, unwilling, or unwelcome elsewhere to leave home. That means that at least 1 billion Indians, 1 billion Chinese, 700 million Africans, 200 million Brazilians, the same number of Indonesians, 100 million Pakistanis, and another 1 billion others remain geographically immobile. That still leaves 4 billion people who may be both eager and capable of migrating.

这 40 亿人几乎都是年轻人。世界上一半以上的人口是在冷战结束后的三十年里出生的。这包括大多数千禧一代（Y 世代）和所有 Z 世代。截至 2020 年，他们占世界人口的60%以上。我们经常谈论一个正在老龄化的世界，但现在的世界比老年人更年轻——从统计数据来看，人类老龄化的主要原因是当今的年轻人几乎没有孩子。因此，当我们谈论“人民”时，想象生活在郊区的雅皮士、中产阶级、两收入、两个孩子的家庭是错误的。但在美国、欧洲、中国或任何地方都不是这样。世界上最大的一类人最恰当的描述是年轻、单身、无儿无女，在城市里苦苦挣扎。如果你不是其中之一，那么你就是少数。

Almost all of those 4 billion are young. Just over half the world’s population was born in the three decades since the Cold War ended. This includes most millennials (Gen-Y) and all of Gen-Z. As of 2020, they represent more than 60 percent of the world population. We often talk about a world that’s aging, but right now, the world is more young than old—and the primary reason humanity is getting statistically older is because today’s youth are barely having any children. Thus, when we talk about “the people,” it’s wrong to envision yuppie, middle-class, two-income, two-child households living in suburbia. That isn’t true in America, Europe, China, or anywhere. The largest category of people in the world is best described as young, single, childless, and struggling in cities. If you are not one of them, you are in the minority.

而且，如果你不是亚洲人，那你绝对是少数。亚洲不仅占全球人口的 60%（而北美和欧洲的总人口仅占25%），而且几乎涵盖了世界上年轻人数量最多的所有国家。中国和印度的千禧一代人数都比美国或欧洲的人口还要多。近年来，大约三分之二的亚洲移民仍留在该地区，但随着西方人口失衡变得更加严重，全世界对亚洲人的需求将越来越大。目前，中国以外的中国人比印度以外的印度人还多，但这种情况很快就会发生逆转：中国的人口很快就会开始下降，而印度的人口则年轻得多，而且还在继续增长——整个南亚地区（包括巴基斯坦和孟加拉国）的人口也都在增长。比中国贫穷得多，但它的年轻人更愿意搬家。从地缘政治角度来看，世界似乎正在​​变成黄色，但从人口角度来看，毫无疑问它正在变成棕色。

Furthermore, if you are not Asian, you are definitely in the minority. Asia represents not only 60 percent of the global population (versus only 25 percent combined for North America and Europe), but also almost all of the countries with the largest number of young people in the world. China and India each have more millennials than America or Europe have people. In recent years, about two-thirds of Asian migrants have remained within the region, but as the West’s demographic imbalances become more acute, Asians will be in ever higher demand worldwide. There are presently more Chinese outside of China than Indians outside of India, but soon that will reverse: Whereas China’s population will soon begin to decline, India’s is much younger and continues to grow—and with all of South Asia (including Pakistan and Bangladesh) much poorer than China, its youth are much more motivated to move. Geopolitically, the world seems like it’s turning yellow, but demographically it’s unquestionably turning brown.

无论他们来自哪里，今天的年轻人都是人类历史上人数最多、身体和数字化程度最高的一代。他们要去哪里，他们如何生活，以及他们今天所做的事情揭示了明天什么样的社会、政治和经济模式将盛行，以及哪些模式将会失败。今天失去公民的国家明天可能就会衰落。相比之下，今天吸引年轻人的国家明天很可能会繁荣发展。

Wherever they hail from, today’s youth are the largest and most physically and digitally mobile generation in human history. Where they’re going, how they’re living, and what they’re doing today reveals what social, political, and economic models will prevail—and which ones will fail—tomorrow. Countries that are losing citizens today are likely to wither tomorrow. By contrast, countries gaining youth today may well thrive tomorrow.

未来三十年（从现在到 2050 年）对于今天30 岁以下的人来说会发生什么？他们将面临怎样的地缘政治、经济、技术、社会和环境环境？他们要去哪？哪些社会将成为二十一世纪的赢家和输家？这些以及我们这个时代的其他重大问题正在年轻人用脚投票的过程中得到解答。那么，要了解未来，我们必须跟随下一代进入其中。

What will the next three decades—between now and 2050—hold for those under the age of thirty today? What geopolitical, economic, technological, social, and environmental circumstances will they face? Where are they going? Which societies will be the winners and losers in the twenty-first century? These and other great questions of our time are being answered as young people vote with their feet. To know the future, then, we must follow the next generation into it.

手机的生存

Survival of the mobile

婴儿潮一代记得冷战时期的“世界末日时钟”，它警告即将发生的核毁灭；随着地缘政治紧张局势升级，科学家们将时间指针移近午夜。今天的年轻人对“气候时钟”更加熟悉，它会在地球温度上升达到两摄氏度时倒计时。正如气候活动家比尔·麦基本（Bill McKibben）所写，“现在阻止全球变暖为时已晚，但接下来的十年似乎可能是我们限制混乱的最后机会。” ⁴可以肯定的是，我们将无法限制混乱。罗伊·斯克兰顿等哲学家告诉我们，我们需要“学会死亡”。这同样不太可能。更有趣的问题是：我们要做什么才能生存？

Baby boomers remember the Cold War “Doomsday Clock” that warned of impending nuclear destruction; scientists moved the needle closer to midnight as geopolitical tensions escalated. Today’s youth are much more familiar with the “climate clock” that counts down to when the Earth’s temperature rise hits two degrees Celsius. As climate activist Bill McKibben has written, “It is far too late to stop global warming, but these next ten years seem as if they may be our last chance to limit the chaos.”⁴ It’s safe to assume we will fail to limit the chaos. Philosophers such as Roy Scranton tell us that we need to “learn to die.” That’s equally unlikely. The more interesting question becomes: What will we do to survive?

人类长期以来一直在寻找适宜的气候，沿着温带地区的河流和海岸线定居。随着我们学会了控制火灾、放牧动物、建造坚固的庇护所和抽取地下水，我们的传播范围更加广泛，城市成为工业时代人口和增长的所在地。但数十亿人的城市生活所需的大量资源消耗导致碳排放量猛增、气温升高、冰雪融化创纪录，使地球上越来越多的地区变得不适宜居住。

Mankind has long been on the move in search of the right climate, settling along rivers and coastlines in the temperate latitudes. As we learned to control fire, herd animals, build sturdy shelters, and pump groundwater, we spread more widely, with cities becoming the locus of populations and growth in the industrial era. But the intense resource consumption required to fuel urban life for billions of people has caused skyrocketing carbon emissions, scorching temperatures, and record ice melt, rendering ever more swaths of the Earth unlivable.

有很多方法可以抵御炎热并远离大海，但没有淡水就无法生存。尼罗河、底格里斯河、印度河和黄河流域的古代文明都是建立在灌溉之上的。如今，世界三分之二的人口居住在河流附近，农业消耗了 70% 的淡水。但随着地下水枯竭加速和降雨量减少，河流正在干涸。从巴西到非洲再到印度，农民已经年复一年面临农作物歉收的问题。那些与自己的土地息息相关的人背负着巨额的代际债务，要么自杀，要么逃往城市，要么加入非法跨境移民的行列。一个无雨季节或一周“零日”缺水就足以促使农民和城市居民追逐更肥沃、水份充足的土地。

There are many ways to beat the heat and retreat from the sea—but no survival is possible without freshwater. Ancient civilizations of the Nile, Tigris, Indus, and Yellow River valleys were built on irrigation. Today two-thirds of the world’s population lives near rivers, and agriculture consumes 70 percent of our freshwater. But with groundwater depletion accelerating and rainfall declining, rivers are drying up. Farmers from Brazil to Africa to India already face crop failure year after year. Those who are bonded to their land amass huge generational debts, commit suicide, flee to cities, or join the hordes illegally migrating across borders. One season without rain or one week of “zero day” water shortages is all it takes to push farmers and city dwellers to chase more fertile and hydrated lands.

全球水资源压力日益加剧

Rising Water Stress Across the Planet

预计未来二十年世界上几乎所有地区的淡水供应量都会下降。中东和北非以及美国南部和澳大利亚东部将是受影响最严重的地区。

Freshwater availability is projected to decline in almost all regions of the world over the coming two decades. The Middle East and North Africa, as well as the southern United States and eastern Australia, will be among the most affected geographies.

“人类世”一词（韦伯斯特将其定义为“人类活动对地球产生环境影响的时期，被视为构成一个独特的地质时代”）最初给了我们一种对环境进行控制的错误感觉，但现在我们看到它意味着一个自我毁灭的反馈循环。^II即使立即实施一些当今最雄心勃勃的建议——停止所有燃煤发电；用核能、氢能、风能和太阳能替代化石能源；在俄罗斯、加拿大、澳大利亚、巴西和美国种植 1 万亿棵树——大气中已经积累的温室气体可能对地球生命产生比迄今为止更严重的影响。对于数十亿人来说，留在原地意味着不可避免的自杀。仅仅三个世纪以来，政治主权一直是我们地理的一个决定性特征，但我们的海平面将在接下来的几个世纪里不断上升。问问自己哪种力量会让步。

The term “Anthropocene” (defined by Webster as “the period of time during which human activities have had an environmental impact on the Earth regarded as constituting a distinct geological age”) initially gave us a false sense of control over the environment, but now we see that it signifies a self-destructive feedback loop.^II Even if some of today’s most ambitious proposals are undertaken immediately—stopping all coal-powered electricity generation; replacing fossil with nuclear, hydrogen, wind, and solar power; and planting 1 trillion trees across Russia, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and America—greenhouse gases already accumulated in the atmosphere may have an even more severe impact on planetary life than they have had to date. For billions of people, staying put means inevitable suicide. Political sovereignty has been a defining feature of our geography for only three centuries—but our seas will be rising for the next several centuries. Ask yourself which force will give way.

气候并不关心我们的政治界限，人们也会更加强烈地要求克服这些界限。气候压力导致移民激增。如今，5000 万气候难民的数量已经超过了政治难民的数量。据美国国家科学院称，气温再升高一度可能会使 2 亿人脱离他们已经习惯的“气候生态位”。⁵再进一步超出这个范围可能意味着小数点位置进一步移动，使 10 亿或更多的人类变成气候难民。

The climate doesn’t care about our political boundaries, and people too will clamor ever more to overcome them. Climate stresses cause migrant swells. The 50 million climate refugees today already outnumber political ones. According to the National Academy of Sciences, another degree of temperature rise could push 200 million people out of the “climate niche” to which they have become accustomed.⁵ And a further degree beyond that could mean the decimal place moves one further, turning 1 billion or more of humanity into climate refugees.

热起来的速度有多快？

How Fast Will It Get Hot?

随着气温上升，人类居住的最佳地理位置正在发生变化。到2070年或更早，黑色地区的日平均气温将超过30摄氏度，不再适合人类居住。随着时间的推移，浅色阴影区域将变得更适合定居。

The optimal geographies for human habitation are shifting as temperatures rise. Regions in black will have average daily temperatures above thirty degrees Celsius and become unsuitable for human habitation by 2070 or sooner. Lighter shaded regions will become more suitable for settlement over time.

减轻气候变化的影响似乎不再可行，很少有人会等到最坏的情况发生才放弃他们称之为家的地方。相反，我们必须关注适应——对于大多数人来说，适应就意味着移动。可怜的中美洲农民在飓风中失去了一切，非洲人则被飓风消灭了。干旱只会带走剩下的东西并向北移动。当富人在森林火灾中失去房屋或在台风中失去游艇时，他们会投资于更远的内陆和更高海拔的土地和掩体，或者在挪威和新西兰。无论富裕还是贫穷，越来越多的人像我们的远古祖先一样，追逐气候利基市场。

Mitigating the effects of climate change no longer appears plausible, and few will wait until the worst case scenarios come true to abandon wherever they have called home. We must focus instead on adaptation—and for most people, to adapt will mean to move. Poor Central American farmers who lose everything in a cyclone and Africans wiped out by drought will simply take what’s left and move north. As the rich lose a home in a forest fire or a yacht in a typhoon, they invest in land and bunkers farther inland and at higher elevations, or in Norway and New Zealand. Whether rich or poor, ever more people are, like our ancient ancestors, chasing the climate niche.

逃离机器人

Running from the robots

虽然气候变化迫使我们远离传统的栖息地，但机器人却正在将我们从我们曾经熟悉的稳定工作中赶走。外包和自动化已经摧毁了美国的产业工人，迫使他们搬到更便宜的地方寻找新的工作。亚洲工人是供应链转移的受益者，但如今没有哪个国家比中国在工业机器人方面的投资更多，导致数以千万计的中国工人陷入无根的职业生涯。

While climate change drives us away from our traditional habitats, robots are chasing us away from the stable jobs we once knew. Outsourcing and automation have already devastated America’s industrial workers, forcing them to move to cheaper places in search of new jobs. Asian workers were the beneficiaries of supply chain shifts, but today no country is investing more in ramping up industrial robotics than China, pushing tens of millions of Chinese workers into the rootless gigonomy.

随着公司寻求减少对弱势人类的依赖，Covid-19 将加速全球自动化工作。在美国，多达 300 万卡车司机可能会因为自动驾驶汽车而失业，200 万房地产经纪人可能会因为房地产科技应用程序而失业。亚马逊的仓库最终将实现无人管理。新冠封锁期间的无名英雄是在农场和肉类加工厂劳动的无证移民，但他们不会得到奖励：他们将被可以压碎杂草、播种和采摘农作物的机器自动化。拉丁裔农场工人不妨前往加拿大帮助扩大那里的农业，罗马尼亚人也可以前往俄罗斯。

Covid-19 will accelerate automation efforts worldwide as companies seek to reduce dependence on vulnerable humans. In the US, up to 3 million truck drivers could lose their jobs to autonomous vehicles, and 2 million real estate agents to proptech apps. Amazon’s warehouses will eventually manage themselves without people. The unsung heroes of the Covid lockdown were undocumented migrants laboring on farms and in meat processing plants, but they won’t be rewarded: They will be automated by machines that can crush weeds, plant seeds, and pick crops. Latino farmhands might as well move on to Canada to help expand farming there, and Romanians to Russia.

在今天的年轻人加入劳动力市场之前，当前的许多创造就业机会的引擎就会被消灭。当所有这些都已经完成时，再渴望安装 5G 电信网络或太阳能电池板是没有意义的。从教育到酒店业再到零售业等其他主要行业尚未进行数字化改革，但它们终将进行。一项估计表明，至少 3.75 亿人将不得不转换“职业类别”由于人工智能和自动化。他们的新工作地点会在旧工作地点吗？不见得。

Many current job creation engines will be wiped out before today’s youth even join the labor market. There’s no point in aspiring to install 5G telecom networks or solar panels when all of that will have been done already. Other major sectors, from education to hospitality to retail, have yet to be digitally overhauled—but they will be. One estimate suggests that at least 375 million people will have to switch “occupational categories” due to artificial intelligence and automation. Will their new job be located where their old one was? Not likely.

与机器的竞赛是最富有者的生存。编码员、工程师和其他拥有顶级技能的人通过设计机器人和算法来保持领先地位，而贫穷的工人则充当制造、物流或零售机械中的齿轮，直到他们被抛弃。与此同时，年轻人也不想像机器人一样工作。在法国，乡村面包店正在被半自动化杂货店甚至法棍面包自动售货机所取代。无论如何，年轻人对凌晨 3 点起床烤面包不感兴趣，所以他们搬家了。

The race against the machines is survival of the richest. Coders, engineers, and others with top-tier skills stay ahead of robots and algorithms by designing them, while poor workers serve as cogs in the manufacturing, logistics, or retail machinery until they become disposable. At the same time, young people don’t want to work like robots either. In France, village bakeries are being replaced by semi-automated grocery stores and even baguette vending machines. Youth aren’t interested in waking up at 3 a.m. to bake bread anyway, so they move.

如果各国对企业机器人征税并重新分配利润，它们就可以成为更加公平的福利国家，而无需增加人口。然而，今天，可以想象，只有德国和日本能够鼓起政治意愿采取这一举措，而它们的公司又不会急于外包。不管怎样，它们仍然是移民的磁石，因为它们提供金融、媒体、教育、科技、医药、物流、娱乐、零售和其他职业的就业机会。根据小企业管理局 (SBA) 的数据，这些行业增长的美国州与人口增长的州相同：北卡罗来纳州、俄勒冈州、华盛顿州、弗吉尼亚州、佐治亚州、犹他州、科罗拉多州、加利福尼亚州和德克萨斯州。⁶教训很明确：跟随人民。

If countries tax corporate robots and redistribute profits, they can become more equitable welfare states without needing larger populations. Today, however, only Germany and Japan could conceivably muster the political will for such a move without their companies rushing to outsource. Either way, they remain migration magnets because they offer jobs in finance, media, education, tech, medicine, logistics, entertainment, retail, and other professions. According to the Small Business Administration (SBA), US states where these sectors are growing are the same states where populations are growing: North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, Virginia, Georgia, Utah, Colorado, California, and Texas.⁶ The lesson is clear: Follow the people.

量子未来

A quantum future

在过去的二十年里，数以百万计的美国人放弃了密歇根州、宾夕法尼亚州、俄亥俄州和其他北部各州的铁锈地带，最后几乎默认来到了加利福尼亚州。然而，自 2015 年以来，加利福尼亚州的居民不断流失，尤其是流向税收较低的德克萨斯州和亚利桑那州。然而，整个美国西南部正遭受着愈演愈烈的热浪、水资源短缺和不稳定的移民政策的困扰。尽管拉斯维加斯、菲尼克斯和图森很受欢迎，但美国大片的沙漠地区可能需要被遗弃——而那些逃离五大湖的人很可能会比他们想象的更早返回。

Over the past two decades, millions of Americans who abandoned rust-belt districts of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other northern states wound up in California, almost by default. Since 2015, however, California has been losing residents, especially to lower-tax Texas and Arizona. Yet the entire southwestern US is suffering from intensifying heat waves, water shortages, and volatile immigration policy. Despite the popularity of Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Tucson, large tracts of America’s desert regions might need to be deserted—and those who fled the Great Lakes may well return sooner than they think.

回到起点似乎是一种毫无意义的循环。然而在一定的时间范围内，我们可以设计其背后的逻辑。再举个例子：英国 2016 年的脱欧决定将商业和投资推离该国，英国人才将他们的技能和资金带到加拿大、葡萄牙、荷兰、瑞士、瑞典和其他六个国家。但英国拥有受过教育的人口、庞大的经济、充足的淡水，随着气候变化的加速，英国的表现将比大多数国家好得多。因此，尽管英国脱欧，那些被英国脱欧推迟的人最终可能会回来，以及明智的政府招募的新一波移民。

To end up where one started seems a pointless circularity. And yet over a certain time horizon, we can engineer the logic behind it. Take another example: The UK’s 2016 Brexit decision pushed business and investment away from the country, with British talent taking their skills and money to Canada, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and a half-dozen other countries. But Britain has an educated population, a large economy, ample freshwater, and will fare far better than most places as climate change accelerates. So those that Brexit pushed away may eventually return despite Brexit—along with a new wave of migrants recruited by a wiser government.

人文地理学变得越来越模糊。当人们发现自己经常在移动时，我们正在经历一种相变，就像物质从固体转变为液体再到气体时一样：分子相互加热并松开，振动更快。人们甚至可能会说，人类正变得像量子物理学中的粒子，它们的速度和位置总是在变化。如果能回到某种表面上的稳定状态就好了，但这并不是量子世界的运作方式。相反，当今世界的复杂性使得在任何地方永久定居变得越来越困难。高薪数字游牧民和拥有多本护照的亿万富翁，以及菲律宾女佣和印度建筑工人等移民下层阶级，都是全球多样化且不断增长的量子人口的一部分。

Human geography is getting fuzzy. As people find themselves regularly on the move, we are experiencing a phase shift like when matter transitions from solid to liquid to gas: molecules heat up and loosen from one another, vibrating more rapidly. One might even say that humans are becoming like particles in quantum physics, their velocity and location always in flux. It would be nice to return to some semblance of stability, but that’s not how things work in a quantum world. Instead, the complexity of today’s world makes it increasingly difficult to settle permanently anywhere. Highly paid digital nomads and billionaires with multiple passports as well as the migratory underclass of Filipino maids and Indian construction workers are all part of the diverse and growing global demographic of quantum people.

我们也没有理由相信政治难民和寻求庇护者的浪潮将会停止，但有更多的理由表明这种趋势将会持续下去。在非洲、中东和亚洲部分地区的后殖民景观中，国家几乎从诞生之日起就开始因人口过剩和腐败而衰落。近几十年来，多次伊拉克战争和阿拉伯之春已将数百万阿拉伯人从北非、叙利亚、约旦、土耳其，以及最近的欧洲推向别处——或许再也没有回到那些在海外支离破碎的祖国。认出。正如保罗·萨洛佩克 (Paul Salopek) 2019 年在《国家地理》中所写，“如今，有超过 10 亿难民和移民在国内和跨境流动，逃离大规模暴力和贫困。这是人类历史上最大规模的无根浪潮。” ⁷

There’s also no reason to believe that the rising tide of political refugees and asylum seekers will stop—but plenty more reasons suggesting it will continue. Across the postcolonial landscape of Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia, nations began to decay from overpopulation and corruption almost as soon as they were born. In recent decades, the multiple Iraq wars and the Arab Spring have pushed millions of Arabs from North Africa to Syria into Jordan, Turkey, and most recently Europe—perhaps never to return to the home nations that have been shattered beyond recognition. As Paul Salopek wrote in National Geographic in 2019, “More than a billion refugees and migrants are on the move today, both within countries and across borders, fleeing mass violence and poverty. This is the largest tide of rootlessness in human history.”⁷

“难民”一词意味着狭隘和短暂的群体，但我们拥有的是半永久性重新安置的人，例如邻国的叙利亚人、约旦的巴勒斯坦人、巴基斯坦的阿富汗人和肯尼亚的索马里人。在土耳其，近400万叙利亚人持有“临时保护身份”，但实际上可能永远不会离开。与此同时，他们始终面临着被驱逐出境的风险，作为迫使欧洲让步的讨价还价筹码——就像土耳其在 2020 年向希腊发起另一波浪潮时所做的那样。这些难民定期在土耳其境内转移，这意味着他们的永久流动会迈出更多的一步——对于那些被驱逐出境的人来说，又是一步。对于数千万难民、寻求庇护者和无证移民来说，几乎没有什么安全的选择。过去十年，美国已将数百万墨西哥人和中美洲人赶回边境，西班牙继续驱逐北非人，随着冠状病毒的爆发，中国将缅甸移民驱逐回缅甸。他们以为自己已经成功了——直到他们被迫再次搬家。

The term “refugee” implies a narrow and transient group, but what we have is semipermanently resettled people, such as Syrians in neighboring states, Palestinians in Jordan, Afghans in Pakistan, and Somalis in Kenya. In Turkey, nearly 4 million Syrians hold “temporary protected status” but in reality may never leave. At the same time, they’re always at risk of being deported as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from Europe—as Turkey did in 2020 in pushing another wave toward Greece. These refugees regularly shift within Turkey, meaning more steps in their perpetual movement—and for those who are deported, yet one more. There are few safe bets for tens of millions of refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants. The US has pushed several million Mexican and Central Americans back across the border over the past decade, Spain continues to expel North Africans, and China booted Burmese migrants back into Myanmar as the coronavirus struck. They thought they had made it—until they were forced to move again.

在拉丁美洲、非洲和南亚的大城市，暴力和资源压力是日常生活中的现实。当今发展最快的城市不是中国超现代化的大湾区，而是拉各斯、卡拉奇、开罗、达卡、马尼拉、伊斯坦布尔、雅加达、孟买、加尔各答、圣保罗和曼谷等城市，其中大多数城市的排名低得令人担忧。气候适应能力。这些城市和其他大城市的巨大贫民窟居住着大约 15 亿人。回收集装箱或补贴 3D 打印住房、提供流动医疗诊所、在城市农业中创造就业机会以及安装太阳能电池板的城市可能会安抚贫困的下层阶级。但此类举措仍然少之又少。在未来十年中，我们要么会看到此类创新的规模，要么会见证针对边缘化和压迫的大规模反抗。距离资源较近、海拔较高。会是哪一个呢？答案是：三者皆有。

Violence and resource stress are daily facts of life in the teeming megacities of Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Today’s fastest growing cities are not those in China’s hyper-modern Greater Bay Area but cities such as Lagos, Karachi, Cairo, Dhaka, Manila, Istanbul, Jakarta, Mumbai, Kolkata, São Paulo, and Bangkok—most of which rank worryingly low in climate resilience. The vast slums in these and other megacities are home to an estimated 1.5 billion people. Cities that recycle shipping containers or subsidize 3D-printed housing, offer mobile health clinics, and create jobs in urban farming and installing solar panels may pacify the poor underclass. But such initiatives are still few and far between. In the coming decade, we will either see such innovations scale or we will witness large-scale revolt against marginalization and oppression. There is also a third scenario—mass exodus—as people flee to towns closer to resources and at higher elevation. Which will it be? The answer is: all three.

我们如何知道未来几年哪些地方会增加或失去人员？有些地方对他们不利：年轻人太少、政治不稳定、经济缺乏竞争力、生态脆弱。这些是人们想要逃离的地方。另一方面，有些地方拥有一切优势：强劲的人口、稳定的政治、繁荣的经济和环境稳定。这些都是每个人都想去的地方。问题是：我们今天如何描述一个国家，明天可能就不正确了。那么多新人到来，哪个地方能保证稳定？它本身的欲望可能很快就会破坏它的稳定。有些人认为这种情况已经在欧洲和美国发生过；加拿大可能是下一个。

How do we know which places will gain or lose people in the years ahead? Some places have every strike against them: They have too few young people, are politically volatile, economically uncompetitive, and ecologically vulnerable. These are the places from which people want to flee. At the other end of the spectrum are places that have it all going for them: robust demographics, stable politics, prospering economies, and environmental stability. Those are the places everyone wants to go to. The catch is: How we would describe one country today may not be true tomorrow. What place can be sure of its stability when so many newcomers arrive? Its own desirability could quickly destabilize it. This is what some feel has already happened to Europe and America; Canada could be next.

但不可预测性并不是停滞不前的理由。相反，这正是为什么这么多人一开始就搬家，并发现自己一次又一次搬家的原因。流动性是我们对不确定性的反应：逃离我们无法对抗的事物。未来是一个不断变化的目标——我们也是如此。

But unpredictability is no reason to stand still. On the contrary, it’s precisely why so many people move in the first place—and find themselves moving again and again. Mobility is our response to uncertainty: flight from what we cannot fight. The future is a moving target—and so are we.

一种未来，四种场景

One Future, Four Scenarios

我不是那种爱做白日梦的人，但有时在长途徒步旅行中，我会陷入轻微的恍惚状态。我的脑海中浮现出一个世界的愿景，在这个世界中，全球不同的社区自由、和平地联系和交流，人们可以随意流通。可悲的是，今天我们距离这个梦想还很遥远。目前，我们的人文地理学的出现更多的是出于偶然而不是设计。这让我们别无选择，只能构建一系列场景来展示未来几年移动性、权威、技术和社区的结合将如何展开。

I’m not the daydreaming type, but sometimes during a long hike, I fall into a light trance. My mind slips into visions of a world in which disparate communities across the globe freely and peacefully connect and exchange, and people circulate as they please. Sadly, we are a long way from that dream today. At the moment, our human geography is emerging more by accident than design. That leaves us little choice but to build a range of scenarios for how the combinations of mobility, authority, technology, and community will unfold in the years ahead.

这里描述的四种情景代表了我们对未来沿着移民和可持续发展轴心展开的不同愿景。

The four scenarios depicted here represent divergent visions for our future playing out along the axes of migration and sustainability.

世界将走哪条路？

Which Path Will the World Take?

未来的四种情景。所有这些都可能在世界不同地区同时上演。

Four scenarios for the future. All are likely to play out simultaneously in different parts of the world.

左上角的“地区堡垒”最接近当今的现状。清洁能源投资正在增加，但移民数量有限。北方富裕国家更注重自身的气候适应能力，而不是支持贫困地区。他们有选择地在贫困地区推广可持续农业或其他生存措施，但主要是为了贿赂人民远离他们。北美、欧洲和东北亚逐渐陷入相互作用有限的自给自足的系统，尽管它们可能会在必要时进行协调以限制来自南方的入侵。他们也可能像乔治·奥威尔的《1984》中那样互相争斗。

In the upper left, “Regional Fortresses” most closely resembles today’s status quo. Clean energy investments are ramping up, but migration is limited. The rich countries of the North are far more focused on their own climate resilience than supporting deprived regions. They selectively promote sustainable farming or other survival measures in impoverished regions, but mostly to bribe their people to stay away. North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia drift into self-contained systems with limited interactions, though they may coordinate where necessary to limit encroachment from the South. They could also be at perpetual war with one another as in George Orwell’s 1984.

另一种低移民情景预示着更加分裂的“新中世纪”的出现。在这种情况下，可持续性投资被放弃，军队从本国公民或跨境强行夺取水和能源。自然灾害的浪潮人为的生态灭绝导致世界上大部分人口死亡。那些留下来的人聚集在封建城市地区，形成类似于中世纪汉萨同盟的联盟。从《饥饿游戏》到《疯狂的麦克斯》，无数电影都捕捉到了这一景观。（加入杀手机器人，你就会得到终结者。）

Another low-migration scenario portends the emergence of a “New Middle Ages” of even greater fragmentation. In this scenario, sustainability investments are abandoned and militaries forcibly seize water and energy resources from their own citizens or across borders. Waves of natural disasters and man-made ecocides kill off large portions of the world population. Those that remain converge upon feudal city-regions that form alliances akin to the medieval Hanseatic League. This landscape has been captured in countless films, from Hunger Games to Mad Max. (Throw in killer robots and you get Terminator.)

在这两种低移民情况下，世界人口作为一个整体显然并没有变得更好。在一个区域堡垒遍布的世界里，气候变化的破坏性可能较小，但即使有大量机器人取代了外国劳动力，我们也可能缺乏振兴我们的社会和过上更便利的生活所需的年轻工人。如果我们进入一个新的中世纪，那么世界将远小于各个部分的总和，并且可能走上人类灭绝的快车道。

In both these low-migration scenarios, the world population as a whole is clearly not better off. Climate change may be less devastating in a world of regional fortresses, but even with lots of robots supplanting foreign labor, we may lack the young workers needed to rejuvenate our societies and lead a more convenient life. If we’re headed into a new Middle Ages, then the world will be much less than the sum of its parts—and potentially on the fast track to human extinction.

转到右下象限，我们发现一个同样无法协调可持续发展努力的世界，但“门口的野蛮人”却多得多。气候变化对全球经济造成严重破坏，流域地区爆发“水战”，大量移民强行进入宜居地区，大量涌入破坏了栖息地。与此同时，富人为自己和家人购买气候绿洲区，在周围筑起武装护城河。科幻灾难片《后天》也许最好地捕捉到了政治和气候混乱的结合。

Moving to the bottom-right quadrant, we find a world similarly unable to coordinate sustainability efforts but with far more “Barbarians at the Gate.” Climate change wreaks havoc on the global economy, “water wars” break out over watershed regions, and masses of migrants force their way into livable regions, their overwhelming influx ruining habitats. At the same time, the rich buy up climate oasis zones for themselves and their dependents, building armed moats around them. The sci-fi disaster film The Day After Tomorrow perhaps best captures this combination of political and climatic chaos.

只有一种情景“北极光”涉及大规模人类重新安置和环境再生的预先规划。经济体迅速转向碳中和能源，大片跨国融资和治理区域（主要在北半球）吸收了数十亿移民，大量投资也致力于恢复南半球。世界既实现了资源效率，又实现了有管理的文化同化。目前还没有关于此场景的电影拍摄。我们必须写剧本。

Only one scenario, “Northern Lights,” involves advanced planning for large-scale human resettlement and environmental regeneration. Economies move rapidly toward carbon-neutral energy, vast tracts of transnationally financed and governed zones (mostly in the northern hemisphere) absorb billions of migrants, and large investments are also devoted to rehabilitating the southern hemisphere. The world achieves both resource efficiency as well as managed cultural assimilation. No movie has yet been made about this scenario. We will have to write the script.

到达北极光世界的途径和阶段可能是什么？第一阶段，今天的民粹主义和大流行限制可能将移民限制在国家和地区层面。但十年之内，随着经济复苏和婴儿潮一代退休，劳动力短缺将进一步恶化，对移民更友好的年轻一代领导人可能会掌舵。与此同时，气候影响可能会更加严重，加剧了移民重新安置和政府部署移民开垦宜居土地的需要。将开展认真的地球工程工作，以限制 CO ₂排放和太阳辐射，并加强受灾地区的生态。最终，我们很可能稳定环境并安全地重新在地球上繁衍。

What might be the pathways and stages for getting to a Northern Lights world? In the first phase, today’s populism and pandemic restrictions may limit migration to the national and regional level. But within a decade, as economies recover and baby boomers retire, labor shortages will worsen and a younger generation of more migrant-friendly leaders could take the helm. At the same time, climate effects may kick in even more severely, compounding the need for migrants to relocate and governments to deploy them to cultivate habitable terrain. Serious geoengineering efforts will get underway to limit CO₂ emissions and solar radiation, as well as fortify the ecology of devastated regions. Eventually, we might well stabilize the environment and safely repopulate the Earth.

但未来不会让我们有幸走一条简洁、可预测的道路。合理的情景从来都不是相互排斥的；现实是一条曲折的道路，不可否认的是，所有四种愿景的要素都存在。例如，环境恢复可以通过北极光场景中的有意识规划来实现，也可以通过新中世纪的大规模死亡来实现。一定程度的创新、碎片化和不平等遍及所有场景。

But the future won’t give us the luxury of following one neat, predictable path. Plausible scenarios are never mutually exclusive; reality takes a zigzagging path, with elements of all four visions undeniably present. For example, environmental restoration may occur through conscious planning in a Northern Lights scenario but also via mass death in the New Middle Ages. Some degree of innovation, fragmentation, and inequality pervades all scenarios.

重要的是，我们绝不能认为如此多的变量的碰撞会均匀地发挥作用，无论是在地理上还是在时间上——这就是为什么当不同的地方在这些场景中蹒跚而行时，我们开始寻找更好的生活。事实上，在美国这样一个幅员辽阔的国家内，人们可以很容易地想象所有四种情景的要素在不同地区、不同时间发生。这就引出了一个问题：我们能否继续依靠“国家”作为我们未来的支柱。哪个更重要：地方还是人？

Importantly, we must never think that the collision of so many variables will play out evenly, either geographically or chronologically—which is why, as disparate places lurch across these scenarios, we move in search of a better life. Indeed, within a single vast country such as America, one can easily imagine elements of all four scenarios coming to pass in different regions at different times. This begs the question as to whether we can continue to rely on “the nation” as the anchor of our future. What matters more: places or people?

我。城市和地区之间的工资差距继续扩大，目前核心城市的工资差距约为1.5倍。William Gbohoui 等人，“国家不平等地图”，国际货币基金组织博客，2019 年 11 月 6 日。

I. The gap between wages of people in cities and regions continues to grow and now stands at about 1.5 times higher in core cities. William Gbohoui et al., “A Map of Inequality in Countries,” International Monetary Fund Blog, November 6, 2019.

二．乔治城环境历史学家 JR 麦克尼尔系统地记录了人-技术-自然关系的“巨大加速”。

II. Georgetown environmental historian J. R. McNeill has methodically documented this “great acceleration” of the man-technology-nature nexus.

第2章青年人才争夺战

CHAPTER 2 THE WAR FOR YOUNG TALENT

欢迎来到“人性巅峰”

Welcome to “peak humanity”

1975 年 10 月 16 日，国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格向杰拉尔德·福特总统提交了一份备忘录，寻求批准 NSSM-200：“全球人口增长对美国安全和海外利益的影响”。该提案呼吁印度、巴基斯坦、孟加拉国、尼日利亚、埃塞俄比亚、印度尼西亚、墨西哥和巴西等十几个国家加强对计划生育和其他人口控制措施的支持。白宫希望到 2050 年将世界人口控制在 60 亿，“不会出现大规模饥饿，也不会导致发展希望完全落空”。这些国家显然从未收到这份备忘录。当世界人口确实达到 60 亿时（1995 年），联合国仍然预测几乎永远增长到150亿。

On October 16, 1975, national security advisor Henry Kissinger presented a memo to President Gerald Ford seeking approval for NSSM-200: “Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests.” The proposal called for enhanced support for family planning and other population control measures in a dozen countries, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil. The White House hoped to steer the world population to 6 billion by 2050, “without massive starvation or total frustration of developmental hopes.” Those countries clearly never got the memo. When the world population did reach 6 billion (in 1995), the United Nations still forecast nearly perpetual growth toward 15 billion.

然而今天，前景有所不同。我们现在可以满怀信心地预见，世界人口最早可能在 2045 年达到峰值，而且可能永远不会达到 90 亿。我们怎么会失算得如此严重？答案是我们错了，因为我们是对的：关于人口过剩造成的经济和生态危险的警告促使高生育率的贫穷国家采取措施遏制人口的急剧增长。要不是为了按照这个反馈循环，世界人口可能已经突破100亿。

Today, however, the outlook is different. We can now foresee with confidence that the world population may peak as soon as 2045 and perhaps never reach 9 billion. How could we have miscalculated so badly? The answer is that we were wrong because we were right: Warnings about the economic and ecological perils of overpopulation are what prompted poor countries with high fertility to take measures to curb their breakneck population growth. Were it not for this feedback loop, world population may already have crossed 10 billion.

即使达到 90 亿，实际上也取决于对非洲尼日利亚、埃塞俄比亚、乌干达、坦桑尼亚、刚果和埃及以及亚洲印度、巴基斯坦和印度尼西亚等高度肥沃国家人口持续爆炸的可能错误预测。相反，快速的城市化、女性赋权和水资源枯竭肯定会影响这些地方的计划生育。发展中国家的父母过去常常认为生养更多孩子是对未来劳动力的良好投资。如今，它只会造成更多的失业。

Even getting to 9 billion actually hinges on what are likely erroneous predictions of a continued population explosion in highly fertile countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Congo, and Egypt in Africa, and India, Pakistan, and Indonesia in Asia. Instead, rapid urbanization, female empowerment, and depleting water supplies will surely impact family planning in those places. Parents in developing countries used to consider having more children a good investment in the future labor force. Today, it just creates more unemployment.

人性巅峰

Peak Humanity

世界人口已接近顶峰并将开始下降。唯一的问题是多快。

The world population is nearing its zenith and will begin to decline. The only question is how quickly.

我们还能如何解释我们的生殖焦虑呢？马尔萨斯担心人口增长超过粮食供应，但如今世界人口约有 30%肥胖，只有 13% 营养不良。这是人类成为其自身成功的受害者的一个迹象。金钱也是抑制生育的一个主要因素。自2008年金融危机以来，稳定已被焦虑所取代。在美国，出生率在危机爆发之前的五年里一直略有上升，但危机之后出生率急剧下降。事实上，自危机以来的十多年里，整个世界，无论贫富，生育率都显着下降。¹截至 2020 年，全球 65 岁及以上的人口数量多于 5 岁及以下的儿童数量。矛盾的是，较高的预期寿命也会导致生育率下降：既然我们有意识地操纵我们的生物学，我们就必须节省更多的钱，以便在更长、更积极的生活中照顾自己。

How else can we explain our reproductive anxiety? Malthus feared population growth outstripping food supply, but today about 30 percent of the world population is obese, and only 13 percent malnourished. This is one sign that humankind is a victim of its own success. Money is also a major factor inhibiting fertility. Since the 2008 financial crisis, stability has given way to angst. In America, birth rates had been rising slightly for five years until the crisis, after which they plummeted. In fact, the entire world—rich and poor—saw fertility rates decline markedly in the decade plus since the crisis.¹ Globally, as of 2020, there are more human beings aged sixty-five and older than there are children aged five and younger. Higher life expectancy also paradoxically contributes to declining fertility: Now that we consciously manipulate our biology, we must save more money to take care of ourselves during longer and more active lives.

除了长寿和金钱之外，还有道德困境。即使是有能力生更多孩子的千禧一代也倾向于认同后物质主义价值观——其中最重要的是对气候的关注。Z世代对如何应对地球的脆弱性怀有一种自觉的负罪感：他们更关心文明的生存，而不是生养孩子。对于很多人来说，生孩子不仅是这是一种经济上的奢侈，但考虑到孩子出生的环境不稳定以及每个新人类对我们脆弱的生态系统造成的损害，被认为是不道德的。网上流传的一份流行信息图显示，少一个孩子比没有汽车、避免长途飞行和转向植物性饮食三者相结合可以减少更多的 CO ₂排放。在一个日益世俗化的世界，或者在信徒中生态意识超越任何宗教的世界，大多数年轻人不相信他们结婚生子是上帝的旨意。

In addition to longevity and money, there are ethical dilemmas. Even millennials who could afford to have more children tend to subscribe to postmaterialist values—the most significant of which is a focus on the climate. Gen-Z carries a self-conscious guilt about how to cope with the fragility of the planet: They’re far more concerned with civilizational survival than with having children. To many, bearing children is not only an economic luxury but is considered immoral given the volatile environment into which the children would be born and the damage each new human inflicts on our fragile ecosystems. A popular infographic circulating online shows that having one less child would save more CO₂ emissions than not having a car, avoiding long-haul flights, and shifting to a plant based diet—combined. In a world that’s increasingly secular—or where eco-consciousness surpasses any religion in adherents—most youth don’t believe that it’s God’s will for them to get married and have multiple children.

伟大的婴儿半身像

The Great Baby Bust

具有环保意识的千禧一代和 Z 世代采取了许多措施来减少碳足迹，但迄今为止最大的减排量来自于减少地球上的一个孩子。

Environmentally conscious millennials and Gen-Z take many steps to reduce their carbon footprint, but the biggest emissions reduction by far would come from bringing one less child onto the planet.

所有这一切都发生在Covid-19 大流行之前。由于经济收缩远比 2008 年金融危机严重，我们可以预期 Z 世代的生育率会像 2008 年之后千禧一代的生育率一样崩溃。在大流行期间，各国政府希望夫妇被迫就地避难会导致生育率上升，但相反，在封锁初期，安全套销量激增，离婚率在解除封锁后飙升。又一个婴儿半身像。布鲁金斯学会估计，2021 年美国出生的儿童数量将比 2020 年减少多达 50 万。在未来的几年里，如果世界经历任何重大的世界大战或自然灾害，或另一场流行病，只会进一步加速我们的出生率。人口统计。

All of this was happening before the Covid-19 pandemic. With an economic contraction far more severe than the 2008 financial crisis, we can expect Gen-Z’s fertility to crash in the same way that millennial fertility did after 2008. During the pandemic, governments hoped that couples being forced to shelter in place would lead to elevated childbirth, but instead, condom sales surged early in lockdown and divorce rates spiked when it lifted. Another baby bust. The Brookings Institution estimates that as many as 500,000 fewer children were born in the US in 2021 as in 2020. And in the years ahead, should the world experience any major world war or natural disaster—or another pandemic—it would only further hasten our demographic reckoning.

人类已经从许多大规模死亡事件中恢复过来，例如十三世纪的蒙古征服和十四世纪的黑死病。它还能够抵御其他造成大规模死亡的事件，例如欧洲殖民主义者及其外来疾病对美洲原住民的蹂躏、中国历朝历代几个世纪的内战、1600年代的小冰河时代（在此期间世界三分之一的人口死亡）、长达几个世纪的大西洋奴隶贸易、第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战、1918 年的西班牙流感大流行，以及苏联时期和毛泽东时代政治引发的饥荒。中国。

Humanity has recovered from numerous instances of mass death, such as the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century and the fourteenth-century Black Death. It has also been resilient to other events that caused large-scale fatality, such as the devastation of the native peoples of the Americas by European colonialists and their exotic diseases, centuries of civil warfare across dynasties in China, the Little Ice Age of the 1600s (during which one-third of the world population perished), the centuries-long Atlantic slave trade, World Wars I and II, the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, and the politically induced famines during the time of the Soviet Union and under Mao in China.

但这一次不同。目前，千禧一代（1981-1996 年出生）和 Z 世代（1997-2014 年出生）占全人类的 64%。但这些年轻人并没有产生更多的后代：Alpha 世代（2015 年以后出生）可能没有 Z 世代那么大。因此，今天的年轻一代也构成了明天人口的大部分。换句话说，它们既是现在，也是未来。到 2050 年，他们将达到 30 多岁到 60 多岁，但仍然占全球总人口的大部分，因为今天的老年人将会死去，而很少有孩子出生。2019 年 8 月，当马云和埃隆·马斯克同台时，他们对人工智能的未来无法达成一致，但他们一致认为，未来二十年最大的挑战是全球人口崩溃。

But this time is different. Right now, millennials (born 1981–1996) and Gen-Z (born 1997–2014) represent 64 percent of all human beings. But these youth aren’t producing a larger batch of offspring: Gen Alpha (born 2015 onward) may not be as large as Gen-Z. As a result, today’s younger generations constitute most of tomorrow’s population as well. In other words, they are both the present and the future. By 2050 they’ll be thirty-somethings to sixty-somethings who still represent most of the total global population because today’s elderly will have died off and few children will have been born. When Jack Ma and Elon Musk shared the stage in August 2019, they couldn’t agree on the future of AI, but they resoundingly agreed that the greatest challenge of the next twenty years is global population collapse.

最后的伟大一代？

The Last Great Generation?

近一个世纪以来，每一代都比前一代更大。但经济危机和 Covid-19 可能会使 Alpha 世代的总规模略小于 Z 世代。

For nearly a century, each generation has been larger than its predecessor. But economic crises and Covid-19 may bring down Gen Alpha’s total size to slightly less than Gen-Z.

富裕的国家，消失的人民

Rich countries, vanishing people

在美国总统唐纳德·特朗普多年来致力于在墨西哥边境修建隔离墙并减少移民的运动中，他停下来宣布：“我们的国家已经满了。” 但他自己的幕僚长米克·马尔瓦尼却提出不同意见。在 2020 年初的一次活动中，他坦言，“我们非常渴望更多的人。” 他的声明背后的简单算术说明了这一点：即使美国每年引进 50 万新移民，到 2030 年其 GDP 仍将比 2020 年少 1万亿美元^。2而现在，即使有 50 万移民也将是一个很大的数字。在连续五年每年新增移民超过 100 万之后，2019 年净移民人数骤降至略高于 20 万。美国甚至没有吸收足够的移民来取代现有的劳动力：每年有超过 100 万婴儿潮一代（总共 8000 万）退休，因此几乎所有县都面临着工人数量下降的问题。³鉴于美国的低生育率和快速老龄化，移民是人口增长的唯一原因。

Amid US president Donald Trump’s multi-year campaign to erect a wall on the Mexican border and roll back immigration, he paused to declare, “Our country is full.” But his own chief of staff Mick Mulvaney begged to differ. At an event in early 2020, he confessed, “We are desperate, desperate for more people.” The simple arithmetic behind his statement is telling: Even if America brings in five hundred thousand new migrants per year, in 2030 its GDP will still be $1 trillion smaller than it was in 2020.² And right now, even half a million migrants would be a big stretch. After five consecutive years of gaining more than 1 million new migrants annually, net migration plummeted in 2019 to just over two hundred thousand. America isn’t even taking in enough migrants to replace its existing workforce: More than 1 million baby boomers (out of 80 million) are retiring each year, hence almost all counties are suffering a decline in the number of workers.³ Given America’s low fertility and rapid aging, immigration is the only reason the population is growing at all.

我们不必等到 2040 年才能见证人类的巅峰。很多世界上的人已经有这种感觉了。北美、欧洲和东北亚——世界上最富裕的三个地区——的生育水平低于更替水平。^我没有哪个国家比日本更能体现人口减少的困境。今天出生的日本人的预期寿命已达到 107 岁，但该国目前的 1.25 亿人口每年净减少 50 万人。它的抚养比是世界上最高的，即每个劳动年龄人口在经济上抚养的老年人数量。现在，成人尿布的销量超过了婴儿尿布，松下正在制造可转变为轮椅的医院病床。韩国的生育率甚至低于日本：每个妇女只生育一个孩子。该国已经建立了高科技新城市，例如仁川主要机场附近的松岛，但很少有年轻人有兴趣搬到那里。

We don’t have to wait until 2040 to witness peak humanity. Much of the world feels that way already. North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia—the three richest zones of the world—have sub-replacement fertility levels.^I No country better exhibits the dilemma of a vanishing population than Japan. Life expectancy for Japanese born today has reached 107, but the country is losing a net of five hundred thousand per year from its current population of 125 million. It has the world’s highest dependency ratio, meaning the number of old people each working-age person supports financially. Adult diapers now outsell those for babies, and Panasonic is making hospital beds that transform into wheelchairs. South Korea’s fertility rate is even lower than Japan’s: below one child per woman. The country has built high-tech new cities, such as Songdo near its main airport at Incheon, but there are few young people interested in moving there.

中国仍然是世界上人口最多的国家，拥有14亿人口，但其人口将在这十年达到顶峰并开始下降。与日本一样，中国的人口是日本的十倍，但中国正在迅速老龄化，却没有足够的孩子愿意照顾老人。2020年，中国的社会保障基金支付开始超过其流入量，到2040年，中国的老年人数量可能是15岁以下儿童的两倍。因此有人称中国为“世界上最大的养老院”。

China is still the world’s most populous nation with 1.4 billion people, but its population will peak and begin to decline this decade. Like Japan but with ten times the population, China is aging rapidly without enough children willing to care for the elderly. In 2020, China’s social security fund payments began to exceed its inflows, and by 2040, China could have twice as many elderly people as children under the age of fifteen. Hence some call China the “world’s largest nursing home.”

欧洲的未来也开始看起来像是一胎政策的计划外版本。欧洲的中位年龄为 43 岁，比世界平均水平高出 10 岁，尽管有移民，但预计 2020 年代其人口仍将减少。从爱尔兰到斯洛文尼亚，从芬兰到意大利，几乎每个欧洲国家都面临着养老金和老年人护理支出不断增加以及劳动力萎缩的双重困境。西班牙和意大利的公民与日本人的寿命相似，但生育率也同样较低。意大利人口百年来首次下降，目前为 5500 万；80%随着人们聚集到大城市，西班牙城镇的人口出现了下降。从面积和人口来看，意大利和西班牙都是相对较大的国家，但它们的许多省份实际上是空置的。天主教国家爱尔兰和波兰的出生率也低于两岁，并且还在下降。

Europe’s future is also starting to look like an unplanned version of the one child policy. Europe’s median age of forty-three is ten years above the world average, and its population is projected to shrink over the course of the 2020s despite immigration. From Ireland to Slovenia and Finland to Italy, almost every European nation faces the untenable combination of rising spending on pensions and elder care and a shrinking workforce. Spain and Italy, whose citizens enjoy longevity similar to the Japanese, have similarly low fertility. Italy’s population has declined for the first time in a century and now stands at 55 million; 80 percent of Spanish towns have experienced population decline as people cluster into larger cities. By size and population, Italy and Spain are relatively large countries, yet many of their provinces are effectively vacant. Fellow Catholic countries Ireland and Poland also have birth rates below two and falling.

人口减少使得抽象经济学突然显得有限，令人担忧。谁将纳税来资助医院和卫生设施？谁来照顾老人？谁会去学校？谁会去餐馆和商店购物？人口减少（且贫困）意味着消费和投资（国内和国外）减少。随着人口减少，房产价值暴跌。人口下降比零和更糟糕：它是负和的，因为社区遭受不可逆转的衰退。公司倾向于在看到消费增长潜力的地方进行有形投资。换句话说，有人的地方。

A declining population makes abstract economics suddenly seem worryingly finite. Who will pay taxes to fund hospitals and sanitation? Who will care for the elderly? Who will attend school? Who will go out to restaurants and shop in stores? Smaller (and poorer) populations mean less consumption and less investment (both domestic and foreign). As populations deflate, property values plummet. Demographic decline is worse than zero-sum: it’s negative-sum as communities suffer irreversible decay. Companies tend to make tangible investments where they see the potential for rising consumption. In other words, where there are people.

一个都来，一个都来

Come one, come all

2020 年 4 月，唐纳德·特朗普签署了一项严格限制移民的行政命令，尤其是拉丁裔和亚洲人。具有讽刺意味的是，与此同时，在美国冠状病毒死亡人数不断增加的情况下，美国在世界各地的使馆和领事馆接到指示寻找医生和护士，以便快速办理移民手续。美国 30% 的医生和外科医生是移民，整个医疗保健行业的近 25% 也是移民。如果美国的移民政策以供需而非意识形态为指导，那么数万人的生命将很容易得到拯救。

In April 2020, Donald Trump signed an executive order to heavily restrict immigration, especially for Latinos and Asians. Ironically, at the same time, amid America’s mounting coronavirus body count, US embassies and consulates all over the world were instructed to find doctors and nurses to be fast-tracked for immigration. Thirty percent of America’s doctors and surgeons are immigrants, as well as nearly 25 percent of the overall healthcare sector. Tens of thousands of lives would easily have been saved if America’s immigration policy were guided by supply and demand rather than ideology.

同样，在过去的十年里，英国公民已经习惯了脱欧派奈杰尔·法拉奇就“英国政治中的头号问题”——移民——以及“我们如何失去对边境的控制”发表武断。尽管鲍里斯·约翰逊(Boris Johnson)高喊着这些口号进入白厅，但没过多久，兴奋之情就被残酷的事实所取代：人才短缺国家卫生系统有超过 10 万名医生和护士，还有创纪录的 450 万名患者在候补名单上等待治疗——而这些都是在 Covid-19 爆发之前发生的。到 2020 年中期，政府改变了态度。鲍里斯·约翰逊承诺“把人放在护照之上”，内政大臣普里蒂·帕特尔承诺为医生、护士、助产士、支付全额学费的学生——基本上是任何有脉搏、有一定技能或有钱的人——提供快速签证。

Similarly, over the past decade, British citizens have grown accustomed to hearing Brexiteer Nigel Farage pontificate on “the number one issue in British politics”—immigration—and how “we have lost control of our borders.” Though Boris Johnson rode these slogans into Whitehall, it didn’t take long for euphoria to give way to brute facts: a shortage of more than a hundred thousand doctors and nurses in the National Health System, and a record 4.5 million patients on waitlists for treatments—and that was before Covid-19 struck. By mid-2020, the government had changed its tune. Boris Johnson pledged to put “people before passports,” and home secretary Priti Patel promised to fast-track visas for doctors, nurses, midwives, full-tuition paying students—basically anyone with a pulse and some skills or money.

因此，当今全球移民的最大讽刺之处在于，劳动力短缺最严重的国家却存在敌对的反移民政治。但与老年人口和年轻人口之间的巨大失衡以及社会和经济生活正常运转所需的劳动力短缺相比，这种民粹主义只是昙花一现。民粹主义和疫情使一些边界变得更加坚固，但它们也再次软化，以允许有技能的人流动。正如世界正处于人口从快速增长向人口下降的过渡时期一样，当今误导性的移民政策正在让位于全面的人才争夺战。^二

The great irony of global migration today is therefore that countries with the largest labor shortages have had hostile anti-immigrant politics. But such populism is merely a blip compared with their overwhelming imbalance between old and young populations, and the labor shortages that need to be filled for social and economic life to function. Populism and the pandemic have hardened some borders, but they are also softening again to allow people with skills to circulate. Much as the world is in a transition from rapid population growth to decline, today’s misguided immigration policies are giving way to an all-out war for talent.^II

毫无疑问：移民是经济刺激。从华盛顿到伦敦再到新加坡，保守派谴责对外国劳动力的过度依赖。但移民实际上通过让专业人员提高效率来提高产出。他们还租房和买房，他们的孩子比本地出生的人挣得更多，对税基的贡献也更多。美国经济由消费驱动，以零售、食品杂货、医疗保健和娱乐等活动为主。因此，该国的金融巨头应该大力支持移民，既是为了提供廉价劳动力，也是为了引进新一代消费者。既然限制移民往往会产生完全相反的效果，那么那些反对移民的人必须采取什么策略来重振增长呢？在美国需要大规模基础设施改革之际，

Make no mistake: Immigration is an economic stimulus. From Washington to London to Singapore, conservatives decry an overdependence on foreign labor. But immigrants actually raise output by allowing professionals to be more efficient. They also rent and buy homes, and their children earn more and contribute more to the tax base than the native-born themselves. America’s economy is consumption-driven and dominated by activities such as retail, grocery, healthcare, and entertainment. The country’s financial titans should therefore be rabidly pro-immigration, both for the supply of cheap workers it brings as well as to import a new generation of consumers. What strategy do those opposing migration have to revive growth, since restricting migration tends to do the exact opposite? At a time when America needs a massive infrastructural overhaul, imported labor will be essential to getting it done.

认为创新驱动型经济只需要高技能移民的观点也是错误的。⁴事实上，从建筑业、制造业到农业和护理业，如果没有低技能移民，整个行业都将陷入停滞，而许多商品和服务的价格上涨将推高通货膨胀。反移民倡导者认为，政府的首要职责是保护本国公民，但当医院人手短缺时，谁是输家呢？考虑到需要照顾超过 1000 万新冠病毒感染者以及幸存者将遭受的长期影响，纠正美国随意的移民政策还不够快。

It’s also a mistake to believe that innovation-driven economies need only highly skilled migrants.⁴ In fact, from construction and manufacturing to farming and nursing, entire industries would grind to a halt without low-skilled immigrants, while rising prices for many goods and services would drive inflation upward. Anti-immigration advocates argue that a government’s first duty is to its own citizens, but who’s the loser when hospitals are short-staffed? Rectifying America’s haphazard immigration policy couldn’t come soon enough given the need to care for the more than 10 million infected with Covid and the long-term effects that those who survive will suffer.

提高失业人员的技能与吸引能增加价值的外国人之间并不存在根本性的紧张关系。国内和国外劳动力大多属于不同的职业，很少会竞争工作。没有足够的美国人会采摘水果和棉花来取代拉丁美洲人，也不会成为护士和保姆来取代菲律宾人，也不会取代所有印度程序员。一些增长最快的工作类别，例如家庭健康援助、食品准备、卫生服务等，几乎不需要或不需要教育，但却使社会其他人，特别是老年人和中产阶级的生活更加便利。

There’s no fundamental tension between upskilling the unemployed while inviting in foreigners who add value. Domestic and foreign labor largely belong to different professions and rarely compete for jobs. Not enough Americans will pick fruit and cotton to replace Latinos, nor become nurses and nannies to replace Filipinos, nor substitute for all the Indian coders. Some of the fastest growing jobs categories, such as home health assistance, food preparation, sanitation services, and so forth, require little or no education but make life far more convenient for the rest of society, especially the elderly and the middle class.

事实上，西方国家的 X 世代职场女性在几乎没有或根本没有帮助的情况下同时照顾自己的上一代和下几代人时，遭受的痛苦是最大的。在新冠疫情封锁期间，母亲们除了工作之外还要照顾孩子们的在线教育（如果有的话），同时还要照顾年迈的父母并管理日常家务。X世代的离婚率上升也无济于事，这意味着母亲通常必须在家里的支持更少的情况下照顾孩子。与此同时，负担得起的临终关怀中心、养老院、活跃的成人社区以及儿童保姆和保姆都严重供应不足。

Indeed, working Gen-X women in Western countries suffer the most of anyone when they have to care for the generations above and below them at the same time with little or no help. During the Covid lockdown, mothers were run ragged managing the kids’ online schooling (to the extent there was any) alongside their jobs, while also checking in on their aging parents and managing the usual housekeeping. It doesn’t help that the divorce rate has risen among Gen-X, meaning typically mothers have to manage childcare with even less support at home. Meanwhile, there is massive undersupply of affordable hospices, elderly care homes, and active adult communities, as well as child-minders and babysitters.

“母性惩罚”在美国卷土重来，迫使越来越多的女性退出劳动力市场。相比之下，女性在企业高管阶层中所占比例更大在香港和新加坡，中产阶级家庭可以请得起女佣、厨师、清洁工和保姆。成为一个精疲力尽的“足球妈妈”——或者在新冠病毒时代的“愤怒妈妈”——是一种政治选择，是一种弊病，而移民劳工是解决这一弊病的一个重要方法。

The “motherhood penalty” has returned with a vengeance in America, forcing rising numbers of women to drop out of the workforce. By contrast, women comprise a larger share of the corporate executive class in Hong Kong and Singapore, where middle-class households can afford maids, cooks, cleaners, and nannies. Being an exhausted “soccer mom”—or “rage mom” in the age of Covid—is a political choice, a malady for which migrant labor is a large part of the solution.

当美国失去移民时，它也会失去他们愿意在经济中进行的数千亿美元的投资。2019 年，美国收到的约 2500 亿美元外国直接投资 (FDI) 中，超过四分之一进入了房地产领域，现金充裕的移民可以快速获得绿卡，然后获得公民身份。美国 EB-5 和其他计划引导外国人在贫困地区（例如“机会区”）购买房产，或向房地产开发商提供贷款，以便他们可以在购买公寓后完成公寓建设。EB-5在历届政府中都很受欢迎，并且毫不奇怪地幸免于特朗普不稳定的移民政策，因为他自己的儿子们积极向中国投资者推销它。⁵

When America loses immigrants, it also loses the hundreds of billions of dollars in investment they are willing to make in the economy. More than one-quarter of the approximately $250 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) the US received in 2019 went into real estate, with cash-rich migrants fast-tracked into green cards followed by citizenship. The US EB-5 and other schemes steer foreigners to buy properties in disadvantaged areas (such as “opportunity zones”) or to lend to property developers so they can complete condos in which they have purchased an apartment. EB-5 has been popular across administrations, and not surprisingly was spared Trump’s erratic immigration policy since his own sons actively promoted it to Chinese investors.⁵

移民推动了洛杉矶、旧金山、西雅图、丹佛、达拉斯、休斯顿、迈阿密、亚特兰大和华盛顿特区等房地产市场的发展，也推动了阿克伦、印第安纳波利斯、奥兰多和杰克逊维尔等低迷房地产市场的发展。在这些城市，移民及时抵达，购买房屋，让孩子上学，并接替白人阿片类药物成瘾者从事当地工作。数以千万计的美国人没有实现美国理想所体现的潜力，而数以千万计的移民正在做更多的事情来保持美国的伟大。当他们到来时，美国应该心存感激。

Immigrants have fueled property markets such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Denver, Dallas, Houston, Miami, Atlanta, and Washington, DC, as well as sagging ones such as Akron, Indianapolis, Orlando, and Jacksonville. In these cities, immigrants have arrived just in time to buy homes, put kids in schools, and take over from white opioid addicts in local jobs. Tens of millions of Americans are not living up to the potential embodied in American ideals, while tens of millions of immigrants are doing much more to keep America great. America should be grateful when they come.

趁他们年轻的时候得到他们

Get them while they’re young

学生是人才争夺战中最引人注目的自由人。2001年9/11恐怖袭击后，穆斯林（尤其是阿拉伯）学生成为美国移民限制的目标。此后的二十年里，许多发展中国家精英赴美留学的愿望日益强烈随着这样做的难度越来越大以及来自其他地方的竞争而减少。截至 2019 年，估计有 500 万国际学生可供争夺。美国过去吸引了其中五分之一的人，但与中国的地缘政治紧张局势以及更广泛的亚洲人的仇外心理已经造成了损失。自 2010 年代中期以来，中国学生（占美国外国学生总数的三分之一）开始越来越多地回国，特别是在他们被禁止学习敏感技术科目和参加可选实践培训 (OPT) 之后签证延期终止。同样，H1-B 签证计划的不确定性主要使印度专业人士受益，但也让许多印度学生望而却步。失败者当然是^三、

Students are the most visible free agents in the war for talent. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Muslim (particularly Arab) students were targeted in America’s immigration restrictions. Over the two decades since, many developing country elites’ desire to study in America has diminished in lockstep with both the growing difficulty of doing so and competition from elsewhere. As of 2019, there were an estimated 5 million international students up for grabs. The US used to attract one-fifth of them, but geopolitical tensions with China and xenophobia toward Asians more broadly have taken their toll. Since the mid-2010s, Chinese students (representing up to a third of total foreign students in the US) began to return home in growing numbers, especially after they were forbidden from sensitive technical subjects and their access to the optional practical training (OPT) visa extension terminated. Similarly, the uncertainty over the H1-B visa program, which had mostly benefited Indian professionals, pushed away many Indian students as well. The losers, of course, are not Asian students but the American economy and universities—especially in California, which gets one-fifth of all foreign students coming to America.^III

英语圈的其他国家很快就利用了特朗普的仇外心理和对冠状病毒的拙劣利用。英国向所有印度毕业生提供四年居留签证，加拿大部署了全数字学生签证系统，澳大利亚为亚洲学生提供快速旅行豁免。尽管英国对 Covid-19 的处理同样不力，但 2020 年英国大学录取的外国学生人数翻了一番，达到四万多人。无论美国政治发生什么，这些其他国家都以低得多的成本提供同样高标准的大学，而且是更安全的国家，毕业生也有良好的就业前景。美国大学本身明智地利用了学生对赴美旅行的不确定性，在国外建立了世界一流的校园，

The rest of the Anglosphere wasted little time in capitalizing on Trump’s xenophobia and botching of the coronavirus. The UK offered four-year residency visas to all Indian graduates, Canada deployed an all-digital student visa system, and Australia fast-tracked travel immunity for Asian students. The number of foreign students admitted to UK universities in 2020 doubled to more than forty thousand despite the country’s similarly poor handling of Covid-19. Whatever happens in American politics, these other countries offer equally high-standard universities at much lower cost, and are safer countries with good job prospects for graduates as well. American universities themselves have wisely capitalized on students’ uncertainty about traveling to the US by setting up world-class campuses abroad, such as Yale-NUS in Singapore and NYU Abu Dhabi in the UAE.

每年三月和四月我都会收到来自以下方面的烦人的电子邮件和电话伦敦、迪拜、香港和新加坡的朋友们，他们的孩子刚刚被美国、加拿大、英国和其他地方的众多填空大学录取。在讨论了学校和国家的优点后，他们感谢我，然后又开始担心孩子的未来。在过去的几年里，我注意到越来越多的人倾向于将孩子送到加拿大。尽管美国大学毕业生仍不确定如何处理他们的学位，但滑铁卢等加拿大大学已将学徒期纳入其课程中，作为毕业要求。

Every March and April I get antsy emails and phone calls from friends in London, Dubai, Hong Kong, and Singapore whose children have just been admitted to numerous fill-in-the-blank universities in America, Canada, Britain, and elsewhere. After debating the merits of the schools and countries, they thank me and go back to fretting about their kids’ future. Over the past few years, I’ve noticed a more frequent leaning toward sending their children to Canada. While American college graduates remain unsure what to do with their degrees, Canadian universities such as Waterloo have blended apprenticeships into their curricula as a requirement for graduation.

在人才争夺战中，提供最无障碍移民的国家将获得优势，并且毫无疑问他们所说的人才意味着：青年。基于积分的移民制度普遍有利于年轻人。对于加拿大，十八岁至三十五岁的申请者的总分为十二分；四十五岁以上的人只得两分。人才移民存在年龄歧视，X 一代可能不适用。然而，千禧一代和 Z 世代应该收拾行李。

In the war for talent, countries that offer the most hassle-free migration will get the edge—and make no mistake what they mean by talent: youth. Points-based immigration systems universally favor young people. For Canada, applicants aged eighteen to thirty-five get twelve points toward their total score; those above forty-five get only two points. Talent migration is ageist and Gen-X might as well not apply. Millennials and Gen-Z, however, should pack their bags.

吸引学生对经济有提振作用，因为今天节俭的大学生很可能成为明天的企业家。这就是为什么外国学生应该在获得文凭的同时获得绿卡。如果他们留在学习的地方，他们将振兴大学城，而当他们搬迁时，他们将把铁锈地带城镇变成数字化工业设计和先进制造的中心。美国只有三分之一的移民拥有学士或硕士学位；如果政策符合国家高科技产业的需求，这一数字很容易翻倍。如果美国不吸纳全球人才，世界其他国家也会很乐意——并且越来越多地会首先吸纳他们。

Grabbing students has an uplifting effect on the economy because the frugal college kids of today are likely to become the entrepreneurs of tomorrow. That’s why foreign students should be given green cards alongside their diplomas. If they remain where they studied, they’ll revitalize university towns, and when they move, they’ll turn rust-belt towns into hubs for digitized industrial design and advanced manufacturing. Only one-third of America’s immigrants have bachelor’s or master’s degrees; that could easily be doubled if policies were aligned with the demands of the country’s high-tech industry. If America doesn’t take global talent, the rest of the world is happy to—and increasingly will get them first.

古老的真理很难改变：虽然曾经有理由声称美国拥有世界上最优秀和最聪明的人才，但今天这只不过是陈词滥调。虽然现在是英语作为通用语言的黄金时代，但越来越多的国家可以在不受英美民粹主义影响的情况下获得高质量的英语学位。德国、荷兰、瑞典、日本、等国家也将很多节目准确地改为英语，以便可以直接与美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚竞争。

Old truisms die hard: Whereas once it could plausibly be claimed that America received the lion’s share of the world’s best and brightest, today that’s little more than a cliché. While this is a golden age for English as a universal language, there’s an ever growing roster of countries where one can get a quality English language degree without the side order of Anglo-American populism. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, and other countries have switched many programs to English precisely so that they can directly compete with the US, Britain, Canada, and Australia.

与美国一样，欧洲领导人表示只寻求技术移民，利用计分制来青睐那些受过良好教育、工作经验和经济独立的人。但就像美国签证政策的错位一样，苏黎世的 ETH-Z 等欧洲顶尖大学每年花费数百万美元为亚洲学生提供奖学金，结果却只给他们三个月的时间找到工作，然后他们的签证就会被终止。相反，欧洲政府应该给他们至少三年的时间在此期间，他们一定会做出积极的贡献。集体发放欧洲蓝卡来刺激投资，比把纳税人的钱花在人才身上然后扔掉更好的计划。无论哪个国家首先解决相互矛盾的移民政策，都将在争夺年轻人才的战争中占据优势。

As in America, European leaders speak of seeking only skilled migrants, using points-based systems to favor people with good education, work experience, and financial independence. But much like America’s misalignment of its visa policies, top European universities such as ETH-Z in Zurich spend millions per year on scholarships for Asian students only to give them a mere three months to find a job before their visas are terminated. Instead, European governments should give them at least three years during which they’ll surely make positive contributions. Doling out European blue cards en masse to boost investment is a better plan than spending taxpayer money on talent and then tossing it out. Whichever countries untangle their contradictory immigration policies first will get the edge in the war for young talent.

赢得年轻人的心和思想

Winning Young Hearts and Minds

每年有近500万学生出国留学。欧洲拥有最多的跨境学生，而美国历来接收最多的亚洲学生。加拿大现在正在积极与美国争夺外国学生，而日本正在扩大其英语课程以吸引更多的亚洲人。

Each year nearly 5 million students go overseas for study. Europe has the largest number of cross-border students, while the US traditionally receives the largest number of Asians. Canada is now actively competing with America for foreign students, while Japan is expanding its English-language programs to capture more Asians.

真正的移民问题：移民

The real migration problem: emigration

“我们是一个面临灭亡的国家吗？不幸的是，是的。一个不生育孩子的国家注定会灭亡。” 很少有意大利领导人能像该国北方联盟党领袖、曾短暂担任副总理的马泰奥·萨尔维尼(Matteo Salvini)一样成为头条新闻。萨尔维尼自认为是一位富有魅力的 X 世代政治偶像。他的巡回演讲、赤裸上身的集会和自拍会持续几个小时。他甚至还当DJ。

“Are we a country facing extinction? Unfortunately, yes. A country that doesn’t create children is destined to die.” Few Italian leaders have garnered as many headlines as Matteo Salvini, leader of the country’s Northern League party who briefly served as deputy prime minister. Salvini fancies himself a charismatic Gen-X political icon. His stump speeches, shirtless rallies, and selfie sessions last for hours. He even DJs.

然而，在生育政策方面，他的记录比该国标志性的白松露片还要轻。尽管他推动建立一个“家庭部”来支持女性生育更多孩子，但自 1980 年以来，离开意大利的职业意大利人（男性和女性）的数量每年都在增加。人口结构井然有序的国家可能会受益如果这意味着更高的工资和赋予妇女权力，那么它就来自贫乏的人口，但如今南欧没有一个国家符合这一描述。

When it comes to fertility policy, however, his record is lighter than the country’s signature white truffle flakes. Even though he pushed for the creation of a “family ministry” to support women having more children, the number of professional Italians—men and women—leaving the country has risen every year since 1980. Countries that get their demographic house in order could benefit from lean populations if it means higher wages and empowered women, but today not a single country in southern Europe fits that description.

十多年来，移民一直是欧洲政坛的避雷针问题，但有人忘记告诉该地区的民粹主义者，他们面临的更大的生存威胁是移民。欧洲的面积是美国的一半，人口是美国的两倍，但其中的大部分地区却让人感觉空荡荡的——因为它已经被腾空了。在低生育率和移民之间，世界上没有哪个地区的人口萎缩速度比东欧更快。自从罗马尼亚于 2007 年加入欧盟，估计该国四分之一的人口（约 500 万人）已经向西迁移，再也没有回来。专家们向诸如此类的国家提出了显而易见的建议：改善基础设施、提供更多的托儿服务、投资于教育——但几乎没有采取任何行动。此类改革可能不足以阻止年轻的保加利亚人出国留学或工作，这就是为什么（除了高死亡率和低出生率）保加利亚是世界上人口减少最快的国家。目前，保加利亚和土耳其之间 270 公里长的边界上有一道锋利的栅栏，无法轻易跨越，但很快就会没有人来监管。

Immigration has been a lightning rod issue in European politics for over a decade, but someone forgot to tell the region’s populists that the far greater existential threat they face is emigration. Europe is half the size of America, with twice the population, yet so much of it feels vacant—because it has been vacated. Between low fertility and emigration, no region of the world is shrinking more rapidly than Eastern Europe. Since Romania joined the EU in 2007, an estimated one-quarter of the country’s population (about 5 million people) have headed west and never returned. Experts make obvious suggestions to countries such as this: improve infrastructure, offer more childcare, invest in education—but little is done. Such reforms probably wouldn’t be enough to keep young Bulgarians from leaving to study or work abroad, which is why (alongside a high death rate and low birth rate) Bulgaria is the most rapidly depopulating country in the world. A razor-sharp fence currently inhibits easy crossing of the 270-kilometer-long border between Bulgaria and Turkey, but soon enough there won’t be anyone left to police it.

南欧和东欧的人才外流还没有结束的迹象——而且是在塞尔维亚、波斯尼亚和阿尔巴尼亚等巴尔干国家最终成为欧盟成员之前，这可能会进一步加速移民潮。这些移民也没有返回的计划，因为他们也正确地相信他们的孩子在其他地方会有更好的经济机会。一旦他们家乡的父母去世，他们的汇款也将停止，从而严重削弱这些本已摇摇欲坠的经济。显然，我们和部落身份一样都是经济需要的生物。

There is no end in sight to the brain drain of southern and eastern Europe—and that’s before Balkan countries such as Serbia, Bosnia, and Albania eventually achieve EU membership, which will likely accelerate emigration even further. These emigrants also have no plans to return, since they also rightly believe that their children will have better economic opportunities elsewhere. And once their parents back home pass away, their remittances will stop as well, severely crippling these already shaky economies. Clearly, we are as much creatures of economic necessity as tribal identity.

在历史的大部分时间里，地方——一个地方——一直是身份和稳定的源泉。但在就业机会很少、而且又缺乏能力和腐败的社会中成长的年轻人必须自己解决问题。调查显示，他们认为流动性的特权比投票权更重要。流动性是比归属感更高的美德——尤其是如果你的国家的领导人拥护古老的社会态度的话。这就是为什么研究移民比沉迷于当今的民粹主义更有用。年轻人对政治动荡和经济萎靡的反应并不是“挺过去”。当他们可以游到更坚固的地面上时，他们没有兴趣抓住正在下沉的船的桅杆。因此，《追随青年》说明民族主义和移民根本不是对立的：民族主义在驱使人们方面发挥着出色的作用远离他们本应引以为豪的州。

For much of history, place—one place—has been the source of identity and stability. But growing up in societies offering few jobs while excelling at incompetence and corruption, youth have to take matters into their own hands. Surveys suggest they hold the privilege of mobility to be more important than the right to vote. Mobility is a higher virtue than belonging—especially if your country’s leaders espouse archaic social attitudes. This is why studying migration is more useful than indulging in today’s populism. Young people’s response to political turmoil and economic malaise is not to “tough it out.” They have no interest in clinging to the mast of a sinking ship when they can swim to sturdier ground. Following youth thus illustrates that nationalism and migration are not antithetical at all: Nationalism does a superb job of driving people away from the states of which they’re supposed to be proud.

地理学家和人类学家都敦促我们克服将身份与国籍混为一谈的“领土陷阱”。认识到人们对流动性的深远渴望是一个很好的起点。对于大多数人来说，移民——而不是民族主义——才是解放。

Geographers and anthropologists alike urge us to overcome the “territorial trap” of conflating identity with nationality. Appreciating the far-reaching yearning for mobility is a good place to start. For most people, migration—not nationalism—is liberation.

民族主义走向坟墓

Nationalism heads to the grave

几个世纪以来，民族主义一直承诺政治解放和安全的家园。谁能反对这种令人自豪的世俗和公民国家建设传统呢？事实上，仍有数千万无国籍人为建国而战，无论是巴勒斯坦人还是库尔德人。对他们来说，民族主义仍然是一项存在的使命。如果我们坚持将民族主义应用于这些事业，那么它确实是一种有价值的意识形态。

For centuries, nationalism has promised political liberation and a secure homeland. Who could argue against such a proud tradition of secular and civic state building? In fact, there are still tens of millions of stateless people fighting for nationhood, whether Palestinians or Kurds. For them, nationalism remains an existential mission. If we stick to nationalism as applied to these causes, it is a worthy ideology indeed.

然而近年来，专家们也宣称“新民族主义”正在崛起，这种民族主义将爱国自豪感与对他人的偏见结合在一起。从美国到土耳其，再到印度和中国，民族沙文主义者抓住这个口号，把少数族裔和外国人当作替罪羊。在产业和基础设施升级方面几乎没有采取任何行动的政府自然会更容易将失败归咎于移民和中国。

Yet recent years have also witnessed pundits proclaiming the rise of a “new nationalism” that combines patriotic pride with prejudice against others. From America to Turkey to India and China, ethno-chauvinists have seized upon the slogan to scapegoat minorities and foreigners. Governments that have done little to upgrade industries and infrastructure naturally find it easier to blame immigrants and China for their failures.

那么，新民族主义就是要歪曲残酷的事实，而不为未来制定可行的计划。过去，只有非洲、中东和亚洲的后殖民社会才会将自己的困境归咎于殖民主义和资本主义。但讽刺的是，许多后殖民国家已经放弃了这种徒劳的自怜，现在正忙着自力更生地迈向现代化。在大多数情况下，亚洲人有正当的爱国心，因为他们迅速减少了贫困并发展了经济经济体。但他们的民族主义强化了追赶和取代西方的愿望，而不是惩罚西方。人们想知道，如果美国或英国两国政府像日本或韩国那样在工人再培训、经济适用房和高质量基础设施上投入资金，那么美国或英国的“民族主义”会有多么不同。

The new nationalism, then, is all about deflecting hard truths without creating a workable plan for the future. It used to be that only the postcolonial societies of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia would blame colonialism and capitalism for their woes. But in an ironic twist, many postcolonial countries have given up on such futile self-pity and are now busy bootstrapping their way into modernity. For the most part, Asians are justifiably patriotic, as they have rapidly cut poverty and grown their economies. But their nationalism reinforces a desire to catch up to and supersede the West, not to punish it. One wonders how different American or British “nationalism” would look if those two governments had spent what Japan or South Korea do on worker retraining, affordable housing, and high-quality infrastructure.

特别是在美国和英国，新民族主义者也在自己和全球主义者之间划清了界限，后者认为全球市场是有益的，全球协调对于应对地球挑战至关重要。再说一次，真正的鸿沟实际上是在内部：城市与农村、富裕阶层与下层阶级、年轻人与老年人。城市青年强烈投票反对美国的特朗普和英国的脱欧。因此，英国脱欧和特朗普都没有提供持久的新民族主义的令人信服的证据，尽管两者都揭示了在因地理位置和世代而分裂的国家中共识民主的脆弱性。

Especially in America and Britain, the new nationalists have also drawn battle lines between themselves and globalists, who believe that global markets are beneficial and global coordination is essential to confront planetary challenges. Once again, the real divide is actually within: urban versus rural, wealthy versus underclass, and young versus old. Urban youth strongly voted against Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK. Neither Brexit nor Trump therefore presents compelling evidence of a durable new nationalism, though both reveal the fragility of consensual democracy in countries so divided by geography and generations.

这提醒人们，新的民族主义者（尤其是西方的民族主义者）主要迎合老一代人，他们的一只脚已踏入坟墓，并将跟随他们进入坟墓。他们代表了白人上层阶级的最后欢呼，他们设法将其身份政治伪装成国家利益。巴基斯坦小说家莫辛·哈米德尖锐地捕捉到了这种诱人的怀旧之情：“我们被告知，不仅可以停止穿越地理的运动，而且穿越时间的运动也可以停止，我们可以回到过去，回到更好的过去，当我们的国家，我们的种族、我们的宗教确实是伟大的。我们必须接受的只是分裂。人类分为本地人和移民。” ⁶但这篇论文唯一可以确定的是，它的拥护者很快就会死去。老年排外者正走向哈米德所说的“空中大脱欧”。

This is a reminder that the new nationalists (especially in the West) cater largely to an older generation, with one foot in the grave—and will follow them into it. They represent the last hurrah of a white overclass that managed to masquerade its identity politics as the national interest. The Pakistani novelist Mohsin Hamid poignantly captures this seductive nostalgia: “We are told not only that movement through geographies can be stopped but also movement through time can be too, that we can return to the past, to a better past, when our country, our race, our religion were truly great. All we must accept is division. The division of humanity into natives and migrants.”⁶ But the only certainty in this thesis is that its advocates will soon be dead. Elderly xenophobes are headed for what Hamid terms the “big Brexit in the sky.”

相比之下，今天的年轻人很难被认为是捶胸顿足的民族主义者。根据美国选举调查，只有 45% 的美国千禧一代认为自己的民族身份很重要（而婴儿潮一代的这一比例为 70%，X 一代的比例为 60%）。此外，一半的美国千禧一代认为美国并不比任何其他国家更伟大，这一比例显着低于婴儿潮一代的 75%。认为美国是特殊的。（PragerU 的空洞的五分钟视频，标题为“为什么你应该成为一名民族主义者”，观看次数不到 400 万次。）在前几代人（或几个世纪），人们可能会认为忘恩负义的年轻人最终会成熟为民族主义态度，但今天的年轻人有更好的获得信息并能够自己判断他们的国家是否真的值得幸灾乐祸的自我吹捧。

By contrast, today’s youth can hardly be considered chest-thumping nationalists. According to the US Election Survey, only 45 percent of American millennials even consider their national identity important (versus 70 percent of boomers and 60 percent of Gen-Xers). Furthermore, half of American millennials believe the US is no greater than any other nation, a significant drop from the 75 percent of boomers who view America as exceptional. (PragerU’s vacuous five-minute video titled Why You Should Be a Nationalist has fewer than 4 million views.) In previous generations (or centuries), one might have assumed that ungrateful youth would eventually mature into nationalist attitudes, but today’s young have far better access to information and can judge for themselves whether their nation is actually deserving of gloating self-praise.

同样重要的是，当今的年轻人明显持有支持全球主义的态度。在一项涵盖 20 个西方国家的调查中，绝大多数 77% 的 18 至 24 岁受访者认为“全球化是一股向善的力量”，而只有 11% 的人持负面看法。⁷年轻人流动和交往越多，全球主义就越根深蒂固，民族主义就越消退。罗纳德·英格尔哈特和乔纳森·海特等学者的研究表明，受过教育的青年具有全球主义特征，社会价值观也随之演变。也许全球主义者和民族主义者之间的区别就在于前者接受现实而后者不接受现实。

Just as important is the fact that today’s young populations hold demonstrably pro-globalist attitudes. In a survey covering twenty Western nations, an overwhelming 77 percent of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four felt that “globalization is a force for good” versus only 11 percent taking a negative view.⁷ The more youth move and mingle, the more globalism is entrenched and nationalism recedes. The work of scholars such as Ronald Inglehart and Jonathan Haidt suggests that educated youth carry globalist traits and society’s values evolve with them. Maybe the difference between a globalist and a nationalist then is that the former accepts reality and the latter does not.

年轻人也明智地相信，民粹主义政治对国家稳定的威胁比移民更大。与民族主义一样，民粹主义更多地是一种利用不满的政治运动，而不是真正解决不满的平台。民粹主义的历史是一个长长的政权名单，这些政权擅长用危言耸听的言论来团结选民并呼吁进行彻底的改革，但几乎没有取得任何成果。从拉丁美洲社会主义者到阿拉伯伊斯兰主义者，民粹主义者从未失败过。Covid-19 感染率最严重的是美国、英国、印度和巴西等民粹民族主义政权国家。

Youth are also wise to believe that populist politics are a bigger threat to national stability than immigration is. As with nationalism, populism is much more a political movement to exploit grievance than a platform to actually address it. The history of populism is a lengthy roster of regimes skilled at rallying voters behind alarmist rhetoric and calls for drastic reforms—but achieving next to nothing. From Latin American socialists to Arab Islamists, populists have never failed to fail. The worst Covid-19 infection rates were in countries with populist nationalist regimes such as the US, UK, India, and Brazil.

波兰和匈牙利最常被视为泛欧洲民粹主义浪潮的先驱。在波兰，右翼反移民法律与秩序党在 2020 年 7 月的选举中遭到该国年轻人的明确拒绝后，勉强保住了权力。匈牙利的维克多·欧尔班（Victor Orban）是欧洲反自由主义强人的象征，他将反移民作为其议程的支柱（并不是说移民实际上想留在与德国如此接近的匈牙利）。但可以预见的是，一旦工人短缺这意味着普通匈牙利人必须加班和周末轮班（无薪），公众集会很快就反对他。与此同时，年轻、环保和技术官僚的自由派在华沙、布达佩斯、布拉格和布拉迪斯拉发的市长选举中大获全胜。在小国家中，只有一项工作比首都市长更大，因此我们不会再将这些国家称为民族主义强人政权。

Poland and Hungary have most frequently been held up as harbingers of a pan-European populist wave. In Poland, the right-wing, anti-immigrant Law and Order Party barely clings to power after being clearly rejected by the country’s youth in the July 2020 election. Hungary’s Victor Orban, icon of Europe’s illiberal strongmen, made anti-immigration a pillar of his agenda (not that migrants actually wanted to stay in Hungary with Germany so close). But predictably, once worker shortages meant that ordinary Hungarians had to work overtime and weekend shifts (without pay), public rallies quickly turned against him. Meanwhile, young, green, and technocratic liberals have swept the mayoral elections in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and Bratislava. In small countries, there’s only one job bigger than being mayor of the capital—so we won’t be referring to their countries as nationalist strongmen regimes much longer.

民粹主义者使用的扩音器是他们自己的失败。无论是左翼还是右翼，那些通过宣扬民粹主义信息而受到关注的人每天都清楚地表明责任在哪里。他们情绪高涨，实质内容匮乏，声称代表着对“一切照旧”的强烈抵制，但很快就会招致对自己的强烈抵制。例如，在意大利，草根沙丁鱼运动被认为是让马泰奥·萨尔维尼失去风帆的功劳，它传递出这样的信息：他们——普通人、中间派、工人阶级——是人民，而不是夸夸其谈的边缘人。⁸意大利最近几任总理不再是那些想成为 DJ 的人，而是学术律师朱塞佩·孔特 (Giuseppe Conte)，其次是央行行长马里奥·德拉吉 (Mario Draghi)。同样，在与布鲁塞尔玩了十年“希腊退欧”小鸡之后，希腊民粹主义政党的旋转木马音乐已经停止了。（新纳粹金色黎明党也消失了，暴露出其真正的使命——杀人暴行。） 取而代之的是，新民主党专注于政府应该做的事情：鼓励投资和创造就业机会。技术官僚可能不那么感伤，但民粹主义者的无能注定了他们的政治寿命很短。请记住，在最大和最重要的欧洲国家——德国和法国——技术官僚实用主义盛行。安格拉·默克尔 (Angela Merkel)，欧洲元老政治家，

The megaphones utilized by populists are their own undoing. Whether on the left or the right, those who gain the spotlight by preaching populist messages make clear on a daily basis where the buck stops. High on emotion and low on substance, they claim to represent a backlash against “business as usual,” yet quickly invite a backlash against themselves. In Italy, the grassroots Sardines movement, for example, has been credited with taking the wind out of Matteo Salvini’s sails with a message that they—ordinary, centrist, working-class—are the people, not the bombastic fringe.⁸ Instead of wannabe DJ drop-outs, Italy’s most recent prime ministers have been the academic lawyer Giuseppe Conte followed by central banker Mario Draghi. Similarly, after a decade of playing “Grexit” chicken with Brussels, the music has stopped on Greece’s merry-go-round of populist parties. (The neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party also disappeared, exposed for murderous thuggery, its true vocation.) In their place, the New Democracy Party is focused on what a government should do: encourage investment and create jobs. Technocrats may be less sentimental, but populists’ incompetence guarantees a short political lifespan. And remember that in the largest and most important European states—Germany and France—technocratic pragmatism prevails. Angela Merkel, Europe’s elder stateswoman, used the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II to denounce the very idea of “the nation-state alone.”

欧洲是民族国家的诞生地，也是民族国家因人口下降、移民、异族通婚和公民权利法律变化而被最迅速稀释的地方。欧洲人曾经因国籍而严重分裂。现在，他们有了一代“伊拉斯谟婴儿”，他们的父母是在跨境交流项目中相识的 X 世代，即第一代后民族欧洲人。此外，进入欧洲的移民数量及其来源地的多样性都在增加。无论你今天从极右翼政党那里听到什么，供给和需求仍然是比历史上任何民粹主义运动都强大得多的力量。如果民族主义和作为经济必要性的移民之间存在深刻且不可调和的紧张关系，那么没有一个西方国家最终属于前一类。

Europe—the birthplace of the ethnically defined nation-state—is also where nation-states are being most rapidly diluted through demographic decline, migration, intermarriage, and legal changes to citizenship rights. Europeans once divided themselves violently by nationality; now they have a generation of “Erasmus babies” born of Gen-X parents who met during cross-border exchange programs—the first generation of post-national Europeans. Furthermore, both the number of migrants into Europe and the diversity of where they come from are growing. No matter what you hear from far right political parties today, supply and demand remains a far more powerful force than any populist movement in history. If there is a deep and irreconcilable tension between ethnonationalism and immigration as economic necessity, not a single Western country ultimately lands in the former category.

在一种极端的情况下，人口扩张超出了社会政治和文化所能承受的范围。然而，到那时，人口统计时钟将不可能倒转。要么建立一个包容性的新国家认同，要么内战。老一代人可能会坚持他们的怀旧观念，但这是当今年轻人和后代无法承受的奢侈品。

There is an extreme scenario in which demographic expansion goes further than societies can politically and culturally manage. By that point, however, turning back the demographic clock won’t be possible; the choice will be between building an inclusive new national identity or civil war. An older generation may well cling to their nostalgic notions, but that’s a luxury today’s youth and future generations can’t afford.

美国从来没有像今天这样种族多元化。事实上，美国唯一一个变得更少的县多样化的地区本来就主要是西班牙裔人口，而且这种情况变得更加多样化，例如迈阿密周围或德克萨斯州的墨西哥边境沿线。年复一年，美国、英国、加拿大和德国位居全球顶级移民目的地之列。这既提醒人们民粹主义注定要失败，又警告民粹主义将继续存在，因为移民的存在给民粹主义者带来了一些值得抱怨的东西。但事实上，民粹主义者在民主政治中仍然顽固地阻碍政治进步，这正是越来越多的人——尤其是年轻人——想要逃离的原因。如果他们的国家在任何一个方向上过于倾向于政治极端主义，他们就会匆忙撤离。

America has never been more ethnically diverse than today. In fact, the only counties in America that have become less diverse are those that were already mostly Hispanic populated and have become even more so, such as around Miami or along the Mexican border of Texas. Year after year, the US, UK, Canada, and Germany rank as the world’s top immigrant destinations. This is both a reminder that populism is fated to fail but also a warning that it’s here to stay, since the presence of migrants gives populists something to rail against. But the fact that populists remain sufficiently obstinate in democratic politics to prevent political progress is precisely why more and more people—particularly the young—want to have an escape hatch. If their countries tilt too far toward political extremism in either direction, they’ll rush for the exits.

正如国家品牌专家西蒙·安霍尔特（Simon Anholt）解释的那样，年轻人选择目的地并不是基于独特的身份，而是基于一个国家是否受到钦佩或蔑视。毫不奇怪，那些对其身份最为沙文主义的国家与它们在全世界获得的钦佩之间存在着负相关关系。一个假设的世界每个人只能选择一种公民身份，这对于土耳其、俄罗斯和巴西的民族主义领导人来说将是非常尴尬的，因为他们的年轻人非常渴望弃船。

Young people choose destinations not based on exclusive identity but rather, as nation branding expert Simon Anholt explains, whether a country is admired or scorned. Not surprisingly, there is an inverse correlation between those countries most chauvinistic about their identity and the admiration they command worldwide. A hypothetical world in which each person could choose only one citizenship would be deeply embarrassing for the nationalist leaders in Turkey, Russia, and Brazil, given how keen their youth are to abandon ship.

这就是为什么当前流行的“文明国家”概念倾向于民族中心主义帝国主义，只不过是一种伪知识分子的抽象。事实上，他们的基本人口统计数据往往表明稀释而不是净化。俄罗斯和土耳其是大多数保守派文明复仇主义的典型代表。但俄罗斯的穆斯林和来自前苏联加盟共和国的突厥少数民族人口不断增加，而俄罗斯族的死亡率最高。尽管普京不愿意承认这一点，但如果不接受苏联从波罗的海到亚洲人民的巨大种族多样性，他就无法重建苏联。就土耳其而言，它还有更多库尔德公民和阿拉伯移民比以往任何时候都多。如果埃尔多安真的想复兴奥斯曼帝国，他还需要在人口方面这样做，因为奥斯曼人统治着从巴尔干半岛到伊拉克再到埃及的一系列令人眼花缭乱的种族和信仰。与俄罗斯一样，少数族裔在经济不景气时成为替罪羊，但长期成功取决于将他们转化为资产。

This is what makes the currently vogue notion of “civilizational states” bent on ethnocentric imperialism little more than a pseudointellectual abstraction. In reality, their underlying demographics often point to dilution rather than purification. Russia and Turkey are most conservatives’ poster children for civilizational revanchism. But Russia has a growing population of Muslims and Turkic minorities from former Soviet republics, while ethnic Russians have the highest death rate. As much as Putin would hate to admit it, he can’t rebuild the Soviet Union without accepting the Soviet Union’s vast ethnic diversity from Baltic to Asiatic peoples. For its part, Turkey has more Kurdish citizens and Arab migrants than ever. If Erdogan genuinely wants to resurrect the Ottoman empire, he’ll also need to do so demographically, for the Ottomans presided over a dizzying array of ethnicities and faiths, from the Balkans to Iraq to Egypt. As with Russia, minorities are scapegoated in bad economic times, but long-term success hinges on turning them into assets.

历史奖励那些建立共同身份的帝国，惩罚那些把自己凌驾于其他文明之上的文明。纵观历史，罗马和蒙古等成功的帝国都是建立在多样性和包容性的基础上，而不是单一的种族统治之上。人口减少的“文明国家”在适当的时候将不再是一个文明或国家。

History rewards empires who forge shared identity and punishes civilizations who put themselves above the rest. Throughout history, successful empires, such as the Romans and Mongols, have been built on diversity and inclusion rather than singular ethnic dominance. A “civilizational state” in demographic decline will in due course not amount to much of either a civilization or a state.

追求文明自豪感的强人可能希望将时钟重置到一个有一致民族认同的时代，但年轻一代除了祖父母的相册外并不知道那是什么样子。不可避免的是，每一代人都越来越不再扎根于单一的统治部落。国家不造就人民，国家造就人民。人民创造国家。

Strongmen pursuing an agenda of civilizational pride may want to reset the clock to a time when there was a coherent national identity, but younger generations have no idea what that looks like other than in grandparents’ photo albums. Inevitably, each generation is ever less anchored in a single dominant tribe. The nation doesn’t make people; people make the nation.

征兵：民族主义的考验

Conscription: The test of nationalism

当我在德国读完高中时，我所有的（男性）朋友都被要求向联邦国防军报到服兵役，少数人选择了Zivildienst（公务员）。逃避兵役是不可想象的。只有一个很好的医疗借口——或者严重声称自己是良心拒服兵役者（Wehrdienstverweiger））——可以获得豁免并获得公务员服务的途径。从我收到的信件来看，军队和公务员似乎都同样单调。毕竟，当时是20世纪90年代中期，西欧正在享受冷战后的和平。要求将兵役期限从十八个月缩短至一年或更短的压力不断增加。到 2011 年，惰性和空白不再持续。德国转而采用全志愿军，使其成为一种职业选择（就像在美国一样），而且通常是非常临时的选择。2018年，德国基民盟提出恢复兵役以弥补军队人数骤减的想法，主要是为了迎合支持这一举措的极右翼分子。这遭到了其他人的嘲笑。

When I finished high school in Germany, all my (male) friends were required to report to the Bundeswehr for military service, with a minority opting instead for Zivildienst (civil service). Skipping out on military service was unthinkable. Only a very good medical excuse—or serious claim to be a conscientious objector (Wehrdienstverweiger)—could secure exemption and a route to civil service instead. Based on letters I received, it seems both military and civil service were equally monotonous. After all, it was the mid-1990s and Western Europe was enjoying the post–Cold War peace. Pressure had been steadily mounting to reduce the term of military service from eighteen months to one year or less. By 2011, the inertia—and the lacuna—could no longer hold. Germany switched to an all-volunteer army, making it (as in America) a career choice, often a very temporary one. In 2018, Germany’s CDU party floated the idea of bringing back military service to compensate for plummeting troop numbers, mostly as a gesture pandering to the far right that supported the move. It was ridiculed by everyone else.

对征兵的态度呈现出所谓“民族主义回归”最可怕的景象。也许没有什么问题比保护国家的责任更清楚地体现了许多社会（无论是东方还是西方）的代际鸿沟。伯特兰·罗素将爱国主义定义为“愿意为了微不足道的原因而杀人或被杀”。以此衡量，今天的年轻人是历史上最不爱国的一代。

Attitudes toward conscription present the most damning picture of the so-called “return of nationalism.” Perhaps no issue more clearly embodies the gaping generational divide across many societies—both East and West—than the duty to protect one’s country. Bertrand Russell defined patriotism as the “willingness to kill and be killed for trivial reasons.” By that measure, today’s youth are the most unpatriotic generation in history.

在整个欧洲，年轻人拒绝接受政府在他们神圣的后青春期生活中施加的任何影响。征兵制度已被废除，或者投入的时间大大减少。甚至还有瑞士——有句名言说：“瑞士没有军队，只有军队”。它是一支军队”——军事参与率迅速下降。对于老一辈的瑞士人来说，服兵役期间形成的债券转化为银行业利润丰厚的工作。但随着今天的年轻人对创业和公民追求更感兴趣，国民服役突然显得浪费时间。个人机会主义胜过集体承诺。

Across Europe, youth have rejected any whiff of government imposition in their sacred post-adolescent lives. Conscription has been abolished or the time commitment heavily reduced. Even Switzerland—of which it was famously said: “Switzerland does not have an army; it is an army”—has rapidly declining rates of military participation. For the older Swiss generation, bonds formed during military service translated into lucrative jobs in the banking industry. But with youth today more interested in entrepreneurship and civic pursuits, suddenly national service appears a waste of time. Individual opportunism trumps collective commitment.

在承担兵役负担方面，美国人并不比任何其他国家更爱国。越南战争后，美国恢复了全志愿军，如今，三十岁以下的美国人中只有不到三分之一有亲戚在军队服役。^V全志愿军代表着从将兵役视为爱国义务和成人仪式的巨大转变。根据兰德公司 2018 年的一项调查，在美国，职业动机（即需要军队作为雇主）远远超过制度动机（服兵役的价值）。应征入伍者的主要兴趣是摆脱不健康的环境并获得经济和教育方面的好处，而报效国家往往主要激励那些有服兵役家族史的人。9/11 恐怖袭击发生二十年后，伊拉克和阿富汗战争退伍军人所遭受的创伤让所有想要入伍的退伍军人望而却步。这些“永远的战争”表现得如此糟糕，以至于今天的年轻人会不惜一切代价避免被送往他们不相信的战争中去送死。

Americans are no more patriotic than any other nation when it comes to taking up the burden of military service. The US returned to an all-volunteer army after the Vietnam War, and today less than one-third of Americans under the age of thirty have a relative serving in the military.^V All-volunteer armies represent a sea change from military service as a patriotic duty and rite of passage. According to a 2018 survey by the RAND Corporation, occupational motivations (meaning needing the military as an employer) far outweigh institutional motivations (the value of military service) in the US. Enlistees are primarily interested in getting out of an unhealthy environment and gaining financial and educational benefits, whereas serving one’s country tends to motivate primarily those who have a family history of military service. Two decades after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the trauma suffered by Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans has discouraged would-be recruits across the board. These “forever wars” have fared so badly that youth today will do anything to avoid being sent to die in wars they don’t believe in.

即使他们愿意，很多美国公众也不适合参战。百分之七十一的美国人由于健康问题（如肥胖）、犯罪记录或教育不足而没有资格服兵役。2010 年代的一系列美国陆军报告都带有不祥的标题，例如“太胖而无法战斗”——随后是“仍然太胖而无法战斗”——（似乎是一再地）警告肥胖对美国国家安全构成的威胁。（你不能编造这些东西。）然而，如果花在社交媒体和游戏上的时间构成了为网络战职业生涯做准备，那么未来的军队有大量的新兵可供招募。这或许就是它开始积极利用 TikTok 招募更多 Z 世代志愿者的原因（直到 TikTok 失宠）。2020 年初，有关军队希望恢复兵役的传言导致兵役网站崩溃，因为害怕的年轻人紧张地在谷歌上搜索该网站。今天的美国年轻人不会回应战斗的号召。

Even if they wanted to, much of the American public isn’t fit to fight. Seventy-one percent of Americans are ineligible for military duty due to health issues (such as obesity), criminal records, or insufficient education. A series of US Army reports from the 2010s carried ominous titles such as Too Fat to Fight—followed by Still Too Fat to Fight—warning (repeatedly, it seems) of the threat obesity poses to American national security. (You can’t make this stuff up.) If time spent on social media and gaming constitutes preparation for a career in cyber warfare, however, then the army of the future has plenty of recruits to tap. This is perhaps why it began actively using TikTok to recruit more Gen-Z volunteers (until TikTok fell out of favor). In early 2020, rumors that the army wanted to reinstate the draft led to the Selective Service website crashing as fearful youth nervously Googled it. The call to fight is one today’s American youth are not going to answer.

俄罗斯似乎是一个民族主义国家的典型例子，一支由忠诚士兵组成的强大军队对于确保其地位至关重要。但俄罗斯也于2008年削减了强制征兵制，从两年缩短为一年，而维持普京在年轻人中地位的唯一承诺之一是，一旦俄罗斯有能力用一支职业军队取代征兵制，他就会完全废除征兵制。 。截至2016年，每年只有26万名新兵加入俄罗斯军队，而俄罗斯有近40万名合同兵——实际上是各个年龄段的国内雇佣兵在寻找工作，无论是维护全国各地的军事设施还是占领外国军事设施。与美国一样，俄罗斯年轻人大多在需要钱的情况下进入军事领域。

Russia would seem an obvious case of a nationalistic country for which a strong army of loyal soldiers is vital to ensuring its stature. But Russia too slashed its mandatory conscription, from two years to one, in 2008, and one of the only pledges that has maintained Putin’s standing among youth is his promise to abolish conscription entirely as soon as Russia can afford to replace it with a professional army. As of 2016, only 260,000 new draftees enter the Russian army each year, versus nearly 400,000 contract soldiers—effectively domestic mercenaries of all ages looking for a job, whether maintaining military installations across the country or occupying foreign ones. As in America, Russian youth enter the military profession mostly if they need the money.

即使在中东和亚洲等环境较艰苦的地区，年轻人也没有服兵役的兴趣。例如，土耳其和韩国都是面临真正战略风险的爱国社会。与欧洲一样，土耳其的公众压力已经导致兵役期从一年减少到六个月。但即便如此，要求也太过分了。截至 2018 年 8 月，土耳其政府允许年轻人通过购买方式结束为期六个月的服役，只服役三周支付 5,000 里拉（约 900 美元）。在注册门户上线的前两周内，就有 34 万名土耳其男性申请了豁免。那一年，又有 18 万名男子未能报到服兵役。对于土耳其青少年男性来说，存钱以保释已经成为最重要的储蓄优先事项。就是这样，或者被送到叙利亚。2020年，土耳其签署了一项协议，向在土耳其军队服役的巴基斯坦人提供公民身份，就像他们在也门为沙特阿拉伯提供公民身份一样。

Even in tougher neighborhoods such as the Middle East and Asia, youth have no appetite for military service. For example, Turkey and South Korea are both patriotic societies facing genuine strategic risks. As in Europe, public pressure in Turkey has already led to military service being reduced, from one year to six months. But even that’s too much to ask. As of August 2018, the Turkish government allowed young men to buy their way out of the six-month service and do just three weeks by paying 5,000 lira (about $900). Within the first two weeks of the registration portal going online, 340,000 Turkish men had applied for the exemption. That year, an additional 180,000 men failed to report for military service. Saving up to bail out of national service has become the most significant savings priority for any Turkish teenage male. It’s that or get sent to Syria. In 2020, Turkey signed an agreement offering citizenship to Pakistanis who would serve in its military as they have for Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

韩国的情况也类似，83% 的男性表示，如果可以的话，他们会逃避征兵。由于留守不力，军队只剩下八万人。年长的韩国人倾向于将朝鲜视为生存威胁，而年轻一代则支持文在寅总统的统一议程。事实上，政府开放朝鲜的动机之一是为大量失业的韩国年轻男性创造就业机会，这些男性将被派往朝鲜，而不是作为士兵，而是作为国家建设者。首尔最近尝试招募更多女性——男性也强烈支持这一点，作为对该国强大的#MeToo运动的报复。鉴于生育率低和#NoMarriage 流行趋势，女性不能以家庭生活为借口。在日本也是同样的情况，

The situation is similar in South Korea, where 83 percent of men say they would dodge conscription if they could. Poor retention has shrunk the army to just eighty thousand. Older South Koreans are prone to viewing North Korea as an existential threat, while the younger generation supports President Moon’s agenda of reunification. Indeed, one of the government’s motivations in opening North Korea is to create jobs for legions of unemployed young South Korean males who would be sent to North Korea not as soldiers but nation builders. Seoul has recently dabbled in trying to recruit more women—something men also strongly support, as revenge for the country’s strong #MeToo movement. Given their low fertility rate and trending #NoMarriage meme, women can’t use family life as an excuse. The same is true in Japan, where the fertility rate is so low that the Self-Defense Forces have tried appealing to women, to little avail.

中国呢？中国年轻人经常受到民族主义教条的影响，但总的来说，他们的物质主义远多于军国主义。他们知道中国可能必须与美国作战才能将其驱逐出他们的邻国，但不希望这样的冲突破坏他们舒适的生活。天安门广场大屠杀后，中国以建设民族主义的名义扩大了一年的兵役计划。但不久之后，就减少到大学一年级开始时的两周讲座和健身训练。

How about China? Chinese youth are constantly exposed to nationalistic dogma, but overall they’re far more materialistic than militaristic. They know China may have to fight America to expel it from their neighborhood, but wouldn’t want such a conflict to disrupt their comfortable existence. After the Tiananmen Square massacre, China expanded its one-year military service program in the name of building nationalism. But soon after, it was reduced to two weeks of lectures and fitness training at the beginning of the first year of university.

为什么要有军队？墨西哥等国家正在考虑解散军队，以更强大的国家军队取代军队警卫专注于打击毒品和犯罪以及控制移民。华盛顿迫使墨西哥部署更强大的部队，阻止中美洲人到达格兰德河，导致数十万危地马拉人和洪都拉斯人留在墨西哥境内。据官方统计，该国外国出生的居民不足 200 万；非官方数字是这个数字的两倍。巴西也没有面临国际军事威胁；它最大的军事部署是保护亚马逊。与此同时，肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚正在集结各自的空军来对抗数十亿只蝗虫，而不是相互对抗。在世界各地，军队在抗击冠状病毒方面发挥了至关重要的作用，军舰变成了医院，军队搭建了医疗帐篷。

Why have militaries at all? Countries such as Mexico are weighing disbanding their armies, replacing militaries with stronger national guards focused on fighting drugs and crime—and controlling migrants. Washington compelled Mexico to deploy more robust forces to block Central Americans from reaching the Rio Grande, resulting in hundreds of thousands more Guatemalans and Hondurans staying within Mexico’s borders. Officially, the country has less than 2 million foreign-born residents; the unofficial figure is twice that. Brazil, too, faces no international military threat; its largest military deployments have been to protect the Amazon. Meanwhile, Kenya and Ethiopia are marshaling their air forces to combat swarms of billions of locusts rather than each other. Across the world, militaries played a crucial role in combating the coronavirus as warships became hospitals and armies erected medical tents.

美国军队还需要重新关注存在的国内任务。随着从佛罗里达州到内布拉斯加州再到阿拉斯加州的越来越多的基地受到洪水、飓风和野火的威胁，武装部队花费更多的时间和金钱来维持自身的运作。⁹在经历了 Covid-19 管理不善、令人尴尬和致命的一年之后，有能力、有纪律的国防部加快了“曲速行动”，以支持疫苗的制造和部署。也许民族主义应该被重新定义为认识到我们往往是自己最大的敌人，并为此采取行动。

America’s military also needs to refocus on existential domestic missions. As ever more bases, from Florida to Nebraska to Alaska, are threatened by floods, hurricanes, and wildfires, the armed forces are spending more time and money simply keeping themselves operational.⁹ After an embarrassingly and deadly year of Covid-19 mismanagement, it was the capable and disciplined Defense Department that accelerated Operation Warp Speed in support of vaccine manufacturing and deployment. Perhaps nationalism should be redefined as recognizing that we are often our own worst enemies and doing something about it.

大多数国家可以而且应该对男性和女性实行一年的国民服役要求，以应对对社会凝聚力和公民文化的紧急贡献，例如老年人护理、移民同化和帮助不健康的人塑身。比尔·克林顿 (Bill Clinton) 将国民服役作为 1992 年总统竞选的核心内容。三十年后，美国仍然没有这样的强制性计划。“为美国而教”既具有竞争力又受人尊敬，但规模较小且资金不足。将爱国主义与实用主义结合起来的方法有无数种。服兵役的社会会更加团结——如果没有这种团结，民族主义最终就毫无意义。

Most countries can and should have a one-year national service requirement for both men and women, to take care of urgent contributions to social cohesion and civic culture such as elder care, migrant assimilation, and helping unfit people get into shape. Bill Clinton made national service a centerpiece of his presidential campaign in 1992. Thirty years later, America still has no such mandatory program. Teach for America is both competitive and respected, but it’s also small and underfunded. There are countless ways to blend patriotism with pragmatism. Societies with national service have more solidarity—and without that, nationalism ultimately means nothing.

我。总的来说，世界上一半的人口生活在所谓的“生育陷阱”，即低于更替出生率（每个母亲生育的孩子少于两个孩子）的国家。

I. In total, half the world’s population lives in countries falling within this so-called “fertility trap” of sub-replacement birth rates (anything less than two children per mother).

二．全球人才竞争力指数根据各国吸引和留住技术工人的能力对各国进行排名。表现最好的国家包括瑞士、新加坡、美国、英国、瑞典、澳大利亚和加拿大，其他得分最高的国家都是欧洲国家。

II. The Global Talent Competitiveness Index ranks countries by their ability to attract skilled workers and retain them. Its top performers include Switzerland, Singapore, the US, Britain, Sweden, Australia, and Canada, with all the other top scorers being European.

三．9/11 事件后的三年里，赴美国际学生申请量下降了 30%，十年后外国学生净入学人数下降了 2.4%。Burton Bollag，“美国大学的外国入学人数 32 年来首次下降”，纪事报，2004 年 11 月 10 日。

III. In the three years after 9/11, international student applications to the US dropped by 30 percent, and a decade later net enrollment of foreign students had fallen by 2.4 percent. Burton Bollag, “Foreign Enrollments at American Universities Drop for the First Time in 32 Years,” Chronicle, November 10, 2004.

四．这已经对地区移民产生了影响：印巴分治​​后留在巴基斯坦的印度教徒返回印度的人数创历史新高，每年翻一番，2018 年达到一万两千多人。

IV. This has already impacted regional migrations: Those Hindus who remained in Pakistan after Partition have been returning to India in record numbers—doubling every year to more than twelve thousand in 2018.

五。退伍军人，包括过去二十年在伊拉克和阿富汗服役的退伍军人，构成了他们自己的家庭社会阶层，他们定居在离他们服役的基地不远的地方，他们的家人依赖军事福利提供的社会服务和福利。

V. Veterans, including those who have served over the past twenty years in Iraq and Afghanistan, constitute their own social class of families, settled perhaps not far from the bases they served at, their families dependent on social services and welfare provided by military benefits.

六．这本身就证明身份是多重且重叠的。具有讽刺意味的是，民族主义者指责许多普通宗教人士是极端主义者，而实际上他们最熟悉持有多重身份的挑战。民族主义者才是极端主义者，是单一身份的简单心态的囚徒。

VI. This is in itself evidence that identities are multiple and overlapping. It’s ironic, then, that nationalists accuse many ordinary religious people of being extremists when they are in fact most familiar with the challenge of holding manifold identities. It’s nationalists who are the extremists, prisoners of the simple-minded mentality of a singular identity.

第3章世代迁移

CHAPTER 3 GENERATION MOVE

全球第一代

The first global generation

整整二十五年前，我是联合国青年股的正式实习生，也是团队中唯一真正的年轻人。该部门的大部分预算都用于召集和培训年轻的活动人士，以游说政府在制定社会政策时纳入他们的观点。这些千禧一代后来成为进步的市长和部长、运行社会正义团体的“事业公民”、多边人道主义组织的管理者以及促进利益相关者参与、可持续供应链和影响力投资基金的企业“内部企业家”。如此多的年轻人想要这些工作，以至于商业、法律和政策学校都进行了大规模的课程升级，以满足需求。

Exactly twenty-five years ago I was a card-carrying intern in the United Nations Youth Unit—and the only actual youth on the team. Most of the unit’s budget was spent on convening and training young activists to lobby their governments to include their views when making social policy. Those millennials have gone on to become progressive mayors and ministers, “cause-mopolitans” running social justice groups, managers at multilateral humanitarian organizations, and corporate “intra-praneurs” advancing stakeholder engagement, sustainable supply chains, and impact investment funds. So many youth want these jobs that business, law, and policy schools have undergone massive curricular upgrades to cope with the demand.

我从 20 世纪 90 年代那些以年轻人为中心的实习中回忆起一个不可动摇的观察，即尽管每位代表都专注于国内的国家变革，但他们的友情是代代相传的。政治身份也是如此：现在它更多地是代际的而不是国家的。正如卡尔·曼海姆 (Karl Mannheim) 在 20 年代所解释的那样，世代不仅具有生物学意义，而且具有社会学意义：共同的经历塑造了他们的心理。¹但只有在过去三十年里，真正的全球事件才成为一代人的里程碑：1991年苏联解体、2001年9/11恐怖袭击、2008年金融危机和2020年冠状病毒大流行。随着时间的推移，移民激增，移动电话和互联网达到普遍规模，气候变化成为地球生存的威胁。已故社会学家乌尔里希·贝克（Ulrich Beck）正确地认为，技术使自我意识超越了地理和阶级。1968年的学生示威既不像今天的#MeToo、气候行动和种族平等运动那样具有全球性和包容性。

One unshakable observation I recall from those youth-focused internships in the 1990s was that even though each delegate was focused on national change at home, their camaraderie was generational. The same is true of political identity: It is now more generational than national. As Karl Mannheim explained in the 1920s, generations are not just biological but also sociological: shared experiences shape their psychology.¹ But only in the past thirty years have truly global events served as generational milestones: the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the financial crisis of 2008, and the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. During this same time frame, migration exploded, mobile phones and the Internet reached universal scale, and climate change became an existential planetary threat. The late sociologist Ulrich Beck was correct that technology has enabled self-awareness beyond geography and class. The 1968 student demonstrations were neither as global nor as inclusive as today’s #MeToo, climate action, and racial equity movements.

事实上，今天的年轻人在不同地区持有的共同观点远多于他们与自己国家的老年人的观点。我们倾向于认为各国拥有共同的心态，但千禧一代和 Z 世代在全球范围内拥有共同的价值观，尤其是互联互通、流动性和可持续性的权利。²前几代人都无法像今天那样自信地指出这些或其他共同特征。因此，世界上最大的鸿沟不是东方与西方、北方与南方，而是年轻人与老年人。

In fact, today’s youth hold common views across geography far more than they do with older people in their own countries. We tend to think of nations as having a common mindset, but millennials and Gen-Z share values on a global scale—especially the right to connectivity, mobility, and sustainability.² For no previous generation could we so confidently pinpoint these or other common traits as we can for billions of young people today. The great divide in the world is therefore not East versus West or North versus South but young versus old.

我对青年人的困境深表同情。在过去的二十年里，我询问了无数企业家和活动家、学生和教授、政治家和记者、中间人和翻译人员，了解他们国家年轻人的生活是什么样的。在过去两年的研究和研讨会中，我有机会在小组讨论中与数百名年轻专业人士交谈。我发现，在他们眼中，几乎没有什么是一样的：地缘政治竞争（无关紧要）、金融资本主义（讨厌它）、选举民主（非必要）、住房所有权（拖累）、婚姻（以后，如果有的话），甚至大学教育（太贵了）。

I have great sympathy for the youth predicament. Over the past twenty years, I’ve queried countless entrepreneurs and activists, students and professors, politicians and journalists, fixers and translators about what life is like for the young in their countries. During the past two years of research and workshops, I’ve had the chance to speak with hundreds of young professionals in small group discussions. What I found is that almost nothing looks the same through their eyes: geopolitical rivalry (irrelevant), financial capitalism (hate it), electoral democracy (nonessential), home ownership (a drag), marriage (later, if ever), or even a college education (too expensive).

最好的政府形式……？

The best form of government…?

年轻一代对民主的幻想越来越幻灭；千禧一代受访者对政府的满意度最低。

Younger generations have been increasingly disillusioned with democracy; millennial respondents exhibited the lowest level of satisfaction with their government.

在所有这些会议中，他们总是问我的一个问题是：对他们的成功最重要的一项技能是什么？我的回答比以往任何时候都更明确：无论你拥有什么技能，都要确保它是可移植的。准备好行动吧。我想我可能对搬家略知一二。平均而言，我一生中每三到四年搬一次家。即使我们没有有效的护照（印度），我的家人也会定期搬家。从青少年时期起，我在美国、欧洲和亚洲之间所做的每一次搬家，都增强了地理变化带来的智力和职业优势。

In all these sessions, the one question they always ask me is: What is the one skill most essential for their success? More than ever, my answer is: Whatever skill you have, make sure it’s portable. Be ready to move. I suppose I might know a thing or two about moving. On average, I’ve moved every three to four years of my life. My family moved around regularly even when we didn’t have a powerful passport (Indian). Every move I’ve made since my teenage years, between the US, Europe, and Asia, has reinforced the intellectual and professional benefits of shifting geographies.

我们低估了人们离开祖国的意愿，也许是出于某种无意识的偏见，认为其他人在他们的家里可能和我们在自己的家里一样舒服。确实，从历史上看，人们倾向于在自己的民族部落附近定居。甚至许多冒险出国的人也回国照顾年迈的父母或组建家庭。例如，海外华人谈到的“文化认同”或“寻根”吸引他们回国。但没有孩子的年轻人不需要回家以特定的方式抚养孩子，也不需要父母的帮助。无论如何，今天的祖父母不希望他们的孩子回来，所以他们搬进专业护理中心，不能做全职保姆。也许最重要的是，

We underestimate people’s willingness to leave their home country, perhaps out of some unconscious bias that others may be as comfortable in their homes as we are in ours. It’s true that, historically, people have tended to settle near their national tribe; even many who ventured abroad returned to care for elderly parents or to start a family. Overseas Chinese, for example, speak of such “cultural recognition” or “searching for my roots” that lures them back home. But youth who don’t have children don’t need to go “home” to raise them a particular way, nor do they need their parents to help out. In any case, today’s grandparents don’t expect their children to return, so they’re moving into professional care centers and can’t be full-time babysitters. Perhaps most of all, today’s world is full of places where youth can co-create their social milieu rather than submitting to a predefined culture.

即使生活水平截然不同的国家，青年也面临着相似的经济挑战。例如，自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，美国工资停滞不前，而房价却翻了一番，医疗费用上涨了 280%，大学学费上涨了 500%。美国千禧一代和 Z 世代欠下约 1.5 万亿美元的学生债务，信用卡债务甚至更多。2019 年美联储的一份报告指出，千禧一代“与前几代人年轻时相比，收入较低、资产较少、财富较少”。³尽管美国拥有强大的军事实力、深厚的金融市场、创新人才和创业活力，但美国也是一个年轻人无精打采、储蓄率低、对未来信心薄弱的国家。

Even across countries with very different standards of living, youth face similar economic challenges. For example, American wages have stagnated since the 1990s while home prices have doubled, healthcare costs have risen by 280 percent, and college tuition by 500 percent. American millennials and Gen-Zers owe about $1.5 trillion in student debt and even more in credit card debt. A 2019 Federal Reserve report states that millennials “are less well off than members of earlier generations when they were young, with lower earnings, fewer assets, and less wealth.”³ Despite its military might, deep financial markets, innovative talent, and entrepreneurial dynamism, America is also a nation of listless youth with low savings and weak confidence in the future.

相比之下，中国年轻人的生活甚至比他们的父母要好得多可以想象。1980年代邓小平的改革使中国迅速成为世界工厂和增长最快的经济体，实现了历史上最广泛的大规模减贫，底层50%的人的收入翻了两番。但总体而言，他们与美国人一样每天都担心缺乏优质工作和不断上涨的生活成本。⁴北京唯一的经济适用房都在五环以外，三十年的抵押贷款需要整个大家庭才能还清。中国的高利贷者还利用了现金短缺的一代人，当他们从一家数字贷款机构借款来偿还其他贷款机构时，使数百万人陷入债务之中。

By contrast, Chinese youth are far better off than even their parents could ever have imagined. The 1980s reforms of Deng Xiaoping rapidly elevated China into the factory floor of the world and the fastest growing economy, achieving the most extensive mass poverty alleviation in history, with the bottom 50 percent seeing their incomes quadruple. Yet overall they share the same daily concerns over the lack of quality jobs and rising living costs as Americans.⁴ The only affordable homes in Beijing are outside the city’s fifth ring, and a thirty-year mortgage takes a whole extended family to pay off. Chinese loan sharks have also exploited a cash-strapped generation, plunging millions into debt as they borrow from one digital lender to pay off the others.

对于年轻人、城市人和技术人员来说，中国仍然是一片充满机遇的土地。受过教育且没有孩子的千禧一代可以在这里任何地方花钱；他们广阔的领域（像美国一样）是一个巨大的国内市场。他们毫不犹豫地在中国的大型企业或初创公司中跳槽。但如果需要的话，他们也愿意撤离一线城市。中国有如此多的发展中城市，年轻人的到来将二线城市变成了下一个一线城市。长沙、昆明和重庆正在变得像奥斯汀、匹兹堡和亚特兰大一样——只不过面积扩大了十倍以上。中国青年珍视国家的稳定，从而实现身体和职业的流动。牛津历史学家拉纳·米特表示，这就是为什么他们中的许多人被毛主义——具有中国特色的千禧年社会主义所吸引。

For the young, urban, and skilled, China remains a land of opportunity. Educated and childless millennials can spend their money anywhere here; their vast domain is (like America) one enormous domestic market. They bounce from job to job among China’s megacompanies or startups without hesitation. But they’re also willing to decamp from first-tier cities if need be. China has so many growing cities that youth arrivals turn second-tier cities into the next first-tier cities. Changsha, Kunming, and Chongqing are becoming like Austin, Pittsburgh, and Atlanta—except more than ten times bigger. Chinese youth prize the national stability that enables this physical and professional mobility. That’s why, according to Oxford historian Rana Mitter, many of them have been drawn to Maoism—millennial socialism with Chinese characteristics.

世界各地的千禧一代也表示，他们因工作繁重而过度劳累。记者马尔科姆·哈里斯 (Malcom Harris) 将这个年轻的美国不稳定阶层描述为“一群嗡嗡作响的自由仆人，永远在行动”。⁵许多人退出并在其他地方以较慢的速度重新开始。那些失业者搬到更便宜的地方所造成的损失甚至更小。同样，中国的标志性大亨马云也推崇“9 9 6”工作方式——即每周工作六天，早上 9 点到晚上 9 点——而中国“蚂蚁部落”中的数百万人却找不到与他们的教育相匹配的好工作，所以他们只能苦苦挣扎。最低工资存在于城市生活的边缘。即使在百年企业长期主导刚性劳动力市场的日本，也有 35% 的年轻人在工作。现在，临时工将兼职工作外包给大公司，这样大公司就可以削减管理成本。尽管韩国承诺提高社会流动性，但韩国的“土勺”青年（相对于较富裕的“金汤匙”）却遭受着日益严重的不平等。难怪奥斯卡获奖影片《寄生虫》导演奉俊昊会说：“韩国看似光鲜亮丽，但年轻人却陷入了绝望。” ⁶

Millennials worldwide also report being overworked by the grind of the gigonomy. Journalist Malcom Harris describes this young American precariat as “buzzing clouds of freelance servants, always in motion.”⁵ Many are bowing out and starting over at a slower pace somewhere else. Those that are unemployed have even less to lose by moving to cheaper places. Similarly, China’s iconic mogul Jack Ma has glorified working “9 9 6”—meaning 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days per week—while millions in China’s “ant tribe” can’t find good jobs to match their education, so they eke out a minimum wage existence on the margins of city life. Even in Japan, where century-old companies have long dominated the rigid labor market, 35 percent of youth are now temps farmed out part-time so that big firms can pare down overhead costs. Korea’s “dirt spoon” youth (as opposed to wealthier “golden spoon”) have suffered rising inequality despite promises of greater social mobility. No wonder Bong Joon Ho, director of the Oscar-winning film Parasite, has said, “Korea seems glamorous, but the young are in despair.”⁶

经济低迷、企业裁员和自动化导致自营职业成为 Z 世代的常态。职业只不过是零工和费用的组合，无论是送食物还是为富人跑腿。从旧金山到雅加达，“财富工作”应用程序将金钱丰富但时间匮乏的人与金钱匮乏但时间丰富的人配对。十年后，成为一名职业学家会变得乏味，但这并不意味着每个人都可以从事全职工作。难怪青年博客会重复这句老话：“生命中唯一确定的就是不确定性和死亡。”

Sluggish economies, corporate downsizing, and automation have resulted in self-employment becoming the norm for Gen-Z. A career is nothing more than an assemblage of gigs and fees, whether delivering food or running errands for rich people. From San Francisco to Jakarta, “wealth work” apps pair people who are money rich and time poor with those who are money poor and time rich. Being a gigonomist becomes tedious after a decade, but that doesn’t mean full-time work will offer itself to everyone. No wonder youth blogs repeat the worn phrase “The only certainties in life are uncertainty and death.”

大多数美国年轻人尚未开始为退休进行有意义的储蓄，但他们必须搬到负担得起的地方才能真正退休。许多收入丰厚、储蓄积极的千禧一代正在从加利福尼亚等物价昂贵的州搬到俄勒冈州或亚利桑那州等物价较便宜的州。流动性强——财产很少，也没有孩子——是增加储蓄的最可靠方法。⁷对于 Z 世代来说，稳定性更加难以捉摸。即使在新冠疫情爆发之前，他们在净资产和住房资产方面就注定落后于千禧一代和 X 一代。冠状病毒使他们的情况变得更加糟糕。难怪如此多的 Z 世代寻求心理咨询或转向吸毒。当我问一位朋友，他认为十年后他的 Z 世代孩子会在哪里时，他面无表情的回答是“康复”。

Most American youth have yet to start saving meaningfully for retirement—but they will have to move to more affordable places in order to ever retire at all. Many millennials who are earning decently and saving aggressively are moving out of expensive states such as California to cheaper ones such as Oregon or Arizona. Being mobile—and having few possessions and no children—is the surest way to stretch one’s savings.⁷ For Gen-Z, stability is even more elusive. Even before Covid, they were fated to lag behind millennials and Gen-X in net worth and housing assets. The coronavirus has made their situation unfathomably worse. No wonder so many Gen-Zers have sought psychological counseling or turned to drug abuse. When I asked a friend where he thinks his Gen-Z kids would be a decade from now, his deadpan answer was “Rehab.”

毫无歉意的全球化

Globalism without apologies

今天的年轻人属于哪里？他们在哪里可以感受到自己是公民，不仅是在合法成员身份和义务方面，而且在宣誓效忠方面不论其实际国籍如何？一个人可以成为“全球公民”或“世界公民”吗？

Where do today’s youth belong? Where can they feel like citizens, not only in the sense of legal membership and obligations, but pledging allegiance irrespective of their actual nationality? Can one be a “global citizen” or “citizen of the world”?

这些术语相关但又不同。“世界公民”一词一般指的是对我们共同人性的认同以及对人权或环境等全球利益的关注。如今，有许多组织和运动都冠以“全球公民”的名义，从消除贫困的非政府组织到倡导更多公民参与的青年领导力培训项目。^I从蒙台梭利托儿所到精英国际学校，越来越多的学校教授“全球公民”课程，以及世界各地的高中采用日益流行的国际文凭（IB）课程，青少年正在被培养将自己视为全球公民。 。⁸世界联合学院 (UWC) 运动在全球拥有十几所 IB 学校，数千名学生自觉地意识到自己是一个更大社区的成员。使命驱动成为他们身份的一部分。他们不仅被教导要“成为”，还要“去做”。

The terms are related but distinct. The phrase “global citizen” generally refers to one’s identification with our common humanity and concern for global interests such as human rights or the environment. Today there are many organizations and movements bearing the name “Global Citizen,” from NGOs combating poverty to youth leadership training programs that advocate for more civic engagement.^I From Montessori nurseries to elite international schools, youth are being raised to think of themselves as global citizens through the growing number of schools teaching “global citizenship” classes and the increasingly popular international baccalaureate (IB) curriculum being adopted in high schools around the world.⁸ The United World College (UWC) movement has more than one dozen IB schools around the world, with thousands of students who are self-aware of their membership in a larger community. Being mission-driven becomes part of their identity. They are taught not just to “be” but to “do.”

积极主义教育具有政治后果。香港的必修通识教育课程强调公民参与，被认为是2019年以来引发反北京抗议浪潮的关键因素。亲北京官员很快谴责该课程是失败的；学生们认为，这可能是自 1997 年将台湾岛移交给中国大陆以来政府所做的唯一正确的事情，这就是为什么他们继续蔑视北京 2020 年的《国家安全法》，该法将进一步限制他们的自由。2020年中期的一项调查显示，四分之三的岛内年轻人首先将自己视为香港人，其次是“世界公民”和“亚洲人”——“中国人”排在最后。

Activist education has political consequences. Hong Kong’s mandatory liberal studies curriculum, which emphasizes civic engagement, has been cited as a key factor in motivating the waves of anti-Beijing protests since 2019. Pro-Beijing officials quickly denounced the curriculum as a failure; students view it as perhaps the only thing the government has done right since the 1997 handover of the island to mainland China—which is why they continue their defiance against Beijing’s 2020 National Security Law that would further curtail their freedoms. A survey in mid-2020 revealed that three-quarters of the island’s youth view themselves as Hong Kongers first, followed by “global citizens” and “Asians”—“Chinese” ranked last.

总结千禧一代或 Z 世代的心态并不困难：他们想要工作是为了生活，而不是生活是为了工作。他们想要快乐，行善，而不是贫穷。钟摆可能会重新转向专注于追求财富的努力工作，这是有道理的，但资本和劳动力之间日益扩大的鸿沟表明，成为忠诚的员工并不能保证物质或精神上的满足。公司正在紧跟员工利益变化的潮流，为个人和职业发展提供广泛的机会。瑞士信贷有一个“全球公民”计划，允许在银行有两年工作经验的人在该领域工作两个月，为红十字会、非洲的小额信贷组织、拉丁美洲的教育非营利组织或各种其他慈善机构提供志愿服务。公司支持。有偿志愿服务可以培养忠诚度、品格和友情，

Summarizing the millennial or Gen-Z mindset is not difficult: They want to work to live, not live to work. They want to be happy, do good, and not be poor. It’s plausible that the pendulum may swing back to focusing on hard work in pursuit of wealth, but the growing divide between capital and labor suggests that being devoted employees is no guarantee of material or spiritual fulfillment. Corporations are picking up on the shifting tides of employees’ interests, offering a wide range of opportunities for personal and professional growth. Credit Suisse has a “Global Citizens” program that allows people with two years of experience in the bank to take two months in the field, volunteering for the Red Cross, microfinance organizations in Africa, education nonprofits in Latin America, or various other charities the company supports. Paid volunteering builds loyalty, character, and camaraderie, while also providing tangible social benefits.

不幸的是，自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，“全球公民”一词开始与已故哈佛大学教授塞缪尔·亨廷顿 (Samuel Huntington) 所嘲笑的不受束缚的资本主义精英混为一谈，亨廷顿创造了“达沃斯人”一词。认为自己是“全球公民”的非西方人比西方人多得多。事实上，根据 2015 年 BBC Globespan 的一项调查，绝大多数自称为全球公民的人来自发展中国家尼日利亚、中国、印度、肯尼亚和巴基斯坦等国家。全球公民的原型不是乘坐私人飞机的对冲基金亿万富翁，而是印度儿童权利活动家、2014 年诺贝尔和平奖获得者凯拉什·萨蒂亚蒂 (Kailash Satyarthi)，他将自己描述为“全球公民”，既因为他的普遍事业，也因为他自己的事业政府已经如此失职。大多数人需要超越国界寻找崇高的灵感，最优秀的全球公民会做出英勇的努力来付诸行动。

It’s unfortunate then that since the 1990s the term “global citizen” has come to be conflated with the untethered capitalist elites derided by the late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, who coined the term “Davos man.” Far more non-Westerners identify as “global citizens” than Westerners. Indeed, according to a BBC Globespan survey from 2015, the vast majority of self-proclaimed global citizens come from developing countries such as Nigeria, China, India, Kenya, and Pakistan. The archetype of the global citizen is not a hedge fund billionaire in a private jet but the Indian child rights activist and 2014 Nobel Peace Prize winner Kailash Satyarthi, who describes himself as a “global citizen” both because of his universal cause and because his own government has been so derelict. Most people need to look beyond their borders for noble inspiration, and the best global citizens make heroic efforts to act on it.

下一代慈善家渴望追随乔治·索罗斯和比尔·盖茨的脚步，他们将企业财富转变为人道主义事业的战争资金。他们认为年轻和富有是成为更好的全球公民的义务，并且常常肩负着企业和社会正义的双重使命。每家主要私人银行现在都有下一代计划来帮助指导客户的慈善事业，而 Synergos 和 Nexus 等组织则迎合那些曾经是成功企业家或继承了巨额财富并希望进行社会影响力投资的年轻人。无论是西方、亚洲、阿拉伯还是非洲，推动政治本身永远无法实现的变革已成为一代人的使命。

The next generation of philanthropists aspires to follow in the footsteps of George Soros and Bill Gates, who have turned corporate fortunes into war chests for humanitarian causes. They view being young and rich as an obligation to be a better global citizen, and often wear their dual mission of enterprise and social justice on their sleeve. Each major private bank now has next-gen programs to help guide their clients’ philanthropy, while organizations such as Synergos and Nexus cater to youth who have either been successful entrepreneurs or inherited substantial wealth and want to make social impact investments. Whether Western, Asian, Arab, or African, it has become a generational mission to advance the kind of transformation that politics will never achieve on its own.

对于未来的全球公民来说，有许多历史、哲学和文学的灵感。德国启蒙运动哲学家伊曼努尔·康德认为，任何国家的公民都应按照平等的自然法受到对待。在普世人性精神的激励下，美国革命家和开国元勋托马斯·潘恩在《人权》一书中写道，“我的国家就是世界。” 康德和潘恩都被尊崇为世界主义的护身符，即伦理、文化甚至政治共同体的存在超越国家本身。我们已经存在于已故伦敦经济学院政治理论家大卫·赫尔德所说的“命运重叠的共同体”中。赫尔德认为，一个普遍的人类共同体需要将政治和法律权威置于国家主权之上。同时，到达那里的方式是自下而上的。赫尔德不仅仅是一个乌托邦理想主义者，还是一位知识分子活动家，学术界称之为“思想企业家”。赫尔德与著名社会学家安东尼·吉登斯一起制定了“第三条道路”社会民主主义概念，在 20 世纪 90 年代指导托尼·布莱尔和比尔·克林顿。他们的议程也是国际性的。赫尔德主张“世界性的民主，“坚持认为民主政府的理想不应局限于国家边界，而应适用于我们的全球机构。只有这样，我们才能“实现民主全球化，同时使全球化民主化”。这仍然是当今激励大多数“全球公民”的议程。

There are many historical, philosophical, and literary inspirations for would-be global citizens. The German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that the citizens of any state should be treated in accordance with the natural law of equality. Animated by the spirit of universal humanity, the American revolutionary and founding father Thomas Paine wrote in The Rights of Man, “My country is the world.” Both Kant and Paine are revered as talismans of cosmopolitanism, the idea that ethical, cultural, and even political communities exist beyond states alone. We have come to exist in what the late London School of Economics political theorist David Held called “overlapping communities of fate.” Held argued that a universal human community requires political and legal authority to be relocated above state sovereignty. At the same time, the way to get there is bottom up. More than a utopian idealist, Held was an intellectual activist, what academics call an “ideas entrepreneur.” Together with famed sociologist Anthony Giddens, Held crafted the “Third Way” social democratic concepts that guided Tony Blair and Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Their agenda was international as well. Held argued for a “cosmopolitan democracy,” insisting that the ideals of democratic government should not stop at the borders of nations but also apply to our global institutions. Only then could we “globalize democracy while at the same time democratize globalization.” This remains the agenda that animates most “global citizens” today.

然而，就像“全球公民”一样，“世界主义者”一词也被用作轻蔑的绰号。在这里，人们很容易忘记，最初的世界主义哲学家、希腊坚忍的第欧根尼宣称自己是有礼貌的（“宇宙公民”），不是作为一个富人，而是作为一个经常睡在大房子里的乞丐。陶瓷桶。第欧根尼认为，要想成为有美德的人，就应该言行一致。在他在古希腊群岛的漫游中，他否定了这样一种假设：只有一个人出生的城邦才能成为一个人身份的主要来源。相反，他认为，除了个人和直系亲属之外，人类共同社区还存在更大的道德义务。这就是成为全球公民的本质。

Yet much like “global citizen,” the term “cosmopolitan” has also been used as a dismissive epithet. Here again it’s all too easy to forget that the original philosopher of cosmopolitanism, the Greek stoic Diogenes, declared himself to be kosmou polite (“citizen of the cosmos”), not as a rich man but as a beggar who often slept inside a large ceramic barrel. Diogenes believed that to be virtuous, one should practice what one preaches. In his wanderings around the ancient Greek isles, he defied the assumption that only the polis into which one was born could be one’s primary source of identity. Instead, he argued that there are larger moral obligations beyond oneself and one’s immediate family to the shared community of humanity. This is the essence of being a global citizen.

那么“世界公民”呢？最简单的说，这个短语广泛地指的是一个去过很多地方旅行和生活过的人。与“全球公民”一样，这个词在 20 世纪 90 年代也开始流行，用来形容不断壮大的外籍人士和全球游牧者，无论是学生、背包客、高管、企业家还是其他国际经历赋予他们多元身份感的人——全球忠诚度与国家忠诚度相辅相成。“世界公民”也自豪地戴着这个绰号，因为他们无论身在何处都在追逐经验和机会。成为“世界公民”就是选择无根。正如冥想旅行者皮科·艾耶（Pico Iyer）在《这可能是家》中所反映的那样，“当我还是个孩子的时候，你问别人的第一个问题是‘你来自哪里？’ 现在更相关的询问是“你要去哪里？” ” ⁹

What about “citizen of the world”? At its simplest, this phrase widely connotes someone who has traveled and lived in many places. Like “global citizen,” the term also came into vogue in the 1990s to capture the growing ranks of expats and global nomads, whether students, backpackers, executives, entrepreneurs, or others whose international experiences imbued them with a pluralistic sense of identity—a global loyalty that complemented their national one. “Citizens of the world” also wear the moniker with pride as they chase experiences and opportunities wherever they may be. To be a “citizen of the world” is to be rootless by choice. As the meditative traveler Pico Iyer reflects in This Could Be Home, “When I was a boy, the first question you’d ask of someone was ‘Where do you come from?’ Now the more relevant enquiry is, ‘Where are you going?’ ”⁹

年轻的千禧一代和年长的 Z 世代尤其自由自在。普林斯顿大学等常春藤盟校鼓励学生在就读本科生之前进行间隔年旅行，甚至为此支付费用。（冠状病毒几乎使这一点变得必要。）密涅瓦学校和其他大学的校园遍布世界各地，本科生在其中轮流上课。《孤独星球》的书籍生意很兴隆，比如《大旅行》，为出国留学、间隔年和休假提供建议。许多精品协会（例如 Me to We）提倡可持续的旅行体验，从痴迷于自拍的“我”转变为更集体的“我们”。他们都在培养当今世界的年轻公民。

Younger millennials and older Gen-Zers are particularly footloose. Ivy League colleges such as Princeton and others encourage and even pay for students to take traveling gap years before enrolling as undergraduates. (The coronavirus all but made this necessary.) Minerva Schools and other colleges have campuses spread across the world among which undergraduates rotate. Lonely Planet does brisk business with books, such as The Big Trip, that advise on study abroad, gap years, and sabbaticals. A host of boutique associations (such as Me to We) promote sustainable travel experiences, shifting from the selfie-obsessed “me” to the more collective “we.” They are all training today’s young citizens of the world.

与“达沃斯人”一样，也许没有什么比对“世界公民”一词的小规模猛烈抨击更能提高“世界公民”一词的知名度了。这次是英国前首相特雷莎·梅，2016 年她向保守党同僚宣称：“如果你相信自己是世界公民，那么你就不是任何地方的公民。” 她的演讲中的讽刺意味被她的同胞们适当地驳斥了。毕竟，英国的全球流动精英主要由保守党组成，他们支持英国脱欧，同时将自己的资产转移到海外。英国脱欧后，前往西班牙、德国和法国的英国侨民激增 500% 以上。¹⁰人们会想起作者苏克图·梅塔 (Suketu Mehta) 的讽刺评论：“全球主义者就是持有护照的民族主义者。” ¹¹

As with “Davos Man,” perhaps nothing did more to elevate the visibility of the term “citizens of the world” than a petty broadside against it. This time it was former British prime minister Theresa May, who in late 2016 declared to her fellow Conservative Party members, “If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere.” The ironies of her speech have been duly picked apart by her countrymen. After all, the UK’s globally mobile elite is mostly made up of Conservatives who supported Brexit while shifting their own assets offshore. British expatriation to Spain, Germany, and France surged by more than 500 percent in the wake of Brexit.¹⁰ One is reminded of the author Suketu Mehta’s wry comment that “a globalist is a nationalist with a passport.”¹¹

个人、社会团体和社会有许多合法的方式来构建身份，而不仅仅是挥舞一面旗帜，而且其中许多方式是重叠的。由此可见，居住在某个国家不再意味着只属于它们。伟大的自由派哲学家以赛亚·柏林告诫不要将民族主义视为人类自我认同的主要模式，因为我们的个人生活是由家庭、种族、商业、宗教和其他纽带的复杂相互作用所塑造的。忠诚仍然存在，但它正在分裂和倍增。身份是复数的而不是单一的，是自我定义的而不是仅仅继承的。身份是炼金术，而不是教条。

There are many legitimate ways for individuals, social groups, and societies to construct identity beyond just waving one flag—and many of them overlap. It follows then that inhabiting nations no longer means belonging to them exclusively. The great liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin cautioned against viewing nationalism as the main mode by which humans identify themselves, given how our individual lives are shaped by the complex interplay of family, ethnicity, business, religion, and other bonds. Loyalty still exists, but it’s dividing and multiplying. Identity is plural rather than singular, self-defined rather than only inherited. Identity is alchemy, not dogma.

特蕾莎·梅以“你不知道公民身份意味着什么”结束了她现在臭名昭著的“无名公民”谩骂。谁做？它曾经代表政府与社会之间的契约，人们通过工作、税收和兵役为国家福祉做出贡献，以换取法律、政治和社会权利。但今天的年轻人已经打破了义务的平衡，声称他们有权获得环境可持续性、数字访问、全民医疗保健、教育以及遵守国际规范的政府。多哈辩论是一个独立的公民媒体倡议，询问世界各地的年轻人在听到“公民身份”这个词时有何想法。受访者谈到了“保护”和“特权”——没有人将这个词与种族身份或法律义务联系起来。

Theresa May concluded her now infamous “citizen of nowhere” invective with the line “You don’t know what citizenship means.” Who does? It once stood for a compact between government and society in which people contributed to national well-being through work, taxation, and military service in exchange for legal, political, and social rights. But today’s youth have tipped the balance of obligation, claiming their right to environmental sustainability, digital access, universal healthcare, education, and a government that complies with international norms as well. Doha Debates, an independent civic media initiative, asked young people around the world what they thought of when they heard the word “citizenship.” The respondents spoke of “protection” and “privilege”—none associated the term with ethnic identity or legal duties. The young are claiming the individual’s right to determine what citizenship means—and are willing to fight for it.

几代人的冲突

The clash of generations

现代社会契约规定，年轻人应该通过缴纳养老金税款和为老年人提供社会服务来照顾老年人，这一过程应该一代又一代地重复。今天的年轻人应该认识到，正是当今婴儿潮一代的勤奋储蓄才为他们现在认为理所当然的基础设施提供了资金。但老年人也代表了 78 万亿美元的养老金债务炸弹，没有一个年轻人愿意为其纳税——至少没有人愿意去其他地方，让其他人来付钱。¹²

The modern social contract dictates that the young should care for the old by paying taxes into pensions and staffing social services for the elderly, a process that is supposed to repeat itself generation after generation. Today’s youth should appreciate that it was the diligent savings of today’s baby boomers that financed the infrastructure they now take for granted. But the elderly also represent a $78 trillion debt bomb of pension obligations no young person wants to pay taxes for—at least, nobody who can instead go elsewhere, leaving others behind to pay for it.¹²

这场代际冲突正在西方各地的财政辩论中上演。婴儿潮一代受益于慷慨的退休生活，而年轻人则要求老年人积累的储蓄用于经济适用房、宽带互联网和技能培训。目前，老年人和富人坐拥价格过高、面积过大的房屋，他们拒绝出售，而年轻的男性学家阶层则无力支付房租。¹³他们认为，一旦老年人去世，开发商将根据他们缩小规模的需求进行重建。难怪洛杉矶的一位 Z 世代实习生对我感叹道：“我迫不及待地想让婴儿潮一代死去，这样我们就能有地方住了。” 但婴儿潮一代的死亡率预计到 2030 年代才会加速。

This clash of generations is playing out in fiscal debates across the West. Whereas baby boomers benefit from generous retirements, youth demand that the elderly’s accumulated savings be spent on affordable housing, broadband Internet, and skills training. At the moment, the old and rich are sitting on overpriced and oversized homes they refuse to sell, while the young gigonomist class can’t pay the rent.¹³ They assume that once the elderly have perished, developers will rebuild in line with their downsized needs. No wonder one Gen-Z intern in Los Angeles lamented to me, “I can’t wait for the boomers to die so that we can afford a place to live.” But baby boomer mortality is only predicted to accelerate in the 2030s.

尽管婴儿潮一代依然生机勃勃，但政府却将退休年龄从 65 岁提高到 70 岁甚至更高，而福利却缩水，迫使他们中的许多人留在就业市场，与年轻人竞争 Uber 票价和 IT 工作。在美国，三分之二的美国退休人员协会成员报告在工作场所面临歧视，促使国会在 2020 年通过反对年龄歧视的立法。这提醒人们，许多美国老年人与年轻人一样面临着甚至更多的困难，但解决问题的时间却更少他们的未来。

And while boomers are alive and kicking, governments are raising retirement ages from sixty-five to seventy and beyond while benefits shrink, forcing many of them to stay in the job market and compete with youth for Uber fares and IT gigs. In America, two-thirds of AARP members report facing discrimination in the workplace, prompting Congress to pass legislation against ageism in 2020. This is a reminder that many aging Americans are struggling as much or more than youth, but with less time to sort out their future.

随着这场代际大戏的展开，有多少年轻人愿意接受终生更高的税收，以支付一个在他们年龄足以为他们的牺牲获得回报之前崩溃的体系？欧洲人已经以社会公平的名义缴纳足够的税款，承担不起更大的负担。在美国，60% 的千禧一代没有足够的储蓄来支付已经很低的税收（与欧洲相比）。社会保障预计将在 2034 年（远远早于他们退休之前）破产，这一事实也是人们对未来感到恐惧的另一个原因。对于当今大多数美国年轻人来说，继承遗产将是一个小小的缓刑。如果他们继承了一套房子，他们要做的第一件事（特别是如果兄弟姐妹获得同等份额）就是以可耻的损失将其出售，并用这些收益来偿还信用卡和学生债务。

As this intergenerational drama unfolds, how many youth will accept a lifetime of higher taxes to pay for a system that will crumble before they’re old enough to be rewarded for their sacrifices? Europeans already pay enough taxes in the name of social equity and can’t afford a larger burden. In America, 60 percent of millennials don’t have sufficient savings to cover their already low taxes (compared to Europe). The fact that Social Security is expected to go broke in 2034 (well before they’re due to retire) is yet another reason to fear the future. For the majority of today’s American youth, inheritance will be a small reprieve. If and when they inherit a home, the first thing they’ll do (especially if siblings get an equal share) is to sell it for a shameful loss and use those proceeds to pay down credit card and student debt.

与此同时，全球财富从婴儿潮一代转移到其后代的估计为 30 万亿美元，其中大部分仍将掌握在富有的美国人、欧洲人和亚洲人手中。美国的超级富豪将把他们的意外之财投资于科技股、度假屋、加密货币，或许还有离岸资产和外国公民身份。欧洲的财富传统上更多地植根于汽车和杂货店等民族工业，但由于欧洲的养老金支出占全球的一半，下一代可能会卖掉家族企业前往瑞士。私募股权公司已经在欧洲公司推动裁员和削减成本的措施，这与盛行的亲劳工文化相冲突。法国在财富税方面的经验已经将大约五万名百万富翁赶出了该国，英国希望避免这种情况，尽管遗产税会增加急需的收入。毕竟，在英国经济复苏的前景渺茫的情况下，英国年轻人宁愿卖掉自己的遗产，也不愿看着它贬值。法国希望他们能够做到这一点，并被新成立的经济吸引力部推出的计划所吸引，例如为外国投资者提供五年免税期。税收是一个热点政治问题，但现实却要复杂得多。例如外国投资者的五年免税期。税收是一个热点政治问题，但现实却要复杂得多。例如外国投资者的五年免税期。税收是一个热点政治问题，但现实却要复杂得多。¹⁴

Meanwhile, the majority of the estimated $30 trillion in global wealth being transferred from boomers to their offspring will remain in the hands of rich Americans, Europeans, and Asians. America’s super-rich will invest their windfall in tech stocks, holiday homes, cryptocurrencies, and perhaps offshore assets and foreign citizenship. European wealth is traditionally more rooted in national industries such as automobiles and grocery stores, but with half the world’s outstanding pension payouts in Europe, the next generation may just sell off their family businesses and head to Switzerland. Private equity firms are already pushing for layoffs and cost-cutting measures at European firms, clashing with the prevailing pro-labor culture. France’s experience with a wealth tax already pushed an estimated fifty thousand millionaires out of the country, something Britain hopes to avoid even though an inheritance tax would raise desperately needed revenue. After all, with little prospect of an economic rebound in the UK, British youth would rather sell off their inheritance than watch it depreciate. France hopes they’ll do just that and be lured by schemes launched by its new Ministry of Economic Attractiveness, such as five-year tax holidays for foreign investors. Taxes are a hot button political issue but a much more slippery reality.¹⁴

在亚洲，对富人增税的呼声正促使他们先发制人地设计继承意外之财。2019年，中国和印度是失去百万富翁最多的国家，澳大利亚和美国是最大的受益者。中国年轻富有的基金经理很难他们正在努力在全球范围内传播他们的遗产，以确保他们有一个出口，以防习近平的官员袭击他们。在韩国，遗产税高达 50%，幼儿被授予父母和祖父母公司的股份来避税。在一个老龄化国家，年轻的韩国人可以用这笔钱做什么？不多，所以他们将其转移到新加坡或澳大利亚。因此，情况将会是这样的：老龄化国家的养老基金将破产，除非它们将资产投资到本国年轻人想去的地方——无论那是哪里。

In Asia, calls for higher taxes on the wealthy are prompting them to preemptively engineer inheritance windfalls. In 2019, China and India lost the most millionaires of any countries, with Australia and America the largest beneficiaries. Rich young Chinese have fund managers hard at work spreading their inheritance globally to ensure they have an exit hatch in case Xi Jinping’s apparatchiks descend on them. In Korea, where inheritance tax can reach 50 percent, toddlers are being granted shares in parents’ and grandparents’ companies to avoid tax. What can young Koreans do with this money in a country that’s aging? Not much, so they’re moving it to Singapore or Australia. And so it shall come to this: Aging countries’ pension funds will go broke unless they invest their assets in the places where their own youth are going—wherever that may be.

全世界青年，联合起来！

Youth of the world, unite!

2005年夏天，我开着一辆破旧的大众汽车进行了一次激动人心的公路旅行，从波罗的海出发，穿过东欧和巴尔干半岛，穿过土耳其，穿过高加索地区，进入中亚。土耳其散发着乐观的氛围。当时埃尔多安担任总理初期，经济蓬勃发展，人均收入达到7500美元。土耳其广阔的东翼被称为“安纳托利亚之虎”的工厂城镇正在生产纺织品和汽车零部件。十四年后，我再次穿越安纳托利亚，但我看到的不是充满活力的城镇，而是荒凉的乡村和废弃的游乐场。那些青春都去哪儿了？前往伊斯坦布尔，他们走上街头挑战埃尔多安对他们省份的忽视，并选举了一位反对派市长。

During the summer of 2005, I was on an exciting road trip in a beat-up old Volkswagen, driving from the Baltics through Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and across Turkey through the Caucasus into Central Asia. Turkey exuded an optimistic vibe. It was early in Erdogan’s tenure as prime minister, the economy was humming, and per capita income had reached $7,500. Factory towns dubbed the “Anatolian tigers” in Turkey’s vast eastern flank were churning out textiles and car parts. Fourteen years later I crossed Anatolia again, but instead of vibrant towns I witnessed a desolate countryside and abandoned playgrounds. Where did all the youth go? To Istanbul, where they took to the streets challenging Erdogan, on his neglect of their provinces, and electing an opposition mayor. Istanbul has been witnessing nearly uninterrupted tension between youth and the government since the Gezi Park protests of 2013, with a wide array of agendas pulling together: anti-corruption, pro-democracy, rural development, better education, women’s rights, and anti-gentrification.

俄罗斯也有机会提升其破旧的内陆地区的水平。但如今，没有什么比西伯利亚的村庄更具有世界末日般的景象了，这些村庄已经被掏空了十多年：参差不齐的道路被冬季的冰冻裂开，每栋木屋的玻璃都碎裂了，锈蚀腐蚀了每一个金属表面。与埃尔多安一样，普京要么忽视了叙利亚的困境该国广大东部地区的数百万人或因解雇他们喜欢的州长而侵犯了他们的政治尊严。2020年，数万名哈巴罗夫斯克居民不顾莫斯科法令，举行示威活动反对克里姆林宫。

Russia, too, has had its chances to elevate its dilapidated hinterlands. But today there are few more apocalyptic sites than Siberian villages that have been hollowed out for more than a decade: jagged roads cracked by winter ice, shattered glass in every wooden house, rust consuming every metallic surface. Like Erdogan, Putin has either ignored the plight of the millions in the country’s vast east or assaulted their political dignity by sacking their preferred governors. In 2020, tens of thousands of residents of Khabarovsk defied Moscow edicts to demonstrate against the Kremlin.

在世界各地，中产阶级抗议腐败，而工人阶级则抗议经济困难。他们共同构成了一群就业不足、教育过度的年轻男女，他们拥有大学学位，从事卑微的工作，而劳累过度、工资过低的蓝领工人，尽管投入了尽可能多的工作时间，却仍入不敷出。不平等确实让他们烦恼，但贫困和缺乏机会才是引起他们愤怒的更直接原因。科学家彼得·图尔钦 (Peter Turchin) 认为，现代社会产生了太多教育过度、成绩不佳的人，这是当今国内地盘争夺战的主要原因。

Across the world, the middle class protests corruption while the working class protests economic hardship. Together they form a constellation of the underemployed and overeducated young men and women who have university degrees and menial work, and the overworked and underpaid blue-collar workers who can’t make ends meet despite putting in as many working hours as allowed. Inequality surely annoys them, but poverty and lack of opportunity is the more proximate cause of their anger. According to scientist Peter Turchin, modern societies have produced too many overeducated underachievers, a prime cause of today’s domestic turf wars.

智利就说明了这一点。2019年，圣地亚哥地铁票价上涨，引发智利自1990年恢复民主以来首次进入紧急状态，也是皮诺切特政权以来首次在国内部署军队。由于采矿业和银行业在其经济中的突出作用，智利的收入不平等现象非常严重也就不足为奇了；这些行业产生了亿万富翁。但如果没有他们，智利将像秘鲁一样贫穷，而不是成为南美洲最富有的国家（人均）。抗议爆发时，智利的不平等实际上正在下降，但普通公民并没有感觉到，因为交通、教育、医疗保健和住房对大多数人来说仍然太贵。持续的鼓动得到了回报：2020年，智利人以压倒性多数投票决定重写宪法。

Chile illustrates the point. In 2019, metro fare hikes in Santiago prompted the first state of emergency since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, and the first domestic deployment of the military since the Pinochet regime. Owing to the prominent role of mining and banking in its economy, Chile not surprisingly has very high income inequality; these industries produce billionaires. But without them, Chile would be as poor as Peru rather than being the richest country (per capita) in South America. At the time the protests broke out, Chile’s inequality was actually declining, but ordinary citizens didn’t feel it because transport, education, healthcare, and housing were still too expensive for most. The persistent agitation has paid off: In 2020, Chileans overwhelmingly voted to rewrite their constitution.

年轻人见了就知道治理腐败。当公共交通费用上涨时，学生就会发生骚乱。当天然气和电力补贴被削减时，大规模抗议就会随之而来。明智的政府不会重复彼此的错误。同年，智利提高了交通费，爱沙尼亚免费提供所有公共巴士。伊朗定期切断互联网接入，而克罗地亚则确保互联网无处不在、快速且免费。但政府积极关注住房、教育和医疗保健的国家名单就业时间很短。结果，全球下层阶级的反抗仍在继续。

Youth know rotten governance when they see it. When public transport costs are raised, students riot. When gas and electricity subsidies are cut, mass protests ensue. Wise governments do not repeat one another’s mistakes. The same year Chile raised transport fares, Estonia made all public buses free. Iran regularly cuts off Internet access, while Croatia makes sure that it’s ubiquitous, fast, and free. But the list of countries where governments are proactively focused on housing, education, and employment is very short. As a result, the global underclass revolt continues.

即使在更加恭顺的亚洲社会，年轻人也在采取微妙但重大的反对权威的政治行动。印度尼西亚（世界上穆斯林人口最多的国家）的分析人士长期以来一直担心伊斯兰主义的崛起，但该国最著名的新政党印度尼西亚团结党（PSI）不允许成员超过 45 岁，并提倡青年和妇女参与选举。问题。¹⁵印尼年轻人更热衷于在 Go-Jek 超级应用程序上寻找工作，这样他们就能买得起房。在泰国，由年轻人领导的未来前进党成员现在公开反对该国挥霍无度的君主制，并利用《饥饿游戏》中的三指敬礼来呼吁团结。

Even in more deferential Asian societies, youth are making subtle but significant political moves against authority. Analysts of Indonesia (the world’s most populous Muslim country) have long feared the rise of Islamism, but the country’s most notable new political party, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), doesn’t allow members over forty-five and promotes youth and women’s issues.¹⁵ Young Indonesians are far more interested in chasing gigs on the Go-Jek super-app so they can afford homes. In Thailand, members of the youth-led Future Forward Party now openly oppose the country’s profligate monarchy, using the three-fingered salute from The Hunger Games as their call to solidarity.

具有讽刺意味的是，年轻人抗议最多的地方是他们享有最自由和最高生活水平的地方：欧洲。在过去的十年中，西班牙的愤怒运动、nuit debout（夜间起义）和黄背心等运动法国的“黄背心”运动将 X 世代和千禧一代聚集在一起，反对腐败、缺乏就业机会、燃油税和其他不满。2011年夏天，警察的一次暴力行为引发了伦敦和其他十几个城市的骚乱，导致五人死亡、三千多人被捕。煽动者和抢劫者不仅对警察感到愤怒，而且对一切都感到愤怒。十四世纪黑死病之后，英国的农民起义见证了下层阶级要求结束贵族农奴制和降低税收。如果废除欧洲富裕君主制的呼声不断高涨，不仅是因为某些王室成员的肆无忌惮的行为，而且只是因为他们拥有的大量土地可以很容易地重新用于真正的公共利益，请不要感到惊讶。欧洲有许多巴士底狱可供攻击。

Ironically, youth protest most where they enjoy the most freedom and highest living standards: Europe. Over the past decade, movements such as the indignados in Spain, and the nuit debout (uprising at night) and gilets jaunes (yellow vests) in France have brought together Gen-X and millennials against corruption, the lack of jobs, fuel taxes, and other grievances. During the summer of 2011, one act of police brutality sparked riots across London and a dozen other cities, leading to five deaths and more than three thousand arrests. Agitators and looters weren’t angry only at the police, but at everything. After the fourteenth century Black Death, the Peasant Revolt in England saw the underclass demand an end to aristocratic serfdom and lower taxes. Don’t be surprised if calls to dismantle Europe’s opulent monarchies crescendo not only for the unscrupulous behavior of particular royals but simply for their vast land holdings that could easily be repurposed for genuine public benefit. Europe has many Bastilles to storm.

被剥夺财产的人对排斥他们的制度感到不满。几个世纪以来，私人房屋所有权一直被视为一种经济权利和对政治暴政的制衡。但年轻人的住房拥有率急剧下降。¹⁶即使在大城市租一套两居室的公寓，靠底薪也是难以想象的。¹⁷而老年房主由于不想看到自己的财产价值（进一步）下跌，千禧一代和 Z 世代的结婚率较低，就业前景较差，而且比前一代人更有可能被捕。¹⁸准父母往往会变得更加守法，但由于看不到孩子，我们会看到更多邦妮和克莱德。

Dispossessed people resent the system that excludes them. For centuries, private home ownership has been considered both an economic right and a check on political tyranny. But home ownership among the young has dropped sharply.¹⁶ Even renting a two-bedroom apartment in a major city is unimaginable on a basic salary.¹⁷ Whereas older homeowners don’t want to see their property values fall (further), millennials and Gen-Zers have lower marriage rates, weaker job prospects, and are also more likely to have been arrested than any previous generation.¹⁸ Expecting parents tend to become more law-abiding, but with no kids in sight, we’ll see more Bonnies and Clydes.

没有哪两个因素比男性青年失业率高和不平等程度高更能预测内战，而这两个因素结合在一起——以及大量枪支——就会成为一个火药桶。年轻的阿拉伯圣战分子、欧洲新纳粹民兵、俄罗斯雇佣兵、巴西贫民窟街头帮派、墨西哥毒贩、非洲反叛组织——全都是由无所事事的千禧一代和 Z 世代男人和男孩组成。在美国，这是黑人或拉丁裔下层阶级和白人布加卢新法西斯分子。伊拉克叛乱之后，五角大楼开始重新制定城市游击战理论，预计大城市贫民窟也会发生类似的骚乱，结果却发现自己国家的街道将在 2020 年发生爆炸。

No two factors better predict civil war than high male youth unemployment and high inequality, and the two in combination with each other—and lots of guns—makes for a tinderbox. Young Arab jihadists, European neo-Nazi militias, Russian mercenaries, Brazilian favela street gangs, Mexican drug dealers, African rebel groups—all are made up of millennial and Gen-Z men and boys with nothing better to do. In America it’s the black or Latino underclass and white boogaloo neo-fascists. After the Iraqi insurgency, the Pentagon began dusting off doctrines for urban guerrilla warfare in anticipation of similar unrest in megacity slums—only to find the streets of its own country exploding in 2020.

进入安提法。20 世纪中叶欧洲的 Antifa 运动几乎已经消亡，直到 2010 年代，欧洲的反紧缩抗议活动和唐纳德·特朗普的当选才使大西洋两岸的 Antifa 运动卷土重来。这些共产主义者、社会主义者和无政府主义者组成的集体反对强人政府和白人至上主义运动，但作为自治组织运作。安提法成员并没有害怕他们的政府，而是着手唤起他们所反对的暴行。波特兰一直是美国最活跃的 Antifa 大本营，但在 2020 年“黑人命也是命”抗议活动期间，全国各地的组织纷纷涌现，受到 Twitter、Instagram 和 WhatsApp 上全球同僚的启发、激励和煽动。在抗议者与当局的猫鼠游戏中，在线工具将继续发展。他们会以透明的名义进行黑客攻击，加密维护隐私，利用区块链建立安全身份和交易的平行世界。互联和移动的一代将继续给全世界带来麻烦。

Enter Antifa. The Antifa movements of mid-twentieth-century Europe had all but died out until the 2010s, when anti-austerity protests in Europe and the election of Donald Trump brought them back on both sides of the Atlantic. These collectives of communists, socialists, and anarchists oppose strongman governments and white supremacist movements, but operate as autonomous cells. Rather than fear their governments, Antifa members set out to evoke the very brutality they oppose. Portland has been America’s most active Antifa stronghold—but cells popped up all across the country during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests—inspired, motivated, and goaded by their peers worldwide on Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp. Online tools will continue to evolve amid protestors’ cat and mouse with authorities. They’ll hack in the name of transparency, encrypt to maintain privacy, and use the blockchain to establish a parallel world of secure identity and transactions. A connected and mobile generation will continue to cause headaches across the world.

或者千禧一代和 Z 世代最终会成为保守的成年人，就像美国伍德斯托克音乐节上的许多人一样而欧洲的68一代呢？这需要他们获得一定的稳定性来坚持。今天的大多数年轻人仍然坐在场边，沉默的大多数忙于完成学业和找工作等平淡的担忧。他们等待变革的时间越长，他们就越有可能去寻找抗议不是全职工作、人们分享对身份和优先事项的理解的社区。

Or could it be that millennials and Gen-Z will eventually become conservative adults as was the case with many of America’s Woodstock and Europe’s ’68 generation? That would require them attaining some stability to cling on to. Most of today’s youth are still physically sitting on the sidelines, a silent majority occupied with prosaic concerns such as finishing school and looking for work. The longer they have to wait for change, the more likely it becomes that they’ll move in search of communities where protesting is not a full-time job, and where people share their understanding of identity and priorities.

微型熔炉

Micro melting pots

在过去的四十年里，我有幸沉浸在世界上几个最国际化的城市——迪拜、纽约、柏林、日内瓦、伦敦和新加坡。所有国家的外国出生居民比例都很高，因此情况更好。地球村的这种城市缩影可能看起来是自组织的，但事实并非如此。需要不断的管理来创造一个和谐的多种族环境，让所有人都能在不惧怕他人的情况下蓬勃发展。

Over the past four decades I’ve been fortunate to immerse myself in several of the world’s most cosmopolitan cities—Dubai, New York, Berlin, Geneva, London, and Singapore. All have a high percentage of foreign-born residents and are the better for it. Such urban microcosms of the global village may appear to be self-organizing, but they’re anything but. Constant curation is required to create a harmonious multiracial environment in which all can thrive with no fear of others.

伦敦的全球人口结构与英国较为单一的农村地区形成鲜明对比，这有助于解释为什么伦敦对英国退欧的立场与中心地带的立场明显不同。尤其是伦敦，它不仅是国际特赦组织等全球关注组织的总部，也是许多国际化作家的故乡，如伊恩·麦克尤恩和石黑一雄，他们的作品探讨文明和跨文化同化的主题。土耳其小说家埃利夫·沙法克 (Elif Shafak) 认为自己是伊斯坦布尔人和伦敦人，但最重要的是开放社会的倡导者，在这种社会中，人们会为自己是一名公民而感到自豪。尽管英国做出了违背自身利益的集体决定，但伦敦的多元化人口仍使其蓬勃发展。讽刺的是，尽管鲍里斯·约翰逊作为首相支持脱欧，在担任伦敦市长期间，他倡导“伦敦签证”，以确保该市维持其人才管道。现在，他的市长继任者萨迪克·汗 (Sadiq Khan) 正在推动“快速通道”签证，以便伦敦可以引进它所需要的技术工人。就其本身而言，英国其他国家应该希望他成功。

London’s global demographics stand in sharp contrast to England’s more monochrome rural areas, helping explain why the capital’s stance on Brexit differed markedly from the heartland’s. London in particular is not only the headquarters of such globally concerned organizations as Amnesty International but also has been home to many cosmopolitan writers such as Ian McEwan and Kazuo Ishiguro, whose work explores themes of civility and cross-cultural assimilation. The Turkish novelist Elif Shafak identifies as an Istanbulite and Londoner, but most of all an advocate for open society—the kind of place where one would be proud to be a citizen. London’s diversity of people has kept it thriving despite Britain’s collective decisions against its own interests. Ironically, though Boris Johnson backed Brexit as prime minister, while mayor of London he advocated for “London visas” to ensure the city maintained its talent pipeline. Now his successor as mayor, Sadiq Khan, is pushing for “fast track” visas so that London can bring in the skilled workers it needs. For its own sake, the rest of the UK should hope he succeeds.

纵观历史，大城市一直对贸易和人才开放，因为它们知道它们的生存取决于此。随着华人南下和印度人在大英帝国的流通，新加坡在几个世纪的时间里演变成一个多民族的环境。但自 1965 年独立以来，由于开国元勋李光耀坚持实行种族混合的公共住房以防止出现贫民窟，这里有意成为了一个大熔炉。所有种族共用床铺和基础训练的强制性国民服役也促进了跨种族的终生友谊。结果是：新加坡迄今为止是世界上异族通婚率最高的国家（约三分之一），尤其是成为“中印”孩子父母的印度华裔夫妇。随着混血家庭成为社会常态，^二

Throughout history, great cities have been open to trade and talent, knowing that their survival depends on it. Singapore evolved over several centuries into a multi-ethnic milieu as Chinese migrated southward and Indians were circulated across the British empire. But since independence in 1965, it has become a melting pot by design as founding father Lee Kuan Yew insisted on ethnically mixed public housing to prevent ghettos. Mandatory national service in which all races share bunks and basic training also gave rise to lifelong friendships across ethnic lines. The result: Singapore has by far the world’s highest rate of interracial marriages (about one-third), especially Indo-Chinese couples who become parents of “Chindian” children. As mixed race families become the social norm, pleas for ethnically based politics become weaker and having multiple identities becomes a genetic norm.^II

新加坡必须处理的紧张关系是，在向每个民族授予许可——官方语言、国家法定节假日、实践其各种习俗的权利——的同时，还要不懈地促进民族文化的发展。泛种族和非宗派的身份。尽管它是一个以华人为主的国家，但这种公民身份诉诸于后殖民国家建设等共同经历，并指向共同繁荣的未来。但维护社会稳定的任务永远不会完成。新一波中国大陆（以及较小程度上的印度）移民在创业时没有吸收新加坡公民身份的主要特征，例如积极拥抱多样性和学习英语。政府后来加强了同化计划，以避免外国飞地扎根。

The tension Singapore must manage is between granting every ethnic group its license—official language, national holidays, right to practice their various customs—while also relentlessly promoting a national identity that is pan-ethnic and nondenominational. Even though it’s a majority Chinese country, this civic identity appeals to common experiences such as postcolonial state building and points to a future of shared prosperity. But the task of nurturing communal stability is never complete. A new wave of mainland Chinese (and to a lesser degree Indian) migrants have set up shop without absorbing the principal features of Singapore’s civic identity such as actively embracing diversity and learning English. Belatedly, the government has stepped up assimilation programs to avoid foreign enclaves from taking root.

从失败中学到的东西和从成功中学到的东西一样多。尽管香港作为资本主义圣地吸引着来自世界各地的人才，几十年来，它未能建造足够的经济适用住房并解决严重的收入不平等问题。与此同时，过去20年超过100万中国大陆人口的涌入造成了身份危机。当中国在 2019 年通过了一项有争议的引渡法，以及在 2020 年通过了更为不祥的国家安全法时，这些潜在的挫败感猛烈地燃烧起来。高昂的生活成本和政治动荡不仅削弱了香港对外国专业人士的吸引力，而且具有讽刺意味的是，这也让成群结队的香港人望而却步。北至深圳，这里现在比香港更富裕，而且呈现出更加有序的模式，拥有大量新建的补贴公寓。与此同时，中国内地人继续涌入香港，从大亨到官僚、进出口推销员和宪兵。中国正在迅速用自己的“好鱼”取代“坏鱼”，这些“好鱼”将买入香港现已贬值的房地产和金融市场，并采取更多符合大陆利益的行动。人员的流动塑造了地方的忠诚度。

There is as much to be learned from failure as success. Despite Hong Kong’s status as a capitalist mecca attracting talent from around the world, it has failed for decades to build sufficient affordable housing and address massive income inequality. Meanwhile, the influx of more than 1 million mainland Chinese over the past two decades has created an identity crisis. These underlying frustrations combusted violently when China passed a controversial extradition law in 2019 and the even more ominous national security law in 2020. High living costs and political turbulence have not only diminished Hong Kong’s allure to foreign professionals, but also ironically pushed droves of Hong Kongers north to Shenzhen, which is now both wealthier than Hong Kong and appears a more orderly model, with huge new blocks of subsidized apartments. Meanwhile, the inflow of mainland Chinese into Hong Kong continues, from tycoons to bureaucrats, import-export salesmen, and military police. China is quickly replacing the “bad fish” with its own “good fish” who will buy into Hong Kong’s now devalued real estate and financial markets and act more in the interests of the mainland. The movement of people shapes the allegiance of places.

今天你只需年满四十岁，就能亲眼目睹阿联酋的构成如何发生巨大变化，从一个靠采珠和与其他海湾部落及伊朗贸易为生的阿拉伯贝都因社会，变成了世界上最富有的国家之一，摩天大楼闪闪发光。由数百万亚洲客工建造。阿联酋人口自 1971 年建国以来已增长了40 倍，当时其人口仅为 25 万。如今，它是世界上迄今为止最后民族化的国家：每个人都是少数群体——甚至包括阿联酋人自己，他们在该国 1000 万人口中仅占 100 万。

You only need to be forty years old today to have witnessed firsthand how the UAE’s composition has changed drastically from its days as an Arab Bedouin society living off pearling and trade with other Gulf tribes and Iran into one of the world’s wealthiest countries, glittering with skyscrapers built by millions of Asian guest workers. The UAE’s population has grown fortyfold since its founding in 1971, when its population was merely 250,000. Today it is the world’s most post-national country by far: Everyone is a minority—even the Emiratis themselves, who make up only 1 million of the country’s 10 million population.

鉴于其游牧历史和中心地理位置，阿联酋的特点是新定居者的进出，无论是永久的还是临时的。中产阶级外籍人士和保税移民劳工齐头并进：前者的到来为后者带来了更多的工作。相比之下，当大量外籍人士因金融危机或大流行封锁而逃亡时，对女佣、送货员和服务员的需求就会减少。保安人员。除非让所有家庭都感觉自己是稳定的利益相关者，否则阿联酋就不能依赖他们的忠诚。

Given its nomadic history and central geography, the UAE has been defined by the comings and goings of new settlers, both permanent and temporary. Middle-class expats and bonded migrant laborers move in tandem: The arrival of the former begets more work for the latter. By contrast, when a large number of expats bail out due to financial crises or the pandemic lockdown, there is less need for maids, deliverymen, and security guards. Unless families across the board are made to feel like settled stakeholders, the UAE can’t rely on their loyalty.

当绝大多数人永远不会成为公民时，阿联酋将如何吸引更多永久居民？几十年来，占总人口三分之一的印度专业人士被认为是温顺的临时工，没有居住权的保障。但近年来，阿联酋授予了越来越多的外国人长期居留权，甚至允许他们在没有当地合作伙伴的情况下完全拥有公司。2019 年的“外籍人士法”曾一度拒绝为其年长亲属发放签证，但现在允许收入可观的印度人携带家庭成员入境。阿联酋不再将老年人视为经济负担，而是为他们提供有空调的退休殖民地，同时建设医疗旅游业以吸引欧洲人和美国人。

How will the UAE attract more permanent residents when the vast majority will never become citizens? For decades, Indian professionals—who make up one-third of the entire population—were considered docile temporary workers with no guarantee of residency rights. But in recent years, the UAE has granted ever more foreigners long-term residency, even allowing them to fully own companies without local partners. Whereas once it rejected visas for their elderly relatives, the 2019 “expat law” allows Indians earning a decent income to bring in family members. Rather than viewing the elderly as a financial burden, the UAE is now offering air-conditioned retirement colonies for them, while building its medical tourism industry to attract Europeans and Americans. If India’s environment continues to worsen—both ecologically and politically—even more wealthy and upwardly mobile Indians will decamp to the UAE.

同样，在阿联酋长大但拥有印度护照的印度外籍孩子（像我一样）最终移居美国或加拿大以获得更好的工作和公民身份。他们也认为自己是学者迪帕克·乌尼克里希南（Deepak Unnikrishnan）所说的“临时人”。但为了留住一些失去的人才，阿联酋也开始向非阿拉伯人提供公民身份——无论他们的宗教信仰如何。前往阿联酋的印度移民大多是来自喀拉拉邦或泰米尔的穆斯林（以及基督徒和印度教徒）以及旁遮普印度教徒，因此阿联酋对基督教教堂和印度教寺庙持宽容态度。在阿布扎比的萨迪亚特岛，一座大型跨宗教综合体预计将包含一座彼此相邻的清真寺、教堂和犹太教堂。更广泛地说，阿联酋修改了一套民法，允许未婚夫妇同居，修改了管理离婚的外国法律，

Similarly, Indian expat kids who grew up in the UAE but had Indian passports (like me) eventually moved to America or Canada for better work and citizenship. They too thought of themselves as what scholar Deepak Unnikrishnan calls “temporary people.” But to retain some of this lost talent, the UAE is starting to offer citizenship to non-Arabs as well—irrespective of their religion. Indian migrants to the UAE have mostly been Muslims (as well as Christians and Hindus), from Kerala or Tamil, and Punjabi Hindus, hence the UAE’s tolerance for Christian churches and Hindu temples. On Saadiyat Island in Abu Dhabi, a large interfaith complex is slated to contain a mosque, church, and synagogue adjacent to one another. More broadly, the UAE has changed a suite of civic codes to allow for unmarried couples to live together, foreign laws to govern divorce, and public alcohol consumption.

该国的商业中心迪拜就是这种永恒循环和重叠身份的缩影。法律维护稳定，政策力求通过人工智能驱动的城市促进和谐名为“Rashid”的礼宾人员为享受迪拜生活提供指导，为积极的职场文化企业颁发“幸福文凭”，并推出“快乐支付”应用程序，鼓励人们做社区服务来代替缴纳交通罚款。

The country’s commercial hub of Dubai is the epitome of such perpetual circulation and overlapping identities. The law enforces stability, while policy seeks to promote harmony through an AI-powered city concierge called “Rashid” who provides guidance on enjoying Dubai life, the awarding of “happiness diplomas” to companies for positive workplace culture, and a “Happy to Pay” app that encourages people to do community service in lieu of paying traffic fines.

许多城市面临着允许移民而不促进同化的风险，随着越来越多的移民进入并选择阻力最小的道路，贫民窟会变得更加贫民窟化。但超越对“公民身份”的不合时宜的理解，让这些非公民群体成为忠诚的利益相关者，现在还为时不晚。上一代人很难想象非公民能够获得投票权，但新西兰允许所有永久居民在任何选举中投票，多伦多也向所有合法居民开放市政选举，无论公民身份如何。纽约和洛杉矶一直是“庇护城市”之一，向无证移民发放身份证，以保护他们免遭驱逐出境。越多的城市凭借其贡献和义务让所有居民成为有意义的参与者，

Many cities are at risk of allowing migration without promoting assimilation, enabling ghettos that beget more ghettoization as more migrants come in and take the path of least resistance. But it’s still not too late to move beyond the anachronistic understanding of “citizenship” so that these legions of noncitizens become loyal stakeholders. A generation ago it would have been difficult to imagine noncitizens being given voting rights, but New Zealand allows all permanent residents to vote in any election, and Toronto has opened municipal elections to all legal residents irrespective of citizenship. New York and Los Angeles have been among the “sanctuary cities” giving out IDs to undocumented migrants to protect them from deportation. The more cities make all residents meaningful participants by virtue of their contributions and obligations, the more loyalty to the city supersedes that to the nation.

全球互联的城邦是新的后国家全球文明的孵化器，因为它们只有通过包容性而非排他性政策才能取得成功。他们通过努力实现包容性的公民多元化和自豪感而团结在一起。加拿大学者丹尼尔·贝尔（Daniel Bell）将这种日益高涨的城市自豪感称为“公民主义”，它是二十一世纪民族主义的对手，其根源在于古雅典，政治对所有居民开放。

Globally connected city-states are the incubators of the new postnational global civilization because they can succeed only through inclusive rather than exclusive policies. They hold themselves together through efforts at inclusive civic pluralism and pride. The Canadian scholar Daniel Bell calls this rising urban pride “civicism,” a twenty-first-century rival to nationalism with roots in ancient Athens, where politics was open to all residents.

随着人员、货物和数据不断进出全球城市，确定他们的身份变得比以往更加困难。就像叠加的原子一样，人同时存在于多种心态中，既属于本地世界，又属于外国世界。对我们来说，我们身在何处与我们是谁一样重要——抓住流动机会来塑造自己命运的人越多，前者对于定义后者就变得越重要。

As people, goods, and data stream in and out of global cities, it becomes more difficult than ever to pin down their identity. Like super-positioned atoms, people exist in multiple states of mind at the same time, belonging to both local and foreign worlds. Where we are is just as important to us as who we are—and the more people who seize the mobility opportunity to shape their own destiny, the more important the former becomes in defining the latter.

没有更好的堡垒来抵御鲁莽的身份政治比熔炉城市。凭借跨国公司、后国家劳动力和“第三文化”孩子，全球城市成为年轻国际化人士的温床。对于父母来自不同国籍的孩子来说，这一场景已经从父母在一年一度的“联合国日”节日中交替穿着各自的民族服装，演变为抗议学校造成身份危机。对于全球青年来说，身份是累积的，而不是替代的。越多的年轻人在大熔炉城市中凝聚，国际化的身份就越成为我们共同的未来。对于这些年轻人来说，“找到自己”不是“回家”，而是“在家”的感觉。正如 Pico Iyer 优雅地指出的那样，“家既可以是未来的创造，也可以是过去的创造。” ²⁰

There is no better bulwark against the recklessness of identity politics than melting pot cities. With their multinational companies, postnational workforces, and “third culture” kids, global cities are the breeding ground for young cosmopolitans. Among kids with parents of two different nationalities, the scene has evolved from alternating between their parents’ respective national costumes for annual “Uniting Nations Day” festivals to protesting the school for causing an identity crisis. For global youth, identity is cumulative, not substitutive. The more young people congeal in melting pot cities, the more cosmopolitan identities become our common future. To these young people, “finding oneself” is not about “going home” but about feeling “at home.” As Pico Iyer elegantly puts it, “Home can be as much a creation of the future as the past.”²⁰

从同质经济到同质制造

From homo economics to homo faber

人们未来会做什么的答案很大程度上取决于他们去哪里做这件事。这强调了这样一个现实：我们的主要挑战不是人与机器人的对抗，而是技能与地理的对抗。尽管自动化消除了零售、物流、金融、法律和其他领域的数百万个工作岗位，但升级基础设施和社会服务对人才的需求仍然巨大。因此，麦肯锡的迈克尔·崔认为，解决大规模失业的办法是大规模重新部署。

The answer to what people will do in the future very much depends on where they move to do it. This underscores the reality that our main challenge is not man versus robots but skills versus geography. Even as automation eliminates millions of jobs in retail, logistics, finance, law, and other areas, the demand for human talent to upgrade our infrastructure and social services remains enormous. Hence Michael Chui of McKinsey argues that the solution to mass unemployment is mass redeployment.

移动文明需要有技能的人，无论他们是否拥有大学学位。一些面临劳动力短缺的最关键领域，例如建筑和医疗保健，从建造和安装模块化房屋到为老年人提供物理治疗，甚至不需要高中学历。无论如何，高等教育都面临着一场完美风暴。2008 年的金融危机和 Covid-19 一起导致数十所大学破产，因为它们的成本超出了它们的声誉，或者它们未能实现数字化，或者两者兼而有之。到 2026 年，当然此后，还将有数百所大学倒闭。我们怎么知道？因为在2008年婴儿萧条之后整整十八年，美国高中毕业生的数量将急剧下降。那些原本打算在附近上大学的人可能会收拾行李永远离开，加入那些没有理由留下来的大学员工的行列，一起把曾经繁荣的城镇变成了尘土飞扬的地方。美国南部地区将受到最严重的打击，因为该地区占美国高海拔地区的近 45%学生和大多数大学都关门了。（无论如何，在德克萨斯州，只有 56% 的高中生能上大学。）南方只有通过吸引愿意改善这些破旧社区的当地人（当地人或外国人）才能重振当地经济。

A mobile civilization requires people with skills, irrespective of whether there is a university degree attached to them. Some of the most crucial areas facing labor shortages, such as construction and healthcare, from building and installing modular homes to providing physical therapy for the elderly, don’t even require a high school degree. Higher education is in any case facing a perfect storm. The financial crisis of 2008 and Covid-19 together put dozens of colleges out of business as their cost exceeded their reputation, they failed to go digital, or both. By 2026 and certainly thereafter, hundreds more colleges will go defunct. How do we know? Because exactly eighteen years after the baby bust of 2008, the number of American high school graduates will fall off a cliff. Those who had been planning on attending college nearby may pack up and leave for good, joining college employees who have no reason to stick around, together turning once thriving towns into dust bowls. The southern US will be hit hardest, as it represents nearly 45 percent of American high schoolers as well as the most colleges closing shop. (In Texas, only 56 percent of high school students go to college anyway.) The South will only be able to revive its local economies by attracting people—natives or foreigners—willing to uplift these dilapidated communities.

移动专业人员也可以通过移动教育进行培训。许多青少年从九年级开始跟踪他们的学习档案，通过学术和职业课程、校内和课外活动以及 edX 和 Coursera 收集学分。有些人在达到申请在线 MBA 的年龄之前就已经完成了在线 MBA 的内容。大多数美国人认为，从长远来看，在谷歌实习比获得哈佛大学学位更有利。²¹谷歌的新“职业证书”培训时间为六个月，相当于四年制学位，并受到大公司的认可。Lamda Academy 拥有为期九个月的数据科学、全栈网络开发、用户体验设计和其他领域的课程，为毕业生提供技术工作，这样他们就可以从工资中支付学费。这些完全远程的企业课程并没有假装地理位置很重要：他们的兼职订户将选择他们可以同时生活、工作和学习的地方。十年后，超过目前 4% 的美国年轻人可以在家接受教育，以利用这些机会。

Mobile professionals can be trained through mobile education as well. Many youth began tracking their learning portfolios from the ninth grade, collecting credits across academic and vocational courses, through in-school and extracurricular activities, and on edX and Coursera. Some have completed the content of an online MBA well before they’d ever have been old enough to apply for one. Most Americans think an internship at Google would be better for their long-term prospects than a Harvard degree.²¹ Google’s new “career certificates” train in six months the equivalent of a four-year degree and are recognized by major corporations. Lamda Academy, with its nine-month program in data science, full stack web development, UX design, and other areas, places graduates in tech jobs so they can pay back the tuition from their salaries. These entirely remote corporate curricula make no pretense that geography matters: their part-time subscribers will choose places where they can afford to live, work, and study at the same time. A decade from now, far more than the present 4 percent of American youth could be homeschooled to take advantage of these offerings.

今天的年轻人知道他们每到一个地方都需要接受再培训和提高技能。2020年，白宫广告委员会发起了一项“做点新事”运动，敦促美国人利用学徒制作为获得高薪工作的途径，例如航空航天或风力涡轮机技术人员、计算机硬件维护人员或注册护士。英国皇家特许测量师协会 (RICS) 设有学徒计划，旨在让新员工为从事土地开发、物业管理、分析房地产利用数据以及在混合用途空间策划经验方面的工作做好准备。工业 3D 打印操作员的收入高于学术界的平均水平。

Today’s youth know they’ll need to get retrained and upskilled each place they go. In 2020, the White House Ad Council launched a “Do Something New” campaign to urge Americans to use apprenticeships as a path to well-paying jobs such as aerospace or wind turbine technician, computer hardware maintenance person, or registered nurse. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) has an apprenticeship program to get recruits prepared for jobs in land development, property management, analyzing real estate utilization data, and curating experiences in mixed use spaces. Industrial 3D printing operators earn more than the average academic.

摆在面前的世代计划是针对华盛顿、华尔街、硅谷和常春藤联盟为企业家和小企业打造信用和技术平台生态系统。Z世代并不缺乏野心。注重金钱的 X 世代曾经用大富翁的钱经营投资俱乐部，每周检查股市表现；现在青少年在 Robinhood 上用真钱进行交易。《Shark Tank》等节目广受欢迎，将“冒险”一词从动词变成了职业。疫情过后，新的商业应用程序比前一年猛增77%，这表明美国对创业的胃口巨大。

The generational project that lies ahead is for Washington, Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the Ivy League to forge an ecosystem of credit and technology platforms for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Gen-Z is not lacking for ambition. Money-minded Gen-X used to run investment clubs with Monopoly money and check the stock market performance weekly; now teens trade on Robinhood with real money. Shows such as Shark Tank have been wildly popular, turning the word “venture” from a verb into a career. In the wake of the pandemic, new business applications shot up 77 percent from the year prior, indicating that America’s appetite for entrepreneurship is enormous.

但增长和创新本身都不是目的。人们要么建造东西，要么出售东西，要么做事：这些活动可以服务于什么更高的目的？我们的首要任务必须是摆脱现状，开始设计未来，从 5G 基站到城市农场。这一建立可持续和包容性栖息地的使命将吸引那些厌倦了破旧基础设施并希望制造有用的东西而不是仅仅消费无用的东西的年轻人。约翰·西利·布朗（John Seely Brown）所说的“homo faber”（制造者）将取代“homoeconomicus”。黑客马拉松是真实的。

But neither growth nor innovation is an end in itself. People either build things, sell things, or do things: What higher purpose can these activities serve? Our top priority must be to get off the status quo treadmill and begin engineering the future, from 5G base stations to urban farms. This mission to build sustainable and inclusive habitats will attract youth who are fed up with decrepit infrastructure and want to make things that are useful rather than just consume things that are not. What John Seely Brown calls homo faber—man who makes—will take over from homo economicus. The hackathon is real.

我。9/11 事件后，已故政治理论家本杰明·巴伯发起了一场运动，宣布 9 月 12 日为“相互依存日”，这是一场公民运动，甚至印制了自己的护照，宣扬推进全球公民秩序的原则。

I. After 9/11, the late political theorist Benjamin Barber launched a movement to declare September 12 “Interdependence Day,” a civic movement that even printed its own passports proclaiming principles to advance a global civic order.

二．2019年，美国良心呼吁基金会将新加坡评为世界上宗教最宽容的国家。

II. In 2019, the US-based Appeal of Conscience Foundation recognized Singapore as the world’s most religiously tolerant country.

第 4 章下一个美国梦

CHAPTER 4 THE NEXT AMERICAN DREAM

摆脱困境

Getting unstuck

2007年次贷危机爆发后的十年里，超过800万美国家庭被赶出了丧失抵押品赎回权的房屋。许多受影响最严重的人尚未康复，他们在“胡佛维尔”或“特朗普城镇”中勉强度日。甚至在大流行加剧美国人支付租金和抵押贷款的能力之前，驱逐和无家可归的情况就在增加。住房拥有率从金融危机前 70% 的峰值稳步下降。与此同时，全国有近 1400 万套空置房屋，尤其是在大都市地区。¹如果美国所有无家可归者都获得免费住房，所有囚犯都从监狱获释，移民人数恢复到每年 100 万，美国仍然会有多余的空置住房。

In the decade after the subprime mortgage crisis began in 2007, more than 8 million American families were ejected from their foreclosed homes. Many of those worst affected have yet to recover, eking out an existence in “Hoovervilles” or “Trump towns,” as they’ve come to be known. Evictions and homelessness were on the rise even before the pandemic exacerbated Americans’ ability to meet rent and mortgage payments. Home ownership has been falling steadily from the pre–financial crisis peak of 70 percent. Meanwhile, there are nearly 14 million vacant homes nationwide, especially in metro areas.¹ If all of America’s homeless were given free housing, all prisoners released from jail, and immigration restored to 1 million per year—America would still have an excess of vacant housing.

像世界各地无数的人一样，美国人也被迫流动：当公司倒闭、金融危机袭来、经济陷入衰退时，他们必须寻找新的工作、缩小住房面积或搬到其他城市、州和县。^十多年来，数以百万计的美国人从铁锈地带和东北部转移到价格更便宜的南部和西部，在零售、物流、或科技，离开价格过高的纽约、旧金山和洛杉矶，前往丹佛、奥斯汀和罗利。

Like countless people all over the world, Americans too are forced into mobility: When firms collapse, financial crises strike, and economies fall into recession, they have to look for new jobs, downsize homes, or move to other cities, states, and counties.^I For more than a decade, millions of Americans have been shifting from the rust belt and Northeast to the more affordable South and West, taking new jobs in retail, logistics, or tech, leaving overpriced New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles for Denver, Austin, and Raleigh.

尽管估计有 2000 万美国人在 2020 年搬迁，但能够搬迁以改善生活的人仍然太少。从 20 世纪 40 年代到 1960 年代，随着人口增长和向西扩张，每年约有五分之一的美国人搬迁。然而，最近国内移民陷入停滞。具有讽刺意味的是，这是因为就业不足使许多年轻人“被困在原地”：他们应该搬到住房、医疗保健和教育更便宜的地方，但他们负担不起。²如今，大批失业青年再次寻找工作，他们必须行动起来才能找到工作。

Even though an estimated 20 million Americans moved during 2020, still too few are able to relocate in order to improve their lot in life. From the 1940s to 1960s, about one-fifth of Americans moved every year as the population grew and expanded westward. More recently, however, domestic migration has stalled. Ironically, this is because underemployment has rendered many youth “stuck in place”: They should move to places where housing, healthcare, and education are cheaper, but they can’t afford to.² As today’s hordes of unemployed youth look for work again, they’ll have to get moving to find it.

美国梦需要重新定义。新的理想不应该是拥有房屋，而应该是流动性——让每个美国人能够去任何他们需要去的地方，去到需要他们技能的地方，并且他们可以赚更多的钱。哈佛大学拉杰·切蒂的研究表明，在一代人的时间里，一旦家庭搬到经济机会更大的地方，社会经济表现就会改善。³因此，物质流动性是实现经济流动性的最佳途径。

The American Dream needs to be redefined. Instead of owning a home, the new ideal should be mobility—enabling every American to go wherever they need to go, to where their skills are needed and they can earn more. Research by Harvard’s Raj Chetty shows that over the course of a generation, socioeconomic performance improves once families move to places with greater economic opportunity.³ Physical mobility, then, is the best pathway to economic mobility.

移动地产

Mobile real estate

2018 年秋天，《Gear Junkie》杂志的编辑凯尔·诺萨曼 (Kyle Nossaman) 和妻子锁上了明尼阿波利斯高档公寓的门，开始了为期一年的美国探索之旅。他们参观了美国下游四十八个州的大部分地区以及几乎所有的国家公园。他们骑山地自行车和摩托车，露营和徒步旅行，拜访老朋友，结交新朋友，同时继续兼职工作，甚至一路上省钱。他们做这一切都没有坐飞机——因为他们驾驶并生活在自己改装的校车里。⁴

In the fall of 2018, Kyle Nossaman, an editor at Gear Junkie magazine, and his wife locked the door of their upscale apartment in Minneapolis and set off for a year of exploring America. They visited most of the lower forty-eight states and almost all the national parks. They rode mountain bikes and a motorcycle, camped and hiked, visited old friends and made new ones, all the while keeping up their jobs part-time, even saving money along the way. And they did all this without ever getting on a plane—because they were driving and living in their very own converted school bus.⁴

新冠疫情封锁对美国零售业来说是一场生死存亡的灾难——除非你碰巧在销售移动房屋。雷神销售大流行封锁结束后，大型露营车行业激增，梅赛德斯甚至在欧洲流行多年后在美国推出了标志性的露营车（可容纳四人）。房车行业协会报告称，其销量较 2019 年同期增长了近 200% ^。5拖车房已成为传统住房所有权的一种时尚、经济高效且可持续的替代方案。Instagram 上的#skooliebus（将校车改装成移动房屋）和 Pinterest 上的“小房子”等运动表明移动和简约生活越来越受欢迎。

The Covid lockdown was an existential disaster for America’s retail sector—unless you happened to be selling mobile homes. Sales of Thor Industries large camper vans surged after the pandemic lockdown ended, and Mercedes even released its iconic Camper (that sleeps four) in the US after years of popularity in Europe. The RV Industry Association reported a nearly 200 percent jump in sales from the same period of 2019.⁵ Trailer homes have emerged as a trendy, cost-effective, and sustainable alternative to traditional home ownership. Movements like #skooliebus on Instagram (featuring school buses retrofitted into mobile homes) and “tiny houses” on Pinterest point to the growing popularity of mobile and minimalist living.

拖车房是美国新出行方式的终极象征。25% 的移动房屋由千禧一代拥有，他们和 Z 世代越达到购房年龄，移动房屋销量就越多。⁶换句话说，年轻人有意识地选择不买房子（反正他们买不起），而是抢购房车。目睹了金融危机摧毁了父母的房屋价值，他们对流动性的信心超过了对财产的信心，这无可厚非。⁷我们是否正在见证量子时代美国梦的重塑？

The trailer home is the ultimate symbol of the new American mobility. Twenty-five percent of mobile homes are owned by millennials, and the more they and Gen-Z reach home-buying age, the more mobile home sales go up.⁶ In other words, youth are consciously choosing not to buy houses (that they can’t afford anyway), snapping up motor homes instead. Having witnessed the financial crisis demolish their parents’ house value, they can hardly be blamed for having more faith in mobility than property.⁷ Are we witnessing the reinvention of the American dream for the quantum age?

移动房屋是美国传说的一部分，也是美国现在和未来的一个令人惊讶的特征。正如杰西卡·布鲁德 (Jessica Bruder) 在她的书《游牧之地》( Nomadland)中所记录的那样，老一代房车居民已经在全国各地寻找提供现金和食物的兼职工作，这些工作经常像农民工一样受到剥削，该书改编的电影赢得了 2021 年奥斯卡最佳影片奖。社区有一种认同感和安全感，现在也吸引了年轻人。格洛丽亚·斯泰纳姆的回忆录《我的路上的生活》我深情地回忆起亚利桑那州一个全女性拖车公园的骄傲，那里的街道以格特鲁德·斯坦因和埃莉诺·罗斯福的名字命名。对于女性或 LGBTQ 社区来说，拖车公园提供了封闭式住宅社区的氛围，但没有价格标签。随着美国学龄儿童越来越少，有大量校车可供购买——尽管它们的发动机最好从柴油改为电动。

Mobile homes are part of American lore, but a surprising feature of America’s present and future. An older generation of RV dwellers already roams the country seeking part-time jobs that offer cash and food, often exploited like migrant laborers, as Jessica Bruder documents in her book Nomadland, whose film adaptation won the Oscar for best picture in 2021. Trailer home communities have a sense of identity and security that now also draws in young people. Gloria Steinem’s memoir My Life on the Road fondly recalls the pride of an all-female trailer park in Arizona that had streets named after Gertrude Stein and Eleanor Roosevelt. For women or the LGBTQ community, trailer parks provide the vibe of a gated residential community but without the price tag. With ever fewer school age children in America, there are plenty of school buses available for purchase—though their engines should ideally be switched from diesel to electric.

“移动房地产”本身正在成为一种资产类别，一种明智的投资在这个世界里，洪水可能会冲走你的家，巨大的冰雹可能会击碎屋顶，或者你的车道尽头可能会出现一个天坑。如果你的家有一辆巨型汽车，你的生活会更好。Sealander 的拖车配有车载发动机，可将其变成一艘船，非常适合在洪水泛滥的地区航行。特别是如果您不知道下一份工作在哪里，移动房屋意味着您可以在短时间内搬到那里。移动是重塑的终极表达，也许也是最有效的表达。

“Mobile real estate” is becoming an asset class unto itself, a wise investment for a world where flooding could sweep away your home, giant hailstones could smash through its roof, or a sinkhole could emerge at the end of your driveway. You’re better off if your home is a giant car. Sealander’s trailer has an onboard motor that turns it into a boat, perfect for navigating flooded areas. Especially if you don’t know where your next job will be, a mobile home means you can move to it on short notice. Moving is the ultimate expression of reinvention, and perhaps the most effective as well.

美国的年轻人应该停止把自己束缚在他们既不需要也买不起的房子里，而且这些房子并不位于他们需要的地方。相反，我们应该为永久移动的时代进行设计和建设。房地产行业继续向高楼大厦浇筑混凝土，甚至声称全国住房缺口达250万套。但他们的水晶球是否能告诉他们五年后人们想要住在哪里？他们知道工作岗位在哪里吗？他们确定是在气候适应性强的地区建设吗？

America’s youth should stop chaining themselves to homes they neither need nor can afford—and which aren’t located where they need to be. Instead, we should be designing and building for an age of perpetual mobility. The real estate industry continues to pour concrete into McMansions, and even claims there is a nationwide housing shortfall of 2.5 million homes. But does their crystal ball tell them where people will want to live five years from now? Do they know where the jobs will be? Are they sure they’re building in climate-resilient areas?

严重的人口通货紧缩意味着房地产价格不可避免地暴跌，而来自活动房屋的竞争将使房价进一步下跌。房地美（为房地产市场提供流动性）推出了一系列计划，鼓励首次购房者投资便宜得多的预制房屋，即使这会让市政当局和银行坐拥数万亿美元的滞留住房。难怪像沃伦·巴菲特这样的投资者已经悄然成为克莱顿住宅公司等“预制”住宅制造商的最大所有者之一。即使在经济较便宜的州，活动房屋的成本也不到两居室公寓成本的一半，而租用预制房屋的成本也只有两居室公寓成本的三分之一。⁸

The great demographic deflation means an inevitable crash in real estate prices, and competition from prefab homes will bring those down even further. Freddie Mac (which provides liquidity to the housing market) has launched a slew of programs to encourage first-time home buyers to invest in far cheaper prefab homes—even if it leaves municipalities and banks sitting on trillions of dollars of stranded housing. No wonder then that an investor such as Warren Buffett has quietly become one of the largest owners of “pre-fabulous” home manufacturers such as Clayton Homes. Even in cheaper states, a manufactured home costs less than half the cost of a two-bedroom apartment, and renting a prefab as little as one-third as much.⁸

活动房屋革命中最好的部分是什么？它们可以放在卡车后面运送，也可以移动。3D打印微型住宅的时代即将到来。亚马逊出售自己动手制作的家居套件，价格低至 20,000 美元，可以使用太阳能或连接到当地能源网。Mighty Buildings 的 3D 打印“小屋”或“祖母屋”可以放置在后院，以满足数百万老年低收入租房者或预算紧张的年轻人的需求。Boxabl 和 Ten Fold 等公司生产的房屋可在几分钟内扩大到集装箱尺寸的三倍。数以百万计的废弃集装箱本身很容易改装成（移动）房屋。爱沙尼亚的一家初创公司建造了拖车交付的预制单元，这些单元可以用作住宅、办公室、商店、储藏室、咖啡馆、社区区域或用于许多其他用途。所需要的只是一个供它们放置的平坦空间。

The best part of the prefab housing revolution? They can be delivered on the back of a truck—and moved as well. The era of 3D-printed micro housing is at hand. Amazon sells do-it-yourself homemaking kits that cost as little as $20,000 and can be solar-powered or connected to local energy grids. Mighty Buildings’ 3D-printed “casitas” or “granny flats” can be deposited in backyards to cater to the millions of aging low-income renters or youth on tight budgets. Companies such as Boxabl and Ten Fold make homes that expand to triple their container size in minutes. Millions of discarded shipping containers themselves are easily retrofitted into (mobile) homes. One Estonian startup builds trailer-delivered prefab units that can be homes, offices, shops, storage units, cafes, community areas, or serve many other purposes. All that is required is a flat space for them to be set down on.

哪些国家将提供土地、补贴成本、启用甚至要求向 3D 家庭营地提供公共服务？荷兰和法国已成为这一进步社会政策的领导者，而瑞典家具制造商宜家和建筑公司 Skanska 联手推出了 BoKlok（Live Smart），该公司已在斯堪的纳维亚半岛建造了超过一万套住宅。在他们的英国试点项目中，新住户向 BoKlok 支付他们能负担得起的任何费用。您可以从宜家购买整个房屋，而不用把家里堆满宜家的东西。

Which countries will make the land available, subsidize the cost, and enable or even require public service delivery to 3D home encampments? The Netherlands and France have become leaders in this progressive social policy, while Swedish furniture maker IKEA and construction company Skanska have teamed up to launch BoKlok (Live Smart), a firm that has built more than ten thousand homes in Scandinavia already. In their UK pilot, new occupants pay BoKlok whatever they can afford. Rather than cluttering homes with IKEA stuff, you can just buy your entire home from IKEA.

活动房屋正在通过全新的生产工艺从装配线上下线，该工艺结合了 3D 打印、回收材料和机器人效率。对于地理位置不稳定的人口过剩国家，软银资助的 Katerra 可以在短时间内为整个城镇提供交钥匙住宅设计和建造，而 Icon 已经在墨西哥 3D 打印了整个村庄，并为奥斯汀周围的帐篷里的人们提供了坚固的单元。但这些房屋之所以能够抗灾，是有原因的：人们可能不得不再次搬家。自给自足的太阳能集装箱房屋可以通过轮子来适应涨潮，便携式厕所使用微生物而不是水将人类排泄物转化为无味肥料。（这些甚至被部署在珠穆朗玛峰上。）这对于季节性迁徙的世界来说非常有意义，在这个世界中，气候变化和自然灾害以及职业偏好决定了我们的居住地点。对于那些选择带轮住宅作为生活方式的人选择，建筑师正在设计带有木炉的时尚微型住宅；太阳能; 屋顶集水；堆肥厕所；独立的厨房、卧室和起居区；和大窗户。他们的主人可以在 Instagram 上分享每一个新景观。

Movable homes are rolling off assembly lines through an entirely new production process that combines 3D printing, recycled materials, and robotic efficiency. For overpopulated countries in precarious geographies, SoftBank-funded Katerra does turnkey home design and construction for entire towns on short notice, while Icon has already 3D-printed entire villages in Mexico and sturdy units for those living in tents around Austin. But there is a reason why these homes are made to be disaster-resistant: One might have to move again. Self-sufficient, solar-powered container homes can be wheeled to adjust to rising tides, with portable loos that use microbes rather than water to turn human waste into odorless fertilizer. (These are even being deployed on Mount Everest.) This makes great sense for a world of seasonal migrations in which climate change and natural disasters as much as professional preference dictate where we live. For those choosing wheeled residences as a lifestyle choice, architects are designing stylish micro homes with woodstoves; solar power; rooftop water collection; compost toilets; separate kitchen, bedroom, and living areas; and large windows. Their owners can Instagram every new vista.

绝佳的气候度假胜地

The great climate resorting

随着疫情期间远程工作政策的实施，曼哈顿的金融喷气式飞机几乎不浪费时间抢购免税佛罗里达州的海滨房地产，确保他们在纽约的高层建筑中度过尽可能少的时间。佛罗里达州的“追随太阳”运动取得了巨大成功，但是这些流动精英多久之后就必须放弃他们的沿海豪宅呢？

As remote work policies kicked in during the pandemic, Manhattan’s financial jet set wasted little time in snapping up beachfront real estate in tax-free Florida, ensuring they spent as little time as possible in their New York high-rises. Florida’s “Follow the Sun” campaign was a resounding success—but how long before these mobile elites have to abandon their coastal mansions?

自然灾害迫使越来越多的美国人搬家。随着海平面上升对大西洋和太平洋沿岸造成影响，沿海生活正在从仪式感转变为鲁莽的奢华。美国人口最多的四个州——加利福尼亚州、德克萨斯州、佛罗里达州和纽约州——都面临着气候清算。在全球所有沿海城市的风险资产价值排名中，纽约和迈阿密分列第一和第二。纽约尚未为下一场类似桑迪飓风的超级风暴做好准备，这场超级风暴可能会给其地铁和街道带来更多的沿海和内陆洪水，也没有升级其在 2019 年热浪期间遭受严重断电的电网（这也导致取消其主要铁人三项赛）。迈阿密的南海滩、市中心、甚至连港口的新隧道也被淹没了；佛罗里达群岛将会沉没，因为房屋太少，不值得花钱修路。心理和经济影响可能要大得多：随着佛罗里达州发生气候灾难的每一个故事，计划购买房产甚至参观的人越来越少。

Natural disasters are forcing more and more Americans to move. With sea-level rise punishing the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, coastal living is shifting from rite of passage to reckless luxury. America’s four most populous states—California, Texas, Florida, and New York—all face climate reckoning. Among all global coastal cities ranked by asset value at risk, New York and Miami rank first and second. New York has yet to prepare itself for the next Hurricane Sandy–like superstorm that could bring even more coastal and inland flooding of its subways and streets, nor has it upgraded its electricity grid that suffered major outages during the 2019 heat wave (that also led to the cancellation of its major triathlon). Miami’s South Beach, downtown, and even the new tunnel from its port have been flooded; the Florida Keys will be sunk as there are too few homes to merit spending on raising roads. The psychological and economic impact may be far greater: With each story of climate disaster emanating from Florida, fewer people plan to buy property or even visit.

然而，佛罗里达州可能会成为更多加勒比气候难民的家园，就像 2010 年海地大地震的受害者一样。飓风玛丽亚造成破坏后一年内2017年，超过20万波多黎各人逃往美国大陆，其中大多数（如果不是全部）永远逃亡。尽管巴哈马的旅游业和离岸金融收入很高，但大巴哈马岛在 2019 年飓风多里安之后还是被宣布“死亡”。该国 40 万居民中的数千人已经在佛罗里达州和其他州重新定居，也许最终他们都会将要。

Florida could, however, be home to ever more of the Caribbean’s climate refugees, much as it took in victims of Haiti’s massive 2010 earthquake. Within one year of the devastation wrought by Hurricane Maria in 2017, more than two hundred thousand Puerto Ricans had fled to the mainland US, most if not all for good. Despite the Bahamas’ high income from tourism and offshore finance, the island of Grand Bahama was declared “dead” after Hurricane Dorian in 2019. Thousands of the country’s four hundred thousand residents have already resettled in Florida and other states—and perhaps eventually they all will.

一个多世纪前，数百万获得解放的黑人佃农向北迁移到中西部，体现了大迁徙。2005年，卡特里娜飓风将路易斯安那州近十万贫困黑人居民赶出了该州，而且由于该州对冠状病毒处理不力，也许还会有更多人离开。亚特兰大、达拉斯、夏洛特和奥斯汀等城市已经开始吸引来自美国南部其他地方的气候移民。⁹下一次大迁徙正在加速。

More than a century ago, millions of liberated black sharecroppers embodied the Great Migration as they shifted northward to the Midwest. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina pushed nearly one hundred thousand poor black residents of Louisiana out of the state—and perhaps many more will leave after the state’s poor handling of the coronavirus. Already cities such as Atlanta, Dallas, Charlotte, and Austin are gaining climate migrants from elsewhere in the southern US.⁹ The next great migration is accelerating.

每当一个美国家庭失去一切时，他们就更有可能搬家。美国的大片房地产不再物有所值——而且从现在起十年左右的时间里肯定不会如此。随着海平面上升，从康涅狄格州到路易斯安那州的“新海岸”上的城镇将不得不提高税收来资助海障——而且由于巨灾保险正在枯竭，他们将不得不自己支付海障的费用。美国环保署目前将阿拉巴马州、密西西比州、佛罗里达州、佐治亚州和卡罗来纳州列为应对气候灾害准备最差的州，飓风从美国大西洋和墨西哥湾沿岸深入内陆。但来自密苏里河和密西西比河的内陆洪水也困扰着二十多个州，摧毁了道路和桥梁，摧毁了无数房屋，甚至威胁到核反应堆。据贝莱德称，密西西比河以西的美国大部分房地产都位于缺水地区。达科他州、内布拉斯加州和俄克拉荷马州等大平原州是美国的粮仓，使该地区成为玉米、大豆、棉花、苜蓿以及牲畜（牛、猪、羊、鸡）的主要生产地之一。但是，虽然它们远离大海，但它们却遭受着洪水的双重影响，洪水改变了种植季节，而且压迫性的气候也影响了它们的生存。夏季热浪。这些气候风险共同导致财产保险要么负担不起，要么无法获得。业主和工人自己计算过这些数字：搬家更便宜（也更明智）。

Each time an American family loses everything, they become that much more likely to move. Vast swaths of American real estate are no longer deserving of their price—and certainly won’t be a decade or so from now. As sea levels rise, towns on the “new coast” from Connecticut to Louisiana will have to raise taxes to fund sea barriers—and they’ll have to pay for the barriers themselves since catastrophe insurance is drying up. The EPA currently ranks Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas as the states least prepared for climate hazards, with hurricanes reaching deep inland from America’s Atlantic and Gulf coasts. But inland flooding from the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers also torments more than two dozen states, wiping out roads and bridges, wrecking countless homes, and even threatening nuclear reactors. According to BlackRock, most of American real estate west of the Mississippi is in water-stressed areas. The Great Plains states, such as the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, are America’s breadbasket, making the region among the leading producers of corn, soybeans, cotton, and alfalfa, as well as livestock (cows, pigs, sheep, chickens). But while they’re safe from the sea, they suffer from the combination of floods, which alter planting seasons, and oppressive summer heat waves. Together, these climate risks have made property insurance either unaffordable or unavailable. Property owners and workers have crunched the numbers themselves: It’s much cheaper (and smarter) to just move.

联邦政府终于采取了务实的立场。自 2005 年以来，灾害相关支出已达 5000 亿美元，适应灾害已不再是一项值得的支出。FEMA、HUD 和陆军工程兵团 (ACE) 等机构联盟正在推动一项针对受威胁沿海地区（特别是大西洋和墨西哥湾沿岸地区）的“大规模移民或重新安置”计划。接下来，他们将行使征用权，摧毁有风险的房屋，并为居住者提供搬迁买断。¹⁰

The federal government is finally taking a pragmatic stand. After $500 billion in disaster-related expenditures since 2005, adaptation is no longer a worthwhile expense. A coalition of agencies such as FEMA, HUD, and the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) is pushing an agenda of “large-scale migration or relocation” packages for threatened coastal areas, especially along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Next they’ll exert eminent domain, destroy at-risk homes, and provide buyouts for occupants to move.¹⁰

金融业对气候风险的量化越多，就越能促进移民决策。婴儿潮一代已经开始重新考虑在哪里退休，这既是为了他们自己，也是为了避免将贬值（或不存在）的资产传给他们的孩子。年长的美国人往往想选择一个地方居住并留在原地——但这并不像看起来那么容易。退休过去意味着前往海滨，但越来越多地意味着搬到内陆或山区。

The more the financial industry quantifies climate risk, the more it will motivate migration decisions. Already baby boomers are reconsidering where to retire, both for their own sake and to avoid handing down depreciating (or nonexistent) assets to their children. Older Americans tend to want to pick one place to live and stay put—but this is not as easy as it seems. Retirement used to mean heading for the seafront, but increasingly it implies moving inland or into the mountains.

美国和加拿大的人口密度地图提醒我们，为了寻找适合耕种的宜居地区，我们必须扩展到多大的空间。与大多数工业化国家一样，三分之二的美国人口居住在城市，而城市仅占陆地面积的 3%。一半的美国人口仅居住在九个州，但到 2030 年、2040 年和 2050 年，这些州将不再是原来的样子。哪些美国州将美国年轻人所寻求的气候适应能力、创造就业机会和进步政治结合在一起？

A map of the population density of the US and Canada reminds us how much space we have to spread into in search of livable geographies to cultivate. As in most industrialized countries, two-thirds of the American population lives in cities, which represent just 3 percent of the land area. Half the American population lives in just nine states—but they won’t be the same ones in 2030, 2040, and 2050. Which American states bring together the combination of climate resilience, job creation, and progressive politics young Americans are looking for?

尽管加州在自由治理甚至（讽刺的是）排放法规方面处于领先地位，但该州应对气候挑战的准备不足。美国西部地区经历了二十年的特大干旱，炎热的空气从地面吸收了更多的水分，而降雨量却减少了，加利福尼亚州及其南部邻国内华达州和亚利桑那州变成了易燃物。每年都会出现更炎热的气温和更严重的野火，这意味着加州同时面临水、能源和住房危机。从湾区到洛杉矶，数以千计的富人和穷人的房屋被烧毁，保险公司落后了数十年，赔付额达数十亿美元。加州公用事业公司PG&E先发制人地关闭了电力供应，以防止山火通过烧毁的电线蔓延，但也阻止房主改用离网太阳能发电，这样公用事业公司就可以继续收取费用，这实际上导致甚至一些最富有的美国人也无法用电。天。与此同时，洛杉矶县继续批准在火灾多发地区建造新住宅，但越来越多的好莱坞工作室和电影场景受到气候变化或冠状病毒的干扰，

As much as California has led the way in liberal governance and even (ironically) emissions regulations, the state is ill equipped for the climate challenge. America’s West is two decades into a mega-drought in which hotter air absorbs more water from the ground while rainfall diminishes, turning California and its southern neighbors Nevada and Arizona into tinderboxes. Each year brings hotter temperatures and more severe wildfires, meaning California faces water, energy, and housing crises all at the same time. From the Bay Area to Los Angeles, thousands of homes of both the rich and poor have been charred, with insurance companies decades behind and billions short on payouts. California’s utility PG&E has preemptively shut down power supply to prevent wildfires spreading through burnt power lines, but also blocked homeowners from switching to off-grid solar power, so the utility can continue collecting fees, effectively leaving even some of the richest Americans without power for days. Meanwhile, Los Angeles County continues to approve new home construction in fire-prone areas, but the more Hollywood studios and film sets get disrupted by climate change or coronavirus, the more the entertainment elite may decamp to European countries that offer tax breaks and healthier lifestyles.

加州正在变得像大西洋和墨西哥湾沿岸的同行一样：一个生存社会，一个围绕自我重建建立的经济。它从地下含水层抽水用于农业，以应对内华达山脉融雪量和降雨量的减少。但除非它能够通过补充米德湖和鲍威尔湖以及加强海水淡化来解决水危机，否则在那里生活将成为更多的负债而不是资产。对于许多人来说，离开并在更便宜的地方重新开始更具经济意义。加利福尼亚州长期以来一直是美国的乐土——直到事实并非如此。

California is becoming like its counterparts on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts: a survival society, an economy built around rebuilding itself. It has been pumping ever more from underground aquifers for agriculture, to cope with declining snowmelt and rainfall in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. But unless it can solve its water crisis by replenishing Lake Mead and Lake Powell and ramping up desalination, living there will become more liability than asset. For many, it makes more economic sense to just leave and start over someplace cheaper. California had long been America’s promised land—until it wasn’t.

许多加州人已经涌入西部内陆地区，但从蒙大拿州的冰川国家公园到加州的约塞米蒂国家公园，他们想要靠近的主要公园因野火而连续关闭数月。该地区当局将需要更多资金来吸收来自沿海的新移民，并防止他们的新房像加州的旧房一样被烧毁。杜克大学的研究人员对美国每个栖息地的复杂性进行了建模，以预测人类、当地动物物种、土壤和植物、树木覆盖、排放以及生态系统其他要素之间的相互作用，这表明我们是多么容易实现微妙的平衡。认为感到不安是“正常”的通过提高温度、人数或其他因素。¹¹当我们移动时，我们会带来风险。

Many Californians have already pushed into the inland West, but from Glacier National Park in Montana to Yosemite in California, the major parks they seek to be near have closed for months at a stretch due to wildfires. Authorities across the region will need more funds to absorb new migrants from the coast—and prevent their new homes from burning as their old ones in California already have. Duke University researchers have modeled the complexity of each American habitat zone to forecast the interactions of human, local animal species, soil and flora, tree cover, emissions, and other elements of our ecosystems, showing how easy it is for the delicate balance that we consider “normal” to be upset by increasing the temperature, the number of people, or other factors.¹¹ As we move, we bring risk.

在气候高档化的家庭手工业中，落基山脉地区显得方兴未艾。科罗拉多州的海拔、供水和进步的政治吸引了越来越多的千禧一代。丹佛扩建了机场，在市中心建设了轻轨网络，并启动了世贸中心商业园区。该州的滑雪季节越来越短，但全年对于徒步旅行和文化节都很有吸引力。博尔德拒绝建造高层建筑，增添了“美国最幸福小镇”的光环。¹²但随着气温上升，科罗拉多州还面临冬季降雨和快速融雪、夏季干燥以及支撑美国西南部 4000 万人口的科罗拉多河水量逐渐减少的问题。只要确实有雪，雪才能持续作为该州最重要的水源。

In the cottage industry of climate gentrification, the Rocky Mountain region appears ascendant. Colorado has the altitude, water supply, and progressive politics that attract ever more millennials. Denver has expanded its airport, built a light-rail network downtown, and launched a World Trade Center business campus. The state’s ski season is getting shorter, but it’s attractive year-round for hiking and cultural festivals. Boulder has rejected high-rise buildings, adding to its aura as “America’s happiest town.”¹² But as temperatures rise, Colorado also faces winter rains and rapid snowmelt, drier summers and a diminishing Colorado River that sustains 40 million people across the southwestern US. Snow can only last as the state’s most important source of water so long as there actually is snow.

在中西部，内布拉斯加州、堪萨斯州和俄克拉荷马州等粮仓州也面临地下水迅速枯竭的问题。特别是美国南部和墨西哥是世界上水资源最紧张的地区之一。但也有例外。休斯顿是美国最繁忙的港口城市和石油之都，每年新增人口约十万人，但其排水系统几乎没有下过雨。难怪许多地区仍在从 2017 年哈维飓风和 2019 年热带风暴伊梅尔达（造成 5 英尺深的洪水）中恢复。

In the Midwest, breadbasket states such as Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma also face rapidly depleting groundwater. Particularly the southern US and Mexico rank among the most water-stressed regions of the world. But there are exceptions. Houston, America’s busiest port city and oil capital, is gaining about a hundred thousand people per year, but its drainage system dates to a time when it barely received any rain. No wonder many areas are still recovering from Hurricane Harvey in 2017 and Tropical Storm Imelda in 2019, which brought five feet of flooding.

气候变化的复杂性意味着我们不能对任何一个地方能够保证安全免受极端气候事件的影响过于自信。例如，大自然保护协会 2012 年的一份报告将长期废弃的阿巴拉契亚地区确定为应对气候变化的“天然据点”。当时，人们可能会认为徒步旅行季节会更长，滑雪季节会更短，但从中期来看，不会产生重大负面影响。然而，最近的研究表明，阿巴拉契亚山脉中部实际上将经历显着的气温上升、生物多样性丧失以及森林火灾发生率的增加。

The complexity of climate change means that we can’t be too confident in any one place guaranteeing safety from extreme climate events. For example, a 2012 report by the Nature Conservancy identified the long-derelict Appalachian region as a “natural stronghold” against climate change. Back then, one might have assumed that the hiking season would be longer and the ski season shorter, but otherwise no major downside effects in the medium term. More recent studies, however, suggest that the central Appalachians will actually experience significant temperature rise, biodiversity loss, and increased incidence of forest fires.

围绕大帝的大致矩形或菱形的盒子湖区西起明尼阿波利斯，西至堪萨斯城，东至匹兹堡，东北至波基普西，北边是加拿大的重镇魁北克省和安大略省，拥有丰富的淡水，冬季气候温和。自金融危机以来，这个更大的铁锈带地区的人口一直在减少，但由于气候移民，人口将会恢复。如今，伊利诺伊州财政陷入困境，芝加哥成为美国破产最严重的大城市——一旦美国人涌向该地区寻求更稳定的气候，这些都不再重要。明尼苏达州德卢斯赢得了“气候避难所”的绰号，并相应地打造自己的品牌，以增加其近十万的人口。¹³俄亥俄州托莱多的居民深知其有利的地理位置，一直在敦促制定“伊利湖权利法案”，以允许他们起诉污染者。如果不加强环境保护，就让更多的居民来这里，即使不是犯罪，也是一个严重的错误。

A roughly rectangular or diamond-shaped box around the Great Lakes region, from Minneapolis down to Kansas City in the west, eastward to Pittsburgh, and angling northeast to Poughkeepsie, with Canada’s powerhouse provinces of Quebec and Ontario to the north—enjoys an abundance of freshwater and is set for milder winters. This greater rust belt region has been losing population since the financial crisis but will regain it due to climate migration. Illinois today is a fiscal basket case and Chicago ranks as America’s most bankrupt large city—none of which will matter once Americans surge toward the region seeking a more stable climate. Duluth, Minnesota, has earned the “climate refuge” moniker and is branding itself accordingly to boost its population of just under a hundred thousand people.¹³ Well aware of their propitious geography, residents of Toledo, Ohio, have been pressing for a “Lake Erie Bill of Rights” to allow them to sue polluters. Bringing more residents there without strengthening environmental protections first would be a grave mistake even if it were not a crime.

其他气候适应区正在改造自己，以适应未来作为新工业中心的需要。明尼阿波利斯和堪萨斯城正在招募初创公司，而代顿正在振兴其历史悠久的市中心区，即已关闭数十年的拱廊区。布法罗等废弃的公司城镇吸引了阿拉伯寻求庇护者、波多黎各气候难民和刚离开船上的印度家庭。罗切斯特（纽约州第三大城市）和匹兹堡（拥有卡内基梅隆大学等三打以上高等教育机构的所在地）等大学城正在加大力度建设创新区，升级水管和污水处理系统，为未来的人口做好准备。密歇根州安娜堡市的大学人口占该市 12 万人口的三分之一以上，也需要做这一切，因为这些大学城非常适合吸收来自南方的学术和气候难民。密歇根州大急流城的大都市地区拥有近 100 万人（2000 年为 75 万），正在为汽车和生物医学领域建立一个由多用途技术人员组成的生态系统。

Other climate-resilient zones are retrofitting themselves for their future as neo-industrial hubs. Minneapolis and Kansas City are recruiting startups, while Dayton is revitalizing its historic downtown district, known as the Arcade, that had been shuttered for several decades. Abandoned company towns such as Buffalo are attracting Arab asylum seekers, Puerto Rican climate refugees, and fresh-off-the-boat Indian families. University towns such as Rochester (New York State’s third biggest city) and Pittsburgh (home to more than three dozen higher education institutions, including Carnegie Mellon) are doubling down on innovation districts and upgrading their water pipes and sewage treatment to prepare for future populations. Ann Arbor, Michigan, whose university represents more than one-third of its population of 120,000, needs to do all this as well since these college towns are well suited to absorb both academic and climate refugees from the south. Grand Rapids, Michigan, has nearly 1 million people in its metropolitan area (up from 750,000 in 2000) and is building an ecosystem of multipurpose technicians for the automotive and biomedical sectors.

具有讽刺意味的是，退休人员出售哈德逊河谷（从威彻斯特北部到奥尔巴尼）的房屋是多么困难。虽然年轻家庭没有足够的经济保障来投资超出纽约市通勤范围的大型住宅（特别是从 IBM 到百事可乐等公司都缩小了总部），但很少有地区能够同时具备海拔、淡水、树木覆盖、安全和其他优点。气候变化和新冠疫情预示着此类气候宜居地区的复兴，因为新的远程办公阶层正在寻找绿树成荫、宽敞的郊区。甚至在新冠疫情爆发之前，佛蒙特州等聪明的州就推出了税收减免计划来吸引远程工人。俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨市为每位新移民提供 10,000 美元。其他生活成本较低的州，如阿拉斯加、田纳西州、爱达荷州、

There is an irony to how difficult it has been for retirees to sell their homes in the Hudson River Valley, from northern Westchester to Albany. While it’s understandable that young families don’t have the financial security to invest in large homes beyond the commuting range of New York City (especially since companies from IBM to Pepsi have shrunk their headquarters), few geographies offer the combination of elevation, freshwater, tree cover, safety, and other virtues. Climate change and Covid herald a regeneration for such climatically livable areas, as the new telecommuting class seeks out leafy and spacious suburbs. Even before Covid, clever states such as Vermont launched tax break schemes to attract remote workers. Tulsa, Oklahoma, is giving $10,000 to each new arrival. Other states with low living costs, such as Alaska, Tennessee, Idaho, Wyoming, and North Dakota, could easily do the same.

人们还将搬到气候危机后由政府接管的地方，而不是笨手笨脚地前行。预计到 2030 年，波士顿每年将出现 30 天的涨潮洪水，洛根机场将成为美国最早沉入海底的机场之一。¹⁴尽管存在当地政治障碍，该市当局目前仍计划购买并重新规划土地以建设新机场。相比之下，明智的做法是避免各州失去人员并面临市政破产浪潮。他们会与华盛顿耍胆怯，然后失败，他们破旧的公共服务将进一步受到侵蚀。从北卡罗来纳州到德克萨斯州，一些小镇不再收集垃圾，因为该州放弃了这些小镇，而大城市只为自己的道路和卫生设施提供资金。

People will also move to places whose administrations take the reins after climate crises rather than bumbling along. Boston expects to have thirty days of high-tide flooding annually by 2030, and Logan Airport to be among the first in America to sink under the sea.¹⁴ The city’s authorities are now planning to buy and rezone land to build a new airport despite local political obstacles. By contrast, it’s wise to avoid states losing people and facing a wave of municipal bankruptcies; they’ll play chicken with Washington and lose, their decrepit public services eroding further. From North Carolina to Texas, the trash is no longer being collected in some small towns as the state abandons them and big cities finance only their own roads and sanitation.

美国资金严重不足的基础设施更新有什么好处吗？美国遍布着数十万座废弃的桥梁、水坝和电线。该国只有 10% 的能源来自风能和太阳能等可再生能源，而且拥有三个独立的电网（东部、西部和德克萨斯州），绿色新政似乎还有很长的路要走。但新的基础设施计划可以纳入气候评估并优先考虑可再生能源，道路和住宅区位于从南达科他州到密苏里州再到宾夕法尼亚州的地区最有可能增加人口的国家。首先进行彻底改革可以使美国未来的地理分布更加协调。

Could there be an upside to America’s staggeringly underfunded infrastructure renewal? America is littered with hundreds of thousands of derelict bridges, dams, and power lines. The country gets barely 10 percent of its energy from renewable sources such as wind and solar, and with three separate grids (East, West, and Texas), a Green New Deal seems a long way off. But new infrastructure plans could incorporate climate assessments and prioritize renewable power, with roads and residential zones located in areas from South Dakota to Missouri to Pennsylvania that are most likely to gain in population. Putting their overhaul first could bring America’s future geographies into better alignment.

新的社交距离

New social distances

当疲软的经济与无精打采的年轻人和流行病偏执相碰撞时，美国的主要城市将会发生什么？早在新冠疫情爆发之前，不断上涨的住房成本、糟糕的移民政策和全球数字劳动力就足以让科技企业家巴拉吉·斯里尼瓦桑(Balaji Srinivasan)预言硅谷“退出”。随着公司在硅谷筹集资金，但将人力分散到全球，这种“技术竞争”已经进行了多年。许多科技高管将公司迁往温哥华，将不列颠哥伦比亚省称为“新加州”。随后，Covid-19 推动最大的科技公司转向（永久）远程工作，促使硅谷房屋销售激增。为了让在硅谷奋斗的人才保持对公司的忠诚，¹⁵谷歌、Facebook、苹果和其他公司也承诺投资 40 亿美元在湾区建造住宅，但实际需要的金额是这个数字的 200 倍。无论如何，年轻人厌恶企业奴役和心理倦怠。他们重视城市风度和社区氛围，但这并不意味着他们需要处于他人生活的边缘才能实现这一点。

What will happen to America’s major cities as a weak economy collides with listless youth and pandemic paranoia? Well before Covid, rising housing costs, bad immigration policy, and a global digital workforce were enough reasons for tech entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan to prophesize a Silicon “exit.” This “tech-sodus” has been underway for years as companies raise money in the Valley but spread their manpower globally. Numerous tech executives relocated their firms to Vancouver, referring to British Columbia as the “new California.” Covid-19 then pushed the biggest tech companies to switch to (permanent) remote work, prompting a spike in Silicon Valley home sales. To keep struggling talent in the Valley and loyal to their companies, major tech firms have offered income share agreements and loans to help employees pay off their student debt and save to buy homes.¹⁵ Google, Facebook, Apple, and others have also committed $4 billion to build homes in the Bay Area, but two hundred times that amount is needed. In any case, youth loathe corporate slavery and psychological burnout. They value urbanity and community, but it doesn’t follow that they need to remain on the margins of others’ lives to attain it.

纽约市和洛杉矶的情况类似，但规模要大得多。近年来，沿海大城市纽约和洛杉矶的外流又被一批雄心勃勃、富有冒险精神或富有的年轻人所填补。但大型企业总部正在缩小规模，转而采用较小的卫星办公室和远程工作——这是数字化战胜聚集的胜利。在大流行之前，只有 4% 的美国劳动力是远程办公。未来几年，这个数字可能会增加四倍或更多。很多公司宁愿支付工资或者为远程工作人员提供顾问合同，让他们在家中拥有高质量的连接，而不是花费在昂贵的商业房地产上。

New York City and Los Angeles are in a similar boat but at a far larger scale. In recent years, the outflow from coastal giants New York and Los Angeles has been backfilled by a new crop of ambitious, adventurous, or rich youth. But large corporate headquarters are downsizing in favor of smaller satellite offices and remote work—the triumph of digitization over agglomeration. Before the pandemic, only 4 percent of the American workforce were telecommuters. That figure could increase fourfold or more in the years ahead. Many companies would rather pay salaries or offer consultant contracts to remote workers who have quality connectivity at home rather than spend on expensive commercial real estate.

那么年轻人更喜欢什么样的地方作为他们的聚集地、他们睡觉、交友和度过空闲时间的地方呢？美国有超过两打的主要城市地区，每个地区都在竞相保护或升级自己的利基市场，以保持活力并吸引新居民。千禧一代和 Z 世代在决定去哪里工作之前，越来越聪明地计算自己的税后生活成本。¹⁶他们一直在新罕布什尔州、密苏里州和爱达荷州抢购房屋，并推动了盐湖城、亚特兰大、印第安纳波利斯和菲尼克斯的科技场景的渗透。¹⁷另一个成功秘诀是所谓的“18 小时城市”，例如丹佛、夏洛特、纳什维尔、波特兰、圣安东尼奥、亚特兰大和圣地亚哥，这些城市的市中心地区拥有活跃的下班后文化。¹⁸拉斯维加斯还通过 AREA 15 等全方位服务的生活方式中心及其快闪零售和未来娱乐设施吸引了年轻的寻求刺激者。明尼阿波利斯公布了一项 2040 年计划，通过消除对单户住宅的分区偏见和建造更多经济适用房来减少住房不平等。这些城市可能成为适应未来人口结构的全国性模式。

So what kind of places will youth prefer as their hub, the place they sleep, make friends, and spend free time? The US has more than two dozen major urban regions, each of which is competing to guard or upgrade its niche to remain viable and attract new residents. Millennials and Gen-Z are getting clever about calculating their post-tax cost of living before deciding where to take a job.¹⁶ They have been snapping up houses in New Hampshire, Missouri, and Idaho, and fueling the percolating tech scenes in Salt Lake City, Atlanta, Indianapolis, and Phoenix.¹⁷ Another winning formula is that of so-called “18-hour cities”—such as Denver, Charlotte, Nashville, Portland, San Antonio, Atlanta, and San Diego—that have a lively after-work culture in their downtown areas.¹⁸ Las Vegas also lured young thrill seekers with full-service lifestyle hubs like AREA 15, with its pop-up retail and futuristic entertainment. Minneapolis has unveiled a 2040 plan to reduce housing inequality by eliminating the zoning bias toward single-family homes and building more affordable units. Such cities could become a nationwide model attuned to future demographics.

当美国人在国内迁移时，他们会带来更大的商业和投资密度。纽约和加利福尼亚州拥有美国近一半的中小企业，但这些企业正被吸引到德克萨斯州、佛罗里达州、北卡罗来纳州、科罗拉多州和佐治亚州等低税“阳光地带”市场。西海岸和波士顿不再占据所有风险投资和科技工作岗位，奥斯汀、匹兹堡、纳什维尔和夏洛特正在扩张，成为亚马逊等蓝筹公司的生活实验室。¹⁹他们还将吸引 Plug & Play 或 500 Startups 等科技孵化器。AOL 创始人 Steve Case 的 Revolution 致力于推动全国被忽视城市的科技生态系统。

When Americans move within the country, they bring a greater density of businesses and investment. New York and California are home to almost half of America’s small and medium-size businesses, but these are being lured to low-tax “sunbelt” markets such as Texas, Florida, North Carolina, Colorado, and Georgia. And instead of the West Coast and Boston hogging all the VC investment and tech jobs, Austin, Pittsburgh, Nashville, and Charlotte are expanding as living labs for blue chip corporations such as Amazon.¹⁹ They’ll also draw tech incubators such as Plug & Play or 500 Startups. AOL founder Steve Case’s Revolution is devoted to boosting tech ecosystems in neglected cities nationwide.

今天的各州分为低税收和低监管（如德克萨斯州）或高税收和高监管（如加利福尼亚州），但未来可能获胜的州是低税收和高监管的州，例如华盛顿州。西雅图是美国五十个最大城市中人口增长最快的城市，但通过对铁路、公共汽车和自行车道的巨额投资，交通流量保持在较低水平。总部位于西雅图的巨头公司，如波音、微软、亚马逊和星巴克，以及其生态系统中的数千家小公司，已经成为一个自成一体的世界，推动这座城市跻身美国大都市地区重量级企业前十名。

States today are divided between low tax and low regulation (as in Texas) or high tax and high regulation (as in California), but the states that may win the future are low tax and high regulation, such as Washington. Seattle has the fastest growing population among America’s fifty biggest cities but has kept traffic down through huge investments in railways, buses, and bike lanes. Giant Seattle-based companies such as Boeing, Microsoft, Amazon, and Starbucks, and the thousands of smaller firms in their ecosystems, have become a world unto themselves, propelling the city into the top ten of America’s metro-regional heavyweights.

城市成本上升、新冠疫情封锁以及远程办公的激增也可能带来郊区的大幅复苏。随着大城市失去居民，郊区可能会重新成为高薪远程办公高管的全职绿洲。Covid-19 见证了近 50 万富人从城市中心外流到纽约郊外的汉普顿和卡茨基尔、旧金山北部的纳帕谷以及欧洲人的大西洋或地中海沿岸的第二故乡。今年夏天，纽约主要行政区的数千名居民在纽约州北部、长岛和新泽西州购买了房屋，并计划永久搬出该市。曾经的度假屋或乡村住宅现在正在改造（尤其是光纤宽带），成为远离城市封锁和抗议的主要住宅。大城市居民曾经对他们的农村亲戚拥有优越的生活质量感到幸灾乐祸。现在情况可能正好相反。或许不是：2020 年夏天逃离旧金山前往纳帕谷的一些人不得不重新疏散由于山火而返回旧金山。下一次袭击东北部的超级风暴可能也不会饶过汉普顿。

Rising city costs, the Covid lockdown, and the explosion in telecommuting are also likely to bring about a substantial suburban revival. As large cities lose residents, suburbs could regenerate as the full-time oasis for well-paid telecommuting executives. Covid-19 witnessed an exodus of the nearly five hundred thousand wealthy from urban centers to second homes in the Hamptons and Catskills outside New York, Napa Valley north of San Francisco, and the Atlantic or Mediterranean coasts for Europeans. Over the course of the summer, thousands of residents of New York’s major boroughs bought homes in Upstate New York, Long Island, and New Jersey with plans to permanently relocate out of the city. What once were holiday or country homes are now being retrofitted (especially with fiber broadband) as primary residences far from urban lockdowns and protests. Big-city dwellers used to gloat to their rural relatives about their superior quality of life; now it could be the reverse. Or maybe not: Some who fled San Francisco for Napa Valley in the summer of 2020 had to be re-evacuated back to San Francisco because of wildfires. The next superstorm that hits the Northeast may not spare the Hamptons either.

与此同时，即使从城市向郊区转移 10%，也会对美国 27 万亿美元的房地产市场产生重大（且相反）的影响。如果郊区成为宽敞、提供全方位服务、活动密度更大的飞地，新的郊区居民将把城市视为按使用付费，并将税款用于加强所在县的当地社区和学校。年轻人正在寻找有魅力的社区，随着他们与大城市生活的疏远，美国小镇的理想越来越有吸引力。

In the meantime, even a 10 percent shift from cities to suburbia would have a significant (and opposite) impact on both in America’s $27 trillion real estate market. If suburbs become spacious, full-service enclaves with greater density of activity, the new suburbanites will treat cities as pay-per-use and spend their tax dollars on strengthening local communities and schools in their counties. Youth are looking for charismatic communities, and the ideals of small-town America hold growing appeal as they become alienated from big-city life.

无论如何，自金融危机以来，许多千禧一代的主要目的地危机发生在他们童年时在父母家里的卧室。现在，Z 世代兄弟姐妹也加入了他们的行列：截至 2020 年 9 月，52% 的美国年轻人与父母住在一起。对于那些无力搬出的人来说，远程工作可能会提供足够的动力留下来并免租居住，尽管也许可以支持父母的抵押贷款付款。美国的房屋越来越大，而家庭却越来越小，但郊区的家庭住宅也许会卷土重来，成为负担得起的多代人居住的蜂巢。许多年轻人最终会成为郊区的服务人员——做饭、清洁、保姆、健身训练，以及为新定居阶层执行其他任务。类似 Tinder 的应用程序将为年轻人匹配每个邮政编码的工作。年轻人别无选择，只能追随金钱。

In any case, the main destination for many millennials since the financial crisis has been their childhood bedrooms in their parents’ homes. Now they’ve been joined by their Gen-Z siblings: As of September 2020, 52 percent of America’s young adults live with their parents. For those who can’t afford to move out, remote work may provide sufficient incentive to stay and live rent free, though perhaps supporting their parents’ mortgage payments. American homes have been getting bigger while families have been getting smaller, but maybe the suburban family home will make a comeback as an affordable multigenerational hive. Many youth will wind up as suburban service workers—cooking, cleaning, babysitting, fitness training, and performing other tasks for the new settled class. Tinder-like apps will match young people to jobs in every zip code. Youth have little choice but to follow the money.

美国的下一个美国人

America’s next Americans

美国有很多令人敬畏的理由——它的规模、财富和自由。但文化冲击不应该是其中之一。毕竟，美国拥有世界上最大的移民群体，超过 5000 万人遍布地球的各个角落。无论您来自哪里，在美国的某个地方（或许多地方）都有一个像您一样的社区。

There are many reasons to be awed by America—its size, wealth, and freedom. But culture shock shouldn’t be one of them. After all, America has the world’s largest migrant stock, more than 50 million people representing every corner of the planet. No matter where you’re from, you’ve got a community like you somewhere (or in many places) in America.

因此，减少移民将使美国能够专注于改善种族关系和恢复高就业率，这是一个方便的神话。幸运的是，即使自上而下的观点决定了移民紧缩，自下而上的现实却在不断扩大移民。想一想 1882 年的《排华法案》如何世代禁止华人移民，然而华人却是当今美国最大的亚裔人口，而且总体而言，亚裔是新移民中增长最快的群体。从 19 世纪霍乱爆发到 2020 年冠状病毒大流行，亚裔美国人一直是种族主义攻击的目标，但他们的人数继续膨胀到超过 2000 万。

It’s a convenient myth, then, that reducing immigration would allow America to focus on improving race relations and restoring high employment. Fortunately, even where the view from the top dictates immigration retrenchment, the bottom-up reality has been continuously expanding immigration. Consider how the 1882 Exclusion Act barred Chinese immigration for generations, yet Chinese represent the largest Asian population in the country today, and Asians overall are the fastest growing demographic of new immigrants. Asian-Americans have been targets of racist attacks from the nineteenth century cholera outbreak to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, yet their numbers have continued to swell to more than 20 million.

白人民族主义可能是美国政治中的一股强大力量，但这并不能改变这样一个事实：只有 29% 的美国年轻人是白人和基督徒，而且到 2045 年，黑人和西班牙裔人口预计将占到一半或更多。美国总人口。虽然只有 18% 的婴儿潮一代是非白人，但 48% 的 Z 世代是非白人（尤其是黑人、拉丁裔或亚洲人）。白人民族主义者和自由民兵组织，如“骄傲男孩”（Proud Boys）（他们以在州议会大厦挥舞武器来抗议冠状病毒封锁而闻名）告诉自己，他们已经成为美国的弃儿，并转向 Infowars、American Renaissance 和 Stormfront 等网站寻求效忠不满者之中。但他们是一个濒临灭绝的品种（通常是他们自己造成的）。The Base 是一个羽翼未丰的新纳粹组织 已经通过接入 iFunny 等 Z 世代社交媒体平台来尝试招募好奇的会员。无论是限制白人移民，还是用雅利安民族取代联邦政府，白人民族主义的目标都与伊斯兰国成为新的全球哈里发国一样现实。

White nationalism may be a potent force in American politics, but it doesn’t change the fact that only 29 percent of young Americans are white and Christian, and that by 2045, blacks and Hispanics together are expected to make up half or more of the total US population. While only 18 percent of boomers are nonwhite, 48 percent of Gen-Z is nonwhite (especially black, Latino, or Asian). White nationalists and freedom militias such as the Proud Boys (who famously protested the coronavirus lockdown by brandishing their weapons at state capitols) tell themselves that they have become America’s outcasts, and turn to websites such as Infowars, American Renaissance, and Stormfront to find allegiance among the disgruntled. But they are a dying breed (often at their own hand). The Base, a fledgling neo-Nazi group, has resorted to plugging into Gen-Z social media platforms such as iFunny to attempt to recruit curious members. Whether restricting immigration only to white people or replacing the federal government with an Aryan Nation, white nationalism’s goals are about as realistic as ISIS becoming a new global caliphate.

一个对其民族认同有强烈共识的社会有集体信心吸收更多移民。但如果一个国家不能（再）就其身份达成一致，那么其关于移民的争论必然会激烈无比。但年轻人肯定不是那些将犯罪归咎于移民或将失业归咎于全球化的人。2020 年美国盖洛普民意调查显示，对增加移民的支持率达到了有史以来的最高水平（77%）。²⁰这不足为奇，因为正是由于数十年的移民扩张，年轻人在一个种族多元化的国家长大，远比他们的长辈记忆中的要多样化。年轻人根本不从纯粹的种族角度来看待国籍。2020 年，有创纪录的 300 名黑人、拉丁裔、亚裔、阿拉伯人和拉丁美洲人竞选国会职位。

A society with a robust consensus about its national identity has the collective confidence to absorb more migrants. But if a country can’t agree (any more) about what its identity is, then its debates over immigration are bound to be convulsive. But youth certainly aren’t the ones who blame immigrants for crime or globalization for job losses. A 2020 Gallup poll in America showed the highest level of support ever registered—77 percent—for greater immigration.²⁰ This shouldn’t come as a surprise since it’s precisely because of decades of expansive immigration that youth have grown up in a country far more racially diverse than what their elders remember; youth simply don’t view nationality in purely racial terms. In 2020, a record three hundred black, Latin, Asian, Arab, and Latin Americans ran for congressional offices.

有证据表明，分裂的身份政治正在适得其反，这些历史上的“红色”州，如科罗拉多州、亚利桑那州、佐治亚州、佛罗里达州，甚至德克萨斯州，随着受过教育和多元化的年轻人涌入他们的州，这些州变得更加“蓝色”。城市。德克萨斯州的问题不是白人本地人和移民如何相处，而是墨西哥人和印第安人如何相处，而圣安东尼奥的答案似乎是：还好。更大的问题是白人民族主义：德克萨斯州是枪击事件最多的州。移民涌入俄勒冈州和华盛顿州寻求平静的风景，结果却遭遇了右翼民兵和安提法组织（以及持枪牧场主和警察）之间的暴力对峙。美国对冠状病毒的混乱处理以及乔治·弗洛伊德抗议活动引发的社会导火索导致许多移民重新审视他们最初来到美国的决定。

The evidence that divisive identity politics is backfiring lies in historically “red” states such as Colorado, Arizona, Georgia, Florida, and even Texas tilting ever more “blue” as educated and diverse youth file into their cities. The question for Texas isn’t how white natives and immigrants in general get along, but how Mexicans and Indians get along—and the answer in San Antonio appears to be: just fine. The greater problem is white nationalism: Texas has the most shootings of any state. Immigrants have streamed into Oregon and Washington for the placid scenery only to encounter violent standoffs between right-wing militias and Antifa groups (as well as gun-toting ranchers and police). America’s shambolic handling of the coronavirus and the social fuse lit by the George Floyd protests led many immigrants to second-guess their decision to come to America in the first place.

然而，总体而言，拉丁和亚洲移民拥有重生的美国人一样的热情。根据卡托研究所的一项调查，四分之三的入籍移民表示，他们为自己是美国人而“非常自豪”，这一比例高于本土出生的人口。²¹印度移民已经成为爱国的美国人，以至于印度极右翼的RSS印度教运动认为他们中的许多人是叛徒。他们还强化了“美国价值观”，因为他们更有可能在双收入家庭中保持婚姻状态并上大学。任何对“美国身份”的非种族主义观点都应该充分支持移民如何更新美国的本质。

Overall, however, Latin and Asian immigrants have the zeal of the born-again Americans that they are. According to a CATO Institute survey, three-quarters of naturalized immigrants say they’re “very proud” of being American, a higher share than the native-born population.²¹ Indian immigrants have become patriotic Americans to such a degree that India’s far right RSS Hindu movement considers many of them to be traitors. They also reinforce “American values” since they’re more likely to remain married, in two-income households, and go to college. Any non-racist view of “American identity” should fully support how immigration renews America’s essence.

在目前移民减少的过程中，富裕的美国（城市白人和亚洲人）很可能会继续与该国其他地区脱钩。高科技制造业的复兴使大部分工业生产实现了自动化，但却夺走了许多低收入非裔美国人、拉丁裔和白人所依赖的大部分基本零售和物流工作。非裔美国人在主要城市的边缘化确保了（又一个）失落的一代黑人青年无法在他们的贫民窟之外茁壮成长。随着白人和少数族裔的融合，异族通婚加速，但随着白人家庭搬出黑人、拉美裔和亚洲人（因其学术严谨性而令人担忧）人口日益增多的社区，白人的逃亡也在加速。²²因此，美国同时变得更加杂种化和贫民窟化。低技能移民获准照顾老人，但100百万或更多的美国人需要政府的拐杖才能获得基本的医疗保健和住房。人们诉诸于新中世纪的特权与被剥夺权利的飞地——联邦化不仅在政治上，而且在生活的各个方面。这个美国会更大，但不会更富裕。

On the present course of diminished migration, it’s likely that rich America (urban whites and Asians) will continue to decouple from the rest of the country. A high-tech manufacturing renaissance automates most industrial production, but takes away most of the basic retail and logistics jobs on which many lower-income African-Americans, Latinos, and whites depend. The marginalization of African-Americans in major cities ensures (another) lost generation of black youth unable to thrive outside of their ghettos. Intermarriage accelerates as whites and minorities mingle, but so does white flight as white families shift out of neighborhoods increasingly populated by blacks, Latinos, and Asians (feared for their academic rigor).²² America thus becomes both more mongrelized and ghettoized at the same time. Low-skilled immigrants are admitted to care for the elderly, but 100 million or more Americans require a government crutch to get basic medical care and housing. The population resorts to neo-medieval enclaves of privileged versus disenfranchised—federalized not just politically but in every facet of life. This America would be larger, but not richer.

事情在好转之前可能会继续变得更糟。但“更好”是什么样的呢？一个大于其各部分之和的美国将通过对基础设施、技能和流动性的大规模投资来实现自我再生，将财富转化为所有人的机会。它还将拥抱人口更新。两个多世纪以来，移民让每一代美国人变得更加多元化，国家的身份也变得更加有质感。在今天的美国，你无法轻易分辨谁是“美国人”，谁不是“美国人”。也许只有当为时已晚时，这个国家才会意识到最好是让人们来成为美国人，而不是提前认定外国人不够美国化。国家是“想象中的共同体，

Things may continue to get worse before they get better. But what does “better” look like? An America that is greater than the sum of its parts would regenerate itself through large-scale investments in infrastructure, skills, and mobility, turning wealth into opportunity for all. And it would embrace demographic renewal. For more than two centuries, immigration has made each generation of Americans more diverse, and the nation’s identity ever more textured. In America today, you can’t easily tell who is and who is not an “American.” Perhaps only when it becomes too late will the country realize that it’s best to let people come and become American rather than deciding in advance that foreigners are not American enough. Nations are “imagined communities,” in the words of scholar Benedict Anderson—and each generation is entitled to imagine a new one.

向北走吧，年轻人！

Go north, young man!

尽管美国在移民政策上举棋不定，但其北方广阔的邻国却没有那么不安。加拿大已跻身移民大联盟，每年接纳近 35 万移民，使其人口达到 3,000 万，这一比例远高于美国。加拿大的“世纪倡议”公开希望将人口增加到1亿——届时其人口可能会超过俄罗斯。加拿大是二十一世纪的移民磁石吗？

While the US convulses over immigration policy, its spacious neighbor to the north has far fewer qualms. Canada has entered the immigration big leagues, taking in almost 350,000 migrants annually to add to its 30 million population—a far higher annual percentage than the US. Canada’s “Century Initiative” openly aspires to grow the population to 100 million—at which point its population will likely surpass that of Russia. Is Canada the migration magnet of the twenty-first century?

20世纪70年代，加拿大主要的内部文化裂痕围绕着半自治的法语省魁北克。皮埃尔·特鲁多政府推动加拿大身份不仅涵盖英法二元论，还涵盖所有少数民族，例如土著因纽特人以及越来越多的南亚人。从那时起，一代又一代的加拿大人在一个正式的多元文化国家中长大。多元文化主义是加拿大的身份。新加拿大人的入籍仪式有时会在曲棍球场（加拿大最接近群众教堂的地方）举行，球迷们欢呼欢迎他们的新同胞。加拿大人知道他们目前吸收的移民构成了大规模的社会工程。为了使实验取得成功，国家政治和社会支持必须抵制推动美国和欧洲政治的民粹主义。该国还需要一项超越特鲁多家族（无论是父辈还是父辈）的愿景和魅力的战略性人口计划。

In the 1970s, Canada’s main internal cultural fissure revolved around the semi-autonomous French-speaking province of Quebec. The government of Pierre Trudeau pushed for Canadian identity to encompass not just the Anglo-French dualism but all minorities, such as the indigenous Inuit and growing number of South Asians. Since then, generations of Canadians have grown up in an officially multicultural nation. Multiculturalism is Canadian identity. Citizenship ceremonies for newly minted Canadians are sometimes held in hockey stadiums (the closest thing in Canada to a mass church) with fans cheering to welcome their new compatriots. Canadians know that their current migrant intake constitutes social engineering on a grand scale. For the experiment to succeed, national political and societal support will have to buck the populism that animates American and European politics. The country will also need a strategic demographic plan that transcends the vision and charm of the Trudeau family—both pere and fils.

加拿大体现了移民政策就是经济政策的现实。人口老龄化需要护理人员；东部和沿海省份需要通过从信息技术到水电等新产业来振兴；其正在解冻的边境需要热情的工人来耕耘，而将其油田和农田与全球市场连接起来需要新的管道和庞大的货运铁路网络。没有足够的加拿大人来完成这一切。加拿大目前人口的五分之一是移民，他们占加拿大人口增长的大部分（而且很快将是全部），特别是南亚人和华人。如果加拿大继续保持这种高移民趋势，到 2036 年，该国一半的人口将在国外出生或至少有一个移民父母。加拿大人预见到一个“棕色和白色”的未来。

Canada embodies the reality that immigration policy is economic policy. Its aging population requires caregivers; its eastern and maritime provinces need to be rejuvenated with new industries, from IT to hydropower; its thawing frontiers require hearty workers to cultivate the bounty, and connecting its oil patch and farmlands to global markets requires new pipelines and a vast freight rail network. There aren’t nearly enough Canadians to do it all. One-fifth of Canada’s current population is immigrants, who account for most—and soon all—of its population growth, especially South Asians and Chinese. If Canada continues this high immigration trajectory, by 2036 half the country’s population will be foreign-born or have at least one immigrant parent. Canadians foresee a future that is “as brown as white.”

大多伦多地区的布兰普顿市的棕色程度已经远高于白色。但布兰普顿的旁遮普人并没有建立自治飞地，而是竞选公职，并要求在公共部门工作中拥有更多代表性。下议院 15% 的席位由具有移民背景的议员占据，这一事实表明加拿大已经跨越了走向杂种化未来的不归路。

The greater Toronto area city of Brampton is already far more brown than white. But rather than setting up self-governing enclaves, Brampton’s Punjabis are running for office and asking for greater representation in public sector jobs. The fact that 15 percent of seats in the House of Commons are occupied by parliamentarians with immigrant backgrounds demonstrates how Canada has crossed the point of no return toward a mongrelized future.

加拿大比美国更愿意成为非白人占多数的国家。它可能会在下一波浪潮中领先移民与创新的关系也是如此。加拿大在寻求经济多元化的过程中一直在寻找人才，而印度人是一个容易被挖走的目标。2016 年至 2019 年间，每年前往加拿大的印度移民人数增加了一倍多，达到近九万人，比移民到美国的人数还要多。特朗普 2020 年暂停 H1-B 签证计划的行政命令的批评者将该命令称为“加拿大就业创造法案”。接下来，加拿大可以从仅硅谷就有五十万印度裔居民中抽取人才。美国民族主义者不应该将其境内出现的创新与产生这些创新的不同国籍的大脑分开。如果没有后者，前者的情况就会少得多。

Canada is far more comfortable than the US with becoming a majority nonwhite country. It may pull ahead in the next wave of the immigration-innovation nexus as well. Canada is on the hunt for talent as it seeks to diversify its economy, and Indians are an easy target to poach. The number of annual Indian immigrants to Canada more than doubled between 2016 and 2019, to nearly ninety thousand, more than migrated to the US. Critics of Trump’s 2020 executive order suspending the H1-B visa program dubbed the order the “Canadian job creation act.” Next Canada could pluck from the five hundred thousand Indian-origin residents of Silicon Valley alone. American nationalists shouldn’t separate the innovation emerging within their borders from the diverse nationalities of the brains that produced them. Without the latter, much less would happen in the former.

越来越多的美国人自己也意识到了加拿大模式。毕竟，“加拿大梦”比美国梦更容易实现。加拿大不仅是系统性大规模移民和同化的案例研究，也是减少不平等实验的政策实验室。加拿大的社会流动性远远高于美国：近 20% 的美国人出生在贫困线以下，这一数字在加拿大还不到 8%——加拿大为无家可归的人提供了住房，并为饥饿的人提供了工作。与此同时，美国正在经历十年内的第二次驱逐危机，贫困和饥饿进一步恶化。

Americans themselves in growing numbers have awakened to the Canadian model. After all, the “Canadian Dream” is much more attainable than the American Dream. Canada is not only a case study in systematic mass migration and assimilation, but also a policy lab for experiments in reducing inequality. Canada ranks far higher than the US in social mobility: Almost 20 percent of Americans are born below the poverty line, a figure that’s less than 8 percent in Canada—where homeless people are given homes, as well as jobs feeding hungry people. America, meanwhile, is going through its second eviction crisis within a decade, worsening both poverty and hunger.

两个世纪以来，美国人和加拿大人一直相对轻松地跨越漫长的大洋边界。一百多年前，大规模农业的扩张吸引了 75 万美国人来到加拿大的阿尔伯塔省、马尼托巴省和萨斯喀彻温省的草原省份。如今，有多达 200 万美国人居住在边境以北，而且人数还在不断增加。2016年之后，正是特朗普当选，带动了边境以北的新浪潮。2020 年，在冠状病毒最严重的时候，美国人挤满了加拿大的房地产网站，购买了看不见的房产。加拿大人开玩笑说，他们需要在边境修建一堵墙，以将美国人拒之门外。至少他们明智地在 2020 年禁止了攻击性武器，从而消除了美国最令人厌恶的特征。

Americans and Canadians have been moving with relative ease across their long interoceanic border for two centuries. The expansion of large-scale farming just over one hundred years ago lured 750,000 Americans to Canada’s prairie provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. Today as many as 2 million Americans live north of the border, and their numbers are rising. After 2016, it was Trump’s election that drove a new wave north of the border. In 2020, at the height of the coronavirus, Americans jammed Canadian real estate websites, buying properties unseen. Canadians joke they’ll need to build a wall along their border to keep Americans out. At least they wisely banned assault weapons in 2020, keeping out the most odious American trait.

欧洲的人数很可能会与美国一起扩大。与美国一样，加拿大也有大量的东欧侨民，随着这些家园的人口继续减少，而失业率仍然很高，许多失业者可能会跨越大西洋去与他们的亲戚团聚。请记住，凭借其议会形式的政府和福利制度，加拿大比美国或英国更像欧洲大陆，这部分解释了为什么自金融危机以来加拿大的政治一直坚持荷兰、法国和德国的中间派道路，而不是欧洲大陆。比美国和英国恶毒的民粹主义民族主义更重要。

European numbers may well expand alongside American. Like America, Canada has a large Eastern European diaspora, and as those homelands continue to depopulate while unemployment remains high, many of the jobless could skip across the Atlantic to join their relatives. Remember that with its parliamentary form of government and welfare system, Canada is much more like continental Europe than the US or UK, which partially explains why its politics since the financial crisis has stuck to the centrist path of the Netherlands, France, and Germany rather than the virulent populist nationalism of America and Britain.

年轻人青睐加拿大的另一个主要原因是：新增就业岗位绝大多数都是全职工作，而不仅仅是临时工作。事实上，加拿大的移民激增恰逢石油崩盘，这意味着该国正在押注于以制造业和服务业为重点的更加多元化的经济。为了应对不断增长的人口并防止反移民的强烈反对，加拿大需要建造更多的住宅社区、学校和医院。大多数前往加拿大的移民集中在靠近美国边境的主要城市，例如多伦多、蒙特利尔和温哥华，但尽管温哥华是世界上最热门的房地产市场之一，但海平面上升和森林火灾威胁着其温和的气候和昂贵的房产财产。

There is one other major reason for youth to favor Canada: The vast majority of new jobs created are full-time rather than just temp work. Indeed, Canada’s immigrant surge coincides with oil’s collapse, meaning the country is betting on a more diversified economy focused on manufacturing and services as well. To cope with its growing population and to prevent an anti-immigration backlash, Canada needs to build far more residential communities, schools, and hospitals. Most migrants to Canada concentrate in the major cities, near the US border, such as Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, but even as Vancouver is one of the world’s hottest property markets, rising sea levels and forest fires threaten its mild climate and pricey real estate.

因此，新老加拿大人可能会变得更加分散——越来越北。随着气候变暖以及哈德逊湾成为北极的重要门户，加拿大内陆省份安大略省和曼尼托巴省的城镇（例如曼尼托巴省的丘吉尔）变得越来越受欢迎。大多数加拿大人不熟悉他们的北部省份育空地区、西北地区和努纳武特地区，认为它们是一片广阔的空地，但它们却拥有极其丰富的能源和矿产，并且拥有广阔的北方森林（针叶林）。俄语）针叶松和云杉树。未来几年，加拿大人将更加意识到他们的慷慨。随着加拿大变暖，其农业产量大幅增加，数百万公顷的有机农业和轮作使得小麦、豆类、小米、亚麻和小麦的产量不断增加。燕麦。加拿大各地富含蛋白质的大豆种植面积也加速增长。Flash Forest 制造的一架无人机每月可以种植十万棵树，这意味着到 2030 年将有数十亿棵树发芽。加拿大的能源、农业和技术部门正在与人口同步扩张。

Canadians old and new are therefore likely to become more dispersed—farther and farther north. Towns in Canada’s inland provinces of Ontario and Manitoba—such as Churchill, Manitoba—are becoming much more desirable as the climate warms and Hudson Bay becomes a grand Arctic gateway. Most Canadians are unfamiliar with their northern provinces of the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut—thinking of them as a vast emptiness—yet they’re incredibly rich in energy and minerals, and home to vast boreal forests (taiga in Russian) of coniferous pine and spruce trees. Canadians will become much more aware of their bounty in the years ahead. As Canada warms, its agricultural output has swelled, with organic farming and crop rotation across millions of hectares producing ever greater yields of wheat, legumes, millets, flax, and oats. The acreage of protein-rich soy growth has also accelerated all across Canada. A single drone made by Flash Forest can plant one hundred thousand trees each month, meaning billions more trees sprouting by 2030. Canada’s energy, agriculture, and technology sectors are expanding in lockstep with its population.

但加拿大并非没有气候风险。大西洋沿岸纽芬兰省的海平面正在上升，森林火灾的发生率正在增加，如果美国转移五大湖的水（违反 2008 年的协议），加拿大可能不得不从其北部的淡水盆地抽取水，以及落基山冰川。当前的农业繁荣虽然充满希望，但前方的道路并不平坦。气温上升速度是全球平均水平的两倍：今天的农场明天可能会化为尘土，而新的农业带将在更短的时间内保持稳定。

But Canada is not without climate risk. Sea levels are rising along the Atlantic coast province of Newfoundland, the incidence of forest fires is increasing, and if the US diverts Great Lakes water (in violation of a 2008 compact), Canada may have to draw from its freshwater basins in the north as well as its Rocky Mountain glaciers. The current agro-boom, while promising, has a patchy road ahead. Temperatures are rising at twice the global average: Today’s farms could turn to dust tomorrow, and new agricultural belts will be stable for shorter periods.

这就是为什么有人建议加拿大选择“零增长”道路：保持低人口、稳定排放、关注国内社会问题。增长将在一段时间内下降，但最终会稳定下来，而现有人口的生活水平最终应通过升级技术而不是引进人口来提高。当然，加拿大也可以通过部署现有技术来绿色化有毒油砂的开采来减少碳足迹。这可以在不回到过去无聊的低移民社会的情况下实现，或者放弃世界所需要的高移民社会的道路。

This is why some suggest that Canada choose the path of “zero growth”: keep the population low, stabilize emissions, and focus on domestic social concerns. Growth would decline for a period but eventually stabilize, while living standards for the existing population should eventually improve by upgrading technology rather than importing people. Of course, Canada could also reduce its carbon footprint simply by deploying existing technologies to green the extraction from its noxious oil sands. This could be done without returning to the boring low-immigration society it used to be—or abandoning the path of the high-immigrant society the world needs it to be.

我。那些搬到县外的人通常与就业有关（开始一份新工作或搬迁），而在县内搬迁则更多地与住房有关（寻求更好或更便宜的住房）。

I. Those who move outside counties often do so related to employment (starting a new job or relocating for one), whereas moves within a county have more to do with housing (seeking better or more affordable).

第 5 章欧洲联邦

CHAPTER 5 THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH

欧洲方式

The European way

有时需要一段时间才能适应新旗帜。欧洲十二星旗于 20 世纪 80 年代中期采用，但直到 1992 年《马斯特里赫特条约》签订后才悬挂在欧盟各地的建筑物前。此后不久，我记得“2020欧洲杯”会议上的欢快气氛，我们在会上热闹地模拟了欧盟的外交仪式，将模拟联合国推到了一边。然而，由于年轻的欧洲人不记得欧盟之前的时代，他们也开始认为这是理所当然的。¹只有在欧洲最近采取了更大程度的财政团结措施之后——或许还有大西洋彼岸的一瞥——欧盟的受欢迎程度才得以恢复。皮尤研究中心的一项调查显示，从2012年到2019年，普遍对欧元持怀疑态度的希腊对欧盟的支持率上升了26个百分点，达到53%。在德国、西班牙、瑞典和荷兰，欧盟的地位接近70%；在波兰，这一比例为 80%。具有讽刺意味的是，英国脱欧四年后，欧盟在英国的受欢迎程度比以往任何时候都高。²

Sometimes it takes awhile to get used to a new flag. The twelve-starred European flag was adopted in the mid-1980s, but only hoisted in front of buildings across the Union after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Shortly thereafter, I remember the euphoric atmosphere at “Euro 2020” conferences in which we boisterously simulated the EU’s diplomatic rituals, pushing Model UN to the side. Yet because young Europeans can’t remember a time before the EU, they also came to take it for granted.¹ Only after Europe’s recent moves toward greater fiscal solidarity—and perhaps a glance across the Atlantic—has the EU’s popularity recovered. According to a Pew survey, from 2012 to 2019, the EU gained 26 percentage points in favorability in generally Euro-skeptic Greece, reaching 53 percent. In Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands, the EU’s standing is nearly 70 percent; in Poland, it’s 80 percent. Four years after Brexit, the EU’s popularity in Britain was ironically higher than ever.²

如今欧盟的人口数量大约是美国的两倍，其中青少年和年轻人的数量（1.8 亿）大约是美国的两倍。尽管美国和欧洲在根本上存在分歧——美国人蔑视欧洲的地缘政治弱点，而欧洲人则嘲笑美国的严重不平等——但他们对彼此的观察足够密切，思想能够传播开来。亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯推动的“民主社会主义”无非是对社会的重新包装。数十年来，数亿欧洲人一直享有民主福利国家。与此同时，从“占领华尔街”和“黑人生命也是命”到谷歌，欧洲人受到美国无限的社会能量和创业精神的启发。

The EU today has a population approximately twice the size of America’s, including about double the number (180 million) of teens and young adults. While America and Europe have diverged in fundamental ways—Americans scorn Europe’s geopolitical weakness while Europeans mock America’s crass inequality—they observe each other closely enough for ideas to spill over. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s push for “democratic socialism” is nothing other than a repackaging of the social democratic welfare state hundreds of millions of Europeans have enjoyed for decades. Meanwhile, from Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter to Google, Europeans are inspired by America’s unbounded social energy and entrepreneurialism.

但在反映年轻人的偏好方面，欧洲比美国具有先天优势。最明显的是，虽然美国规定了众议院议员（二十五岁）、参议院议员（三十岁）和当选总统（三十五岁）的最低年龄，但欧洲人却没有这样的限制。在美国，成为市长、议员甚至总理的年轻人数量远超想象。欧洲也拥有多党政治制度，而不是美国严格的双头垄断，这意味着联盟内部的妥协对于避免僵局至关重要。这也意味着，美国的年轻政治家被迫遵守党派纪律，而欧洲人可以创办新政党，例如海盗党，该党在北欧和东欧取得了成功。所有这些都有助于解释最近法国和整个欧洲绿党的激增。

But Europe has built-in advantages over America when it comes to reflecting the preferences of youth. Most obviously, while the US has minimum ages to be a member of the House (twenty-five), Senate (thirty), and to be elected President (thirty-five), Europeans face no such restrictions. Far more young people have become mayors, parliamentarians, or even prime ministers than is conceivable in America. Europe also has multi-party political systems rather than America’s rigid duopoly, meaning compromise within coalitions is essential to avoid gridlock. This also means that whereas America’s young politicians are forced into party discipline, Europeans can start new parties such as the Pirate Party, which has been successful across northern and eastern Europe. All of this helps to explain the recent surge of green parties in France and across Europe. In a number of German provinces and in Austria, there are now “black-green” coalitions of conservatives and greens, forcing these seeming extremes to work together on issues such as raising the retirement age, supporting more flexible worker insurance, and promoting clean energy.

这些政治差异源于不同的哲学基础，并导致普通民众截然不同的结果。美国的《权利法案》和《宪法》列举了联邦政府和各州职权范围内对个人的保护，而欧洲宪法则规定了人民的发言权和福利权，以及对个人的保护。滥用权力。欧洲国家平均将GDP的近30%用于社会服务，远高于美国的15%。因此，欧洲人享受免费的教育和医疗保健，同时银行不能欺骗他们，科技公司不能窃取他们的数据，能源公司不能污染他们的土壤和水。在 Covid-19 封锁期间，欧洲各国政府确保失业者无需等待失业救济即可领取大部分工资。像美国人一样，邮件中的支票很少。许多公司转向德国人所说的“Kurzarbeit”，即所有员工都减少工作时间以避免有人被解雇。欧洲人不会以更高“竞争力”的名义放弃进步的监管。

These political differences stem from divergent philosophical foundations and lead to very different outcomes for ordinary people. Whereas the American Bill of Rights and Constitution enumerate individuals’ protections from the federal government and states’ purview, European constitutions delineate people’s right to voice and welfare as well as protections from abuse of power. The average European country spends nearly 30 percent of GDP on social services, far higher than America’s 15 percent. Europeans thus enjoy free education and healthcare, while at the same time banks can’t rip them off, tech companies can’t steal their data, and energy companies can’t pollute their soil and water. During the Covid-19 lockdown, European governments ensured that the unemployed received a majority of their wages without having to wait for a meager check in the mail as Americans did. Many firms switched to what Germans call Kurzarbeit, in which all employees work reduced hours to avoid anyone getting fired. Europeans won’t give up on their progressive regulations in the name of higher “competitiveness.”

对于美国人来说，欧洲的社会架构一定看起来是乌托邦：全民医疗保健、基本收入、大学学费补贴和储蓄账户。欧洲国家在教育水平、经济适用住房和公共交通方面也表现得更好，这些都是促进社会流动性的关键因素。^I全球和平指数发现，前 25 个最安全国家几乎全部位于欧洲（日本、新西兰、新加坡和不丹为补充）。

For Americans, Europe’s social scaffolding must seem utopian: universal medical care, basic income, subsidized college tuition, and savings accounts. European nations also fare much better in education levels, affordable housing, and public transportation, all crucial factors in enabling social mobility.^I The Global Peace Index finds that almost all of the top twenty-five safest countries are in Europe (supplemented by Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and Bhutan).

然而，欧洲人不习惯的是按性别工作。因此，与美国同行一样，大多数人要么没有积蓄，要么只够三个月的开支。但与美国人不同的是，大多数欧洲人没有信用卡来积累债务。他们对借记卡很节俭，并使用 Revolut 或 Klarna 等移动银行服务来分割和推迟付款。此外，越来越多的欧洲人继续与父母住在一起，提供了更高程度的基本稳定性。欧洲千禧一代的生活是文明的，但也充满了厌倦。

What Europeans are not accustomed to, however, is working in the gigonomy. As a result, like their American counterparts, most have either no savings or barely enough for three months of expenses. But unlike Americans, most Europeans don’t possess credit cards by which to pile on debt. They’re frugal with their debit cards and use mobile banking services such as Revolut or Klarna to slice up and defer payments. Also, more Europeans continue to live at home with their parents, providing a higher degree of basic stability. European millennial life is civilized, but full of ennui.

欧洲人已经习惯了免学费、稳定的就业和普遍福利，因此限制福利会引发工会和学生的大规模街头抗议。但欧洲也在推行终身社会稳定的真正实验，例如芬兰不对储蓄征税的人寿账户体系，以及荷兰由国家管理但由雇主资助的便携式养老金。欧洲国家不仅为个体工人的工资提供减震器，而且为中小企业提供比大企业更强有力的支持。尽管欧洲人平均将其收入的 40% 至 60% 用于支付在沃顿商学院最适合经营自己企业的国家排名中，他们的国家占据了整个顶级位置。

Europeans have been so accustomed to free tuition, stable employment, and universal benefits that curbs to benefits are met with mass street protests by unions and students. But Europe is also where genuine experiments in lifelong social stability are being rolled out, such as Finland’s life account system that doesn’t tax savings, and Dutch portable pensions managed by the state but funded by employers. European countries not only have shock absorbers for individual workers’ wages, but also provide stronger backing for SMEs rather than large corporations. Even though Europeans pay on average between 40 to 60 percent of their incomes in taxes, their nations occupy the entire top tier in Wharton’s ranking of the best countries in which to run your own business.

欧洲没有创新科技巨头，但它为了公共利益而部署创新。例如，高性能、开源操作系统Linux就是芬兰发明的。与企业或国家控制数据的美国或中国不同，欧洲在个人数据保护方面最为进步，使得亲公民的数据市场得以蓬勃发展。联合办公的历史也比 WeWork 悠久得多。比利时联合办公先驱 IWG（前身为雷格斯）于 1989 年在比利时成立，其普及程度远超华丽的独角兽 WeWork，而且没有财务欺诈。欧洲的后新冠复苏计划包括斥资数十亿美元发展清洁能源、信息技术和其他欧洲领军企业，以维护欧洲摆脱美国和中国的自主权。

Europe doesn’t have innovative tech giants, but it deploys innovations for public benefit. For example, the high-performance and open-source operating system Linux was invented in Finland. Unlike America or China, where corporations or the state control data, Europe is most progressive in personal data protection, allowing pro-citizen data marketplaces to thrive. Coworking too is far older than WeWork. The Belgian coworking pioneer IWG (formerly Regus) began in 1989 in Belgium and is far more widespread than the flashier unicorn WeWork, without the financial chicanery. Europe’s post-Covid recovery plan includes billions of dollars to grow clean energy, IT, and other European champions to assert Europe’s autonomy from both America and China. It’s ironic that Washingtonians speak about a world of two models when the model most of the world wants to emulate is the European one.

人们永远不应该对美国下赌注，但人们可能对此感到非常不耐烦。这当然是过去十年中大批移居欧洲的美国人的观点，他们放弃了美国过度的创造性破坏和愤怒的政治，转而支持受监管的资本主义和受到合理限制的自由。许多美国人不想再等待美国成为欧洲式的福利体系——他们只是为了得到它而搬到欧洲。越来越多的美国学生在高中毕业后直接前往欧洲攻读英语语言课程的完整本科学位，而不是积累六位数的债务。随着欧洲教师工资的上涨，越来越多的英语教师也被吸引到大西洋彼岸。

One should never bet against America, but one can get very impatient with it. That’s certainly the view of the throngs of Americans who have moved to Europe over the past decade, abandoning America’s excessively creative destruction and the politics of outrage in favor of regulated capitalism and liberty with sensible constraints. Many Americans no longer want to wait for America to become a European-style welfare system—they’re just moving to Europe to get it. Rather than amassing six figures of debt, a rising number of American students are going straight to Europe after high school and doing their full undergraduate degree in English-language programs. And with teacher salaries higher in Europe, ever more English teachers are being lured across the Atlantic as well.

每年移居欧洲的美国人数量猛增，如今总数已超过 100 万。英国是美国侨民最多的国家，但德国和法国也越来越受欢迎。^II无数网站和博客上出现了美国人购买前往爱尔兰、荷兰、意大利和其他六个国家的单程机票的沾沾自喜的故事，颂扬欧洲公共安全、负担得起的医疗保健、消费者友好型法规的优点和家庭友好型就业政策，并就如何追随他们的脚步提供分步指导。十九世纪，欧洲移民给美国工业和社会带来了巨大的人力增长。在二十一世纪，美国人能为欧洲做同样的事情吗？

The number of Americans moving to Europe annually has jumped, bringing the total to more than 1 million today. The UK is home to the most American expats, but Germany and France are gaining popularity.^II Umpteen websites and blogs have cropped up with self-congratulatory stories of Americans moving on one-way tickets to Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, and a half-dozen other countries, extolling the virtues of European public safety, affordable healthcare, consumer-friendly regulations, and family-friendly employment policies—and providing step-by-step guidance on how to follow in their footsteps. During the nineteenth century, European migrants gave American industry and society a seismic boost in manpower. Could Americans do the same for Europe during the twenty-first?

亚裔欧洲人的崛起

The rise of Asian-Europeans

在过去的三十年里，西欧国家之间一直存在着软竞争，以吸引前苏联（特别是俄罗斯）外流中最优秀和最聪明的人才，其中德国和英国（以及美国和以色列）明显的赢家。但就亚洲人而言，美国拥有最多的日本、韩国、中国和印度人才。亚裔美国人的数量（刚刚超过 2000 万）是“亚裔欧洲人”的两倍多——这就是为什么这个词实际上并不存在。但未来几年，亚裔欧洲人口将激增，这不仅使其本身成为一个类别，而且在数量上可能会超过亚裔美国人。

Over the past thirty years, there has been a soft competition among Western European nations to attract the best and the brightest from the exodus out of the former Soviet Union (particularly Russia), with Germany and Britain (together with the US and Israel) being the clear winners. But when it comes to Asians, America has garnered the largest share of Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Indian talent. There are more than twice as many Asian-Americans (just over 20 million) as there are “Asian-Europeans”—which is why that term doesn’t really exist. But the coming years will witness the Asian-European population surge, making it not only a category in its own right but perhaps one that eclipses Asian-Americans in number.

随着东欧人集体背井离乡前往西欧，他们的家园已成为来自更东方的移民向西迁移的沃土。然而，保持土地肥沃还需要付出一些努力：2020 年，干​​旱迫使波兰和罗马尼亚禁止粮食出口。他们和该地区的其他国家将需要对新的水利工程项目进行更多投资，以保持东西方的粮仓。但随着来自西方的资金步履蹒跚，更多的资金将来自东部——还有更多的农民和其他移民。

As Eastern Europeans have uprooted themselves en masse to head for Western Europe, their homelands have become fertile ground for migrants from farther east who are also moving west. Keeping the land fertile, however, will require some work: During 2020, droughts forced Poland and Romania to ban grain exports. They and other countries in the region will need to invest much more in new hydro-engineering projects to remain breadbaskets for both east and west. But with funds from the west faltering, more will come from the east—and more farmers and other migrants too.

罗马尼亚正在成为这方面的一个测试案例。该国将自己标榜为低成本科技中心，其工资与印度 IT 行业的工资一样低廉。事实上，克卢日镇邀请了印度软件高管和工程师来指导如何成为罗马尼亚版的班加罗尔。罗马尼亚仍面临约100 万熟练和非熟练工人的短缺，因此该国计划吸引印度、巴基斯坦、斯里兰卡和越南的许多人到建筑、医药、科技和农业领域工作。³有多少人会返回亚洲？

Romania is becoming a test case of what this might look like. The country has branded itself as a low-cost tech hub with wages as modest as those of India’s IT industry. In fact, the town of Cluj invited Indian software executives and engineers to coach it on how to become a Romanian version of Bangalore. Romania still faces a shortage of about 1 million skilled and unskilled workers—hence its plan to lure that many from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam to work in construction, medicine, tech, and agriculture.³ How many will ever return to Asia?

捷克共和国已经是欧洲最热门的搬迁目的地之一，外国人占该国劳动力的10%。大多数新来者是俄罗斯人、乌克兰人或美国人，他们巩固了布拉格作为热门留学中心的地位。全国学生人数中已经有四分之一是外国人。随着捷克教育体系转向英语，越来越多的学生将来自世界各地以获得负担得起且风景优美的学位。此外，与其他欧洲社会一样，捷克的生育水平极低。虽然政府为多达三个试管受精周期提供的资金对捷克生育率的影响可以忽略不计，但它催生了蓬勃发展的试管受精行业，迎合了注重成本的准父母。

The Czech Republic is already one of the hottest relocation destinations in Europe, with foreigners making up 10 percent of the country’s workforce. The majority of new arrivals are Russians, Ukrainians, or Americans, who have cemented Prague’s status as a hot study-abroad hub. Already one-quarter of the country’s entire student population are foreigners. As the Czech education system pivots to English, ever more students will come from around the world for an affordable and scenic degree. Furthermore, as with other European societies, Czech fertility levels are abysmally low. While government funding for up to three IVF cycles has had a negligible impact on Czech fertility, it has given rise to a thriving IVF industry catering to cost-conscious would-be parents.

学生和年轻家庭的涌入帮助欧洲小国和岛国在开放中获得安慰，同时填补了劳动力短缺。它还为外国人提供了在比他们的祖国稳定得多的社会中立足的立足点。

This influx of students and young families helps small and insular European states gain comfort in their openness while filling their labor shortages. It also gives foreigners a toehold in societies far more stable than where they come from.

鉴于欧洲的低出生率，具有讽刺意味的是，世界上几乎所有养育子女排名最高的国家（基于女性赋权和儿童营养等变量）都在欧洲。拥有如此大量的闲置住房和优质的基础设施，子孙后代如果不能享受欧洲所创造的生活福利将是一种遗憾。事实上，欧洲国家维持其慷慨的福利国家的唯一方法——即使是为了他们自己——就是引进新的纳税人，让他们为自己的收入纳税。

Given Europe’s low birth rates, it’s ironic that almost all of the top-ranked countries in the world for raising children (based on variables such as female empowerment and child nutrition) are in Europe. With such a large idle housing stock and quality infrastructure, it would be a pity for future generations not to enjoy the benefits of the life Europe has built. Indeed, the only way for European nations to maintain their generous welfare states—even for themselves—is to import new taxpayers who pay into the pot from which they collect.

只有波兰成功稳定了人口，主要是通过吸引约二十万邻国乌克兰人。为了扭转人才流失的局面，中国还取消了年轻工人的所得税。波兰和克罗地亚已经成为一些最热门的电子学习初创公司的所在地，而乌克兰（以及目前动荡之前的白俄罗斯）作为低成本技术后台吸引了爱沙尼亚和俄罗斯的投资。“一带一路”倡议使中国成为许多东欧国家最大的投资者之一，也为长期的亚洲商人打开了大门。

Only Poland has managed to stabilize its population, mostly by attracting an estimated two hundred thousand neighboring Ukrainians. To reverse brain drain, it has also scrapped its income tax for young workers. Poland and Croatia have become home to some of the hottest e-learning startups, while Ukraine (and until its present unrest, Belarus) has attracted Estonian and Russian investment as a low-cost tech back office. The Belt and Road Initiative has made China one of the largest investors in many Eastern European countries, opening the door to a long-term Asian merchant population as well.

东欧国家之间的软竞争就这样开始了，不是为了阻止有才华的外国人，而是为了吸引他们。但即使年轻的俄罗斯人继续向西方寻求更加自由的生活，仍然没有足够的斯拉夫年轻人重新定居欧洲——无论是东方还是西方。但在更远的东方，有数亿高技能和半熟练的亚洲人渴望成为亚裔欧洲人。

And so begins the soft competition among Eastern European states not to ward off talented foreigners but to attract them. But even as young Russians continue to seek a more liberal life to the west, there aren’t enough Slavic youth left to repopulate Europe—either eastern or western. But farther east lie many hundreds of millions of highly and semi-skilled Asians eager to become Asian-Europeans.

南欧出售

Southern Europe for sale

1968 年 1 月，一场地震袭击了意大利珍贵的西西里岛，夺去了 200 多人的生命，使 10 多人无家可归。波焦雷亚莱等一些城镇遭到严重破坏，罗马委托著名建筑师设计全新的城镇，以便幸存者重新安置。附近萨莱米的市长还有另一个想法：他可以通过有效地赠送房屋来吸引公民前来重建他的城镇。四十年后的 2008 年，他的继任者更新了政策，并根据该国的新货币，正式启动了一项以 1 欧元的价格出售废弃房屋的计划。

In January 1968, an earthquake struck Italy’s treasured island of Sicily, claiming more than two hundred lives and leaving more than one hundred thousand homeless. Some towns, such as Poggioreale, were so decimated that Rome commissioned famous architects to design entirely new ones to which survivors were resettled. The mayor of nearby Salemi had another idea: He could attract citizens to come and rebuild his town by effectively giving away homes. Forty years later, in 2008, his successor updated the policy and, in keeping with the country’s new currency, officially launched a scheme to sell abandoned homes for exactly 1 euro.

最初只是当地的噱头，现在已经成为村庄、城镇和中型城市之间的全国性军备竞赛，以吸引新居民，否则就有从国家地图上消失的风险。有些提供减税甚至向任何愿意创业的人提供 25,000 欧元。许多此类措施首先向全国民众推出，但效果不温不火。如果不说服更多的外国人将其空置省份作为新家，意大利南部就无法作为一个有人居住的地区而生存。卡拉布里亚省和阿布鲁齐省的许多城镇没有受到新冠疫情的影响，随着大量欧洲人在空虚中寻求安全，在辛克夫隆迪镇开展的“美丽行动”等活动势头强劲。意大利人不仅想要个人和情侣，还想要能带来更多亲戚和朋友的人：你可以在一个废弃的意大利小镇重建你的整个社交圈。

What started out as a local gimmick has become a nationwide arms race among villages, towns, and mid-size cities to lure new residents—or risk disappearing off the national map. Some offer tax abatements and even 25,000 euros to anyone willing to start a business. Many such measures were rolled out first to the national population—with tepid results. Southern Italy won’t survive as an inhabited region without convincing far more foreigners to make its vacant provinces their new home. With a number of towns in Calabria and Abruzzi Provinces unscathed by Covid, campaigns such as “Operation Beauty,” in the town in Cinquefrondi, have gained momentum as a wide range of Europeans seek safety in emptiness. The Italians want not just individuals and couples but people who will bring yet more relatives and friends in tow: You could recreate your entire social circle in an abandoned Italian town.

就连西班牙加泰罗尼亚等人口稠密、富裕的地区也纷纷效仿，推出了自己版本的意大利计划。在那里，你可以花 28 万欧元购买整个 80 公顷的村庄，其中有 14 栋房屋，并默认成为市长。毕竟，你拥有这个地方。自举办 1992 年夏季奥运会以来，巴塞罗那经历了一次重大复兴，结合其世界历史，使其成为西班牙最国际化的城市。然而，最近，其过度监管的房地产市场——建筑成本太高，租赁权太宽松——吓跑了西班牙开发商。结果，即使是巴塞罗那风景优美的港口旁的巴塞罗那区等黄金地段也已破烂不堪，年迈（甚至已故）的业主囤积着破旧的建筑物。

Even populous and wealthy regions such as Spain’s Catalonia have taken the cue and launched their own versions of Italy’s schemes. There you can buy an entire village of eighty hectares, with fourteen homes, for 280,000 euros—and become the mayor by default. You own the place, after all. Since hosting the 1992 Summer Olympics, Barcelona has undergone a major renaissance, which combined with its worldly history has made it Spain’s most cosmopolitan city. More recently, however, its overregulated property market—construction costs are too high and tenancy rights too lenient—has scared Spanish developers away. As a result, even prime neighborhoods such as the Barceloneta district, by the city’s scenic port, are in tatters, with aging (or even deceased) owners hoarding decrepit buildings. Why not build affordable and sustainable housing for young workers and talented entrepreneurs?

这并不是西班牙第一次需要进口勤劳的移民来填补劳动力短缺。在 20 世纪 90 年代和 2000 年代，许多年轻的巴基斯坦人凭临时许可证进入该国，随着时间的推移，他们被巴塞罗那的海滨气候​​所吸引，在那里定居下来，组建了家庭，并学会了说西班牙语和一些加泰罗尼亚语。现在他们勤奋地经营着电器店和药店，过着舒适的工薪阶层生活。在最近的一次访问中，我只有一个在整整一周的时间里，非巴基斯坦出租车司机。巴塞罗那的拉瓦尔街区（紧邻著名的兰布拉大道）已成为哥特式的拉合尔。

This wouldn’t be the first time Spain has needed to import hardworking immigrants to fill labor shortages. In the 1990s and 2000s, many young Pakistanis entered the country on temporary permits, over time gravitating toward the seaside climate of Barcelona, where they settled down, started families, and learned to speak both Spanish and some Catalan. Now they diligently run electronics shops and pharmacies, living comfortable working-class lives. During a recent visit, I had only one non-Pakistani taxi driver over the course of an entire week. Barcelona’s Raval neighborhood (just off the famed Las Ramblas boulevard) has become a Gothic Lahore.

西班牙继续随意地努力拼凑下一代。西班牙大约有 250 万拉美裔人，但它很容易吸引更多墨西哥人或哥伦比亚人。与德国和意大利一样，出生权政策正在修订，以便更容易地向拥有该国传统的人授予公民身份。在西班牙居住十年即可获得公民身份，2015年通过了一项法律，根据文化和历史联系向塞法迪犹太人（他们在15世纪被驱逐出西班牙）授予公民身份。

Spain continues its haphazard efforts to cobble together its next generation. There are about 2.5 million Latinos in Spain, but it could easily attract more Mexicans or Colombians. As in Germany and Italy, birthright policies are being revised to more easily grant citizenship to those who share the country’s heritage. Citizenship can be acquired after residing in Spain for ten years, and in 2015, a law was passed awarding citizenship to Sephardic Jews (who were expelled from the country in the fifteenth century) on the basis of cultural and historical ties.

葡萄牙有充分理由成为欧洲人和其他寻求长期稳定的人更受欢迎的目的地之一。预计气候变化对其淡水资源的影响较小，波尔图周围的北部和阿尔加维南部地区的淡水资源丰富。葡萄牙倾向社会主义的政府扭转了危机后的经济衰退，增加了对火车和地铁的公共投资并提高了工资。它还寻求吸引超过200万海外葡萄牙人回国。2000 年代，穷困潦倒的葡萄牙人在繁荣的前殖民地巴西寻找工作，而现在情况却相反。在大流行封锁期间，葡萄牙给予所有已在该国的移民和寻求庇护者充分的权利，以便他们能够接受新冠病毒检测。其他人可以向这种进步社会主义学习。

Portugal is with good reason one of the more popular destinations for Europeans and others seeking long-term stability. Climate change is expected to have less impact on its freshwater resources, which are abundant in the north around Porto and in the southern region of Algarve. Portugal’s socialist-leaning government has reversed its post-crisis economic decline, boosting public investment in trains and subways and raising wages. It’s also seeking to lure back more than 2 million overseas Portuguese. In the 2000s, down-and-out Portuguese sought work in their thriving former colony of Brazil—now it’s the reverse. During the pandemic lockdown, Portugal gave full rights to all migrants and asylum seekers already in the country, so they could get Covid tests. Others could learn from this brand of progressive socialism.

欧洲面临着要么同化移民，要么掉下人口悬崖的选择。与美国一样，欧洲也需要非技术移民来修复基础设施、收集垃圾、照顾老人、帮助其他外国人融入社会以及承担无数其他职能。欧洲依赖波兰水管工、罗马尼亚农民和非洲环卫工人。尽管英国失业率不断上升，而且采摘庄稼的工人短缺七万名，但只有一百名英国人参加了抗议活动。政府呼吁在新冠疫情封锁期间发挥农业作用。不接受必要数量和范围的移民来解决劳动力短缺问题的社会最终会变得更加贫穷。

Europe faces a choice between assimilating migrants or falling off a demographic cliff. As in America, Europe needs unskilled migrants to fix infrastructure, collect trash, care for the elderly, help integrate other foreigners, and countless other functions. Europe depends on Polish plumbers, Romanian farmers, and African sanitation workers. Despite rising unemployment in the UK and a seventy-thousand-worker shortage picking crops, only one hundred Britons showed up in response to a government call to step into farming roles during the Covid lockdown. Societies that don’t accept the necessary number and range of migrants to plug their labor shortages wind up poorer.

即使是希腊、意大利和西班牙等欧盟南部成员国也面临农民、厨房工作人员和街道清洁工的短缺。他们不应该用机枪向载有叙利亚寻求庇护者的船只射击，而应该弄清楚如何充分利用这些船只。远至阿富汗和尼日利亚的难民蹲在雅典的空荡荡的建筑物里，但正当他们开始寻找工作时，希腊政府将他们驱逐，并将他们关进帐篷营地，他们坐在那里无所事事。相反，他们应该根据当地需求、就业水平和住房能力的评估，将移民分配到不同的省市，平衡负荷，不仅可以分散移民的利益，也可以避免出现无精打采的贫民窟。

Even southern EU members such as Greece, Italy, and Spain have shortages of farmers, kitchen staff, and street cleaners. Rather than firing with machine guns at boats loaded with Syrian asylum seekers, they should figure out how to make the most of them. Refugees from as far as Afghanistan and Nigeria have squatted in empty buildings in Athens, but just as they began looking for work, the Greek government evicted them and corralled them into tent camps where they sit and do nothing. Instead, they should allocate migrants to different provinces and cities based on an assessment of local needs, employment levels, and housing capacity, balancing the load not only to spread the benefits of immigrants but also to avoid listless ghettos.

从西班牙到意大利再到保加利亚，南欧是擅自占地者的天堂，是废弃城镇和村庄的发现者和守护者的世界。中国大片肥沃的土地和可固定的住房实际上迫切需要数以千万计的移民占据，这些移民可以换取稳定的新生活，从而重振陷入困境的经济。最终，这将使这些土地具有比情感墓地更高的用途。埃及亿万富翁纳吉布·萨维里斯 (Naguib Sawiris) 向意大利或希腊提供 1 亿美元，用于建造一座人口稀少的岛屿，以重新安置阿拉伯难民。无人居住岛屿的主权是否应该比其效用更重要？

From Spain to Italy to Bulgaria, southern Europe is a squatter’s paradise, a finders-keepers world of abandoned towns and villages. Its vast tracts of fertile land and fixable housing are practically crying out to be occupied by tens of millions of migrants, who in exchange for a stable new life could revitalize ailing economies. Ultimately, this would give these lands a higher purpose than to be sentimental graveyards. Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris offered Italy or Greece $100 million for a depopulated island to repurpose for sheltering Arab refugees. Should an uninhabited island’s sovereignty matter more than its utility?

同化紧急情况

An assimilation emergency

在过去的十年中，来自叙利亚和利比亚等国的超过 100 万阿拉伯人以及 100 万非洲人（主要来自刚果、厄立特里亚、索马里和苏丹）进入欧洲，其中大部分通过土耳其或穿越地中海。尽管欧洲总体上欢迎斯拉夫和巴尔干人民，但它遇到的困难要大得多总体上吸收了阿拉伯人、非洲人和穆斯林。事实上，保持欧洲内部边界开放的条件是必须关闭地中海航线。

In the past decade, more than 1 million Arabs from countries such as Syria and Libya and 1 million Africans (mostly from the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan) have made it into Europe, mostly via Turkey or across the Mediterranean. But while Europe has generally been welcoming toward Slavic and Balkan peoples, it has had much more difficulty absorbing Arabs, Africans, and Muslims in general. Indeed, the bargain holding Europe’s internal borders open is that the Mediterranean routes must be shut.

但欧洲必须应对已经存在于其中的数百万移民、在市中心闲逛的年轻阿拉伯人以及经常流动的非洲人，通过小道消息分享哪些城镇正在变得更加宽容而不是虐待。毒品交易、盗窃和其他犯罪急剧增加。巴塞罗那因其多功能城市设计和促进交通的数据传感器而赢得了“智慧城市”的美誉，但正如许多旅游网站已经预先警告的那样，它也是“世界扒手之都”。到目前为止，西班牙当局一直拒绝采取纽约和北京那种更具侵入性的“智慧”方法：无处不在的警察摄像头。然而，巴塞罗那的吸引力地位的缺点可能是需要更强有力的治理来维持法律和秩序。

But Europe has to grapple with the millions of migrants already in its midst, the young Arabs loitering in city centers and the Africans who often stay on the move, sharing through the grapevine which towns are becoming more tolerant versus abusive. Drug dealing, burglary, and other crimes have shot up drastically. Barcelona has earned a reputation as a “smart city” for its mixed-use urban design and data sensors to facilitate traffic, but as many travel websites already forewarn, it’s also the “pickpocket capital of the world.” Thus far, Spanish authorities have resisted taking the more intrusive approaches to “smart-ness” found in New York and Beijing: ubiquitous police cameras. Yet the downside of Barcelona’s magnetic status may be the need for more muscular governance to maintain law and order.

尽管英国已经成为一个监控社会，但那里的犯罪率也在上升，仅 2018 年就发生了 4 万起持刀袭击事件，其中大部分是年轻的黑人或穆斯林男性所为。硫酸袭击事件也在增加，主要肇事者和受害者都是白人、加勒比黑人或巴基斯坦人。显然，许多移民逃离非自由国家的事实并不意味着他们不怀有自己的不宽容倾向，也不意味着他们在重新定居后不会采取这些态度。

Though the UK has already become something of a surveillance society, crime has been rising there as well, with forty thousand knife attacks in 2018 alone, mostly perpetrated by young black or Muslim males. Acid attacks are also on the rise, with the main perpetrators and victims being white, Afro-Caribbean, or Pakistani. Clearly, the fact that many immigrants have fled illiberal countries doesn’t mean they don’t harbor their own intolerant tendencies, or adopt those attitudes once they have resettled.

在英国，老一代的巴基斯坦人和阿拉伯人建立了自己平行的社会世界，将包办婚姻强加给他们实际上是西方的孩子。从郊区的地盘争夺战到所谓的“诱拐团伙”中的未成年人卖淫，英国的巴基斯坦穆斯林社区中有许多成员似乎没有意识到他们生活在一个以人权和法治为荣的国家。在伦敦东部的一些行政区，来自穆斯林反十字军的巴基斯坦激进分子推动伊斯兰教法自我监管，实际上呼吁建立自己的伊斯兰酋长国，禁止饮酒、赌博和音乐，并在其中禁止饮酒、赌博和音乐。通奸会被处以石刑，偷窃则会被砍手。所有这些都有助于解释 2005 年 7 月 7 日伦敦爆炸案造成 52 人死亡的四名肇事者中的三名是在英国出生和长大的巴基斯坦人，他们参加了激进的清真寺。

In Britain, an older generation of Pakistanis and Arabs have set up their own parallel social world of arranged marriages imposed on their effectively Western children. From suburban turf wars to underage prostitution among so-called “grooming gangs,” the Pakistani Muslim community in the UK has many members who seem unaware that they live in a country that prides itself on human rights and the rule of law. In boroughs of east London, Pakistani radicals from Muslims Against the Crusades push for Shariah self-policing, effectively calling for their own Islamic emirate that forbids drinking, gambling, and music, and in which adultery is punished with stoning, and stealing with cutting off hands. All of this helps explain how three of the four perpetrators of the July 7, 2005, bombings in London that killed fifty-two people were British born and raised Pakistanis who attended radical mosques.

无论移民来自哪里，同化的挑战都是一代人的挑战，不幸的是，解决问题的时间比应有的晚了一代人。与美国的拉丁裔一样，欧洲的阿拉伯和非洲移民往往停留的时间比预期长，出生率也高于土著人口。穆斯林人口最多的城市——布鲁塞尔、伯明翰、安特卫普、阿姆斯特丹、马赛和马尔默——的整个社区都是移民。仇视伊斯兰教的恐怖活动正在抬头，反移民团体焚烧清真寺、水烟吧和穆斯林聚集的其他地方。与此同时，移民群体之间也存在紧张关系。2019 年，一段在拥挤的伦敦双层巴士上拍摄的视频在网上疯传，视频中一名戴着头巾的索马里妇女对一名印度男子咆哮，谴责他的气味并恳求他回家。他们很可能都是英国公民。国籍并不能保证文明程度。

Wherever migrants have come from, the challenge of assimilation is a generational one—and unfortunately addressed a generation later than it should have been. As with Latinos in the United States, Arab and African migrants in Europe tend to stay longer than expected and have higher birth rates than indigenous populations. The cities with the largest Muslim populations—Brussels, Birmingham, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Marseilles, and Malmö—have entire neighborhoods consisting only of migrants. Islamophobic terror is on the rise, with anti-immigrant groups torching mosques, shisha bars, and other places Muslims convene. Meanwhile, there are tensions between migrant groups themselves. In 2019, a viral video taken on a crowded London double-decker bus showed a Somali woman in a hijab ranting against an Indian man, denouncing his smell and imploring him to go home. They may well both have been British citizens. Nationality is no guarantor of civility.

当叙利亚人和土耳其人、印度人和巴基斯坦人、中国人和越南人都在欧洲定居时，他们并没有放弃自己国家的竞争。相反，他们的敌意变成了欧洲街头上演的国内争端。20世纪90年代，库尔德人和土耳其人互相轰炸对方的商店和加油站；今天，库尔德人走上街头抗议土耳其入侵叙利亚。欧洲的土耳其人本身对埃尔多安总统也存在分歧，土耳其裔足球运动员因向他致敬而公开蒙羞，而欧洲各国政府则严厉批评他的独裁主义。在卫城阴影下平静的一天，看到一队身着传统服装的巴基斯坦男子在一辆货车后面行进，用扩音器大声赞美安拉并谴责印度在克什米尔的行为，这不再是一个奇怪的景象——全部用乌尔都语，

As Syrians and Turks, Indians and Pakistanis, Chinese and Vietnamese all settle in Europe, they don’t leave their countries’ rivalries behind. Instead, their animosities become domestic disputes that play out on European streets. In the 1990s, Kurds and Turks bombed each other’s shops and gas stations; today the Kurds take to the streets protesting Turkey’s incursion into Syria. Turks in Europe are themselves divided over President Erdogan, with football players of Turkish descent publicly shamed for saluting him while European governments heavily criticize his authoritarianism. On an otherwise calm day in the shadow of the Acropolis, it’s no longer a strange sight to see a column of traditionally clad Pakistani men marching behind a van with a loudspeaker blaring praise for Allah and denunciations of India’s actions in Kashmir—all in Urdu, which nobody else in Athens understands.

谁应该为有时感觉像是文明冲突的情况负责在欧洲城市街头玩耍？问题既在于不被同化的父母，也在于本土沙文主义，它不平等地接受来自前殖民地的人——或者坦率地说，来自任何地方的人。无论哪种方式，更好地将数百万移民融入其中的一个解决方案是，执法机构雇用更多具有种族背景的男女，他们了解他们所保护的人之间的文化差异。另一项明显但迟来的措施是补贴大规模强化语言培训计划，以便他们能够做好准备，实现功能上的自给自足和就业。

Who is to blame for what sometimes feels like a clash of civilizations playing out on European city streets? The fault lies both with unassimilated parents as well as a nativist chauvinism that doesn’t accept as equals people from former colonies—or quite frankly from anywhere. Either way, one solution to better integrate the millions of migrants in their midst is for law enforcement agencies to hire more men and women with ethnic backgrounds who understand the cultural nuances of those they’re protecting from one another. The other obvious and overdue measure would be to subsidize a mass program of intensive language training so they can prepare to become functionally self-sufficient and employable.

欧洲不存在移民问题。它存在同化问题，这一问题可以通过明智的社会经济政策来解决。在人口下降和同化挑战之间，后者应该是更好的选择。移民将会继续——唯一的问题是文化同化是否会成功。

Europe doesn’t have a migration problem. It has an assimilation problem, one that can be solved by smart socioeconomic policies. Between demographic decline and assimilation challenges, the latter ought to be the preferable choice. Migration will continue—the only question is whether cultural assimilation will succeed.

新德国人

The new Germans

2015 年至 2016 年间，德国接受了超过 100 万阿拉伯寻求庇护者，这令人惊叹地展示了该国受到全世界赞扬的意志文化。凭借其著名的后勤能力，移民被分配到全国各地的城镇并受到接纳，冷战时期的柏林滕珀尔霍夫机场也充当了临时避难所。但随着聚光灯的消退，处理数十万无限期新居民的任务却没有消失。在一个曾经是种族身份代名词的国家，如何才能同化数百万移民？

Between 2015 and 2016, Germany accepted more than 1 million Arab asylum seekers, a stunning demonstration of the country’s Willkommens—kultur that was lauded across the world. With its famous logistical prowess, migrants were allocated to and embraced in cities and towns across the country, with Berlin’s Cold War–era Tempelhof Airport serving as a temporary refuge as well. But as the spotlight faded, the task of processing hundreds of thousands of indefinite new residents did not. What will it take to assimilate millions of migrants in a country once synonymous with race-based identity?

德国的土耳其人是最定居的侨民之一，尽管他们在心理上从未完全放松过。战后第一代加斯塔拜特努力争取德国社会的认可，并为土耳其语言和文化获得了更大的官方认可做出了贡献。这导致了一个双文化的 X 世代群体，其中包括受人尊敬的演员、运动员和政治家，但总的来说仍然属于一个平行的土耳其社区。更多的千禧一代土耳其裔德国人不确定他们是否应该被称为德国土耳其人。他们出生时就拥有德国公民身份，不敢为了土耳其公民而放弃德国公民身份，而且德语比土耳其语说得更流利。

Turks in Germany represent one of the most settled diasporas, albeit one that has never been fully at ease psychologically. A first generation of postwar Gastarbeiter worked hard to gain acceptance in German society, and were responsible for the greater official recognition of Turkish language and culture. This led to a bicultural Gen-X cohort that included respected actors, athletes, and politicians but on the whole still belonged to a parallel Turkish community. An even larger crop of millennial Turkish-Germans aren’t sure whether they should perhaps be referred to as German-Turks instead. They hold German citizenship by birth and wouldn’t dare give it up for the Turkish equivalent, and speak German more fluently than Turkish.

土耳其人目前占德国人口的 5%，这是一个重要的侨民群体，埃尔多安政府试图通过指示土耳其领事馆和协会在土耳其年轻人中积极推广土耳其语和古兰经课程来对其施加影响。为了对抗土耳其的影响力，许多德国公立学校也开始教授土耳其语，但它们面临着缺乏能够加强土耳其年轻人“母语”技能的土耳其教师的问题。然而，考虑到埃尔多安目前对土耳其自由派的攻击，土耳其有很多教师愿意移民——这意味着更多的土耳其人居住在德国，土耳其人的双重身份在那里延续。

Turks now represent 5 percent of the German population, a significant diaspora over which the Erdogan government has sought to wield influence by directing Turkish consulates and associations to aggressively promote Turkish and Koran classes among Turkish youth. To counter Turkey’s clout, many German public schools have begun teaching Turkish as well—except they face a shortage of Turkish teachers capable of strengthening Turkish youth’s “native language” skills. Given Erdogan’s current assault on the Turkish liberal establishment, however, there are plenty of teachers in Turkey willing to emigrate—meaning yet more Turks residing in Germany and a continuation of Turks’ dual identity there.

德国政治提醒我们，移民辩论不仅涉及文化，还涉及经济。虽然欧洲的其他首都城市也是国家经济引擎（例如伦敦或巴黎），但柏林很贫穷，并且充斥着反资本主义的民粹主义。时髦的年轻人赶走了谷歌，尽管它会带来数千个新的就业机会。他们声称“社区”取得了胜利，但他们的主要成就是永久地依赖该市负债累累的政府。由于租金太高，柏林居民于 2019 年发起一项倡议，将该市最大的私人业主 (Deutsche Wohnen) 国有化，并于 2020 年，当地立法机构通过了五年暂停租金上涨的规定。虽然这名义上给了该市一些时间将大片未使用的土地改造成经济适用房，该市仍需要吸引更多居民，让开发商证明建设它的合理性。缓慢的政治和糟糕的经济才是问题所在；投资吸纳移民是解决方案。

German politics is a reminder that immigration debates are really about economics as much as culture. While other capital cities in Europe are also national economic engines (think London or Paris), Berlin is poor and riddled with anti-capitalist populism. Hipster youth chased away Google even though it would have brought thousands of new jobs. They claimed victory for “community,” but their main achievement was to perpetuate their own dependency on the city’s indebted government. Berlin residents pursued an initiative in 2019 to nationalize the largest private property owner in the city (Deutsche Wohnen) because rents were too high, and in 2020, a five-year moratorium on rental increases passed the local legislature. While this nominally gives the city some time to convert vast unused land tracts into affordable housing, the city still needs to attract more residents for developers to justify building it. Slow politics and bad economics are the problem; investing to absorb migrants is the solution.

柏林比欧洲大陆的任何其他城市都更能证明自己是一个国际化的城市环境。柏林墙倒塌三十年来，这座城市不断吸引着土耳其人和东欧人、西德人和西欧雅皮士、亚洲学生以及现在的阿拉伯移民和难民。虽然德国的整体生育率较低，但柏林却是欧洲出生率最高的城市，这一点从新基塔的不断开放就可见一斑。（日托中心）位于东柏林千禧一代居住的社区。今天这座城市的人口终于赶上了一百年前的人口。尽管一些政客公开表示不满，许多街道上听不到德语，但许多居民只是将英语作为他们的共同点。对于柏林年轻人来说，“Denglish”的半英语句子是德语。

More than any other city in continental Europe, Berlin has proven itself as a cosmopolitan urban milieu. In the thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the city has steadily attracted waves of Turks and Eastern Europeans, West Germans and Western European yuppies, Asian students, and now Arab migrants and refugees. While Germany’s overall fertility rate is low, Berlin boasts the highest birth rate of any city in Europe, evident in the continuous opening of new kitas (daycare centers) in the millennial-populated neighborhoods of East Berlin. The city’s population today has finally caught up to what it was one hundred years ago. While some politicians vocally resent not hearing German spoken on many streets, many residents have simply made English their common denominator. For Berlin youth, the half-English sentences of “Denglish” are German.

将柏林与其周边地区进行对比。这座城市周围是前东德，那里的低生育率和人口外流意味着数十个废弃城镇，很少有德国人会自愿搬（回）去。自统一以来，已经花费了数万亿美元来提升前东部各州的经济前景，但随着劳动力的减少，政府正在失去增加支出的兴趣。与此同时，许多确实到来的勤劳移民被右翼德国另类选择党（AfD）吓跑了。

Contrast Berlin with its environs. Surrounding the city is the former East Germany, where the combination of low fertility and demographic exodus has meant dozens of abandoned towns few Germans would ever voluntarily move (back) to. Trillions of dollars have been spent since reunification to elevate the former eastern states’ economic prospects, but as the workforce shrinks, the government is losing interest in spending more. Meanwhile, many of the hardworking migrants that do come are scared away by the right-wing Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) party.

德国选择党是一个重要的案例研究，说明为什么不将不存在的民粹主义政党归因于一致性。虽然它的崛起一直很麻烦，但它的大多数支持者——比如那些支持英国脱欧或特朗普的人——都在老龄化，并且居住在人口较少的地区，比如萨克森州，其最大的城市是莱比锡和德累斯顿。20 世纪 90 年代末，当我拜访德累斯顿的朋友时，那里是一座繁荣的大学城，拥有热闹的广场和拥挤的晚间歌舞表演（相当于《周六夜现场》）。但德累斯顿和前东德其他地区一样，一直在经历人口崩溃。德累斯顿官员没有做出更大的努力来吸引新居民，而是被迫宣布“纳粹立场”由于极右势力的日益突出，2019 年出现了“纳粹紧急状态”派对。德国选择党的反移民情绪现在正以符合其议程的方式得到回报：没有人搬到德累斯顿，但任何在其他地方找到机会的人都会离开。随着德累斯顿的衰落，德国选择党已经转向准社会主义，向仇外选民承诺，即使用户所剩无几，他们也会继续开放游泳池和图书馆。德国选择党一开始是反欧元和反移民的。现在还可以抗风电。

The AfD is an important case study in why not to ascribe to populist parties a coherence that doesn’t exist. While its rise has been troublesome, most of its supporters—like those who backed Brexit or Trump—are aging and reside in less populous areas, such as the state of Sachsen, whose largest cities are Leipzig and Dresden. When I visited friends in Dresden in the late 1990s, it was a thriving university town with lively squares and packed evening cabaret shows (the equivalent of Saturday Night Live). But Dresden, along with the rest of the former East Germany, has been experiencing demographic collapse. Rather than make greater efforts to lure new residents, Dresden officials were forced to declare a “Nazinotstand” (“Nazi emergency”) in 2019 due to the growing prominence of far right parties. The AfD’s anti-immigrant sentiment is now being rewarded in a manner befitting its agenda: Nobody is moving to Dresden, but anyone finding opportunity elsewhere leaves. As Dresden withers, the AfD has turned quasi-socialist, promising its xenophobic voters that it will keep swimming pools and libraries open even though there are few users left. The AfD started out as anti-euro and anti-immigrant; now it’s also anti–wind power.

人口和政治达尔文主义最终都将给德国选择党带来应有的命运。也许在这些仇外者去世后不久，他们废弃的城镇将成为一百万或更多移民的家园。数以万计的阿富汗和叙利亚寻求庇护者已经被安置在马格德堡等城市的空置公寓楼里。如果他们获得庇护并被允许工作，他们就可以修复德国日益恶化的基础设施，或许还可以筹集政治和财政支持来重建自己的国家。另一种情况是，中年仇外者和年轻的新纳粹极端分子将自己圈养在东德的飞地里，在那里他们可以感到纯洁，而一旦他们老了，他们就会逐渐感激移民对他们的照顾。

Both demographic and political Darwinism will eventually deliver the AfD the fate it deserves. And perhaps not long after these xenophobes have passed away, their abandoned towns will become home to a million or more migrants. Already tens of thousands of Afghan and Syrian asylum seekers are being housed in vacant apartment blocks in cities such as Magdeburg. If they were granted asylum and allowed to work, they could fix Germany’s degenerating infrastructure—and perhaps raise political and financial support to rebuild their own countries as well. The other scenario is that middle-aged xenophobes and young neo-Nazi extremists corral themselves in East German enclaves where they can feel pure—and once they’re old, they’ll grow to appreciate the immigrants taking care of them.

极右翼政党几乎没有在柏林和汉堡等接纳大量移民的德国人口稠密城市注册，也没有在斯图加特周围的西南工业重镇巴登-符腾堡州产生政治影响，那里有数万名难民和移民。接受过制造汽车和机车的专业培训，直接为该省最重要的出口做出贡献。正是由于这些城市以及涌入这些城市的移民，德国劳动力在 2018 年实际上出现了三十年来的首次增长。

Far right parties barely register in populous German cities that have accepted large numbers of migrants, such as Berlin and Hamburg, nor do they make a political dent in the southwestern industrial powerhouse of Baden-Württemberg around Stuttgart, where tens of thousands of refugees and migrants have received professional training in building cars and locomotives, contributing directly to the province’s most vital exports. It’s thanks to these cities—and the immigrants that have flocked to them—that Germany’s workforce actually expanded in 2018 for the first time in thirty years.

德国金融之都法兰克福也讲述了一个由移民主导的复兴的令人信服的故事。这座城市长期以来一直拥有华丽的办公楼，但缺乏文化活力。现在，英国脱欧流亡者、金融科技初创公司以及成群结队的亚洲和阿拉伯移民的结合，已经让国际学校、餐厅、夜生活和艺术活动的优质资源。欧洲最大的软件公司 SAP 的总部已经给人一种硅谷思科的感觉：一个玻璃般的工业小印度。特别是在过去的十年里，年轻的印度知识工作者在德国中世纪学术中心海德堡安顿下来，他们的孩子在当地学校上学。随着德国向亚洲科技人才提供近乎无限量的“蓝卡”，并进一步为他们提供进入欧盟其他国家的机会，新一代的亚洲人正在欧洲扎根，并在更高的层次上扎根。梯子比伦敦索撒尔的南亚店主还高。德国反移民运动的口号曾经是“ Kinder statt Inder””（“婴儿，不是印第安人”），但今天德国在招募后者方面比培养前者做得更好。

Germany’s financial capital of Frankfurt also presents a compelling tale of immigrant-led rejuvenation. The city has long had glitzy office towers but lacked cultural dynamism. Now the combination of Brexit exiles, fintech startups, and droves of Asian and Arab migrants has put a premium on international schools, restaurants, nightlife, and artistic events. The headquarters of SAP, Europe’s largest software company, already feels like that of Cisco in Silicon Valley: a glassy and industrial Little India. Particularly over the past ten years, young Indian knowledge workers have settled down comfortably in Germany’s medieval academic center of Heidelberg, their children attending local schools. With Germany offering a nearly unlimited supply of “blue cards” to Asian tech talent—and by extension giving them access to the rest of the EU as well—a new micro-generation of Asians is planting roots in Europe at a much higher rung on the ladder than the South Asian shopkeepers of London’s Southall. One slogan of the anti-immigration movement in Germany used to be “Kinder statt Inder” (“Babies, not Indians”), but today Germany is doing a much better job at recruiting the latter than producing the former.

德国和法国都有反移民运动，但这些国家的定义要明确得多，因为它们已经经过几代人的时间成为移民社会。之所以对移民产生强烈反对，是因为为时已晚。请记住，法国的头巾禁令、德国的移民职业配对计划以及荷兰语语言要求很难算作驱逐策略——它们是同化政策。在很大程度上，他们已经发挥了作用。

Germany and France have anti-immigrant movements, but these countries are far more defined by the fact that they have already become immigrant societies over several generations. The reason there is backlash to immigration is because it’s already too late. Remember that France’s ban on headscarves, Germany’s immigrant vocational matchmaking programs, and Dutch language requirements are hardly expulsion strategies—they’re assimilation policies. And to a large degree, they have worked.

德国人普遍赞赏移民的贡献，这些移民已晋升为部长和政党领袖，并占据了2014年男足世界杯冠军球队的一半。从阿尔及利亚人齐达内带领的 1998 年法国世界杯冠军队到喀麦隆人姆巴佩带领的 2018 年卫冕冠军，法国国家足球队也是彻底的多种族球队，而且显然这支球队也更优秀。今天的德国音乐排行榜上位居榜首的是来自土耳其、中国和厄立特里亚背景的说唱歌手。事实上，民族“自我”的部落定义不再是多元文化主义所反对的规范，而是相反。

Germans generally appreciate the contributions of immigrants who have risen to become ministers and heads of political parties, and made up half the 2014 men’s football World Cup championship team. From Algerian Zinedine Zidane’s 1998 French World Cup–winning team to the 2018 repeat victory led by Cameroonian Kylian Mbappé, the French national football team is also thoroughly multiracial and evidently that much better for it. Today’s German music charts are topped by rappers with backgrounds from Turkey, China, and Eritrea. In reality, the tribal definition of the national “self” is no longer the norm against which multiculturalism is pushing but rather the reverse.

德国已经是数百万土耳其人和波斯人的家园，他们从出生起就持有德国护照，尽管他们不符合德国人的历史原型。德国百分之二十的人口是移民出身，无论是来自欧盟邻国、巴尔干半岛、俄罗斯还是中东，十分之一的人是外国公民（一半来自其他欧盟国家，一半来自世界其他地区） 。据估计，德国有 100 万非洲人后裔的体重达到了足够的标准，他们要求在 2020 年进行官方黑人人口普查。

Germany is already home to millions of Turks and Persians who have had German passports since birth even though they don’t conform to the historical archetype of German-ness. Twenty percent of Germany’s population is of immigrant origin, whether from EU neighbors, the Balkans, Russia, or the Middle East, and one in ten people is a foreign citizen (half from other EU countries, and half from the rest of the world). The estimated 1 million people of African descent in Germany have achieved sufficient weight that in 2020 they demanded an official black census.

现在印度人、阿拉伯人和越南人也加入了成为“新德国人”的旅程”（“新德国人”）。每个社会都有一条从名词到形容词的历史路径：美国到美国，德国到德国，加拿大到加拿大，等等。但经过几十年的人口稀释，如今这种身份已成为一个不断变化的目标。德国现在并没有假设每个人都必须遵守过时的种族理想，而是正在认真讨论德国性的真正含义。被认为是德国人或至少足够德国人的门槛是多少？“德国”一定是指白人、基督教徒和日耳曼人吗？还是享受足球、汽车、香肠就够了？或者介于两者之间？人们经常听到过多的移民可能会侮辱一个国家的价值观，但听到明确说明这些价值观实际上是什么的情况却很少见。

Now Indians, Arabs, and Vietnamese are also joining the journey toward becoming “die neuen Deutschen” (“the new Germans”). Every society has a historical path from noun to adjective: America to American, Germany to German, Canada to Canadian, and so forth. But after decades of demographic dilution, today that identity is a moving target. Rather than assume everyone must conform to antiquated ethnic ideals, Germany is now engaged in a serious conversation about what German-ness actually means. What is the threshold for being considered German, or at least German enough? Must “German” mean white, Christian, and Germanic? Or is it enough to enjoy football, cars, and sausages? Or something in between? It’s common to hear that too much immigration can be an affront to a country’s values, but far less common to hear a clear statement of what those values actually are.

毫无疑问，随着移民的加剧，文化冲突也随之增多。例如，近年来，德国穆斯林中发生了数十起名誉杀人事件。然而随着时间的推移，似乎一旦穆斯林到达欧洲，他们实际上就会有越来越多的人放弃伊斯兰教。尽管欧洲仍有一些萨拉菲派资助的清真寺活跃，但荷兰和德国政府正在积极巡逻，并支持更温和的竞争对手。在柏林，土耳其裔德国女权主义者 Seyran Ateş 是这座清真寺的第一位女伊玛目，该清真寺以中世纪伊斯兰哲学家伊本·鲁世德 (Ibn Rushd)和德国诗人约翰·沃尔夫冈·冯·歌德 (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) 的名字命名。它欢迎同性恋者并进行混合性别祈祷。德国现在希望所有新任伊玛目都说德语。

There is no doubt that culture clashes abound as migration intensifies. In recent years, there have been dozens of honor killings among Muslims in Germany, for example. Yet over time, it appears that once Muslims get to Europe, they effectively abandon Islam in ever larger numbers. While there are still some Salafist-funded mosques active in Europe, governments in the Netherlands and Germany are actively patrolling them and supporting more moderate competitors. In Berlin, Turkish-German feminist Seyran Ateş is the first female imam of a mosque named both for medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd and German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. It welcomes homosexuals and has mixed gender prayer. Germany now wants all new imams to speak German.

当移民不会说本国语言时，他们既无法为社会做出贡献，也无法维护自己的利益，而对他们的怨恨也会因为同样的原因而增长。安吉拉·默克尔支持移民，但也承认，由于外国人学习德语的速度不够快，无法正确融入，德国的多元文化主义正在失败。2016 年在柏林避难的中国艺术家艾未未在 2019 年宣称，他发现德国社会不宽容，并列举了出租车司机不友善等困难经历。但毫无疑问，如果他能用常见的德国方言与波斯尼亚、土耳其、波斯和阿拉伯出租车司机进行交流，他会进行更愉快的互动。法兰克福机场从来都不是任何人最喜欢的中转地，但近年来每当我经过时，

When migrants can’t speak the national language, they can neither contribute to society nor stand up for themselves—while resentment against them grows for the same reason. Angela Merkel championed immigration but also confessed that German multiculturalism was failing due to foreigners not learning German fast enough to properly integrate. Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, who took refuge in Berlin in 2016, declared in 2019 that he found German society intolerant, citing difficult experiences such as unfriendly taxi drivers. But there’s little doubt that he’d have had more pleasant interactions if he could have communicated with the legions of Bosnian, Turkish, Persian, and Arab taxi drivers in their common German vernacular. Frankfurt Airport is never anyone’s favorite for transit, but in recent years whenever I pass through, I can’t help but smile when I overhear the airport staff—new Germans from Nigeria to Iran—sharing their life stories with one another, in German.

高山绿洲

Alpine oases

气候模型预测，欧洲温带地区将经历压缩的雨季，降雨量减少或短暂的洪水，随后将出现更长、更热的干旱期。然而，尽管欧洲大陆夏季热浪袭来，阿尔卑斯山却是世界上最接近纬度和态度的理想组合的地方，而且还有海拔的额外好处。

Climate models predict that Europe’s temperate latitudes will experience compressed rainy seasons in which they receive less rain or short deluges—both followed by longer, hotter dry spells. Yet despite continental Europe’s summer heat waves, the Alps come as close as the world can offer to the ideal combination of latitude and attitude—with the added benefit of altitude.

阿尔卑斯山国家——瑞士、奥地利、德国、法国和意大利——受益于世界上最清洁的水源。（毫不奇怪，他们也是世界上最大的瓶装水来源。）随着高山冰川加速融化，更多的水将从山上流下来，最终使他们的滑雪业也随之消失。即使像一些度假胜地那样在雪地里乘坐飞机飞行的反常趋势也有其局限性。

The countries of the Alps—Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, and Italy—benefit from the world’s cleanest water supply. (Not surprisingly, they’re also the world’s top sources of bottled water.) And more water will be coming down the mountain as Alpine glacier melt accelerates—eventually taking their ski industry with it. Even the perverse trend of flying in snow on planes, as some resorts have done, has its limits.

世界上有冰川水的山区——安第斯山脉、阿尔卑斯山和喜马拉雅山——只有阿尔卑斯山国家拥有这样的工程跨境合作的实力和记录，利用冰川融化形成水库（尤其是地下水库，以免水蒸发）和管道，为地区人口服务——毫无疑问，这种合作在未来几年将会增长。随着欧洲石油管道日益过剩，将需要输水管道将水从阿尔卑斯山和比利牛斯山脉输送到西班牙南部和意大利的干旱地区。

Among the world’s mountainous regions with glacial water—the Andes, Alps, and Himalayas—only the Alpine countries have the engineering prowess and track record of cross-border cooperation to harness glacier melt into reservoirs (especially underground ones so that water doesn’t evaporate) and pipes to serve the regional population—which will undoubtedly grow in the years to come. With oil pipelines increasingly redundant in Europe, water pipelines will be necessary to channel water from the Alps and Pyrenees to the parched geographies of southern Spain and Italy.

但瑞士和奥地利也是堡垒国家。由于国土面积小、经济多元化，瑞士已成为欧洲外国出生人口最多的国家之一，但严格的移民政策得到了广泛的政治支持。只有有才华或富有的人才需要申请。瑞士有二十多个行政区（称为州），每个行政区都以高达 30 万法郎的价格出售在该行政区居住一年的权利，但不包括居住权。除非您被公司雇用在瑞士工作，否则您每年必须投资类似金额才能养活自己作为个人投资者移民。

But Switzerland and Austria are also fortress nations. Because of its small size and diversified economy, Switzerland already has among the highest foreign-born populations in Europe, but strict immigration policies have broad political support. Only the talented or rich need apply. Each of Switzerland’s more than two dozen political districts, known as cantons, sells the right to spend up to a year in it for up to 300,000 francs—with no residency rights included. Unless you are hired by a company to work in Switzerland, you’d have to invest similar amounts per year just to support yourself as an individual investor migrant.

也许瑞士甚至会考虑更容易获得的投资者居留计划，例如斯洛文尼亚的计划。斯洛文尼亚位于阿尔卑斯山东部边缘，是第一个加入欧盟的前南斯拉夫共和国，并已成为世界上最公平和可持续发展的国家之一。斯洛文尼亚只需花费 7,500 欧元即可为投资者提供居住权，五年后他们可以申请公民身份。一些首批接受者是利用该国较低企业税率的意大利公司。意大利北部也有可能成为阿尔卑斯山的大熔炉。

Perhaps Switzerland will even consider a more accessible investor residency program, such as that of Slovenia. Located at the eastern fringe of the Alpine range, Slovenia was the first of the former Yugoslav republics to enter the EU and has propelled itself to the status of one of the world’s most equitable and sustainable countries. For 7,500 euros, Slovenia offers investors residency, and after five years they can apply for citizenship. Some of the first takers have been Italian companies capitalizing on the country’s lower corporate tax rate. It remains for Northern Italy to become an Alpine melting pot as well.

欢迎来到帕达尼亚

Welcome to Padania

清晨，我在博洛尼亚慢跑时，看到年轻的非洲男孩在指定的角落里就位，他们站在那里观看和等待。博洛尼亚是世界上最古老的大学之一的所在地那里充满了年轻人的喧嚣，但尼日利亚黑手党正在寻找在垂死老人腾出后可以入住的公寓。随着白天到黄昏，男孩们将任何有用的细节传递给他们的老板和上夜班的青少年同伴——就像他们在拉各斯所做的那样。

On an early morning jog through Bologna, I watched young African boys take up their positions on designated corners, where they stood to watch and wait. Bologna is home to one of the world’s oldest universities and has a youthful bustle, but the Nigerian mafia is on the lookout for apartments to occupy once they’ve been vacated by the dying elderly. As day turns to dusk, the boys pass on any useful details to their bosses and to the fellow teens who take up the night shift—exactly as they do in Lagos.

早在最新一波阿拉伯和非洲移民出现之前，意大利就在同化外国人方面遇到了严重困难。想想看，尽管一半人拥有意大利国籍（另一半来自巴尔干国家），但大约有二十万罗姆人（吉普赛人）在隔离的棚户区生活了几十年。他们不能被合法驱逐，所以政府没有为他们做任何事。事实上，政府没有启动综合社会住房，而是启动了一项“游牧计划”，将罗姆人强行驱逐出主要城市附近的非正式定居点，并将他们安置在农村营地。

Well before this latest wave of Arab and African migrants, Italy had grave difficulties assimilating foreigners. Consider how about two hundred thousand Roma (Gypsies) have lived for decades in segregated shantytowns, even though half have Italian nationality (and the other half hail from Balkan countries). They can’t be legally expelled, so the government does nothing for them. In fact, instead of integrated social housing, the government has initiated a “Nomad Plan” to forcibly evict Roma from their informal settlements near major cities and place them in rural camps.

意大利公民身份法仍然非常严格，即使对于在该国出生的人也是如此：血统公民身份（血统主义）比出生公民身份（出生地公民权）具有更大的影响力。）。截至 2018 年，法律已经收紧，以减少可以申请公民身份的移民或其子女的数量。但一旦第一代移民在当地扎根并获得居住权，他们的孩子就会比祖辈更习惯新家。例如，意大利北部已经是来自印度旁遮普邦的锡克教徒的长期居住地。锡克教家庭被波河谷平坦肥沃的土地所吸引，自 20 世纪 80 年代起就一直在那里挤奶和制作奶酪，现在意大利 60% 的帕尔马干酪出口量均由锡克教家庭生产。作为奖励，诺维拉拉镇的锡克教社区被允许建造一座谒师所寺庙。正如市长本人所说，“如果没有印度人民的支持，就不可能想到这个行业。” ⁴

Italian citizenship laws remain notoriously strict, even for those born in the country: Citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) carries far greater weight than citizenship by birth (jus soli). As of 2018, laws have been tightened to reduce the number of immigrants or their children who can apply for citizenship at all. But once a first generation of migrants plants local roots and acquires residency, their children become more accustomed to their new home than to their ancestral one. Northern Italy, for example, is already home to a long-standing community of Sikhs from India’s Punjab. Drawn to the flat and fertile landscape of the Po Valley, Sikh families have been milking cows and making cheese there since the 1980s, and now produce 60 percent of all of Italy’s Parmesan exports. As a reward, the Sikh community of the town of Novellara has been allowed to build a gurdwara temple. As the mayor herself said, “It would be impossible to think of this industry without the support of people from India.”⁴

无论这些移民是否获得意大利公民身份，他们都是北部“帕达尼亚”地区（横跨意大利北部主要省份的波河流域）重新成为该国跳动心脏的重要原因。但帕达尼亚省的移民策略与联邦政府大相径庭表现得更像一个自治城邦。毕竟，帕达尼亚确实在 1996 年象征性地宣布脱离意大利独立。

Whether or not these migrants are ever granted Italian citizenship, they’re an important reason why this northern “Padania” region—the Po River valley stretching across the main provinces of Northern Italy—has re-emerged as the country’s beating heart. But with an immigration strategy so at odds with the federal government, the provinces of Padania act more like an autonomous city-state. Padania did, after all, symbolically declare independence from Italy in 1996.

如果帕达尼亚有一个首都，那当然是米兰，这座城市在 1990 年代处于衰落状态，到 2000 年代已经被淘汰，但随着公共交通的改善和自行车道的扩大、新的活动场地以及现代化、经济实惠的生活，已经恢复元气。住房。凭借有利的气候、来自阿尔卑斯山的淡水、大型工业公司以及通往法国和瑞士的公路和铁路的改善，米兰对意大利的未来来说已经比罗马重要得多。毫不奇怪，米兰吸收的移民（尤其是 18 至 35 岁的移民）比意大利任何其他城市都多得多。

If Padania had a capital, it would of course be Milan, a city that was in decline in the 1990s and written off by the 2000s, but has surged back with improved public transportation and expanded bike lanes, new event venues, and modern, affordable housing. With a favorable climate, freshwater from the Alps, major industrial companies, and improved roads and railways to France and Switzerland, Milan is already far more important to Italy’s future than Rome. Not surprisingly, Milan has absorbed far more migrants (especially aged eighteen to thirty-five) than any other city in Italy.

米兰和其他地区城镇的周六早上跳蚤市场是意大利北部新的全球人口的象征。意大利、非洲和阿拉伯的夫妻团队并肩作战，向精打细算的老人、学生和彼此出售尼龙衬衫、塑料凉鞋和家居用品。附近，孟加拉杂货店今天开门营业，就在中国干洗店的隔壁。虽然白天是邻居，但到了晚上，他们就会回到自己族裔人口越来越多的社区。米兰唐人街估计有三万居民，城里有更多的菲律宾人，还有越来越多的斯里兰卡人。当意大利人去世或向北迁移时，他们就会被来自南部和东部的非洲人和亚洲人填补。这片中世纪欧洲的中心地带已成为新中世纪的原型，

The Saturday morning flea markets in Milan and other regional towns are emblematic of the new global demographic of Northern Italy. Side by side, Italian, African, and Arab husband-and-wife teams sell nylon blouses, plastic sandals, and household wares to cost-conscious elderly, students, and one another. Nearby, the Bengali grocer opens his shop for the day, next door to the Chinese dry cleaner. Though neighbors by day, at night they return to neighborhoods increasingly populated by their ethnic groups. Milan’s Chinatown has an estimated thirty thousand residents, and there are even more Filipinos in the city and a growing number of Sri Lankans. As Italians pass away or move north, they’re being backfilled by Africans and Asians from the south and east. This heartland of medieval Europe has become the archetype of a new Middle Ages, with fluid populations and demographic tides linking the Mediterranean to the South China Sea.

年轻一代的意大利人已经非常适应多元文化的城市生活。最近上映的艺术电影《孟加拉》讲述了第二代孟加拉裔意大利男孩与一位勇敢的意大利女孩的浪漫故事，很好地捕捉到了许多移民已经成为主流和意大利人的情况——就像美国的印第安人一样，他们自己的文化包袱与当地习俗发生冲突，但最终与当地习俗和解。 。最重要的是，这个新民族景观中最年轻的居民——幼儿米兰的幼儿园的家长来自意大利、非洲、委内瑞拉和南亚，他们几乎不会意识到曾经有一个完全由意大利人居住的意大利。他们会认为前多元文化的意大利就像数字原住民认为互联网出现之前的生活一样：无关紧要。

The younger generation of Italians is already quite attuned to multicultural urban life. The recent arthouse film Bangla about a second-generation Bangladeshi-Italian boy’s romance with a spunky Italian girl nicely captures how mainstream and Italian many immigrants have already become—like Indians in America, with their own cultural baggage that clashes but ultimately reconciles with local customs. Most importantly, the youngest inhabitants of this new ethnoscape—the toddlers in Milan’s kindergartens whose parents hail from Italy, Africa, Venezuela, and South Asia—will scarcely be aware that there ever was an Italy populated exclusively by Italians. They’ll think of the pre-multicultural Italy as what digital natives think life before the Internet was: irrelevant.

今天受过教育的意大利孩子将成长为医生和工程师、教师和记者、政治家和官僚、军官和运动员、建筑师和时装设计师。但他们已经依赖移民充当垃圾收集者、发型设计师、出租车司机和勤杂工。就在米兰郊外的贝加莫镇，一所“融合学院”接收从尼日利亚到巴基斯坦的移民，让他们参加新兵训练营，在那里他们学习意大利语和基本技能，从熨烫衣服到服务员到操作垃圾车，并为他们安排工作，以便他们能够获得申请居留权所需的经济独立。然后，在下一代，他们的孩子将成为国家的医生和运动员。

Today’s educated Italian kids will grow up to be doctors and engineers, teachers and journalists, politicians and bureaucrats, military officers and athletes, architects and fashion designers. But they already rely on immigrants to be their trash collectors and hair designers, taxi drivers and handymen. Just outside of Milan in the town of Bergamo, an “Academy of Integration” takes in migrants from Nigeria to Pakistan and puts them through a boot camp in which they learn Italian and basic skills, from ironing clothes to waiting tables to operating garbage trucks, and places them into jobs so they can gain the financial independence necessary to apply for residency. Then, in the next generation, it will be their children who will be the country’s doctors and athletes.

英国能再次伟大吗？

Can Britain be great again?

2016年英国脱欧公投继续扰乱英国政治，但其对英国人口构成的影响最终可能微不足道。2018年有近三十万移民进入英国，其年度流入量仅次于美国和加拿大。根据目前的趋势，到 2050 年，该国人口预计将达到约 8000 万（目前为 6600 万）。⁵如果英国脱欧是为了控制边境和移民，它是否让英国更接近其目标？

The 2016 Brexit referendum continues to roil British politics, yet its impact on the composition of the British population may ultimately be insignificant. Nearly three hundred thousand migrants entered the UK in 2018, placing it just behind the US and Canada in annual inflow. Based on current trends, the country’s population is expected to reach some 80 million people by 2050 (from 66 million today).⁵ If Brexit was about controlling borders and immigration, has it brought Britain any closer to its goal?

已故牛津哲学家迈克尔·达米特 (Michael Dummett) 认为，一个国家应该能够只拒绝罪犯入境，或者限制可能导致人口过剩或淹没其文化的大规模移民。达米特认为这种情况很少发生，但这种逻辑心照不宣地成为脱欧派反移民偏执狂的掩护。但凭借其工业基础英国将不得不重新定位其经济，更加注重服务业，并且需要更多的人来做这件事。从医疗保健到公用事业，英国劳动力的严重短缺表明，英国无法承受每年因脱欧而失去八万或更多公民的后果，除非它能带来更多的数量和财富。和才华。

The late Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett believed that a state should be able to refuse entry only to criminals, or to limit mass immigration that would lead to overpopulation or submerge its culture. Dummett thought this would rarely be the case, but the logic tacitly became cover for Brexiteers’ anti-immigrant paranoia. Yet with its industrial base in tatters, Britain will have to repurpose its economy to focus even more on services—and will need more people to do it. The acute shortages already apparent in the UK’s labor force, from healthcare to utilities, suggest that Britain can’t afford to lose eighty thousand or more of its own citizens each year due to Brexit unless it brings in that many and more in number, wealth, and talent.

英国应该想要更多移民的原因之一是利用英格兰中部的气候机会。伦敦及其南部英格兰周边地区面临长期干热和淡水短缺的问题，而伦敦约 20% 的住宅面临泰晤士河口潮汐的威胁。伦敦需要分散财富。在英国脱欧和疫情爆发之前，英国的“其他地区”正处于从数十年的基础设施忽视和人才流失中恢复的早期阶段，年轻且受过教育的英国人被吸引到曼彻斯特、利物浦和伯明翰，这些城市的工程和技术企业也转向节省成本。现在，英国将不得不依靠更少的外国投资来应对，而法国人则将英国的农田重新开垦为葡萄园，因为他们自己的气候对葡萄酒种植不利。

One reason Britain should want more migrants is to take advantage of central England’s climate opportunity. London and its southern England environs face long spells of dry heat and freshwater shortages, even as about 20 percent of London’s residences are at risk from tidal surges in the Thames estuary. London will need to spread the wealth. Prior to Brexit and the pandemic, the “rest” of the UK was in the early stages of a recovery from decades of infrastructural neglect and brain drain, with young and educated Brits lured to Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham, to which engineering and tech companies also shifted to save costs. Now the UK will have to make do with even less foreign investment, other than the French who are recultivating English farmland into vineyards as their own climate becomes hostile for wine growing.

对于英国来说，推进从利兹到利物浦的更好一体化“北方走廊”的长期计划是明智的，特别是考虑到英国年轻人居住在大城市的愿望已缩减至略高于20%。相反，新冠疫情封锁引发了人们对农村房产的兴趣激增。英国可能正在回归其根源。毫无疑问，靠近苏格兰边境的英国经济最贫困的县将受益于更多的农业和轻工业工人。

It would be wise for Britain to move ahead with long-standing plans for a better integrated “Northern Corridor” from Leeds to Liverpool, especially given that British youth’s desire to live in a big city has shrunk to just over 20 percent. Instead, the Covid lockdown sparked a surge of interest in rural properties. Britain may be going back to its roots. No doubt the UK’s most economically deprived counties, near the Scottish border, would benefit from more workers in agriculture and light industry.

鉴于其石油财富和水资源，苏格兰本身也感受到了气候机遇。该国已经拥有三万个淡水湖（或湖泊，没有怪物居住），降雨量大幅增加。它还每年种植超过 2000 万棵树。爱丁堡是一个拥有自由思想、历史古迹和国际美食的国际化中心，吸引着来自世界各地的顶尖学生和学者世界。苏格兰人现在正在积极制定北极战略，将其港口与加拿大和斯堪的纳维亚半岛的港口连接起来。如果英国不迎合苏格兰的利益，分离主义运动将再次兴起。与此同时，北爱尔兰可能会选择与其更为务实的亲属重新团结。英国已经离开欧盟，但可能很快就会被欧盟成员国四面包围。英国脱欧将更多地停留在名义上而不是现实上。

Scotland itself senses a climate opportunity given its oil wealth and water resources. Already blessed with thirty thousand freshwater lakes (or lochs, none inhabited by monsters), the country has seen rainfall rise substantially. It’s also planting more than 20 million trees per year. Edinburgh is a cosmopolitan center of free thinking, historical monuments, and international cuisine attracting top students and academics from around the world. Scots are now actively developing an Arctic strategy to link their ports to those in Canada and Scandinavia. If Britain doesn’t cater to Scotland’s interests, the separatist movement will once again gain steam. Meanwhile, Northern Ireland may choose to reunite with its more pragmatic kin. Britain has left the EU, but may soon be surrounded by EU members on all sides. Brexit will remain more in name than reality.

北欧风情

Nordic by nature

即使按照欧洲标准，北欧人的生活也很好。由于财富和团结，挪威、丹麦、冰岛、芬兰和瑞典等北欧国家常年被评为世界“最幸福”国家。他们的平等社会政策有很多值得钦佩的地方，这些政策让当地人自豪，外国人也为他们的到来而感到高兴。瑞典允许私营部门工人有六个月的休假时间来尝试创业，以后重返工作岗位不会受到任何处罚。芬兰为无家可归者提供永久住所并帮助他们找到工作。丹麦通过带公民出去听音乐会来对抗孤独和抑郁。慷慨的养老金和全民负担得起的医疗保健是整个地区的常态——这是一种权利，而不是一种特权——尽管它们不断上升的成本需要财政改革。斯堪的纳维亚人了解基本的经济学原理，即税基缩小需要削减福利或进口纳税人。他们继续明智地选择后者。

Even by European standards, northern Europeans have a good life. Owing to their wealth and solidarity, Nordic states such as Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden perennially rank as the world’s “happiest” countries. There is much to be admired in their egalitarian social policies that make locals swell with pride and foreigners glad they came. Sweden allows private sector workers a six-month sabbatical to try their hand at entrepreneurship, with no penalty for returning to work later. Finland gives the homeless a permanent home and helps them find jobs. Denmark counters loneliness and depression by taking citizens out to concerts. Generous pensions and universal affordable healthcare are the norm across the region—a right rather than a privilege—even though their rising costs require fiscal reforms. Scandinavians understand the basic economics that a dwindling tax base requires either cutting benefits or importing taxpayers. They continue to wisely choose the latter.

北欧国家面积较大，但人口却很少。尽管他们的社会是同质的，但他们对增加移民持相当开放的态度，即使存在明显的文化冲突。但在养老金领取者老龄化、低增长、高债务和种族多样性日益增加的情况下，他们对自由社会契约的承诺能否维持下去？

Nordic countries are relatively large in size, but each has very few people. Despite their homogenous societies, they have been quite open to increased immigration, even given the glaring culture clashes. But will their commitment to a liberal social contract sustain itself amid aging pensioners, low growth, high debt, and rising ethnic diversity?

年轻的丹麦人，如柏林人和米兰人，是在移民的陪伴下长大的，他们是社会的一部分，他们喜欢外国食物和音乐家，将其作为日常生活的一部分。与其反对移民，他们坚持认真努力同化，即使这意味着禁止穆斯林妇女戴头巾。为了维持对开放边界的支持，丹麦人认为他们必须强化他们所珍视的自由主义。

Young Danes, like Berliners and Milanese, have grown up with immigrants as a part of their society and are fond of foreign foods and musicians as an element of daily life. Rather than oppose immigration, they insist on serious efforts at assimilation, even if it means banning headscarves for Muslim women. To maintain support for open borders, Danes feel they must enforce their cherished liberalism.

面积大得多的瑞典的人口是丹麦的两倍，并且还成功地将其出生率提高到欧洲最高。几十年来，瑞典一直在接纳阿拉伯移民，其中主流是阿拉伯裔的著名演员、音乐家和运动员。尽管如此，2015年接纳了来自叙利亚、伊拉克和阿富汗等国的16万名寻求庇护者（人均欧洲最高），这敲响了警钟。移民社区内的暴力事件有所增加，袭击庇护中心等仇恨犯罪也有所增加。2020 年 8 月，右翼团体焚烧一本《古兰经》后，马尔默爆发骚乱。极右翼政党在该国 2018 年选举中获得了近四分之一的选票。一旦这些国家被认为是安全的，瑞典还加大了将寻求庇护者遣返回国的力度。

Far larger Sweden has twice Denmark’s population, and has also managed to lift its birthrate to the highest in Europe. Sweden has been taking in Arab migrants for decades, with prominent actors, musicians, and athletes of Arab descent in the mainstream. Nonetheless, its acceptance of 160,000 asylum seekers in 2015 (the highest in Europe per capita) from countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan raised alarm bells. Violence has risen within migrant communities, as have hate crimes such as attacks on asylum centers. In August 2020, riots broke out in Malmö after a right-wing group burned a Koran. Far right parties captured nearly a quarter of the vote in the country’s 2018 elections. Sweden has also stepped up repatriating asylum seekers to their home countries once those countries are deemed safe.

瑞典和挪威也是数以万计的印度人和巴基斯坦人的家园，每年约有一千名印度人在这两个国家申请公民身份。在挪威，巴基斯坦人是继波兰人和瑞典人之后的第三大移民群体，远远领先于印度人。从 20 世纪 60 年代来到这里的早期旁遮普人，到随后几十年加入他们的大家庭，几代人已经成为同化的挪威人，甚至跻身政治高层。您在奥斯陆或斯德哥尔摩遇到的出租车司机中，有三分之二是南亚人。我的孩子们曾经认为说印地语和乌尔都语只在印度、巴基斯坦、迪拜和新加坡有用——直到我们去斯堪的纳维亚半岛度假。

Sweden and Norway are also home to tens of thousands of Indians and Pakistanis, with approximately one thousand Indians applying for citizenship in each of those countries annually. In Norway, Pakistanis are the third largest immigrant group after Poles and Swedes, and well ahead of Indians. From the early Punjabis who came in the 1960s to the extended families who joined them in subsequent decades, multiple generations have become assimilated Norwegians and even risen to high levels of politics. Two out of every three taxi drivers you’ll encounter in Oslo or Stockholm is South Asian. My kids used to think speaking Hindi and Urdu was only useful in India, Pakistan, Dubai, and Singapore—until we went on holiday across Scandinavia.

芬兰的面积与瑞典和挪威大致相当，但人口只有 500 万。由于其从俄罗斯边境进行军事动员和撤离的历史，它建立了一流的国家基础设施网络，使其能够比邻国瑞典更好地控制自然灾害（例如森林火灾）。它还计划将铁路延伸至挪威北部，连接希尔克内斯港并加速对亚洲的出口。然而，随着人口老龄化，所有这些都将需要更多的移民。在阿拉伯难民危机之前，只有四千名索马里人构成了芬兰最大的非欧洲少数民族，但保守派政府对移民采取了强硬立场。与此同时，即使是芬兰最受重视的全球产业也需要更多的外国劳动力。例如，移动技术先驱诺基亚不仅有一位印度首席执行官，而且还需要大量印度IT工人和人力来与华为竞争全球5G网络的建设。

Finland is roughly the same size as Sweden and Norway, but has barely 5 million people. Due to its history of military mobilizations and evacuations from the Russian border, it has built a superb national infrastructure network that allows it to control natural disasters (such as forest fires) better than neighboring Sweden. It also has plans to extend its railways into northern Norway to connect to the port of Kirkenes and accelerate exports to Asia. With an aging population, however, all of this will require far more migrants. Prior to the Arab refugee crisis, a mere four thousand Somalis constituted Finland’s largest non-European minority, yet still conservative governments took a hard line on immigration. At the same time, even Finland’s most prized and global industries need more foreign labor. For example, mobile technology pioneer Nokia not only has an Indian CEO, but will need legions of Indian IT workers and manpower to compete with Huawei in installing global 5G networks.

随着北欧作为一个冬天不太冷、夏天不太热的全年旅游目的地而成为人们关注的焦点，他们的旅游经济正在蓬勃发展。寻求摆脱闷热的地中海和大陆炎热的南欧人已经开始在北方建立更大的影响力，就像斯堪的纳维亚人过去所做的相反。冬季运动将从阿尔卑斯山转移到挪威、瑞典和芬兰的北部地区，而夏季户外活动也将扩大。北极巡游、露营和生存训练营每年都会吸引数以万计的新游客。芬兰和俄罗斯边境的原始卡累利阿地区拥有六万个湖泊，冬季提供为期一周的狗拉雪橇探险活动，夏季提供露营和钓鱼活动。幸运的是，

As northern Europe gets thrust into the spotlight as an attractive year-round destination that’s neither too cold in the winter nor too hot in the summer, their tourist economies are flourishing. Southern Europeans seeking respite from the sweltering Mediterranean and continental heat have begun to establish a greater presence in the north, much as Scandinavians used to do in reverse. Winter sports will shift from the Alps to the northern regions of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, while summer outdoor activities will expand as well. Arctic cruises, camping, and survivalist boot camps get tens of thousands of new tourists each year. The pristine Karelia region on the Finland-Russia border boasts sixty thousand lakes and offers weeklong dogsledding expeditions in the winter as well as camping and fishing in the summer. Fortunately, wealthy Nordic countries can afford to maintain sustainable habitats even with the new tourist influx.

从挪威北部的希尔克内斯到丹麦首都哥本哈根，环游北欧，你会发现即使是世界上最同质化的角落也正在成为一个繁荣的多民族公社。如果斯堪的纳维亚半岛像对待政治和经济难民一样欢迎气候难民，那么这个过程就会滚雪球般地滚雪球。像格蕾塔·桑伯格这样的斯堪的纳维亚人已经成为敦促采取行动应对气候变化的全球偶像，但考虑到气候变化对他们所在地区的影响会温和得多，斯堪的纳维亚人与世界团结的真正考验将是他们愿意接受多少气候移民。吸收。合并后的北欧国家人口不足3000万。他们愿意将其翻五倍吗？

Traveling around the Nordics from Kirkenes in northern Norway to Denmark’s capital, Copenhagen, reveals how even the most homogenous corner of the world is becoming a thriving multinational commune. This process will snowball if Scandinavia proves as welcoming to climate refugees as it has been to political and economic ones. Scandinavians such as Greta Thunberg have become global icons in urging action against climate change, but given how much milder the climate effect will be on their region, the real test of Scandinavian solidarity with the world will be how many climate migrants they’re willing to absorb. The combined population of the Nordic countries is under 30 million. Are they willing to quintuple it?

如果斯堪的纳维亚半岛确实成为数百万新移民的家园，那么其国家就需要像加拿大那样设计一种后国家身份。由于英语已经被广泛使用，它们很可能成为以英语为共同点的多语言熔炉。这些可能是向北迁徙最直接的方面。事实上，向北欧的大规模转移将比直接通往该地区美丽的首府城市要复杂得多。一方面，哥本哈根、斯德哥尔摩和赫尔辛基尽管制定了雄心勃勃的碳中和计划，但仍面临海平面上升的风险。这些城市在本地化粮食供应和部署可再生能源方面的成功很可能最终对波罗的海北部和内陆地区最有用。的确，瑞典最北端的北博滕郡已经完全由氢能和风能驱动。凭借强大的法治，斯堪的纳维亚国家不会允许外国掠夺土地。事实上，瑞典已经宣布，大土地所有者不能禁止人们穿越他们的土地去享受大自然。宜居空间正在成为一种宝贵的公共利益，在其上自由行动的权利也是如此。

If Scandinavia does become home to many millions of new migrants, its nations would need to devise a post-national identity the way Canada has. Since English is widely spoken already, they may well become multilingual melting pots with English as the common denominator. These may turn out to be the most straightforward aspects of the northward migration. Indeed, a large-scale shift to the Nordics will be much more complicated than drawing a straight line to the region’s beautiful capital cities. For one thing, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki are at risk from rising sea levels despite their own ambitious plans to go carbon-neutral. It could well be that these cities’ success in localizing food supply and deploying renewable power will ultimately be most useful much farther north and inland from the Baltic Sea. Indeed, Sweden’s northernmost county of Norrbotten is already entirely hydrogen- and wind-powered. And with strong rule of law, Scandinavian countries won’t allow foreign land grabs. In fact, Sweden has declared that large landholders can’t prohibit people from crossing their property to enjoy nature. Livable space is becoming a precious public good, as is the right to move freely on it.

我。自 1980 年以来，美国收入最低 50% 的人的收入仅增长了 3%，而欧洲收入较低的一半人的收入却增长了 40%。根据乔治城大学 2019 年发表的一项研究，在美国，出身富裕远比聪明好得多。参见：阿比盖尔·赫斯，“乔治敦研究：‘要在美国取得成功，出生富有比出生聪明更好’”，CNBC，2019 年 5 月 29 日。

I. Since 1980, the bottom 50 percent of Americans have seen incomes rise a mere 3 percent, whereas the lower half of Europeans have had a 40 percent gain in incomes. According to a study published by Georgetown University in 2019, America is a country where it’s far better to be born rich than smart. See: Abigail Hess, “Georgetown Study: ‘To Succeed in America, It’s Better to Be Born Rich Than Smart,’ ” CNBC, May 29, 2019.

二．据估计，有 80 万美国人居住在欧洲，其中 216,000 人居住在英国，127,000 人居住在德国，法国、意大利和西班牙各约 50,000 人，另有 50,000 人分布在东欧。联合国，“按原籍地和目的地划分的国际移民存量”，经济和社会事务部人口司，2019 年。

II. An estimated 800,000 Americans reside in Europe, with 216,000 in the UK, 127,000 in Germany, and roughly 50,000 each in France, Italy, and Spain, with a further 50,000 spread across Eastern Europe. United Nations, “International Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination,” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019.

第 6 章桥接区域

CHAPTER 6 BRIDGING REGIONS

在高加索地区保持凉爽

Keeping cool in the Caucasus

土耳其东部偏远的高地上有一些湖泊，几千年来一直是美索不达米亚文明的命脉。正如美国人放弃加州前往落基山脉一样，土耳其企业家也纷纷涌入这片茂密的橡树林和松树林的薄雾地区，改造埃尔祖鲁姆等城镇，这里已成为安纳托利亚的阿斯彭，是一个全年热闹的山地滑雪中心体育活动。

In the remote highlands of eastern Turkey lie the lakes that for millennia served as the lifeblood of Mesopotamian civilization. Just as Americans have been ditching California for the Rockies, Turkish entrepreneurs have been flocking to this misty region of dense oak and pine forests, renovating towns such as Erzurum, which has become the Aspen of Anatolia, a mountain ski hub buzzing with year-round athletic activity.

然而，尽管底格里斯河和幼发拉底河的源头继续滋养着安纳托利亚东部丰富的景观，下游的土地却不再像最早出现定居农业的“肥沃的新月形”。四千年前，正是干旱摧毁了阿卡德帝国，如今，该地区再次被叙利亚、伊拉克、伊朗和巴基斯坦等严重缺水的国家占领。经济匮乏和内乱席卷了土耳其整个南部边境，而伊拉克和伊朗部分地区的气温超过了七十摄氏度，人们难道无法想象阿拉伯和波斯难民撬开高地并在这片安纳托利亚绿洲重新定居吗？

But while the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers continue to nourish eastern Anatolia’s rich landscapes, the lands downstream no longer resemble anything like the “fertile crescent” where settled farming first appeared. It was droughts that brought down the Akkadian empire four thousand years ago, and today again the region is occupied by severely water-stressed countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. With economic deprivation and civil unrest wracking Turkey’s entire southern frontier while temperatures cross seventy degrees Celsius in parts of Iraq and Iran, can one not imagine Arab and Persian refugees prying their way upland and resettling in this Anatolian oasis?

沿着黑海向东，安纳托利亚过渡到高加索地区，这里曾经是奥斯曼帝国的保护国，最近又出现了三个相当同质的苏联共和国：格鲁吉亚、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆。格鲁吉亚在 90 年代和 2000 年代的大部分时间里假装其基督教传统使其优于突厥邻国，而实际上它的行为是很像一个失败的状态。但在过去十年中，很少有国家能实现如此巨大的转变。首都第比利斯仍然存在大量的政治争吵、反政府示威和宪法混乱，而俄罗斯仍然占据其 20% 的领土。然而，格鲁吉亚已成功加强其道路网络，成为土耳其和阿塞拜疆之间的主要铁路运输走廊，并建立了生产制造区。该国一年举办了二十场欧式文化节，并正在大力敲击欧盟重启入盟谈判的大门。

Eastward along the Black Sea, Anatolia transitions into the Caucasus, once a collection of Ottoman protectorates and more recently three quite homogenous Soviet republics: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Georgia spent much of the 1990s and 2000s pretending its Christian heritage made it superior to its Turkic neighbors, while in reality it acted much like a tinpot failed state. But few countries have made such a dramatic turnaround in the past decade. There is still plenty of political bickering, antigovernment demonstrations, and constitutional confusion in the capital Tbilisi, all while Russia still occupies 20 percent of its territory. Yet Georgia has managed to strengthen its road network, become a major rail transit corridor between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and establish productive manufacturing zones. The country has hosted as many as twenty European-style cultural festivals in a single year, and is knocking hard on the EU’s door to revive membership negotiations.

今天的第比利斯充满了古老的魅力和现代的时尚。熟练的泥瓦匠聘请了德国开发商，将世纪之交的建筑升级为精品公寓和酒店。就像微风徐徐的东柏林一样，它已成为西方年轻人的低成本英语中心。格鲁吉亚的河流网络由厄尔布鲁士山（欧洲最高峰，位于俄罗斯边境附近）的 20 多座冰川提供水源，格鲁吉亚的大部分地区都能够很好地应对气候变化。如今，格鲁吉亚已成为背包客的“热门”国家。明天这里可能就是他们的家——特别是考虑到该国最近推出的有吸引力的“游牧签证”计划。

Tbilisi today oozes with both ancient charm and modern chic. Its skilled masons have recruited German developers to upgrade turn-of-the-century buildings into boutique apartments and hotels. Like a breezy East Berlin, it has become a low-cost English-speaking hub for Western youth. And with its river network fed by the more than twenty glaciers of Mount Elbrus—Europe’s highest mountain located just over the border in Russia—much of Georgia is well placed to weather climate change. Today Georgia is the “it” country for backpackers; tomorrow it might be their home—especially given the attractive “nomad visa” program the country recently launched.

阿塞拜疆提供了一个更有趣的案例，说明经济和环境趋势如何将大量移民驱至世界上被遗忘的角落。阿塞拜疆的人口大约是格鲁吉亚的四倍，石油财富使阿塞拜疆人的人均财富是格鲁吉亚邻国的四倍。阿塞拜疆横跨白雪皑皑的高加索山脉，一直延伸到首都巴库外的沙漠，拥有全球范围内的微气候，包括茂密的森林和湿地。为了抵御沙漠的侵蚀，它发起了植树热潮，并从高加索输送冷却水用于灌溉和城市降温。

Azerbaijan presents an even more interesting case of how economic and environmental trends may drive large numbers of migrants to a forgotten corner of the world. Azerbaijan has about four times as many people as Georgia, and oil wealth has made Azeris four times wealthier per capita than their Georgian neighbors. Spanning the snowy Caucasus Mountains to the deserts outside its capital of Baku, Azerbaijan is home to the full planetary array of micro-climates, including dense forests and wetlands. To ward off the encroachment of its deserts, it launched a tree planting binge and pipes cool water down from the Caucasus for irrigation and urban cooling.

巴库的大规模重建为其赢得了“里海迪拜”的绰号，这是理所应当的，因为大量阿联酋人（以及沙特人和卡塔尔人）一直在那里购买豪华房产，作为躲避海湾炎热的避难所（更不用说为了躲避海湾的炎热）。阿塞拜疆的优势更加自由的酒类法律）。鉴于阿塞拜疆人在种族和语言上属于突厥语系，但在宗教上属于什叶派，且与伊朗关系密切，因此阿塞拜疆已成为海湾阿拉伯人与伊朗做生意的重要门户（尽管是迂回门户）。

It’s appropriate that Baku’s lavish redevelopment has earned it the moniker “Dubai on the Caspian,” for a large number of Emiratis (and Saudis and Qataris) have been buying up fancy properties there as a refuge from the Gulf heat (not to mention to take advantage of Azerbaijan’s more liberal liquor laws). And given that Azeris are ethnically and linguistically Turkic but religiously Shiite, with close ties to Iran, Azerbaijan has become an important—if roundabout—portal for Gulf Arabs to do business with Iran.

伊朗人也可能将阿塞拜疆视为远离该国扭曲的政治和炎热气候的避风港。伊朗境内的阿塞拜疆人已经比阿塞拜疆本土的阿塞拜疆人还要多，他们主要分布在伊朗北部边境省份。叙利亚内战之前，伊朗人曾在大马士革大使馆寻求西方签证，现在他们也在巴库尝试同样的做法，巴库自称为里海地区的外交中心。这不是第一次了。1870 年代的石油繁荣吸引了大量欧洲人来到巴库，为其里海滨海大道赋予了闪闪发光的维多利亚式外观，该外观经过完美翻新，以满足当今阿拉伯和突厥、法国和德国、印度和中国商人和承包商代表团的需求。

Iranians may also come to see Azerbaijan as a safe haven from their country’s warped politics and searing climate. Already there are more Azeris in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself, largely located in the northern Iranian border provinces. Iranians who used to seek Western visas at embassies in Damascus before Syria’s civil war now attempt the same in Baku, which has branded itself as the Caspian region’s diplomatic hub. It would not be the first time. The oil boom of the 1870s brought large numbers of Europeans to Baku, giving its Caspian corniche a glittering Victorian facade that has been impeccably refurbished to cater to today’s delegations of Arab and Turkic, French and German, Indian and Chinese traders and contractors. Listening to them all mingle and bicker in Baku’s medieval old city is a reminder that the Caucasus are once again claiming their role as a corridor of both the east-west and north-south silk roads—though in the nineteenth century these various nationals all spoke one another’s languages with far greater felicity.

亚美尼亚是三个高加索国家中最贫穷的国家，它是多山的内陆国家，气候干旱，而且在未来几年将变得更加干旱。鉴于与更强大的邻国土耳其和阿塞拜疆的敌对关系（包括 2020 年战略领土被后者夺走），亚美尼亚继续依赖俄罗斯作为军事和经济生命线。事实上，俄罗斯的亚美尼亚人数量几乎已经与亚美尼亚本土一样多。除了计划将森林覆盖面积增加一倍之外，针对亚美尼亚目前 300 万人口的最佳气候适应战略可能会转移到俄罗斯。亚美尼亚的另一个战略是追随爱沙尼亚的脚步，实现自身数字化。总统阿曼·萨尔基相，是一位理论物理学家和计算机科学家，他希望该国分散的侨民在云端保持统一。他对国家地位的下一步的称呼是：“量子国家”。

The poorest of the three Caucasus countries, mountainous and landlocked Armenia, features an arid climate that will become more so in the years ahead. Given its hostile relations with more powerful neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan (including the loss of strategic territory to the latter in 2020), Armenia continues to depend on Russia as a military and economic lifeline. Indeed, Russia is already home to almost as many Armenians as Armenia itself. Besides plans to double the amount of its land covered by forests, the best climate resilience strategy for Armenia’s current 3 million population is likely to move to Russia. Armenia’s other strategy is to follow in Estonia’s footsteps and digitize itself. The president, Armen Sarkissian, is a theoretical physicist and computer scientist who wants the country’s dispersed diaspora to remain unified in the cloud. His term for this next step in nationhood: “quantum country.”

下一次俄罗斯革命

The next Russian revolution

这个世界上最大的国家也希望振兴其黑海薄弱环节。2014年，俄罗斯在黑海度假胜地索契举办了冬季奥运会，最近又完成了蜿蜒的伏尔加格勒绕道和伏尔加河上的桥梁，以处理莫斯科和与中国接壤的东部地区之间的巨大货运量。尽管俄罗斯人口减少、经济疲弱，但它仍然占据着世界十分之一的土地面积，并拥有大量的石油和天然气储备，这对欧洲尤其是中国的工业产出至关重要。即使在最终的后石油世界中，俄罗斯的石化产品不仅仍然对塑料、橡胶、纤维和其他材料的生产至关重要，而且还拥有世界上对核反应堆至关重要的铀的巨大份额。

The world’s largest country also wants to revitalize its Black Sea underbelly. In 2014, Russia hosted the Winter Olympics at the Black Sea resort of Sochi, and more recently it completed the twisting Volgograd bypass and bridges over the Volga River to handle the enormous cargo volumes between Moscow and the eastern regions bordering China. Despite Russia’s demographic decline and feeble economy, it still occupies one-tenth of the world’s land area and presides over vast oil and gas reserves that are crucial to European and especially Chinese industrial output. Even in an eventual post-oil world, not only will Russia’s petrochemicals still be essential for the production of plastics, rubber, fibers, and other materials, but it also has a huge share of the world’s uranium, which is critical for nuclear reactors. Russia is not a traditional superpower anymore, but in terms of functional geography, few countries are remotely as important.

与二十世纪相比，俄罗斯的故事将变得更加引人入胜，尤其是在北极变得更加重要的情况下。用地缘政治的术语来说，俄罗斯是欧亚大陆的“心脏地带”大国（无法全年进入无冰海域），但十年之内，其核动力破冰船队将需要其他目的，因为可能不再有核动力破冰船队。任何需要打破的冰块。经过几个世纪的努力进入更南边的海域后，气候变化正在让俄罗斯不费一枪一弹就获得了“边缘地带”（海上）强国的地位。

Russia is set to become even more fascinating a story than it was in the twentieth century, especially as the Arctic takes on greater prominence. In geopolitical parlance, Russia is a Eurasian “heartland” power (lacking year-round access to ice-free seas), but within ten years, its flotilla of nuclear-powered ice-breakers will need some other purpose as there may no longer be any ice to break. After centuries of maneuvering to gain access to seas farther south, climate change is handing Russia the status of a “rimland” (maritime) power without firing a shot.

从与挪威接壤的摩尔曼斯克州到与阿拉斯加隔白令海峡相望的楚科奇联邦区，俄罗斯正在部署新的营，将其数千公里的北极海岸线军事化，升级其北方海军舰队，并部署浮动核电站，以提供稳定的电力供应。为近 200 万俄罗斯人提供电力，他们的南方道路季节性被切断。北极的矿藏创造了俄罗斯 GDP 的 20%，永久冻土融化，可以发现和提取更多的东西。俄罗斯的生态景观潜力正在飙升——俄罗斯希望充分利用其土地。

From the Murmansk oblast on the Norwegian border to the Chukotka federal district across the Bering Strait from Alaska, Russia is militarizing its thousands of kilometers of Arctic coastline with new battalions, upgrading its northern naval fleet, and deploying floating nuclear power stations that will provide steady electricity to the nearly 2 million Russians who are seasonally cut off from roads farther south. The mineral deposits of the Arctic generate 20 percent of Russia’s GDP, and as the permafrost melts, much more could be discovered and extracted. Russia’s ecological landscape potential is surging—and Russia wants to put its land to work.

然而，它缺乏的是去做这件事的人。虽然其人口目前是加拿大的三倍，但老龄化、酗酒和人口外流都导致其人口结构以惊人的速度下降。尽管加拿大寻求成为移民超级大国，但俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京却将移民描述为毒药；他的倒退民族主义使俄罗斯在很多方面成为加拿大的反面。但在冰冷的政治外表下隐藏着一个迫切希望保持作为欧洲 7 亿人民和亚洲 40 亿人民之间桥梁的作用的国家。为了实现其新的欧亚野心，俄罗斯也必须招募移民，最有可能的是突厥、中国、阿拉伯和印度劳工，他们非常愿意离开腐败或污染的土地来开发俄罗斯的资源和工业。

What it lacks, however, are the people to do it. While its population is presently three times larger than Canada’s, aging, alcoholism, and exodus are all driving its demographics downward at an alarming rate. And whereas Canada seeks to become an immigration superpower, Russian president Vladimir Putin has described immigration as a poison; his regressive ethnonationalism makes Russia, in many ways, the anti-Canada. But beneath the icy political veneer lies a country desperate to remain relevant as a bridge between the 700 million people of Europe and the 4 billion people of Asia. To fulfill its new Eurasian ambitions, Russia too will have to recruit migrants, most likely Turkic, Chinese, Arab, and Indian laborers who are more than willing to leave their corrupt or polluted lands to develop Russia’s resources and industries. What seems politically impossible today could be common sense tomorrow: Russia needs to become the Eurasian Canada.

然而，如果你今天搬到西伯利亚中部城市雅库茨克，你会发现冬天仍然寒冷难耐，春天下沉，夏天遭受酷热的热浪和不受控制的野火（这些火会耗尽并释放出永远的火）。更多来自土壤的碳）。永久冻土融化得如此之快，以至于居民们纷纷加高了他们房屋所建的支柱的高度，而在其他地方，沼泽只是简单地消失了，排干了整个湖泊并露出了巨大的天坑。随着数百万平方公里曾经坚固的土地变成糊状沼泽，土地不再能够支撑提取其下方大量天然气矿藏所需的道路和机械的重量。石油泄漏和有毒化学品泄漏正在毒害曾经的原始地区，数百公里内没有公共服务来清理它。

If you moved to the central Siberian city of Yakutsk today, however, you’d find that it’s still unbearably cold in the winter, sinking in the spring, and suffering from torrid heat waves and uncontrolled wildfires in the summer (that deplete and release ever more carbon from the soil). Permafrost is thawing so fast that residents are extending the height of the stilts their homes are built on, while elsewhere the bog simply gives way, draining entire lakes and revealing giant sinkholes. As millions of square kilometers of once sturdy ground turn into mushy swamps, the land can no longer support the weight of the roads and machinery that are needed to extract the vast natural gas deposits beneath them. Oil spills and toxic chemical leaks are poisoning once pristine terrain, with no public services within hundreds of kilometers to clean it up.

然而，在接下来的几十年里，美国宇航局估计，西伯利亚高达 85% 的地区可能完全适合居住且肥沃，不仅生产小麦，还生产苹果、葡萄、玉米和豌豆。俄罗斯已经加拿大是植被面积增长最快的地区之一，其广阔的森林（占世界森林总量的 20%，而加拿大占 30%）是重要的碳汇。各种种子都可以种植和施肥，以扩大北极农业，这些种子可能由在相似纬度地区有经验的荷兰科学家和贸易商以及加拿大农业综合企业提供。世界粮食供应需要俄罗斯，就像需要加拿大一样。

Over the next several decades, however, NASA estimates suggest that up to 85 percent of Siberia could be fully habitable and fertile, producing not only wheat but also apples, grapes, corn, and peas. Russia already ranks among the top geographies gaining in vegetation area, and its vast forests (representing 20 percent of the world’s total versus 30 percent in Canada) are vital carbon sinks. All manner of seeds can be planted and fertilized to expand Arctic agriculture, potentially supplied by Dutch scientists and traders and Canadian agribusiness companies with experience at similar latitude. The world’s food supply needs Russia as much as it needs Canada.

经过几十年的忽视，俄罗斯终于利用中国的基础设施投资和资源潜力来重新考虑其空间组织和人口需求。西伯利亚大铁路正在升级改造，中资修建的新铁路线将使欧亚商业更加高效。在俄罗斯南部靠近哈萨克斯坦和蒙古边境的城市，如新西伯利亚、克拉斯诺亚尔斯克和伊尔库茨克，官员们制定了高速公路、铁路和河港计划，并将苏联时代的秘密核设施变成“科学城”。随着气候的改善，年轻人才理想的工作正在他们的父母曾经放弃的地方出现。新西伯利亚和克拉斯诺亚尔斯克都拥有俄罗斯排名前十的大学，里面充满了希望利用数据科学实现经济多元化的学生。（他们还利用充足的能源供应来开采比特币和其他加密货币。）正如我在前苏联所看到的那样，年轻的技术官僚正在继承管理基础设施、电信、城市规划、金融监管和其他重要领域的任务。他们不想生活在一个人口稀少的失败国家。

After decades of neglect, Russia is finally taking advantage of both Chinese infrastructure investments and resource potential to rethink its spatial organization and demographic needs. The Trans-Siberian Railway is being upgraded, and new Chinese-funded rail lines will make Eurasian commerce more efficient. In southern Russian cities near the borders of Kazakhstan and Mongolia, such as Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk, officials have laid out plans for highways, railroads, and river ports, and turning secretive Soviet-era nuclear facilities into “science cities.” As the climate improves, desirable jobs for young talent are appearing in places their parents once abandoned. Both Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk have universities that rank in the top ten largest in Russia, full of students who want to use data science to diversify their economy. (They also use the ample energy supply to mine Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.) As I’ve seen across the former Soviet Union, young technocrats are inheriting the mandates to manage infrastructure, telecom, urban planning, financial regulation, and other important areas. They don’t want to live in a depopulated failed state.

如果说俄罗斯有什么资源丰富的话，那就是资源丰富、人口稀少的土地。俄罗斯西部拥有位于伏尔加河和乌拉尔山脉之间的水资源丰富的共和国，例如鞑靼斯坦和巴什科尔托斯坦（以其多样化的植物和野生蜂蜜而闻名）。再往东是阿尔泰地区，这是俄罗斯、中国、蒙古和哈萨克斯坦交界处真正偏远的四角地带。俄罗斯的阿尔泰共和国（隶属于西伯利亚）只有二十万人口，是俄罗斯人口最少的国家之一。然而阿尔泰山却是一片壮观这里有冰川山脉、卡吞河和比亚河（合并形成鄂毕河，向北流向北极）和巨大的淡水湖，更不用说金、银和锂矿藏了。由于冬季漫长，而且近 50% 的人口来自突厥阿尔泰部落，该地区一直处于人们的关注之下。然而如今，它的美丽和资源吸引了大宗商品经纪人和房地产开发商，以及俄罗斯暴发户的频繁访问。随着互联互通和气候变化使共和国变得更加适宜居住，很快它的人口就会增加十倍。

If there is one thing Russia has in abundance, it’s resource-rich terrain with almost no people. Western Russia has water-rich republics lying between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (famous for its diverse flora and wild honey). Farther east lies the Altai region, the truly remote four-corner zone where Russia, China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan meet. Russia’s Altai Republic (governed as part of Siberia) has only two hundred thousand people, making it one of the least populous in all of Russia. Yet the Altai is a spectacular region of glacial mountains, the Katun and Biya Rivers (which merge to form the Ob River flowing north to the Arctic), and huge freshwater lakes, not to mention gold, silver, and lithium deposits. Given its long winters and population that’s nearly 50 percent from the Turkic Altai tribe, the region has remained under the radar. Today, however, its beauty and resources have attracted commodities brokers and real estate developers, as well as more frequent visits by Russia’s nouveau riche. As connectivity and climate change make the republic more habitable, soon it could become home to ten times more people.

如今，俄罗斯远东地区的人口也同样减少，但可能会成为一个更加密集和结构更加丰富的人口环境。自苏联解体以来，马加丹等港口城市的人口已经减少了一半，但随着寒冷的冬天缩短到只有两到三个月，需要年轻人来利用该地区丰富的矿藏。俄罗斯推出了自己版本的美国 1862 年宅地法案，将 160 英亩土地授予西方定居者，如果他们在五年内有效利用这片土地，则将所有权转让给他们。最近的另一个好处是：在这些人口稀少的地区，保持社交距离很容易。但有多少俄罗斯人会接受这个提议呢？

Russia’s Far East is similarly depopulated today but could become a far more dense and textured demographic milieu. Port cities such as Magadan have lost half their population since the Soviet collapse, but as frigid winters shorten to just two to three months, youth are needed to harness the region’s vast mineral deposits. Russia has unveiled its own version of America’s 1862 Homestead Act that gave 160 acres to Western settlers and transferred title ownership to them if they made productive use of the land within five years. Another plus recently: Social distancing is easy in these sparsely populated areas. But how many Russians will take the offer?

俄罗斯远东地区更有可能吸收大量面临水资源短缺和粮食压力的中国和其他亚洲人。他们一年中的大部分时间都会在俄罗斯土地上度过，但会回家过冬。中国准备派遣数百万未就业的青年和中年男子渡过阿穆尔河，帮助俄罗斯进行自我重建，并履行其日益增长的为亚洲群众提供食物和住房的使命。俄罗斯拥有世界第二大淡水供应（仅次于巴西），但巴西的水无法轻易转移到另一个大陆，但俄罗斯的河流有可能被转移到中国东部的河流和运河项目。

It’s far more likely that Russia’s Far East will absorb large numbers of Chinese and other Asians facing water shortages and food stress. They’ll spend much of the year on Russian soil but travel home for the winter. China is prepared to send millions of underemployed young and middle-aged men across the Amur River to help Russia rebuild itself and fulfill its growing mandate to feed and shelter Asia’s masses. Russia has the world’s second largest supply of freshwater (behind Brazil), but whereas Brazilian water can’t easily be shifted to another continent, Russian rivers can potentially be diverted to eastern China’s rivers and canal projects.

俄罗斯对其巨大的南方邻国保持警惕是有充分理由的。华人在东西伯利亚的稳定增长让人想起蒙古元朝。八个世纪后，中国的气候民族主义可以为新的民族统一主义辩护。德国地理学家弗里德里希·拉策尔的回应解决马尔萨斯难题——人口规模将超过资源——不仅是人口控制，而且是扩大Lebensraum（生存空间），这一论点在 20 世纪 30 年代成为纳粹词典中的重要论点，以证明其扩张主义的合理性。

Russia is wary of its giant southern neighbor for good reason. The steady growth of Chinese in eastern Siberia is reminiscent of the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Eight centuries later, Chinese climate nationalism could justify a new irredentism. The German geographer Friedrich Ratzel’s response to the Malthus conundrum—that population size would outstrip resources—was not only population control but also expanding Lebensraum (living space), an argument that in the 1930s became prominent in the Nazi lexicon to justify its expansionism.

未来的俄罗斯远东地图是否会将其标记为“中西伯利亚”？在传说中的贝加尔湖畔，中国人建造了非法酒店，并向当局骗税。与许多边界协议一样，中国认为 1858 年将领土割让给俄罗斯的条约不公平——它仍然将贝加尔湖称为“北海”。中国尚未在俄罗斯进行任何土地掠夺，但它过度采伐木材并将有毒工业废物泄漏到流入两国共同阿穆尔河边界的松加里河中。

Will future maps of the Russian Far East label it “Sino-Siberia”? On the shores of fabled Lake Baikal, Chinese have built illegal hotels and bilked authorities on taxes. As with many of its border agreements, China considers the 1858 treaty that ceded territory to Russia unfair—it still refers to Lake Baikal as the “North Sea.” China has not yet conducted any land grabs in Russia, but it has over-harvested timber and leaked toxic industrial waste into the Sungari River, which flows into the countries’ shared Amur River border.

如果没有其他大国（或许最终甚至包括美国）的支持，俄罗斯就无法维持与中国的主权平等。目前，它正在吸引更多来自日本的投资，2019年，弗拉基米尔·普京邀请印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪作为首席嘉宾出席在该地区首府符拉迪沃斯托克举行的远东论坛。印度企业一直在忙于升级钢厂、建立制药厂以及对远东众多邦的农场和食品配送中心进行现代化改造。俄罗斯曾试图招募远至南非的农民，但印度长期以来一直是俄罗斯的朋友：印度农民认为俄罗斯人是“北方的旁遮普人”。西伯利亚的印第安人甚至可能成为对抗中国控制的绊脚石。

Russia can’t maintain its sovereign equality vis-à-vis China without support from other major powers—perhaps eventually even the US. For now, it’s luring more investment from Japan, and in 2019, Vladimir Putin featured India’s Narendra Modi as the chief guest at the Far East Forum in Vladivostok, the region’s capital. Indian businesses have been busily upgrading steel mills, setting up pharmaceutical plants, and modernizing farms and food distribution centers across numerous Far East states. Russia has tried to recruit farmers from as far as South Africa, but it’s India that has long been a Russian friend: Its farmers consider Russians the “Punjabis of the north.” Indians in Siberia may even serve as a trip wire against Chinese control.

在接下来的几代人中，各种民族将在这片广阔的西伯利亚边境上混合并繁殖亚洲混血民族。这并不是第一次：三万多年前，欧亚西部和东亚民族就在这里融合成一个共同的种族。在贝加尔湖附近发现的一万四千年前的牙齿化石表明，这些古代亚洲人是第一批跨越白令海峡陆桥到达阿拉斯加的人，并且与美洲原住民有亲缘关系。¹俄罗斯远东地区可能再次成为亚洲共同边界。崎岖的火山堪察加半岛很快将成为全年开放的大型滑雪和徒步旅行胜地，这可能是居民涌入利用其多雨气候和肥沃土壤的先兆。符拉迪沃斯托克的亚洲绅士化可能使其成为太平洋彼岸温哥华的镜像。

Over the next several generations, a wide range of nationalities will mingle and multiply the stock of Asiatic hybrid peoples across this vast Siberian frontier. It wouldn’t be the first time: More than thirty thousand years ago, this is where Western Eurasian and East Asian peoples fused into a common race. Fourteen-thousand-year-old tooth fossils found near Lake Baikal show that these ancient Asiatics were the first to cross the Bering Strait land bridge to Alaska and are related to Native Americans.¹ Russia’s Far East could once again become a common Asian frontier. The rugged, volcanic Kamchatka Peninsula will soon be home to a massive year-round ski and hiking resort, a precursor perhaps to an influx of inhabitants taking advantage of its rainy climate and fertile soil. Vladivostok’s Asian gentrification may make it a mirror image of Vancouver across the Pacific.

俄罗斯似乎并不热衷于大规模移民，但当它愿意时，它就会大笔吸引工人。有 200 万乌克兰人生活在俄罗斯，估计每年有三十万人向东迁移。为了惩罚乌兹别克斯坦新政府不服从俄罗斯关税同盟计划，普京向所有想要移居俄罗斯的乌兹别克人提供俄罗斯护照。2020年，俄罗斯通过了双重国籍法，以说服更多人无需放弃自己的国籍即可获得俄罗斯国籍。（美国告密者爱德华·斯诺登是早期的接受者。）俄罗斯也参与了人才争夺战，无论是来自其前卫星共和国还是其他国家。

Russia doesn’t appear keen on mass migration, but when it wants to, it lures workers with a wave of the pen. Two million Ukrainians live in Russia, with an estimated three hundred thousand moving east each year. To punish the new government of Uzbekistan for not submitting to Russia’s plans for a customs union, Putin offered Russian passports to all Uzbeks who wanted to move to Russia. In 2020, Russia passed a dual citizenship law to convince more people to take Russian nationality without having to give up their own. (American whistleblower Edward Snowden was an early taker.) Russia too is engaged in the war for talent, both from its former satellite republics and beyond.

下一次俄罗斯革命的重点不是谁统治俄罗斯，而是谁占领俄罗斯。与一个世纪前布尔什维克的快速接管不同，当前的革命是一场慢动作的史诗，俄罗斯在人口上变成灰色，在地形上变成绿色，在种族上变成棕色和黄色。

The next Russian Revolution won’t be about who rules Russia but who occupies it. Unlike the fast-moving Bolshevik takeover of a century ago, the current revolution is a slow-motion epic as Russia turns gray demographically, green topographically, and brown and yellow ethnically.

挺进中亚

Stepping up to Central Asia

中亚是一个由非常年轻的国家占据的古老空间。西至里海、北至俄罗斯、东至中国、南至印度河文明之间的大片草原和沙漠，几千年来一直是人类定居点的十字路口。游牧粟特人是最早的丝绸之路抄写员，在公元前四世纪亚历山大大帝到来时，他们在波斯语、土耳其语、汉语甚至古希腊语之间进行翻译。伊斯兰教于七、八世纪从阿拉伯传入，此后商队旅馆希瓦、布哈拉和撒马尔罕（位于今天的乌兹别克斯坦）成为从土耳其到蒙古各地的商人的休息站，成吉思汗的掠夺部落在十三世纪从蒙古而来。土耳其-波斯将军帖木儿从蒙古人手中夺回该地区后，他的曾孙巴布尔建立了莫卧儿帝国，在德里建立自己的国家，并从阿富汗统治印度大部分地区。即使在俄罗斯统治一个多世纪之后，该地区多民族的拼凑比任何边界都更能揭示中亚的本质。

Central Asia is an ancient space occupied by very young nations. The vast area of steppe and desert stretching between the Caspian Sea to the west and Russia to the north, China in the east, and Indus civilizations to the south has for millennia been as much crossroads as settlement. The nomadic Sogdians were the original Silk Road scribes, translating between Persian, Turkish, Chinese, and even ancient Greek upon Alexander the Great’s arrival in the fourth century BC. Islam arrived in the seventh and eighth centuries from Arabia, after which the caravanserai of Khiva, Bukhara, and Samarqand (in today’s Uzbekistan) became rest stops for merchants traveling out of everywhere from Turkey to Mongolia—from which Genghis Khan’s marauding hordes descended in the thirteenth century. After the Turko-Persian general Tamerlane reclaimed the region from the Mongols, his great-grandson Babur founded what became the Mughal empire, establishing itself in Delhi and ruling from Afghanistan through most of India. Even after more than a century under Russian dominance, the region’s multi-ethnic patchwork is more revealing about Central Asia’s essence than any of its borders.

哈萨克斯坦是中亚最大的共和国，其面积几乎与澳大利亚相当，人口同样稀少，而大宗商品驱动的经济使其在财富和声望方面领先于邻国。作为通往石油资源丰富的里海的关键桥梁，哈萨克斯坦已迅速成为跨欧亚物流的主要门户，高速货运列车从中国穿越到欧洲。其首都努尔萨尔坦（原阿斯塔纳）是一个快速发展的地区金融中心，也是新大学和 2017 年世博会展馆等令人眼花缭乱的建筑遗址的所在地。

Kazakhstan, the largest of Central Asia’s republics, is nearly the size of Australia, with a similarly sparse population and a commodities-driven economy that has propelled it ahead of its neighbors in wealth and prestige. As the key bridge to the oil-rich Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan has quickly become a major trans-Eurasian logistics gateway, with high-speed freight trains crossing from China to Europe. Its capital, Nursaltan (formerly Astana), is a fast-growing hub for regional finance as well as home to new universities and dazzling architectural sites such as the World Expo 2017 pavilions.

二十五年来，哈萨克斯坦一直将专业人士和工人派遣到国外（主要是俄罗斯），如今哈萨克斯坦本身已成为该地区的主要吸引力。随着俄罗斯经济降温，超过300万中亚人在该国蓬勃发展的建筑业和其他行业找到了工作。出生在邻国俄罗斯和中国的哈萨克人也回到了新哈萨克斯坦。最近的人口涌入是未来发展的一个迹象，因为哈萨克斯坦可能成为世界上真正的气候绿洲之一。如今哈萨克斯坦只有2000万人口。准备好再花2亿了吗？

After twenty-five years of sending its professionals and workers abroad, mostly to Russia, Kazakhstan is itself the region’s main magnet. With Russia’s economy cooling, more than 3 million Central Asians have found work in the country’s booming construction industry and other sectors. Kazakhs born in neighboring Russia and China have also returned to the new Kazakhstan. The recent population influx is a sign of things to come, for Kazakhstan could be one of the world’s true climate oases. Today Kazakhstan has only 20 million people. Is it ready for another 200 million?

阿拉木图是该国的商业中心，坐落在天山脚下，历任市长（可以追溯到俄罗斯军事驻地时期）都要求不断植树并对高层建筑实施限制，这让阿拉木图受益匪浅。如今，这座城市的 200 万居民享受着不断的美化：新的游乐场、步行街、自行车道和凉爽的喷雾器。

Nestled at the base of the Tian Shan mountains, the country’s commercial hub of Almaty has benefited from a succession of mayors (dating to its time as a Russian military garrison) who mandated constant tree planting and enforced curbs on tall buildings. Today the city’s 2 million residents enjoy continuous beautification: new playgrounds, pedestrian streets, bike lanes, and cool mist-sprayers.

哈萨克斯坦人日益增长的信心不仅体现在该国相对较高的出生率，还体现在豪华汽车经销店、别致的购物中心、时尚的夜总会和棱角分明的公寓大楼。日贝克佐利街 (Zhibek Zholy Street) 与贝尔格莱德的米哈洛大公街 (Knez Mihailova) 类似，这里有音乐家、霹雳舞者、街头艺术家和提供各种美食的咖啡馆。无处不在的货币兑换商遍布每个角落，为越来越多的商务旅客和游客快速交易所有地区货币。这是阿尔卑斯山亚洲世界主义的沃土。

Kazakhs’ rising confidence is on display not only in the country’s relatively high birth rate but at posh car dealerships, chic shopping malls, trendy nightclubs, and angular apartment complexes. Zhibek Zholy Street resembles Belgrade’s Knez Mihailova with its musicians, break-dancers, street artists, and cafes offering an eclectic array of cuisines. Ubiquitous money changers, on every corner, quickly trade all regional currencies for the growing numbers of business travelers and tourists. This is fertile ground for an Alpine Asian cosmopolitanism.

在阿拉木图一个典型的夏日，很难不注意到成群结队的印度游客一边躲避南亚的酷热，一边探索自己的遗产。中亚人和印度人之间的文化渊源深厚，从莫卧儿遗产到苏联时期流行的宝莱坞经典。我只看过一部哈萨克肥皂剧，但城市与乡村的方言冲突情节的每一句台词都可能有写于孟买。在距离乌兹别克斯坦首都塔什干不远的地方，我遇到了很多能说流利印地语的店主。乌兹别克斯坦允许印度人免签证入境，印度中年男性似乎非常有兴趣飞往乌兹别克斯坦进行周末的性旅游。

On a typical summer day in Almaty, it’s hard not to notice the throngs of Indian tourists escaping South Asia’s searing heat while exploring their own heritage. The cultural affinity between Central Asians and Indians runs deep, from Mughal legacies to Bollywood classics that became popular during the Soviet period. I’ve only watched one Kazakh soap opera, but every line of the city-meets-village clash-of-dialects plot could have been written in Mumbai. Not far away in Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent, I’ve met more than a few shopkeepers who speak impressive Hindi. Uzbekistan allows visa-free entry for Indians, and there appears to be quite an appetite among middle-aged Indian men to fly in for a weekend of sex tourism.

我们是否正在走向莫卧儿帝国的逆转，印度拓荒者从南向北稳步迁徙，在他们祖先的土地上定居？富有进取心的印度医生已经在阿拉木图和塔什干开设了私人诊所。印度游客最常光顾的酒店的厨房由印度厨师主理。随着英语国际学校的流行，对来自印度的合格教师的需求也在增加。印度越不适宜居住，就会有越多的印度人北上寻找温和的气候和创业机会，从而扭转他们祖先的足迹。

Are we heading for a reversal of the Mughal empire, a steady south-to-north migration of Indian pioneers settling the lands of their ancestors? Enterprising Indian doctors have already set up private clinics in Almaty and Tashkent. Indian chefs lead the kitchens at hotels most frequented by Indian travelers. And with English international schools the new vogue, demand is rising for qualified teachers from India as well. The more unlivable India becomes, the more Indians will find themselves heading north in search of temperate climate and entrepreneurial opportunity—reversing their ancestors’ footsteps in the process.

哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦提供了充分的证据，证明中亚的文化融合如何从该地区的突厥部落吸引许多新居民，但也可能从其文化集聚区（包括今天的伊朗、巴基斯坦和中国）吸引数百万人。想想新疆2000万维吾尔族穆斯林，他们一直在中国再教育营中遭受酷刑和羞辱。数千人逃过边境并在哈萨克斯坦重新定居，还有数百万人可能会跟随。在 20 世纪 90 年代和 2000 年代，人们非常担心伊斯兰运动会在该地区获得支持，特别是考虑到阿富汗的不安全局势。但对于哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦合计 5000 万人口来说，伊斯兰教更像是一种文化特征，而不是宗教枷锁。学生们像游客一样参观清真寺和宗教学校：

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan provide ample evidence of how Central Asia’s cultural syncretism could draw many new residents from the region’s Turkic tribes but potentially millions more from its cultural catchment area spanning today’s Iran, Pakistan, and China. Consider the 20 million Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang who have been suffering the torture and humiliation of Chinese re-education camps. Thousands have fled across the border and resettled in Kazakhstan, and millions more may follow. In the 1990s and 2000s, there was considerable fear that Islamist movements would gain traction in the region, especially given Afghanistan’s insecurity. But for the combined 50 million people of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Islam appears more a cultural characteristic than a religious yoke. Students visit mosques and madrassas much the way tourists do: to learn history.

这对于伊朗人来说无疑也是令人欣慰的，因为他们一直受到什叶派伊斯兰神权政治和国家环境危机的压制。伊朗人传统上逃往北美或欧洲，但他们与塔吉克斯坦有着最密切的种族和语言血缘关系——这些国家被描述为“一个精神与两个身体”。伊朗有在塔吉克斯坦修建了发电厂和隧道，穿越阿富汗北部地区的“达里带”走廊继续取得进展。它的目的是贸易，但鉴于塔吉克斯坦拥有丰富的冰川，它很可能成为波斯人寻求高海拔避难所的迁徙路线。伊朗和中国签署了一项为期二十五年的战略伙伴关系，重点关注伊朗的商业交易，但随着伊朗气候的时间流逝，他们可能会合谋将帕米尔山脉的冰川融化引入潘吉河，并为事实上的伊朗提供水合物。阿富汗-塔吉克斯坦“波斯斯坦”国家。

This is surely comforting for Iranians as well, who have been stifled both by their Shia Islamic theocracy and the country’s environmental crisis. Iranians have traditionally fled to North America or Europe, but they share the closest ethnic and linguistic kinship with Tajikistan—the countries have been described as “one spirit with two bodies.” Iran has built power plants and tunnels in Tajikistan, and progress continues on the “Dari belt” corridor through the swath of northern Afghanistan separating them. Its aim was trade, but it may well become a migration route for Persians seeking a high-altitude refuge, given Tajikistan’s abundant glaciers. Iran and China have signed a twenty-five-year strategic partnership focused on commercial deals in Iran, but as the clock ticks on Iran’s climate, they might conspire to channel Pamir mountain range glacier melt into the Panj River and hydrate a de facto Iran-Afghan-Tajik “Farsi-stan” state.

迄今为止，中亚不断增加的移民数量更多的是偶然而非有意为之。哈萨克斯坦政府已特赦了数十万以前无证的非法移民，并在地区范围内招募学生，但公民之间尚未就未来人口问题的深刻影响进行积极对话。除非涉及到中国人。中国工人和房地产投资者的涌入在哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦引发了反华抗议和项目罢工，各方都在争先恐后地挽回面子，寻找公平的解决劳工和合同纠纷的方案。

Thus far, Central Asia’s rising migration has occurred more by accident than by design. Kazakhstan’s government has granted amnesty to hundreds of thousands of previously undocumented illegal migrants and recruited regionally for students, but there has not been an active dialogue among citizens as to the profound implications of the demographic encounters that lie ahead. Except, that is, when it comes to the Chinese. The influx of Chinese workers and property investors has led to anti-Chinese protests and project strikes in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with all sides scrambling to save face and find equitable solutions to labor and contract disputes.

但中亚吸引的游客和居民越多，其政府就越会将移民视为其商业模式和经济多元化路线图的一部分。外国劳动力对于拓宽道路、修建铁路、建设住宅区、扩大灌溉渠道和建设大型太阳能发电厂至关重要，哈萨克斯坦正在为这些项目发行绿色债券并吸引投资。

But the more visitors and residents Central Asia attracts, the more its governments will see migration as part of their business model and road map to economic diversification. Foreign labor will be essential to broaden roads, construct railways, build housing colonies, expand irrigation channels, and build massive solar power plants, projects for which Kazakhstan is issuing green bonds and drawing in investment.

如果中亚人口从 5000 万增长到五六倍，它也需要找到养活所有人的方法。该地区终于从几十年来苏联强制生产的灾难性棉花生产中恢复过来，这些生产导致咸海几乎完全消失。哈萨克斯坦正在咸海地区种植数亿粒抗旱种子，以恢复其曾经充满活力的农业。乌兹别克斯坦（80% 都是灌木丛沙漠）现在提供税收减免有能力开采地下含水层、修建新水渠和安装高效滴灌的投资者。温室如雨后春笋般涌现，以扩大西瓜、黄瓜、西红柿、石榴、樱桃和其他水果和蔬菜的生产，而食品加工业也在不断升级，以延长该国农业的保质期和市场范围。阿姆河沿岸一排排带有太阳能电池板屋顶的活动房屋拔地而起，这表明乌兹别克人有足够的能源、水和食物来度过未来几十年的炎热天气。

If Central Asia’s population grows from 50 million to five or six times more, it will need to find ways to feed everyone as well. The region is at last recovering from decades of disastrous Soviet-mandated cotton production that caused the near total disappearance of the Aral Sea. Kazakhstan is planting hundreds of millions of drought-resistant seeds in the Aral area to restore its once vibrant agriculture. Uzbekistan (which is 80 percent scrubby desert) now offers tax breaks to investors who have the capacity to tap underground aquifers, build new water canals, and install efficient drip irrigation. Greenhouses are popping up to expand production of watermelons, cucumbers, tomatoes, pomegranates, cherries, and other fruits and vegetables, while the food processing industry is getting upgraded to extend the shelf life and market reach of the country’s agriculture. The long rows of prefab houses with solar-paneled roofs sprouting along the Amu Darya River are a sign that Uzbeks have sufficient energy, water, and food to survive the hot decades ahead.

中亚所谓的大陆性气候具有极端的季节特征，从夏季高达五十五摄氏度到冬季气温降至零下二十度。随着平均气温上升，该地区的冬季可能不会那么寒冷，但夏季会更炎热。2019年夏天，乌兹别克斯坦政府发布了第一个公共服务公告，提醒人们从中午12点到下午4点呆在室内（我个人建议上午11点到下午5点）根据我每天持续暴露在四十摄氏度的经验干燥时，只要在阴凉处就可以忍受炎热，而在潮湿的环境中，这样的炎热就难以忍受。该地区的夜晚令人愉快；黄昏后街道变得生机勃勃。

The so-called continental climate of Central Asia features seasonal extremes from summers as hot as fifty-five degrees Celsius to winters when temperatures drop to minus twenty degrees. As average temperatures rise, the region can expect not-as-chilly winters but hotter summers. During the summer of 2019, the Uzbek government issued its first public service announcements alerting people to stay indoors from 12 p.m. to 4 p.m. (Personally, I’d suggest 11 a.m. to 5 p.m.) In my experience of consistent daily exposure to forty degree Celsius, dryness makes the heat tolerable so long as one stays in the shade, while such heat in humid conditions is unbearable. Evenings in the region are pleasant; the streets come alive after dusk.

由于纬度更高、海拔变化更大，哈萨克斯坦最终更有可能适应气候变化。该国目前是世界上最大的小麦出口国之一，还种植大麦、向日葵、亚麻和水稻。新的农业企业和合作社补贴可以帮助农民获得更好的饲料、化肥和设备，并生产更多的牛奶和农作物。但随着旱季的延长，哈萨克斯坦将需要投入更多资金来扩大天山的灌溉渠道，并将更多的冰川融水收集到水库中。

With its higher latitude and more varied elevations, Kazakhstan ultimately stands a much better chance of adapting to climate change. The country is now one of the world’s largest wheat exporters, and also grows barley, sunflowers, flax, and rice. New agribusiness and cooperative subsidies help farmers get better fodder, fertilizers, and equipment and produce more milk and crops. But with longer dry seasons ahead, Kazakhstan will need to invest much more in expanding irrigation channels from the Tian Shan mountains, and capturing more glacier melt into reservoirs.

哈萨克斯坦幅员辽阔，也使其成为进行大气硫处理以减少太阳眩光、人工增雨以增加降雨以及种植数十亿棵树的理想候选国。哈萨克斯坦的草原由于政府对造林计划的补贴，森林——面积相当于英格兰的地区——正在变得更大。采用可持续的方法来改善该林带破旧的基础设施可以创建一个重要的生态避难所。

Kazakhstan’s immense size also makes it a sensible candidate for atmospheric sulphur treatment to reduce the sun’s glare, cloud seeding to boost rainfall, and the planting of billions of trees. Kazakhstan’s steppe forest—a region the size of England—is growing even larger thanks to government subsidies for afforestation programs. A sustainable approach to improving the dilapidated infrastructure of this forested belt could create a vital ecological refuge.

尽管中亚拥有得天独厚的帕米尔高原和天山山脉（传说中的“亚洲水塔”），但在与吉尔吉斯斯坦这样腐败的国家打交道时，仅靠海拔还不足以确保宜居性。尽管有“中亚瑞士”的美誉，吉尔吉斯斯坦却未能保护伊塞克湖等原始环境。伊塞克湖是死海的高海拔咸海版本，在苏联时期，疗养疗养院的家庭手工业在其周围发展起来。但过度捕捞和污染表明一个国家无法执行环境法，考虑到中国和俄罗斯的邻近性和影响力，这是一个危险的迹象。吉尔吉斯斯坦的承诺在于其纬度和海拔，但其态度仍有很大改进空间。

Though Central Asia is blessed with the Pamir and Tian Shan mountain ranges, the fabled “water towers of Asia,” elevation alone isn’t enough to ensure livability when dealing with countries as corrupt as Kyrgyzstan. Despite its moniker as the “Switzerland of Central Asia,” Kyrgyzstan is failing to protect pristine environments such as Lake Issyk-Kul. A salty, high-altitude version of the Dead Sea, Issyk-Kul saw a cottage industry of curative sanatoria develop around it during the Soviet era. But overfishing and pollution indicate a country unable to enforce environmental laws, a dangerous sign, given China and Russia’s proximity and influence. Kyrgyzstan’s promise lies in its latitude and altitude, but its attitude still has much room for improvement.

总的来说，如果中亚的人口从今天的 6000 万增长到 2 亿或更多，其国家的名称就会变得用词不当：后缀“斯坦”的意思是“土地”，但这些国家在人口上将不再由突厥人占主导地位。部落的名字表明了他们的身份。相反，他们的国民与外国人的人口比例与阿联酋相似，阿联酋人口仅占十分之一，而 90% 是移民。就像阿联酋是一个拥有大熔炉的小部落一样，哈萨克斯坦也将成为一个拥有全球游牧民族的游牧民族。

Collectively, if Central Asia’s population climbs from 60 million today toward 200 million or more, its nations’ very names would become misnomers: The suffix “-stan” means “land of,” but these countries would no longer be demographically dominated by the Turkic tribes whose names identify them. Instead, their demographic ratios of nationals to foreigners would resemble that of the UAE, where barely one-tenth of the population is Emirati while 90 percent is migrants. Much as Emiratis are a small tribe hosting a melting pot, so too would Kazakhstan become a nomadic people hosting global nomads.

如果俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦都对人口强劲增长开放，哈萨克斯坦将成为一个比现在更重要的从南到北的过境国。与俄罗斯近七千公里的边界——世界第二长的边界——可能会恢复到十九世纪和二十世纪的流动性，尽管受到强大的看门人俄罗斯的严格管理。气候变化对该地区政权施加的重大责任无疑将成为他们继续采取高压手段的充分理由。与此同时，哈萨克斯坦已经与国际移民组织（IOM）合作促进移民权利；接下来，它可能会呼吁国际机构协助其共同治理外国人居住区。

If Russia and Kazakhstan both open to robust population growth, Kazakhstan would become even more a transit country from south to north than it already is. The nearly seven-thousand-kilometer border with Russia—the second longest in the world—could return to its nineteenth- and twentieth-century fluidity, though strictly managed by muscular gatekeeper Russia. The grave responsibilities climate change is foisting upon the region’s regimes will surely be ample justification for them to continue in their heavy-handed ways. At the same time, Kazakhstan already works with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to promote migrant rights; next it may appeal to international agencies to assist it in co-governing foreign-populated zones.

哈萨克斯坦及其邻国的宜居地区符合潜在吸收比目前居住地更多人口的条件：它们拥有充足的空间，需要人力来实现经济现代化，能够在未来几十年的气候变化中持续生存，并且提供了高度有可能实现政治稳定的可能性。目前，他们在公路和铁路、农业和食品加工、住房和医疗保健方面的投资似乎充足。但对于未来来说，它们还远远不够。

Kazakhstan and the livable parts of its neighboring countries meet the conditions for potentially absorbing much larger populations than they’re presently home to: They have abundant space, need human labor to modernize their economies, could sustainably survive the next decades of climate change, and offer a high likelihood of managed political stability. For now, their investments in roads and railways, agriculture and food processing, housing and medical care appear sufficient. But for the future, they aren’t nearly enough.

第7章北方主义

CHAPTER 7 NORTHISM

大陆表亲

Continental cousins

超过四分之三的世界人口居住在北半球，其中北美人口略多于 5 亿，欧亚大陆人口略多于 50 亿。北方也是世界上所有强国的所在地，这些国家拥有规模和资源，并且有能力利用它们并吸收更多人口。因此，北美和欧亚大陆都是人口统计和地缘政治的历史和未来所在地。在十九世纪和二十世纪，欧洲技术和移民帮助北美在财富方面迎头赶上，在第二次世界大战结束时，仅美国就占了世界经济的一半。但由于欧亚大陆欧洲端和亚洲端的人口数量远多于北美，同时在财富和技术方面实现了平等，

More than three-quarters of the world population live in the northern hemisphere, with just over 500 million in North America and just over 5 billion in Eurasia. The North is also home to all the powerful states in the world, those with size and resources as well as the capacity to harness them and absorb more people. The North American and Eurasian continents are therefore both the historical and future seats of demographics and geopolitics. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European technology and emigrants helped North America catch up in wealth, with the US alone representing half the world economy at the end of World War II. But with both the European and Asian ends of Eurasia far larger than North America in population, while achieving parity in wealth and technology, North America’s share of the global economy has dropped to 15 percent.

尽管如此，北美的优势在于其战略稳定性和可控的人口规模。尽管这三个主要国家在产业政策和移民问题上存在紧张关系，但美国与加拿大和墨西哥的贸易额都超过了与中国的贸易额，而且美国也是这两个国家迄今为止最大的投资者。非洲大陆的两条主要边界具有重要的象征意义，但两国在能源、农业和工业方面的深刻互补性更为重要。美洲地区对气候变化的适应能力最强，落基山脉、大平原和五大湖等都是美国与加拿大共有的地理和拓扑区域，这进一步凸显了北美联盟更加一体化的必然性。

North America’s advantage nonetheless lies in its strategic stability and manageable population size. Though its three major countries have tensions over industrial policies and immigration, the US trades more with both Canada and Mexico than it does with China, and the US is also by far the largest investor in both countries. The continent’s two major borders are symbolically potent, but the countries’ deep complementarities in energy, agriculture, and industry are far more significant. The American regions most resilient to climate change, such as the Rockies, the Great Plains, and the Great Lakes, are all geographical and topological zones the US shares with Canada—further underscoring the inevitability of a more integrated North American Union.

美国与墨西哥的人口融合也掩盖了坚不可摧的边境围栏的概念。目前已有 3700 万墨西哥裔美国人，双重公民构成了一个规模越来越大的两国社区，遍布加利福尼亚州、亚利桑那州、新墨西哥州和德克萨斯州的城镇。埃尔帕索和华雷斯之间有一座跨越边境的桥梁连接起来，每天都有数千人向北前往学校、购物或分娩，或者向南前往探亲或寻求廉价医疗服务。随着退休人员和年轻的美国人都在寻求更便宜的生活方式，居住在墨西哥的“美国墨西哥人”人数已从 20 年前的 20 万人猛增到今天的 150 万人。¹未来几十年，来自中美洲的气候移民可能会向北涌动，使迄今为止所见的一切相形见绌。²

America’s demographic blending with Mexico also belies the notion of an impenetrable border fence. There are already 37 million Mexican-Americans, and dual citizens comprise an ever larger binational community populating towns across California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. El Paso and Juárez are joined by a bridge across the border, with thousands moving north daily for school, shopping, or to give birth, or south to visit family or for cheap medical care. With retirees and younger Americans alike seeking a cheaper lifestyle, the number of “American-Mexicans” living in Mexico has ballooned from just two hundred thousand twenty years ago to 1.5 million today.¹ In the decades ahead, climate migrants from Central America may become a northward swell that dwarfs anything seen to date.²

俄勒冈大学的著名地理学学者亚历克·墨菲认为，随着时间的推移，人们的流动改变了我们与世界每个地区相关的宏大叙事。通过这种方式，人文地理学使我们能够研究一些深刻的问题，例如：在气候变化加速的情况下，北美及其人口将在复杂的地球社会中发挥什么作用？

Leading geography scholar Alec Murphy of the University of Oregon argues that the movement of people over time alters the grand narrative we associate with each region of the world. In this way, human geography allows us to investigate deep questions such as: What role will North America and its population play in a complex planetary society amid accelerating climate change?

我们必须以同样重要的议程探索欧亚大陆的未来。自苏联解体以来，过去三十年欧亚大陆对中世纪丝绸之路的重新发现一直在加速。20世纪90年代，我开始乘坐欧洲火车南下进入巴尔干半岛，目睹欧盟向东扩张到俄罗斯，其影响力到达里海沿岸的高加索国家。2000年代，我沿着中国的道路和管道从另一个方向穿过哈萨克斯坦，直到也到达里海。在过去的十年里，欧洲、俄罗斯和中国积极合作（并参与竞争）推广连接伦敦和上海的高速货运铁路。

We must explore the future of Eurasia with the same weighty agenda. Eurasia’s rediscovery of the medieval Silk Roads has been accelerating over the past three decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s I began taking European trains south into the Balkans and watching the EU expand eastward toward Russia, and its influence reach the Caucasus countries by the Caspian Sea. In the 2000s, I followed Chinese roads and pipelines from the other direction, across Kazakhstan until they reached the Caspian as well. And in the past decade, Europe, Russia, and China have actively collaborated (and competed) to promote high-speed freight railways connecting London to Shanghai.

未来几十年，跨欧亚基础设施投资将实现经济现代化、促进城市化、促进勤劳工人的流动。像撒马尔罕这样长期休眠的城市可能会再次繁荣起来，来自四面八方的商人会开设商店并出售他们的商品。加密货币将跨越国界蓬勃发展，让资金在任何地方都可以使用。大豆、蔬菜和水稻将在更加多样化的地区种植，并改善物流以确保供应满足需求。除了天然气管道和铁路外，传输太阳能的高压电缆以及连接主要河流的水渠将形成横跨从俄罗斯到印度地区的新基础设施网络。下一条丝绸之路将是多向、多功能、绿色的。

In the decades ahead, trans-Eurasian infrastructure investment will modernize economies, promote urbanization, and facilitate the circulation of industrious workers. Long dormant cities such as Samarqand may thrive again, with merchants from far and wide setting up shops and selling their wares. Cryptocurrencies will flourish across borders, making money accessible anywhere. Soybeans, vegetables, and rice will be planted in far more diverse geographies, with logistics improved to ensure supply meets demand. In addition to gas pipelines and railways, high-voltage electricity cables transmitting solar power, as well as water canals linking major rivers, will form a new infrastructure network spanning the area from Russia to India. The next Silk Roads will be multidirectional, multifunctional, and green.

食物地理

The Geography of Food

当今的全球农业在很大程度上与我们的人口分布重叠。除阿拉伯世界外，粮食生产集中在人口最多的地区，如中国、印度、美国和巴西。但气温上升和降雨模式的变化正在改变农业生产的最佳地理位置。

Global agriculture today largely overlaps with our population distribution. With the exception of the Arab world, food production is concentrated in geographies with the largest populations, such as China, India, the United States, and Brazil. But rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns are changing the optimal geographies for agricultural production.

改造北极

Terraforming the Arctic

沿着北纬 27 度线聚集的人口数量比任何其他单一纬度地区都多。更广泛地说，在过去的六千年里，我们已经习惯了北纬 25 至 45 度地区是最肥沃、最舒适的人类居住地。当气候变化将我们推离这个最佳范围时，我们在气温和人口密度较低的纬度地区向北走会更好吗？杜克大学数学家阿德里安·贝扬（Adrian Bejan）在他的《进化与自由》一书中解释了人口如何像人群一样从狭窄的地方流向广阔的区域。今天，我们主要集中在赤道和热带纬度地区；接下来我们可能会分散到广阔的北方地区。我们的人文地理注定要从赤道起源向北方发展。

More humans are clustered along the 27th parallel than any other single latitude. More broadly, over the past six thousand years, we’ve grown accustomed to the 25- to 45-degree north latitudes being the most fertile and comfortable for human habitation. As climate change pushes us out of this optimal band, would we be better off farther north in latitudes with lower temperatures and population density? In his book Evolution and Freedom, Duke University mathematician Adrian Bejan explains how populations, like crowds, flow from narrow points to wide areas. Today we are densely concentrated in the equatorial and tropical latitudes; next we may disperse into the vast northern expanses. Our human geography is destined to evolve from equatorial origins toward a northern future.

近五百年前，小冰河时期刺激了西班牙、葡萄牙、荷兰和英国的探险，使欧洲海洋成为全球力量的驾驶舱。然而如今，这些昔日的全球帝国正在经济衰退。与此同时，德国、斯堪的纳维亚半岛和俄罗斯——在小冰河时期受害最严重——现在正在变暖并吸收新的人口。北美和欧亚大陆最大的国家——加拿大和俄罗斯——横跨广阔的地理区域，处于有利位置，可以将其宽阔的河流和融化的永久冻土中的大量淡水出售给南方口渴的邻国：美国和中国。加拿大和俄罗斯的共同点是，它们都主宰着一个在全球地缘政治和人口统计中从未发挥过如此核心作用的地区：北极。

Nearly five hundred years ago, the Little Ice Age spurred the explorations of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and British, making maritime Europe the cockpit of global power. Today, however, these former global empires are in economic retreat. Meanwhile, Germany, Scandinavia, and Russia—which suffered most during the Little Ice Age—are now warming and absorbing new populations. North America and Eurasia’s largest states—Canada and Russia—bestride vast geographical expanses and are well positioned to sell massive quantities of freshwater from their broad rivers and melting permafrost to their thirsty neighbors to the south: America and China. What Canada and Russia also have in common is that they dominate a region that has never before played such a central role in global geopolitics and demographics: the Arctic.

长期以来，科幻文化和外星任务一直激发着改造其他行星、为人类居住而设计的愿景。早在这些梦想实现之前，我们就必须在我们星球上崎岖且人烟稀少的地区为大规模定居做好准备。亚利桑那州的生物圈设施设想了三个几十年前，为了模拟人类可能在月球上构建的生态群落。现在它已被重新调整用途，以测试我们如何适应干旱和热浪等恶劣的环境条件。

Sci-fi culture and extraterrestrial missions have long inspired visions of terraforming other planets, engineering them for human habitation. Long before those dreams are even attempted, we must prepare rugged and sparsely inhabited parts of our own planet for large-scale settlement. The biosphere facility in Arizona was conceived three decades ago to simulate the kind of ecological community humans might construct on the moon. Now it has been repurposed to test how we can adapt to harsh environmental conditions such as droughts and heat waves.

人们很容易声称解决全球变暖的办法就是向北极圈移动。北极变暖的速度是其他纬度地区的两倍，粮食产量（尤其是小麦）正在增加。森林正在向北扩展至苔原。北极面积相当于非洲那么大，只有大约 500 万居民，但北极有可能容纳 10 亿甚至更多的居民。正如我在夏季和冬季访问挪威北部城镇（如特罗姆瑟和希尔克内斯）时所目睹的那样，北极城镇正在迅速发展。挪威甚至还有葡萄酒业。

It’s tempting to claim that the solution to global warming is simply to move toward the Arctic Circle. The Arctic is warming at twice the rate of other latitudes, and food production (especially wheat) is rising. Forests are expanding farther north into the tundra. With only about 5 million residents across a geography the size of Africa, the Arctic’s potential to host a billion or more residents seems plausible. Arctic towns are growing quickly, as I’ve witnessed during both summer and winter visits to northern Norwegian towns such as Tromso and Kirkenes. Norway even has a wine industry.

但请记住，虽然北​​极的夏天可能很温暖，但您需要带上眼罩以应对二十四小时的日照，尽管冬天可能不再那么寒冷，但它们仍然会永远黑暗，因此对那些人来说并不适宜居住。患有维生素 D 缺乏症。寒冷造成的死亡人数正在下降，但与高温相关的死亡率正在上升。从阿拉斯加到北欧国家都爆发了森林火灾，但几乎没有消防站（或其他基础设施）来应对。在挪威，特大洪水正在淹没小城镇，而夏季干旱则导致牛群挨饿。即使是田园诗般的岛屿也遇到了麻烦：令人惊叹的斯瓦尔巴群岛正在经历永久冻土融化和雪崩；冰岛冰川融化意味着河流正在干涸。

But remember that while Arctic summers may be balmy, you’ll need to bring your eyeshades for the twenty-four-hour daylight, and although winters may no longer be as insufferably cold, they’ll still be perpetually dark and thus inhospitable for those suffering from Vitamin D deficiency. Deaths from the cold are falling but heat-related mortality is rising. Forest fires have broken out from Alaska to the Nordic countries, but there are few fire stations (or other basic infrastructure) to cope with them. In Norway, torrential flooding is sinking small towns, while summer droughts are starving cattle. Even idyllic islands are in for trouble: Stunning Svalbard is experiencing thawing permafrost and avalanches; Iceland’s melting glaciers mean rivers are drying up.

我们也无法完全摆脱我们在地球其他地方产生的污染：最北端的原始降雪现在含有微塑料。更糟糕的是：在永久冻土和冰层下面隐藏着长期休眠的细菌和疾病，例如过去几个世纪杀死数百万人和动物的瘟疫，它们正在解冻并再次感染。永久冻土融化不仅会释放高度易燃的甲烷等温室气体，还会释放汞这种危险的神经毒素。同时，我们修建的任何道路都会被冻结数月，然后被像流沙一样的泥炭沼泽所吞噬。因此，改造北极涉及到的道路会变成糊状，化学物质会杀死你。

We also can’t fully escape the pollution we generate elsewhere on the planet: Pristine snowfall in the farthest northern reaches now contains microplastics. Even worse: Beneath the permafrost and ice lie long dormant bacteria and diseases, such as the plague that killed millions of people and animals in centuries past, that are defrosting and infecting again. Thawing permafrost not only releases greenhouse gases such as highly flammable methane, but also mercury, a dangerous neurotoxin. Meanwhile, any road we build would be frozen for months and then consumed by peat bogs that act like quicksand. So terraforming the Arctic involves roads that will turn to mush and chemicals that can kill you.

搬到北极？

Moving to the Arctic?

如果气温上升四摄氏度，加拿大、北欧和俄罗斯将成为地球上唯一适合人类常年居住的地区。尽管美国和世界其他地区仍然可以成为太阳能、风能和其他可再生能源的生产国，但当今人口最多的国家，如中国、印度和美国，将因干旱和其他环境危害而不适合。

If temperatures rise by four degrees Celsius, Canada, northern Europe, and Russia would be the only regions of the planet suitable for year-round human habitation. Today’s most populous countries, such as China, India, and the US, would be unsuitable due to droughts and other environmental hazards, though the US and other parts of the world could still be producers of solar, wind, and other renewable power sources.

但我们会尝试。美国唯一一个部分处于北极地区的州阿拉斯加在美国环保局的气候适应能力筛查指数（CSRI）中被标记为拥有最多的县来应对气候灾害。由于人口密度低，该州的新冠病毒感染率也是美国各州中最低的。但目前，阿拉斯加实际上每年都在失去人口，去其他四十八个州寻找更好的工作。毫无疑问，它将吸引那些寻求低税逃税、开始新生活并享受不那么炎热天气的粗犷美国人。但即使在阿拉斯加，也有数十个沿海城镇被上升的太平洋潮汐吞没，而热浪已经在河流中的鲑鱼产卵之前杀死它们。在更远的内陆地区，石油钻探和木材采伐威胁着该州的自然保护区。新的开始很可能意味着完全建设新城镇。在那里和加拿大各地，人们会发现一个由新的北极熔炉组成的群岛。

And yet we will try. America’s only partially Arctic state, Alaska, has been flagged in the EPA’s Climate Resilience Screening Index (CSRI) as having the highest number of counties prepared for climate hazards. With its low population density, it also had the lowest Covid infection rate of any American state. But currently, Alaska is actually losing people annually to better jobs in the lower forty-eight states. No doubt it will attract rugged Americans seeking a low tax escape to start a new life and enjoy less scorching weather. But even in Alaska, dozens of coastal towns are being engulfed by rising Pacific tides, while heat waves have been killing salmon in rivers before they can spawn. Farther inland, oil drilling and timber logging threaten the state’s nature preserves. A fresh start may well mean building new towns altogether. There and across Canada one will find an archipelago of new Arctic melting pots.

在欧洲，北极房地产的淘金热已经开始，这主要是受到从非洲向北吹来的炎热撒哈拉沙漠的巨大阵风的推动。在2019年的漫长酷暑到来之前，一位西班牙气象学家宣布：“地狱即将来临”。德国勃兰登堡地区较长的旱季导致柏林发生野火和灰霾，莫斯科在热浪期间也出现类似的黑红色天空。斯堪的纳维亚房地产开发商热衷于向来自更南部的欧洲人提供夏季别墅。第一家宣布将在夏季建立北极前哨基地以重新安置员工的公司将需要人工智能扫描其收件箱中的所有简历。毕竟，夏天有二十多个小时的日照，有充足的时间工作和娱乐。

In Europe, the gold rush for Arctic real estate has already begun, driven not least by massive gusts of hot Saharan desert blasting north from Africa. Before the long heat spell of 2019 arrived, a Spanish meteorologist announced, “Hell is coming.” A longer dry season in Germany’s Brandenburg region has caused wildfires and ashen haze in Berlin, with similarly black-red skies during heat waves in Moscow as well. Scandinavian property developers keenly offer summer dachas to Europeans from farther south. The first company that announces it’s building an Arctic outpost to relocate its staff during the summer will need AI to scan through all the CVs flooding its inbox. After all, with twenty plus hours of daylight in the summer, there will be plenty of time for both work and play.

北极地区将承担新的使命。在那里将是在那里的原因：为人类建造一些以前只有自然的东西。就像十九世纪美国向西开拓的阿米什人或门诺派社区一样，小型公社将努力脱离电网生活，利用当地的供水和农业来减少对地平线之外难以驾驭的世界的依赖。北极对于寻求建立研究定居点的科学家、工程师、环保人士和金融家来说也很有吸引力。他们已经通过在 VR 中模拟架构并在无现金区块链合约中进行交易，在数字领域对社区进行编码。接下来，他们将从投资者那里筹集资金，并与政府谈判，授予他们殖民土地，以换取投资和从这些新企业中获得利益。这将是，

Arctic territories will take on a new purpose. To be there will be the reason to be there: to build something for humanity where before there was only nature. Like the Amish or Mennonite communities who pioneered westward in nineteenth-century America, small communes will strive to live off-grid, harnessing local water supplies and agriculture to reduce dependence on the unruly world beyond their horizon. The Arctic will also be tempting for scientists, engineers, environmentalists, and financiers seeking to establish research settlements. They’re already coding their community in the digital sphere through simulating architecture in VR and transacting in cashless blockchain contracts. Next they’ll raise funds from investors and negotiate with governments to grant them land to colonize in exchange for investment and access to the benefits from these new businesses. It will be, in the words of Balaji Srinivasan, “Cloud first, land last.”

人口更多的北极地区可能会类似于资源丰富的南美洲大陆，那里有土著人民、伊比利亚殖民者、非洲奴隶、逃离饥饿的欧洲人和亚洲人以及阿拉伯人。几个世纪以来，逃离内战的一切都形成了独特的环境。随着时间的推移，人们预计不仅会在北极看到欧洲人、俄罗斯人和北美人，还会看到叙利亚和印度农民、中国和土耳其工业工程师以及其他数十个国家的人种植树木、建造定居点和收获资源。还有什么地理环境比几个世纪以来一直是无国籍地区的荒芜的远北地区更能促进人类身份的新定位呢？

A more populous Arctic region may come to resemble the resource-rich continent of South America, where indigenous people, Iberian colonists, African slaves, Europeans and Asians escaping hunger, and Arabs fleeing civil war have all layered over the centuries into a unique milieu. Over time, one should expect to see in the Arctic not only Europeans, Russians, and North Americans, but Syrian and Indian farmers, Chinese and Turkish industrial engineers, and dozens of other nationalities planting trees, building settlements, and harvesting resources. What better geography to promote a new orientation for human identity than the barren far north, which for centuries was stateless terrain?

与此同时，资源开采、农产品加工业、房地产开发等方面的土地掠夺也将加速。随着冰层融化，因纽特人和萨米人在陆地和海洋上的生存已经岌岌可危。新的商业涌入可能会进一步迫使他们进入保留地，就像美国的美洲原住民和澳大利亚的原住民一样。鉴于近几十年来原住民获得了巨大的自治权，这对加拿大来说将是一个逆转。矿业公司、亿万富翁环保人士和原住民可能会在法庭上和实地争夺主权。

At the same time, the land grab for resource extraction, agro-industry, and real estate development will accelerate. The Inuit and Sami people already subsist precariously off the land and sea as the ice melts. A new commercial influx may further force them onto reservations, as was the case with Native Americans in the US and aboriginals in Australia. This would be a reversal for Canada given the significant autonomy the First Nations gained in recent decades. Mining companies, billionaire environmentalists, and indigenous peoples may battle in courts and on the ground over sovereignty.

北极地缘政治也可能进一步加剧已经变暖的北锥体。新的航线使北美、欧洲和亚洲能够避开苏伊士运河或马六甲海峡等传统瓶颈。与此同时，俄罗斯正在部署装甲破冰船和核潜艇，以在发现矿藏时宣示其领土主张。北极国家曾经对冰盖的主权主张存在争议，现在他们将在海底争论。鉴于北极蕴藏着丰厚的资源和贸易路线，也许海盗也会向北迁移。

Arctic geopolitics may also further heat up the already warming northern cone. New shipping routes allow North Americans, Europeans, and Asians to evade traditional bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal or Strait of Malacca. At the same time, Russia is deploying armored icebreakers and nuclear submarines to assert its territorial claims as mineral deposits are discovered. Where once Arctic states disputed claims on the ice sheet, now they’ll do so on the ocean floor. Given the lucrative resources and trade routes the Arctic represents, perhaps piracy will migrate north too.

中国对北极的兴趣也与日俱增，宣布其为“极地丝绸之路”。中国投资者试图购买冰岛和挪威的战略性土地，但北欧民主国家拒绝了不涉及全面地方控制和民主审查的提议。

China too has taken a growing interest in the Arctic, declaring it a “polar Silk Road.” Chinese investors have sought to buy strategic tracts of land in Iceland and Norway, but Nordic democracies have rebuffed offers that don’t involve full local control and democratic scrutiny.

综合这些趋势的一个情景表明，北半球贸易中心网络的崛起，最终可能有数亿人在其中流通。中世纪早期汉萨同盟的复兴——其成员跨越汉堡和塔林，包括圣彼得堡、雷克雅未克、希尔科内斯、阿伯丁、努克、丘吉尔和其他志同道合的转口港预示着一个未来，城邦国家及其商会将再次推动务实贸易大国之间重要的全球关系。

A scenario amalgamating these trends points to the rise of a network of northern hemispheric trading hubs across which hundreds of millions of people may eventually circulate. This revival of the early medieval Hanseatic League—with members spanning beyond Hamburg and Tallinn to include St. Petersburg, Reykjavik, Kirkenes, Aberdeen, Nuuk, Churchill, and other like-minded entrepôts—signals a future in which once again city states and their chambers of commerce drive vital global relations among pragmatic trading powers.

我们能否预先设计进入北极纬度的行动，以便我们轻装上阵，逐步准备好地形以吸收人口，同时又不破坏我们赖以生存的资源？或者我们会像过去其他地方那样带来贪婪的掠夺、瘟疫和地缘政治麻烦吗？如果我们不能解决北极问题，就没有其他选择了。

Can we pre-design our movements into the Arctic latitudes in such a way that we tread lightly, gradually preparing the terrain to absorb populations without destroying the resources on which we depend? Or will we bring rapacious extraction, pestilence, and geopolitical troubles as we have elsewhere in the past? If we don’t get the Arctic right, there won’t be any other options left.

明天的气候绿洲？

Tomorrow’s Climate Oases?

当今人口最多、最富有、最稳定的城市群包括伦敦、纽约、东京和上海。未来几十年哪些地区可能会成为更大的人口集群？随着人口迁移加速，这些新的区域和走廊可能会出现。

Today’s most populous, wealthy, and stable urban clusters include London, New York, Tokyo, and Shanghai. Which geographies could become ever-larger population clusters in the coming decades? These new zones and corridors are among those likely to emerge as population shifts accelerate.

四季皆宜的城市

Cities for all seasons

2004 年毁灭性的海啸吞没斯里兰卡海岸前大约一小时，象群迅速从海岸线撤退并跺脚在内陆地区。他们的第六感警告他们，地球的振动有些不对劲。与他们同行的看守人员也从汹涌的海墙中幸存下来。与此同时，数千名不知情的海滩游客被压死并被卷入大海。

About one hour before the devastating 2004 tsunami swallowed the shores of Sri Lanka, elephant herds briskly retreated from the coastline and stomped up-country. Their sixth sense warned them that something was amiss in the earth’s vibrations. The caretakers who marched with them also survived the surging oceanic wall. Meanwhile, thousands of unaware beachgoers were crushed to death and swept out to sea.

沉浸在现代科技中，人类已经失去了感知地球的能力。但当谈到气候变化时，我们不应该再感到惊讶。我们有公平的通知和科学模型告诉我们接下来会发生什么。我们可能失去了第六感，但我们可以利用技术辅助的自身免疫战斗或逃跑本能，在内陆和高地躲避大自然的愤怒。在未来的几十年里，如果我们想要在新的领域生存并抵御自然的冲击，我们就需要祖先将生存本能和开拓精神结合起来。

Immersed in modern technology, humans have lost their ability to feel the planet. But when it comes to climate change, we should no longer be taken by surprise. We have both fair notice and scientific models telling us what comes next. We may have lost our sixth sense, but we can use our technologically assisted autoimmune fight-or-flight instinct to run inland and upland from nature’s wrath. In the decades ahead, we’ll need our ancestors’ combination of survival instinct and pioneer spirit if we’re to inhabit new frontiers while rolling with nature’s punches.

如果最早的原始人类穿越到了现在，他们就有充分的理由相信自己生活在另一个星球上。在他们的时代，他们在地球上徘徊，只寻求季节的稳定。相比之下，今天我们在自然之上随意建造，修改它以满足我们的需要。但我们对自然的冷漠只会成为两个世纪的历史短暂。现在，大自然正在反击，迫使我们从久坐的生活方式恢复到游牧的方式。

If the earliest proto-humans time traveled to the present, they’d have good reason to believe they were on another planet. In their times, they wandered the Earth seeking only seasonal stability. Today, by contrast, we’ve built at will on top of nature, modifying it to suit our needs. But our indifference to nature will only have been a two-century-long blip of history. Now nature is fighting back, forcing us to revert from sedentary to nomadic ways.

气候敏感性已经迫使鲸鱼、北极熊、海龟和蝴蝶改变它们的迁徙模式。两种特殊的鸟类通过改变季节目的地而维持了庞大的种群数量：北极燕鸥（Sterna paradisaea），从一极迁徙到另一极（格陵兰岛到南极洲），以及短尾海鸥（Ardenna tenuirostris），从澳大利亚的北极迁徙。塔斯马尼亚岛到俄罗斯堪察加半岛，然后到阿拉斯加的阿留申群岛，然后返回。当所有物种都受到威胁时，它们因为迁徙而继续生存。人类也非常习惯季节性迁徙，无论是在美国和墨西哥工作的农民，穿梭于落基山脉和阿尔卑斯山之间的滑雪教练，将蒙古包从高原搬到首都的蒙古人，还是在城市顶层公寓、郊区别墅和度假胜地之间轮换的富人。

Climate sensitivity has already forced whales, polar bears, sea turtles, and butterflies to alter their migration patterns. Two particular species of birds have maintained large populations by changing their seasonal destinations: the Arctic tern (Sterna paradisaea), which migrates from pole to pole (Greenland to Antarctica), and the short-tailed shearwater (Ardenna tenuirostris), which migrates from Australia’s Tasmania Island to Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula, then to Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and back. At a time when all species are threatened, they continue to survive because they move. Humans too are quite accustomed to seasonal migrations, whether farmers working in the US and Mexico, ski instructors shuttling between the Rockies and the Alps, Mongolians shifting their yurts from the high plains into the capital, or the wealthy who rotate between urban penthouses, suburban villas, and holiday properties.

量子人的世界中的栖息地是什么样的？答案不是传统的房地产项目，传统的房地产项目需要十年时间才能完成，使用的设计在入住时已经过时。我们已经拥有加热和冷却、水净化和能源存储等技术，可以使任何地形（沙漠、山区、森林或苔原）变得适合居住。我们将需要它们来应对移动的生活。当我们可以部署模块化 3D 打印多用途移动公寓和便携式聚光太阳能发电机时，为什么还要继续建造多余的高层建筑和带有裸露电缆的钢塔呢？

What do habitats look like in a world of quantum people? The answer is not traditional real estate projects that take a decade to complete using designs that are out of date by the time of occupancy. We already have the technologies—heating and cooling, water purification, and energy storage—to make any terrain—desert, mountain, forest, or tundra—habitable. We are going to need them to cope with life on the move. Why should we continue to erect redundant high-rises and steel towers carrying exposed electricity cables when we can instead deploy modular 3D-printed multipurpose mobile tenements and portable concentrated solar power generators?

以孟加拉国的气候移民为例。该国绝大多数地区几乎不高于海平面，旋风和洪水经常导致该国近 1.7 亿人口中的三分之一以上流离失所。总统谢赫·哈西娜表示：“人们正在感到绝望。” 因此，他们带着太阳能电池板、手机、水过滤系统、孩子和衣服搬家。

Consider the climate migrants of Bangladesh. The vast majority of the country lies barely above sea level, and cyclones and flooding regularly displace more than one-third of its nearly 170 million people. President Sheikh Hasina says, “A sense of hopelessness is gripping the population.” And so they move—with solar panels, mobile phones, water filtration systems, and their children and clothing.

但大量人口迁移到相对未受破坏的地区可能会造成更多的人为破坏。解决方案是可持续建设——无论我们走到哪里，都随身携带我们的基础设施。我们可以预先做好准备，而不是施加沉重的城市足迹-设计便携式和独立的定居点，这些定居点不会固定在地面上，而是根据土壤条件移动。研究网络 AudaCities 推出了“移动村庄”原型，其中水净化、水培食品设备和其他必需品被内置到移动房屋和其他设施中。自给自足的城镇可以有水塔来储存雨水、海水淡化和大气发生器；太阳能发电中心和家庭电池更换站；以及食品堆肥、污水处理和材料回收中心。为了帮助恢复湿地和农业，欧洲拆除了数千座水坝，在他们那个时代是必不可少的，但已年久失修。美国越快向太阳能、核能和风能转型，就能越快实现同样的目标。

But large population movements into relatively unspoiled geographies bring the potential for yet more human-inflicted damage. The solution is to build sustainably—and take our infrastructure with us wherever we go. Rather than impose a heavy urban footprint, we can pre-design portable and self-contained settlements that don’t anchor into the ground but shift according to soil conditions. The research network AudaCities has launched a “Movable Village” prototype in which water purification, hydroponic food equipment, and other essentials are built into mobile homes and other facilities. Self-contained towns could have water towers that store water from rain, desalination, and atmospheric generators; solar power centers and battery swap-out stations for homes; and food composting, sewage treatment, and materials recycling centers. Helping to restore both wetlands and agriculture, Europe has dismantled thousands of dams that were essential in their day but have fallen into disrepair. The faster the US transitions to solar, nuclear, and wind power, the faster it can do the same.

对于仅季节性可行的地点，可以存在临时城市。约旦的扎塔尔难民营是一个脱离电网的村庄，有多户家庭大小的帐篷、医疗诊所、太阳能发电站、海水淡化设施、学校、就业安置中心和其他服务，为八万名难民提供服务，其中大部分是叙利亚难民。它是“营地”还是半永久性城市？另一个例子是印度的大壶节，这是印度教宗教节日，每十二年举行一次，在四个圣城轮流举行。超过 700万人居住在节日场地，其中超过100整个季节的访问量达 100 万人次。竹子、塑料、轻金属和织物等材料用于组装和完全拆卸全套基础设施，从电力和安全摄像头到供水和污水处理。用哈佛设计学院教授拉胡尔·梅赫罗特拉（Rahul Mehrotra）的话说，这个曼哈顿大小的场地是一座“短暂的巨型城市”，但它的功能比许多印度城市还要多。城市化应该被视为一种“弹性条件”，在需要的地方聚集，而不是废弃的购物中心和体育场的腐朽的永久性。正如梅赫罗特拉所说：“当变化是唯一不变的时候，为什么还要痴迷于永恒呢？” ³

For locations that are only seasonally viable, there can be pop-up cities. The Zaatar refugee camp in Jordan is an off-grid village of multi-family-size tents, medical clinics, solar power stations, water desalination facilities, schools, job placement centers, and other services for eighty thousand mostly Syrian refugees. Is it a “camp” or a semi-permanent city? Another example is India’s Kumbh Mela, the Hindu religious festival taking place every twelve years that rotates among four holy cities. More than 7 million people reside on the festival grounds, with more than 100 million visiting over the course of the season. Materials such as bamboo, plastics, light metals, and fabrics are used to assemble—and completely disassemble—the full suite of infrastructures, from electricity and security cameras to water supply and sewage. This Manhattan-size site is an “ephemeral mega-city” in the words of Harvard Design School professor Rahul Mehrotra—yet it has more functionality than many Indian cities. Urbanism should be thought of as an “elastic condition,” assembled as and where needed, rather than the decaying permanence of abandoned shopping malls and stadiums. As Mehrotra says, “Why be obsessed with permanence when change is the only constant?”³

梅赫罗特拉的见解对于富裕国家和贫穷国家同样有效。具有讽刺意味的是，尽管我们大大高估了未来的世界人口，但我们却低估了对基础设施的需求，无论是电力还是住房。20 世纪 50 年代到 2000 年代，战后饱受摧残的西欧、超级大国美国（想想州际公路系统）和蓬勃发展的亚洲（首先是日本和“四小龙”经济体，其次是中国和印度）见证了基础设施的持续繁荣。远超 100万亿美元美元被花在高速公路和铁路、管道和电网、机场和办公室、学校和医院上——所有这些都是现代文明的标志。与此同时，大多数发展中国家从来没有足够的基础设施，特别是从令人兴奋的后殖民时期的 20 世纪 50 年代到 2000 年代，这些国家的人口增长了两倍。不管怎样，对于大多数人来说就世界而言，这还不够，因为无论我们在哪里建造任何东西，都需要不断地进行维修和升级，部署互联网电缆等新技术，并适应不断增长的人口。

Mehrotra’s insights are just as valid for the rich world as the poor. Ironically, even though we’ve massively overestimated the future world population, we’ve underestimated our demand for infrastructure, whether electricity or housing. The 1950s through 2000s witnessed a continuous infrastructure boom across devastated postwar Western Europe, superpower America (think of the interstate highway system), and surging Asia (first Japan and the “Tiger” economies, followed by China and India). Well over $100 trillion dollars have been spent on highways and railways, pipelines and electricity grids, airports and offices, schools and hospitals—all the hallmarks of modern civilization. At the same time, most developing countries never had adequate infrastructure, especially as their populations tripled from the heady postcolonial 1950s through the 2000s. Either way, for most of the world, it hasn’t been enough, because wherever we build anything, there is a constant need to repair and upgrade, deploy new technologies like Internet cables, and accommodate growing populations.

然而，由于气候变化、替代能源和人口迁移，从海滨房地产到短路电网，我们的许多基础设施正在变得毫无价值。这些“搁浅资产”现在代表着政府和僵尸公司持有的数万亿债务。就像过去的文明由于干旱或其他灾难而放弃了高耸的纪念碑一样，我们当前文明模式的废墟包括体现民族自我的摩天大楼。但这些并不是人类在未来以移动为导向的基础设施中所需要的。阿拉伯海湾国家再也负担不起；中国已禁止建造五百米以上的建筑。

Yet from beachfront real estate to short-circuited power grids, so much of our infrastructure is being rendered worthless due to climate change, alternative energy, and population shifts. These “stranded assets” now represent trillions in debt held by governments and zombie companies alike. Much as civilizations of the past abandoned their towering monuments due to drought or other calamity, the detritus of our current civilizational model includes skyscrapers that embody the national ego. But these are not the infrastructures mankind needs in a future oriented around mobility. Arab Gulf states can no longer afford them; China has banned buildings taller than five hundred meters.

我们必须建造能够适应自然变化的建筑，而不是指向天空的建筑阳具。不断重复利用现有基础设施有很好的先例：我们首先用来建造建筑物的建筑起重机。十年前，在全球建设的高峰期，估计有十万台起重机挤满了上海、利雅得、悉尼和其他城市的地平线。西雅图的新建工程比纽约或洛杉矶更加活跃。作为 2010 年代中期的孩子，我女儿在新加坡、迪拜和柏林度过的第一个想法是“建筑正在接管 wooorrrlldd！！” 但一旦城市建成，起重机就会被拆除，装上平板卡车，然后运到世界各地需要它们的其他城市。我们现在应该计划对建筑物本身做同样的事情。正如谷歌“登月”项目负责人 Astro Teller 所说，“我们可能需要自动驾驶建筑和自动驾驶汽车。”

Instead of architectural phalluses pointing at the heavens, we must build structures that can adapt to nature’s whims. There is good precedent for constantly reusing existing infrastructure: the construction cranes we use to erect buildings in the first place. At the peak of global construction a decade ago, an estimated one hundred thousand cranes crowded the horizon of Shanghai, Riyadh, Sydney, and other cities. Seattle has been more active in new construction than either New York or Los Angeles. One of my daughter’s first musings as a mid-2010s child spending time in Singapore, Dubai, and Berlin was “Construction is taking over the wooorrlldd!!” But once a city is built up, the cranes are dismantled, put on flatbed trucks, and shipped to other cities around the world where they’re needed. We should now plan to do the same with buildings themselves. As Google’s “moonshot” captain Astro Teller has put it, “We might need self-driving buildings as well as self-driving cars.”

与软件或人工智能方面的任何突破一样，当今最需要的是人类令人印象深刻的地形工程能力。荷兰等沿海小国在应对极端情况的规划中犯错的可能性最小。自 1953 年大洪水以来，荷兰人建立了庞大的海上屏障网络，泵站、堤坝和其他可调节的基础设施，以管理北海和莱茵河的洪水。虽然大规模的土地开垦扩大了国家的面积，但它也将整个地区指定为洪泛区，以拯救阿姆斯特丹、鹿特丹和海牙。其他国家已指定公园在洪水期间充当湿地，并正在部署渗透性沥青，将水膨胀引导至含水层。哥本哈根计划建造一座名为 Lynette Holmen 的住宅岛，岛上的山丘可以阻挡海岸潮汐，同时解决气候变化和住房短缺问题。但我们永远不能对我们的计划过于确定：即使我们可能看不到海洋上升，它的侵蚀将地下淡水推到我们的土壤和街道上：从下面的洪水。也许这就是为什么丹麦建筑师 Bjarke Ingels 提议建造一组随海而升的相互连接的漂浮城市岛屿。^我

As much as any breakthrough in software or artificial intelligence, it’s mankind’s impressive capacity for topographical engineering that is most needed today. Small coastal countries such as the Netherlands have the slimmest margin for error in planning for extreme scenarios. Since the Great Flood of 1953, the Dutch have built a vast network of sea barriers, pump stations, levees, and other adjustable infrastructures to manage flooding from the North Sea and the Rhine. While extensive land reclamation has expanded the country’s size, it has also designated entire zones as flood basins to save Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. Other countries have designated parks to serve as wetlands during flooding, and are deploying permeable asphalt to redirect water swells into aquifers. Copenhagen plans to build a residential island called Lynette Holmen with hills that block coastal surges, tackling climate change and housing shortages at the same time. But we can never be too certain of our schemes: Even though we may not see the ocean rising, its encroachment pushes underground freshwater up through our soil and streets: inundation from below. Perhaps that’s why Danish architect Bjarke Ingels has proposed constructing a set of interlinked floating city-islands that rise with the sea.^I

地球表面90%以上无人居住。我们能否从全球大量人口集中的脆弱沿海大城市中撤离？当我第一次寻找去城市化的案例时，发现的案例非常少，而且规模也非常有限。但既然我们可以在不牺牲全球连通性的情况下居住在更小、更自给自足的社区，这种情况就更合理了。当我们开始计划重新安置人口时，我们应该将他们安置在更远的内陆和更高的海拔地区，最好是靠近农业区，以避免依赖遥远的粮食供应。例如，苏黎世郊区拥有众多城镇，农业、木工、3D 打印精密机械、计算机建模以及其他高科技和低技术产业在清洁的空气、淡水、噪音污染低——所有这些都通过铁路连接到瑞士及其他地区的主要城市。对于大量人口，我们将安装长距离水渠或管道，以及核动力海水淡化厂和废水处理设施。甚至拥有 3 至 500 万人口的城市可以在不破坏周围生态区的情况下利用它们。

More than 90 percent of the Earth’s territorial surface has no inhabitants. Can we disperse from the vulnerable coastal megacities in which so much of the global population has concentrated? When I first searched for cases of de-urbanization, I found very few and at very limited scale. But now that we can inhabit smaller and more self-sufficient communities without sacrificing global connectivity, it’s far more plausible a scenario. As we begin to plan to resettle populations, we should locate them farther inland and at higher elevations, and ideally near agriculture to avoid dependence on far-flung food supplies. The outskirts of Zurich, for example, feature numerous towns where agriculture, woodwork, 3D-printed precision machinery, computer modeling, and other both high- and low-tech industries thrive side by side amid clean air, freshwater, and low noise pollution—all connected by railways to major cities in Switzerland and beyond. For large populations, we would install long-distance water canals or pipes, and nuclear-powered desalination plants and wastewater treatment facilities. Even cities of 3–5 million people can leverage their surrounding ecoregions without destroying them.

我。让我们希望它们比游轮更环保，游轮每位乘客排放的碳比汽车或飞机更多，同时向海洋倾倒无数吨废物。

I. Let us hope they’re more eco-friendly than cruise ships, which emit more carbon per passenger than cars or planes, while dumping countless tons of waste into the oceans.

第 8 章“南方”会幸存吗？

CHAPTER 8 WILL “THE SOUTH” SURVIVE?

国家衰败，人民离去

Decaying states, departing people

我第一次有意识地注意到游手好闲的年轻人的堕落是在我大约十二岁的时候，去印度人口最多的省份北方邦（俗称“UP”）探亲时。我们骑着滑板车到处走走——勒克瑙（北方邦首府）、坎普尔（我污染严重的出生地）和瓦拉纳西（印度教圣城）——孩子们在路边、商店前、小巷里或恒河岸上闲逛。河。就好像他们在等待一些有意义的事情降临到他们身上。现在还没有。北方邦拥有超过 2 亿人口，如今的人口数量是中国人口最多的省份广东省（位于中国南部）的两倍。然而，广东省的人均收入约为 5,500 美元，而 UP 居民的年收入约为 900 美元，不到印度全国平均水平的一半。

The first time I consciously noticed the depravity of idle youth was when I was about twelve years old visiting relatives in Uttar Pradesh (widely known as “UP”), India’s most populous province. Everywhere we scootered around—Lucknow (UP’s capital), Kanpur (my hyper-polluted birthplace), and Varanasi (Hinduism’s holy city)—kids loitered on the roadside, in front of shops, in their alleyways, or on the banks of the Ganges River. It was as if they were waiting for something meaningful to come to them. It still hasn’t. With more than 200 million people, UP today has twice as many people as China’s most populous province of Guangdong (in southern China). However, while the per capita income of Guangdong is roughly $5,500, UP’s residents earn about $900 per year, less than half of India’s national average.

许多阿拉伯青年的情况也好不到哪儿去。20世纪90年代，欧洲国家承诺向北非的阿拉伯社会投资和外包更多工作。在 9/11 事件刚刚发生后，不少专家提请人们关注遭受专制独裁统治的阿拉伯公民所面临的绝望；花在发表有关阿拉伯“青年激增”的报告上的钱比采取任何行动都多。美国随后花费数万亿美元入侵伊拉克和阿富汗，同时还发起与阿拉伯生活无关的公关活动。

Many Arab youth have not fared much better. In the 1990s, European countries promised to invest and outsource more work to the Arab societies of North Africa. In the immediate post-9/11 landscape, no shortage of experts drew attention to the despair facing Arab citizens suffering under arbitrary dictatorships; more money was spent on publishing reports about the Arab “youth bulge” than doing anything about it. The US went on to spend trillions of dollars invading Iraq and Afghanistan, while also launching PR campaigns irrelevant to Arab life.

2000 年代中期，我开始周游世界各地。阿拉伯世界研究我的第一本书，从摩洛哥和利比亚到叙利亚和伊拉克。我和数百位与我同龄的人进行了交谈，他们都是二十多岁的人，几乎没有什么职业机会。那些到了会开车的年龄的人会忙着各种零工。年幼的孩子经常坐在一起嗅胶水。2011 年的“阿拉伯之春”起义似乎不可避免。

It was in the mid-2000s that I began traveling extensively around the Arab world to research my first book, from Morocco and Libya to Syria and Iraq. I talked to hundreds of people my own age, twenty-somethings who had little professional opportunity. Those old enough to drive a car would hustle various odd jobs; younger kids often just sat around sniffing glue. The “Arab Spring” revolts of 2011 seemed inevitable.

自“青年激增”报告发布二十年后，许多阿拉伯国家的状况比当时更糟——而年轻人在成长过程中既没有受过有用的教育，也没有找到工作。与此同时，欧洲人可以让机器人做一些琐碎的工作，专注于向亚洲出口，并阻止任何阿拉伯人的船只或木筏安全穿越地中海。阿拉伯人只能靠自己。阿拉伯青年调查中的绝大多数受访者仍然将工作和生活成本列为他们最关心的问题。阿拉伯青年失业率高达 30%，为世界最高，其中包括大学毕业生。¹青年边缘化不是一个插曲，而是一个永久性的状况——他们移民的愿望也是如此。

Two decades on from the “youth bulge” reports, many Arab countries are in worse shape than they were then—while the youth have grown up with neither useful education nor jobs. Meanwhile, Europeans can have robots do their menial work and focus on exporting to Asia—and blocking any boats or rafts of Arabs from making it safely across the Mediterranean. Arabs are on their own. The vast majority of respondents in the Arab Youth Survey still rank jobs and the cost of living as their top concerns. Arab youth unemployment stands at 30 percent, the highest in the world, including university graduates.¹ Youth marginalization is not an episode but a permanent condition—as is their desire to emigrate.

阿拉伯人在很大程度上共享语言和宗教，并且在过去千年的大部分时间里都在共同的哈里发和奥斯曼帝国的统治下度过。尽管它们在现代被划分为有边界的国家，但它们从后殖民民族主义陷入混乱内爆的过程几乎是无国界的。在我为驻伊拉克的美国特种作战部队提供咨询期间，我们每天都会看到突尼斯人、约旦人和其他心怀不满的年轻人从该地区涌入。伊拉克叛乱和叙利亚内战中出现的激进“伊斯兰国一代”最初由心怀不满的伊拉克复兴党和沙特瓦哈比支持的伊斯兰主义者组成，但经济匮乏使数千人更容易受到激进分子的诱惑，这些激进分子承诺在解放后的土地上提供性奴隶。异教徒（美国）职业和来世的处女。

Arabs largely share language and religion, and have spent most of the past thousand years under shared caliphates and the Ottoman empire. Despite their modern division into bordered nations, their descent from postcolonial nationalism into chaotic implosion has been nearly borderless. During my time advising US Special Operations Forces in Iraq, we watched daily as Tunisians, Jordanians, and other disaffected young men streamed in from across the region. The radicalized “ISIS generation” that emerged out of the Iraqi insurgency and Syrian civil war was originally composed of disaffected Iraqi Baathists and Saudi Wahhabi-backed Islamists, but economic deprivation made thousands more vulnerable to seduction by radicals who promised sex slaves in lands liberated from infidel (American) occupation and virgins in the afterlife. Now those conscripts have become the “jihad diaspora” of disgruntled fighters conducting attacks worldwide.

阿拉伯地区失败国家的最大希望是效仿摩洛哥的模式，通过投资村庄太阳能、高速铁路、海水淡化，让年轻人保持有酬就业。植物、农业振兴和植树造林。由于大多数阿拉伯青年无法跨越地中海，他们应该被部署到过去两代人大多忽视的国家建设中。否则，他们只会前往海湾地区——尤其是阿联酋。长期以来，阿拉伯人才套利一直存在，即一个国家的灭亡导致另一个国家的崛起。1975年至1990年持续的黎巴嫩内战导致精通多种语言的专业人员大量外流；如今，散居海外的黎巴嫩人数量是黎巴嫩境内的两倍。当您走进阿联酋的政府会议时，很可能会有一位黎巴嫩银行家也在场。

The best hope for the Arab region’s failed states is to follow the model of Morocco, which has kept youth gainfully employed by investing in solar power for villages, high-speed railways, water desalination plants, agricultural revitalization, and tree planting. Since most Arab youth won’t make it across the Mediterranean, they ought to be deployed toward this kind of nation-building that the past two generations mostly ignored. Otherwise, they’ll just head to the Gulf—especially the UAE. There has long been a fluid Arab talent arbitrage whereby one country’s demise enables another’s rise. The Lebanese civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990 led to an exodus of savvy multilingual professionals; today there are twice as many Lebanese in the diaspora as in Lebanon. When you walk into a government meeting in the UAE, most likely a Lebanese banker will be in the room as well.

黎巴嫩人、埃及人和其他穷困潦倒的阿拉伯人也最终来到了石油资源丰富的海湾王国：沙特阿拉伯，该国在经济上支撑着他们的国家。但油价正在暴跌，目前对其服务的需求有限。千禧一代王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼启动了宏伟计划，旨在重塑利雅得，并在红海沿岸建造价值数十亿美元的度假村和娱乐中心。为了迎合 80% 40 岁以下人口的需求，他还推动社会改革，包括赋予妇女更大的驾驶、旅行和离婚权利。如果他的计划成功，那么下一代约旦人、埃及人和黎巴嫩人将涌入酒店业。他们甚至可能重建失去的联系，例如奥斯曼时代的汉志铁路，该铁路将伊斯坦布尔穿过黎凡特与伊斯兰教圣地麦加和麦地那连接起来。这是阿拉伯复兴的乐观前景。

Lebanese, Egyptians, and other down-and-out Arabs have also wound up in the oil-rich Gulf kingdom that has financially propped up their nations: Saudi Arabia. But oil prices are collapsing and the need for their services is limited, for now. The millennial Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has launched grand schemes to reinvent Riyadh and erect multibillion-dollar resorts and entertainment complexes on the Red Sea coast. Catering to the 80 percent of the population that’s under the age of forty, he has also pushed social reforms, including greater women’s rights, to drive, travel, and divorce. If his plans succeed, then another generation of Jordanians, Egyptians, and Lebanese will pour into the hospitality industry. They may even rebuild lost connections such as the Ottoman-era Hejaz Railway that linked Istanbul through the Levant to Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina. This is the optimistic scenario for an Arab renaissance.

但如果海湾国家未能自我改造，富有的沙特人和阿联酋人将前往欧洲，而较贫穷的阿拉伯人将返回（或留在）国内，并走上街头。从阿尔及尔到贝鲁特再到巴格达，在酝酿已久的叛乱中，年轻人明智地学会了放弃宗派分歧，团结起来对抗腐败的统治阶级。事实上，在包括沙特阿拉伯在内的整个阿拉伯地区，越来越多的年轻穆斯林正在放弃伊斯兰教，变得无宗教信仰，甚至成为无神论者。²像西方大多数年轻基督徒一样，他们有宗教信仰名义上多于行动。年轻的阿拉伯人也对宗教领袖和伊斯兰政党严重失去了信心。2019 年《阿拉伯新闻》的一项调查显示，大多数伊拉克人和黎巴嫩人对宗教在政治中扮演的过大角色感到不满，并支持专注于经济政策的政府。他们将宗教视为个人偏好而不是政治监狱。他们不想等到来世才获得尊严。

But if the Gulf countries fail to reinvent themselves, the rich Saudis and Emiratis will head to Europe while the poorer Arabs will go back (or stay at) home—and take to the streets. In the simmering revolts from Algiers to Beirut to Baghdad, youth have wisely learned to abandon sectarian divides and take on the corrupt ruling class as a united generation. In fact, across the Arab region—including Saudi Arabia—a rising number of young Muslims are abandoning Islam and becoming non-religious and even atheist.² Like most young Christians in the West, they’re religious more in name than deed. Young Arabs have also dramatically lost faith in religious leaders and Islamist parties. A 2019 Arab News survey showed that most Iraqis and Lebanese resent the outsize role of religion in their politics and favor governments that focus on economic policy. They see religion as a personal preference rather than a political prison. They don’t want to wait until the afterlife for dignity.

阿拉伯政府用他们最了解的反应来应对抵抗：镇压。从 2011 年的阿拉伯之春到 2019 年的报复，各国政权显然没有吸取一个教训：不要篡改互联网。2011年，从穆巴拉克政权切断涌入解放广场的群众的互联网接入到他三十年铁腕统治的结束，仅用了三周时间。2019 年底，黎巴嫩政府提议对数字消息服务征税。“WhatsApp 税”的消息一传开，黎巴嫩年轻人就把沙发停在贝鲁特市中心，让整个城市陷入瘫痪。他们甚至形成了一条170公里长的人链，从的黎波里一直延伸到提尔。该税从未生效。相反，部长们被迫大幅减薪。

Arab governments have responded to resistance with the reflex they know best: repression. One lesson regimes clearly did not learn between the Arab Spring of 2011 and its reprisal in 2019: Don’t tamper with the Internet. In 2011, it took only three weeks from when Mubarak’s regime cut off Internet access to the masses flooding Tahrir Square and when his three decades of iron-fisted rule were brought to an end. In late 2019, the Lebanese government proposed a tax on digital messaging services. As soon as word of the “WhatsApp tax” spread, Lebanese youth parked couches in downtown Beirut and ground the city to a halt. They even formed a 170-kilometer human chain stretching the length of the country from Tripoli to Tyre. The tax never came into effect. Instead, ministers were forced to take a big salary cut.

没有一个阿拉伯国家比也门面临着更严峻的形势，也门的内战已成为世界上最严重的人道主义灾难，而其 3000 万人民却缺水。也门人很快就会涌入他们的折磨者沙特阿拉伯，并已经开始乘木筏越过红海逃往非洲，前往苏丹和埃及。但埃及同时是一颗政治、经济和环境定时炸弹，是一个处于崩溃边缘的文明。尼罗河本身就是埃及社会状况的最佳隐喻：当该国的农业命脉到达地中海三角洲时，这里已经变成了一片沼泽。埃及已经从棉花大国变成了严重缺水，以至于其珍贵的产业正在消失。很快，随着船只走欧洲和亚洲之间更凉爽、更快捷的北极航线，以及横贯欧亚大陆的货运列车，苏伊士运河将失去意义。该国的结婚率已经在下降（因为男人负担不起），而离婚率却在上升。鼓励男性在婚前购买赡养费保险，因为如果离婚，他们必须将收入的 40% 支付给前妻。不用说，这降低了他们第二次婚姻的前景。

No Arab country faces more dire circumstances than Yemen, whose civil war has become the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, all while its 30 million people run out of water. Yemenis will soon flood into their tormentor Saudi Arabia, and have already begun to flee on rafts across the Red Sea to Africa, toward Sudan and Egypt. But Egypt is a political, economic, and environmental time bomb all at once, a civilization on the precipice of collapse. The Nile River itself is the best metaphor for the state of Egyptian society: By the time the country’s agricultural lifeblood reaches the Mediterranean delta, it’s a swamp. Egypt has gone from cotton titan to having such severe water shortages that its prized industry is disappearing. Soon the Suez Canal will lose relevance as ships take the cooler and faster Arctic route between Europe and Asia and freight trains crisscross Eurasia. Already the country’s marriage rate is falling (because men can’t afford it) while the divorce rate is rising. Men are encouraged to get alimony insurance before marriage since in the event of divorce, they’ll have to pay 40 percent of their incomes to their ex-wives. Needless to say, this diminishes their prospects for a second marriage.

埃及长期以来一直认为自己是尼罗河的真正守护者，但事实上，埃及和苏丹（另一个拥有近 5000 万人口的军事控制国家）从尼罗河获得的水几乎 90% 都来自埃塞俄比亚，该国正在建设一座大型水电站大坝尼罗河上游的发电项目，旨在为其近 1.1 亿人口快速增长的经济提供电力。未来几年，埃及、苏丹和埃塞俄比亚要想生存下去，很多事情都必须顺利进行：跨境电力和水共享、高效灌溉和海水淡化、遏制腐败以及为数千万无精打采的人创造就业机会青年。既然希望不是一种策略，那么更安全的赌注是，这一不安分的一代人中的许多人将离开非洲，成为每个人的问题。

Egypt has long considered itself the true guardian of the Nile, but in fact almost 90 percent of the water it and Sudan (another military-controlled state of nearly 50 million) receive from the Nile originates in Ethiopia, which is constructing a grand hydropower dam on the upper Nile to boost electricity generation for its fast-growing economy of nearly 110 million people. A lot of things have to go right in the coming years for Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to survive: cross-border power and water sharing, efficient irrigation and desalination, the curbing of corruption and the creation of jobs for tens of millions of listless youth. Since hope is not a strategy, it’s a safer bet that many of this restless generation will disperse out of Africa, becoming everyone’s problem.

与埃及一样，伊朗是一个充满活力的年轻社会，对未来没有任何有意义的战略。自伊斯兰革命以来的四十年里，才华横溢的伊朗人一直背井离乡前往迪拜、伦敦和洛杉矶，由于面临任意逮捕的风险，大多数人再也没有回来过，甚至没有去看望家人。在这弄巧成拙的孤立的第五个十年里，伊朗不仅面临着更严厉的制裁和低油价，而且还面临着该国腐败的神权政治和停滞的经济所窒息的绝大多数年轻人口。自 2009 年“绿色运动”以来，起义虽然零星，但规模相当大。2014 年，我在德黑兰骑车一周，会见了数十位伊朗权势人物，之后，我将他们称为“Just Do It”一代，因为他们勇敢无畏，并且克服重重困难，进口并修复电子产品。现在他们呼吁“madaniyya是公民的重生，其词根meydan的意思是公共广场。乌克兰2004年的“橙色革命”以基辅的meydan （公园）为中心，伊朗政权击落了一架飞往基辅的乌克兰航空航班后2020年初的基辅，伊朗年轻人将基辅精神带到了德黑兰街头。但每次他们从另一次徒劳的抗议中回家时，就会有更多人策划逃跑。

Like Egypt, Iran represents a teeming young society with no meaningful strategy for the future. For forty years since the Islamic revolution, talented Iranians have been ditching home for Dubai, London, and Los Angeles, with most never returning, even to visit family, due to the risk of arbitrary arrest. In this fifth decade of self-defeating isolation, Iran faces not only tighter sanctions and low oil prices, but an overwhelmingly young population stifled by the country’s corrupt theocracy and stagnant economy. Uprisings have been sporadic but sizable since the 2009 “Green Movement.” After a week scootering around Tehran and meeting dozens of Iranian movers and shakers in 2014, I crowned them the “Just Do It” generation for their brave pluckiness and knack for getting gadgets imported and fixed despite all obstacles. Now they’re calling for “madaniyya,” a civic rebirth, taking the root word meydan that means public square. Ukraine’s 2004 “Orange Revolution” centered on the meydan (parks) in Kiev, and after the Iranian regime shot down a Ukrainian Air flight bound for Kiev in early 2020, Iran’s youth have imported the spirit of Kiev to the streets of Tehran. But each time they return home from another futile protest, ever more plot their escape.

非洲人被困在旅途中

Africans trapped on the go

非洲是罗马俱乐部 1972 年信息没有到达的大陆。它体现了人口增长如何成为一件好事，但也可能成为最糟糕的事情。它的人口规模已经远远超出了经济需要，并将其推入了无法治理和生态危机的深渊。非洲需要更高的生产力，而不是更多它无力承担的人口。现在的问题是：如何处置非洲大陆 60% 24 岁或以下的人口？

Africa is the continent that the Club of Rome’s 1972 message did not reach. It embodies how a growing population can be a great thing—until it’s the worst thing. Its population size has expanded well beyond economic necessity and pushed it deep into ungovernability and ecological crisis. Africa needs more productivity, not more people it can’t afford. The question now is: What to do with the 60 percent of the continent’s population that’s aged twenty-four or younger?

在过去的三十年里，非洲的粮食和矿产资源与全球经济的联系越来越紧密，这使得许多人预测二十一世纪可能属于非洲。但所有推动非洲人口增长的趋势都无法保证非洲的长寿。中国和印度正在实现大宗商品进口多元化，这使得非洲作为供应国的重要性降低，但随着石油和矿产价格下跌，非洲国家可能无法偿还债务，被迫放弃油田和矿山作为抵押品。从吉布提到尼日尔，当中国发出召唤时，欠中国债最多的国家可能会陷入内战。欧洲移民危机部分是中国造成的他们的项目正在取代社区并改变河流系统以种植出口粮食，驱使非洲人向北迁移。但尽管欧洲对未来的移民关闭了大门，但尽管欧洲对非洲的宏伟支持战略进行了多次迭代，但欧洲的投资仍然停滞不前。

Over the past thirty years, Africa’s food and mineral resources have become much more connected to the global economy, leading many to predict that the twenty-first century could belong to Africa. But none of the trends that elevated Africa has guaranteed longevity. China and India are diversifying their commodities imports, making Africa less relevant as a supplier—yet as oil and mineral prices sink, African nations may fail to make debt payments and be forced to give up their oil fields and mines as collateral. From Djibouti to Niger, the countries most indebted to China may be in civil war when China comes calling. The European migrant crisis is partially made in China, whose projects are displacing communities and altering river systems to grow food for export, driving Africans northward. But European investment—despite various iterations of a grand African support strategy—is stagnating even as Europe closes itself off to future migrants.

但无论如何，移民们还是尽力了。数以亿计的非洲青年生活在贫困之中，³，尤其是来自刚果和尼日尔等中非国家的青年已向北逃往利比亚，在那里，困扰该国的民兵通过允许暴徒和海盗敲诈勒索和让那些寻求饥饿的人挨饿而获利。横渡地中海。许多人都没能成功：在地中海溺水身亡的非洲人（自 2014 年以来已有近两万人）远多于穿越墨西哥沙漠到达格兰德河时因中暑而死亡的拉丁美洲人。非洲大陆急剧的人口增长和环境压力导致人们从道德上呼吁更加开放地向欧洲移民，但北半球的回应是：呆在家里，少生孩子。

But the migrants have tried their best to come anyway. Hundreds of millions of African youth live in poverty,³ and especially those from central African states such as Congo and Niger have fled northward to Libya, where the same militias that plague the country profit from allowing thugs and pirates to extort and starve those seeking to cross the Mediterranean. Many never make it: Far more Africans (nearly twenty thousand since 2014) have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea than Latinos perishing from heat exhaustion crossing the Mexican desert to reach the Rio Grande. The continent’s rampant population growth and environmental stress have led to ethical pleas for more open migration to Europe, but the northern hemisphere’s reply has been: Stay home and have fewer children.

非洲人口最多的国家尼日利亚是预测非洲人口持续爆炸和经济增长的关键。但尼日利亚同样面临着资源紧张和衰败的问题，而且更有可能成为一个内战地区，而不是一个拥有 3 亿人口的繁华市场。这是一个经常被描述为处于内爆边缘的国家，而不是更明确地表示其内爆正在加速。非洲最大城市拉各斯也面临海平面上升的风险；像马科科这样的贫民窟建在沼泽上，很快就会被不断侵蚀的大西洋吞没。尼日利亚是世界上最致命的恐怖组织之一博科圣地和许多其他针对基督徒和其他少数群体的民兵组织的所在地。当尼日利亚将人口贩运定为刑事犯罪时，

Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, is the linchpin of forecasts of Africa’s continuing population explosion and economic rise. But Nigeria is as much or more a story of resource stress and decay, and more likely to become a civil war zone than a bustling market of 300 million. It’s a country often described as being on the brink of imploding, rather than stating more plainly that its implosion is accelerating. Lagos, Africa’s largest city, is also at risk from rising sea levels; slums such as Makoko are built on swamps soon to be engulfed by the encroaching Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria is home to one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, Boko Haram, and numerous other militias that campaign against Christians and other minorities. When Nigeria criminalized people trafficking, young Nigerian smugglers lost their livelihood and now make the journey themselves, adding to the exodus from equatorial Africa.

如果说有一个人天生就喜欢搬家，那一定是厄立特里亚人。严重的贫困、数十年的干旱以及 20 世纪 90 年代末与面积大得多的埃塞俄比亚发生的战争迫使约 100 万厄立特里亚人逃往邻国苏丹。二十年后，厄立特里亚难民、寻求庇护者和移民人数仍超过75万，约占总人口的四分之一。有些人穿过苏丹到达利比亚，然后乘木筏到达欧洲。其他人则抵达乌干达，从乌干达搭乘一系列偶然的航班抵达乌拉圭，在那里他们出发步行或搭便车一路穿过巴西、安第斯国家和中美洲，直到到达美国并在加利福尼亚州定居。随着穿越地中海和大西洋变得更加危险，他们可以选择穿越苏丹进入埃及，或者乘木筏穿越红海到达沙特阿拉伯。由于人口绝大多数是年轻人，大多数厄立特里亚人在成长过程中都看到比自己年长的人尽快离开这个国家。迁徙就是他们的生活——他们不知道接下来会带他们去哪里。

If any people were born to move, it’s the Eritreans. Severe poverty, decades of drought, and a late 1990s war with far larger Ethiopia forced about 1 million Eritreans to flee into neighboring Sudan. Two decades later, the number of Eritrean refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants still stands at more than 750,000, about one-quarter of the total population. Some cross Sudan to Libya followed by rafts to Europe. Others make it to Uganda, from which a haphazard series of flights lands them in Uruguay, where they set off to walk or hitchhike all the way through Brazil, the Andean nations, and Central America until they reach the US and settle in California. As crossing to the Mediterranean and Atlantic becomes more perilous, they can opt to cross Sudan into Egypt, or take rafts across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia. With an overwhelmingly young population, most Eritreans have grown up seeing those older than them leave the country as soon as possible. Migration is their life—and they have no idea where it will take them next.

非洲人热衷于前往欧洲，但大多数人只能满足于频繁的国内移民。由于冠状病毒对公共卫生系统造成的破坏性影响，事实证明这一点更加困难。尽管如此，在非洲境内流动的非洲人已经成为世界上最大的移民群体之一，而非洲大陆不明确的边界是人员、货物、食品、矿产、毒品和武器的过境区。非洲各国政府都同意到 2025 年建立一个覆盖整个非洲大陆的自由贸易和流动区，此举既批准了显而易见的事实，也代表了为理清非洲任意殖民边界的崇高努力。随着 2 美元的手机进入他们的手中，移动支付普及到每个国家，

Africans are clamoring to get to Europe, but most will have to content themselves with frequent internal migrations instead. Even that has proven more difficult due to the devastating impact of the coronavirus on public health systems. Nonetheless, Africans circulating within Africa already represent one of the largest migrant groups in the world, and the continent’s ill-defined borders are transit zones for people, goods, food, minerals, drugs, and weapons. African governments have all agreed to a continent-wide free trade and mobility area by 2025—a move that both ratifies the obvious and also represents a noble effort to untangle Africa’s arbitrary colonial borders. With a $2 phone coming into their hands and mobile payments spreading to every country, Africa has an opportunity to use mobility in all its forms as a springboard to reinvent itself.

显而易见，非洲的发展之路在于制造业和贸易、服务和技能、城市化和数字化。肯尼亚首都内罗毕的喧嚣散发着这种积极的氛围。但大多数非洲年轻人甚至不享受最低限度的创业忙碌。非洲是否需要更多陷入交通拥堵的人，或者销售中国玩具和雀巢巧克力？

It may seem obvious that the path forward for Africa’s development lies in manufacturing and trade, services and skills, urbanization and digitization. The bustle of Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, gives off this positive vibe. But most African youth don’t enjoy even that minimal level of entrepreneurial bustle. Does Africa need more people stuck in traffic jams, or selling Chinese toys and Nestlé chocolates?

非洲开发银行有一个更好的想法：它希望将农业地区转变为主要创造就业机会的地区，以提高可再生能源驱动下的粮食生产效率。非洲几乎占了一半世界上有大量未开垦的耕地，并且是最大的磷肥出口国，但仍有数千万人面临严重的粮食短缺。加纳等聪明国家已经启动了项目，对更多农民进行专业培训，并为他们提供更好的设备。非洲不应该为欧洲种植鲜花，而应该为自己种植更多粮食。

The African Development Bank has a better idea: It wants to turn agricultural areas into major job-creating zones for more efficient food production, powered by renewable energy. Africa has almost half the world’s uncultivated arable farmland, and is the largest exporter of phosphate fertilizers, yet tens of millions face acute food shortages. Smart countries such as Ghana have launched programs to professionally train more farmers and get them better equipment. Rather than grow flowers for Europe, Africa should grow more food for itself.

为此，非洲需要节约用水。乍得湖的干涸已经加剧了乍得、喀麦隆、尼日利亚和尼日尔的部落紧张局势，导致近 300 万人背井离乡。干旱还导致赞比西河的流量减少，赞比亚和津巴布韦边境曾经雄伟的维多利亚瀑布可能会逐渐沦为瀑布。这意味着农业减少、旅游业减少、水力发电减少。当苏丹等国家将农田出售给沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家购买尼罗河上游时，非洲也出口水，使苏丹只能借钱从其他国家进口小麦。最终，随着东非国家的干旱，他们的人民可能会带着淡化水向南逃往肯尼亚，向北逃往埃及，或者向东越过红海到达沙特阿拉伯的沿海城市。

To do so, Africa will need to conserve its water. Already the drying of Lake Chad has exacerbated tribal tensions across Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, driving nearly 3 million people from their homes. Droughts have also reduced the flows of the Zambezi River, and hence the once majestic Victoria Falls at the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe may gradually be reduced to a mere spout. This means less farming, less tourism, and less electricity from hydropower. Africa also exports water when countries such as Sudan sell farmland to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states buying up the upper Nile, leaving Sudan to borrow money to import wheat from other countries. Eventually, as East African countries dry out, their people may flee south to Kenya, north to Egypt, or east across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia’s coastal cities with their desalinated water. It’s as if the African mega-drought of a hundred thousand years ago is repeating itself.

非洲的一些地区具有中期宜居潜力，例如加蓬，其80%都是雨林，以及沿海刚果和博茨瓦纳，每个地区的自然生态系统仍处于平衡状态。在这些地方，非洲人可以按照未来电影《黑豹》中瓦坎达的设想，建造可持续的新飞地。⁴如果他们这样做，非洲年轻人肯定会搬到那里。

Some parts of Africa have the potential for medium-term livability, such as Gabon, which is 80 percent rain forest, as well as coastal Congo and Botswana, each representing natural ecosystems still in balance. These are the places where Africans can build sustainable new enclaves along the lines of those imagined for Wakanda in the futuristic film Black Panther.⁴ And if they do, African youth will surely move there.

南美洲：永远的“失落的大陆”？

South America: Forever the “lost continent”?

南美洲拥有世界上最大的淡水储量，但这对于该大陆最大的城市圣保罗来说意义不大，那里的水龙头已经干涸。为了让亚马逊河及其支流到达非洲大陆绝大多数沿海人口，必须允许它们自由流动——森林砍伐和干旱的恶性循环阻止了这一点。巴西继续在左翼社会主义和右翼民粹主义之间摇摆，后者目前正在加速亚马逊地区的破坏。巴西完全可以利用亚马逊来促进生物医学和制药创新，但随着它焚烧自己的未来，越来越多的巴西人带着家人和金钱搬走了。

South America has the largest freshwater reserves in the world, but that doesn’t mean much in São Paulo, the continent’s largest city, where the taps have run dry. For the Amazon River and its tributaries to reach the continent’s overwhelmingly coastal populations, they must be allowed to flow freely—something the pernicious cycles of deforestation and drought have prevented. Brazil continues its swings between left-wing socialism and right-wing populism, the latter currently accelerating the devastation of the Amazon. Brazil could well leverage the Amazon to promote biomedical and pharmaceutical innovations, but as it torches its own future, more and more Brazilians are taking their families and money and moving away.

几乎所有拉丁美洲国家（除了小国哥斯达黎加和乌拉圭）似乎都没有叛乱组织和险恶帮派。该地区的凶杀率是世界上最高的。拉丁青年珍惜为他们提供自我表达媒介的数字工具，但互联网也向他们展示了如果他们能够摆脱贫困、暴力和腐败的困境就能过上更好的生活。

Hardly any Latin American country (save for small-size Costa Rica and Uruguay) appears free of rebel groups and sinister gangs; the region has the world’s worst homicide rates. Latin youth cherish the digital tools that give them a medium for self-expression, but the Internet also shows them a better life if they can escape the plight of poverty, violence, and corruption.

南美洲其他最大的国家都没有对这片大陆持乐观态度。十九世纪，阿根廷对其经济优势如此自信，以至于流行展示颠倒的世界地图，其中南半球位于顶部。但数十年的意识形态摇摆使其经济陷入困境，背负着债务，无法在不提高本已捉襟见肘的人口税收的情况下进行必要的投资。难怪绝望的公民转向比特币来逃避资本管制并将资金转移出该国。更糟糕的是，拥有三分之一人口的首都布宜诺斯艾利斯不得不担心海平面上升。与此同时，阿根廷其他大部分地区正遭受暴雨——两周内相当于一年的降雨量——导致洪水严重，牛必须学会游泳。冰川融化将使河流进一步膨胀，直到它们完全消失——之后可能会发生严重的干旱。阿根廷为一亿人生产足够的粮食，但它必须掌握其郁郁葱葱的巴塔哥尼亚地区的农业工程，才能继续成为世界的杂货店，并吸收来自非洲大陆其他地区的气候移民。

None of South America’s other largest countries give reason for optimism about the continent. In the nineteenth century, Argentina was so certain of its economic ascendancy that it became popular to display upside-down world maps in which the southern hemisphere was on top. But many decades of ideological seesaws made it an economic basket case, saddled with debt and unable to make essential investments without raising taxes on its already strapped population. No wonder desperate citizens have turned to Bitcoin to evade capital controls and get their money out of the country. Even worse, the capital, Buenos Aires, home to one-third of the population, has to worry about rising seas. Meanwhile, much of the rest of Argentina is receiving torrential rain—one year’s worth in two weeks—causing flooding so extreme that cattle must learn to swim. Glacier melt will bulge rivers even further, until they disappear entirely—after which severe droughts may follow. Argentina produces enough food for 100 million people, but it will have to master agricultural engineering for its lush Patagonia region to remain a grocery store for the world—as well as to absorb climate migrants from the rest of the continent.

2000年代，乌戈·查韦斯领导下的委内瑞拉自诩为继任者为阿根廷和巴西两国提供电力。相反，今天它体现了世界上最严重的难民危机之一，营养不良的委内瑞拉人逃往哥伦比亚和其他安第斯国家。过去十年，浩瀚的奥里诺科河年降雨量减少了 50%，导致水资源短缺和水力发电大坝停电。该国西部山区曾经有五座冰川，但现在全部融化了。可以想象，委内瑞拉人有一天可能会在新的领导下回归，利用国家巨大的能源储备，但没有人知道那会是什么时候。

In the 2000s, Venezuela under Hugo Chavez fancied itself the successor power to both Argentina and Brazil. Instead, today it embodies one of the world’s most acute refugee crises as malnourished Venezuelans flee to Colombia and other Andean nations. The mighty Orinoco River has suffered from a 50 percent decline in annual rainfall in the past decade, resulting in both water shortages and power cuts from its hydroelectric dams. The country also once had five glaciers in its western mountains, all of which have melted. It’s conceivable that Venezuelans could one day return under new leadership to harness their country’s enormous energy reserves, but nobody has any idea when that will be.

哥伦比亚等更有前途的安第斯国家也因干旱和过度采矿耗尽了流域而面临水资源短缺。秘鲁的冰川都在快速融化——一开始引发洪水，然后就什么都没有了，特别是对该国1000万农村贫困人口而言。厄瓜多尔、秘鲁和哥伦比亚的人口可能必须向内陆地区迁移到三国边境地区，才能从剩余的雨林中受益，但前提是他们能够首先控制那里的火灾。

Even more promising Andean nations, such as Colombia, are headed for water shortages due to drought and excessive mining that have depleted their water basins. Peru’s glaciers are all melting fast—resulting in floods at first, then nothing, especially for the country’s 10 million rural poor. The populations of Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia may have to move inland toward their tri-border region to benefit from what remains of the rain forests—but only if they can control the fires there first.

安第斯山国家智利表现出资源和人口结构的失调，必须对其人民进行纠正才能适应气候变化。该国干旱的北部地区持续干旱，迫使农民将牲畜向南迁移到更肥沃的地区。首都圣地亚哥仅在过去十年就增加了超过100万人口，目前占智利总人口1800万的一半。然而，这座城市的水正在耗尽，而且由于海拔较高，干旱更加频繁。政府将不得不引导安第斯冰川融化并加强太平洋沿岸的海水淡化，但该国的大部分人口仍然可能不得不向南迁移，面向南极洲的麦哲伦省（以首次环球航行的十六世纪葡萄牙探险家的名字命名）的雄伟峡湾使其成为南半球的挪威。无雪季节已经迫使滑雪者前往安第斯山脉南部，虽然智利南部的夏季正在变暖，但山脉和海洋缓解了炎热（使其比横跨大西洋的澳大利亚更容易忍受）南太平洋）。从 19 世纪开始，德国移民主要定居在智利南部，智利人将需要他们继承的工程实力来扩建目前南北走向的两车道 Ruta 5 公路，即智利全长 3,400 公里的泛美公路路段。

The Andean nation of Chile exhibits a misalignment of resources and demographics that will have to be corrected for its people to adapt to climate change. Perpetual droughts in the country’s arid north have forced farmers to migrate their livestock south toward more fertile terrain. The capital, Santiago, has gained more than a million people in just the past decade, and now has half of Chile’s entire population of 18 million. Yet the city is running out of water, with ever more frequent droughts because of its high elevation. The government will have to channel Andean glacier melt and ramp up desalination on the Pacific coast, but still much of the country’s population may have to migrate southward, where the majestic fjords in Antarctica-facing Magellan Province (named for the sixteenth-century Portuguese explorer who first circumnavigated the world) make it the southern hemisphere’s answer to Norway. Snow-less seasons have already forced skiers to the southern Andes, and while summers in southern Chile are getting warmer, mountains and sea mitigate the heat (making it far more tolerable than scorching Australia across the South Pacific). It was German immigrants who primarily settled southern Chile, starting in the nineteenth century, and Chileans will need their inherited engineering prowess to expand the currently two-lane north-south Ruta 5, Chile’s 3,400-kilometer section of the Pan-American Highway.

澳大利亚：下面太热了

Australia: Too hot down under

几十年来，地球两端的两个大国有着非常相似的发展轨迹。加拿大和澳大利亚这两个资源丰富的大陆，其商品繁荣为其少数人口带来了数十年不间断的经济增长。但现在他们的道路出现了分歧：加拿大将成为气候变化的最大赢家，而澳大利亚将成为输家。

For decades, two large nations on opposite sides of the planet have had remarkably similar trajectories. Both resource-rich continental expanses, Canada and Australia’s commodities booms have delivered decades of uninterrupted economic growth for their small populations. But now their paths are diverging: Canada will be as close to a winner as there can be from climate change, while Australia will be a loser.

二十世纪中叶，澳大利亚学者担心全球人口过剩和粮食短缺将促使国际机构寻求夺取其农业资源。这不再是澳大利亚人需要担心的情​​况。相反，与加拿大广阔的内陆地区拥有丰富的森林和耕地不同，澳大利亚大部分地区都是沙漠，正在迅速侵蚀沿海生物。野火和海平面上升也是如此。澳大利亚的气候灾难是否会吓跑其长期的移民潮，甚至是其最初定居者的后代？

In the mid-twentieth century, Australian scholars raised concerns that global overpopulation and food shortages would prompt international agencies to seek to take possession of its agricultural bounty. This is no longer a scenario Australians need to fear. On the contrary, unlike Canada, whose vast interior is rich in forests and arable land, most of Australia consists of desert that is rapidly encroaching on coastal life. So too are wildfires and rising sea levels. Could Australia’s climate misfortune scare away its long-standing immigrant surge—and even the descendants of its original settlers?

气候变化正在肆虐这个幸运的国家。澳大利亚内陆河流和水库已经干涸；没有新的作物被种植，动物正在死亡，人们正在离开。2019 年肆虐维多利亚省的丛林大火烧焦的面积比瑞士还大，造成数十万只动物和数十人死亡，数千座房屋化为灰烬，并需要该国进行和平时期最大规模的疏散。火灾规模如此之大，以至于产生了“火焰积雨云”，引发了自己的风暴和闪电，从而引发了新的火灾。用一位学者的话说，人类世更像是“火新世”。⁶在澳大利亚人口最多的省份新南威尔士州，丛林大火切断了进出悉尼的主要道路，此后该州在 2020 年初遭受了气旋引发的洪水。然而，该州的水库在一年中的大部分时间都处于低容量，居民面临着严重的水灾。尽管工业活动消耗了供水并产生了可怕的碳足迹，但用水限制仍然存在。

Climate change is ravaging the lucky country. Australia’s outback rivers and reservoirs have dried up; no new crops are being planted, animals are dying, and people are leaving. The 2019 bushfires that ravaged Victoria Province scorched an area larger than Switzerland, killing hundreds of thousands of animals and dozens of people, reducing thousands of homes to ash, and requiring the country’s largest ever peacetime evacuation. The fires were so large that they generated “pyro cumulonimbus” clouds that caused their own storms and lightning that caused new fires. In the words of one academic, the Anthropocene is more like the “Pyrocene.”⁶ Across New South Wales, Australia’s most populous province, bushfires cut off major roads in and out of Sydney—after which it suffered cyclone-induced flooding in early 2020. Most of the year, however, its reservoirs are at low capacity and residents face significant water restrictions, even as industrial activity sucks up the water supply while generating a terrible carbon footprint.

澳大利亚是一个富裕的国家。它人口稀少，但通过矿产和天然气出口产生巨额收入。它的资金和能源都可以用于海水淡化，以恢复其农业。但澳大利亚也有对气候持怀疑态度的政客以及强大的工业游说团体，它们会干扰前瞻性监管。因此，战略性水利工程项目如连接南北的运河昆士兰州和新南威尔士州（NSW）一直无人值守，尽管它们需要很多年才能部署。谁知道移民或澳大利亚人是否会坚持那么久。

Australia is a rich country. It has few people but generates enormous revenues from mineral and gas exports. Both its money and its energy could be used for water desalination to rehabilitate its agriculture. But Australia also has climate-skeptic politicians, as well as powerful industrial lobbies, that interfere in forward-looking regulation. As a result, strategic hydro-engineering projects like a north-south water canal linking Queensland and New South Wales (NSW) have been left unattended even though they’ll take many years to deploy. Who knows if either the migrants or the Australians will stick around that long.

澳大利亚长期以来一直是中年英国人、地中海和阿拉伯移民以及雄心勃勃的亚洲人最喜欢的目的地，吸引了抛弃社会等级制度、僵化教育体系或令人窒息的政治（或三者兼而有之）的中国人、日本人和韩国人。澳大利亚的外国出生人口比例已经是经济合作与发展组织 (OECD) 国家中最高的，每年吸收约 20 万新移民。这个国家正变得越来越亚洲化，而不是白人：目前，只有一半多一点的人口有两个土生父母，但中国、印度、马来西亚和菲律宾是新澳大利亚人父母数量增长最快的原籍国。与同质的农村地区相比，主要城市中心可以更好地了解未来的人口统计数据：移民年轻人直接涌入悉尼市中心，而年长的白人家庭则搬到了郊区。正如前外交部长加雷斯·埃文斯（Gareth Evans）明智地指出的那样，“澳大利亚的未来将更多地取决于其地理位置，而不是其历史。”

Australia has long been a favorite destination for middle-aged Brits, Mediterranean and Arab migrants, and ambitious Asians, absorbing Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans ditching social hierarchies, rigid educational systems, or suffocating politics (or all three). Australia already has the highest foreign-born share of its population among OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, and takes in about two hundred thousand new migrants each year. The country is becoming more Asian than white: Currently just over half the population has two native-born parents, but China, India, Malaysia, and the Philippines are the fastest-rising origin countries for the parents of new Australians. Key city centers give a far better glimpse into the future demographics than homogenous rural areas: Immigrant youth flock straight to downtown Sydney, while older white families have moved out to the suburbs. As former foreign minister Gareth Evans wisely puts it, “Australia’s future will depend much more on its geography than its history.”

如果没有移民被吸引到珀斯、阿德莱德、布里斯班和墨尔本等舒适的城市，澳大利亚的科技行业就不会存在。这些城市在步行、教育和公共服务方面的投资使其成为对澳大利亚和外国人才有吸引力和富有成效的中心。鉴于澳大利亚对外国人才的依赖，边缘的一国党的仇外心理对澳大利亚没有任何好处。冠状病毒也没有杀死许多澳大利亚人，但肯定削弱了外国学生和房地产投资者的胃口——这是经济所依赖的两个群体。如果澳大利亚幸运的经济势头结束，地缘政治变得紧张，或者气候变化驱使移民离开——或者这三者兼而有之——许多人可能会拿走澳大利亚护照并在其他地方重新定居。

Australia’s tech sector wouldn’t exist without immigrants drawn to its comfortable cities such as Perth, Adelaide, Brisbane, and Melbourne, cities whose investments in walkability, education, and public services have made them attractive and productive hubs for both Australian and foreign talent. Given Australia’s dependence on foreign brain power, the fringe One Nation Party does the country no favors with its xenophobia. Nor did the coronavirus, which did not kill many Australians but certainly dented the appetite of foreign students and property investors—two constituencies on which the economy depends. If and when Australia’s lucky economic streak ends, geopolitics gets tense, or climate change drives migrants away—or all three—many might take their Australian passports and resettle elsewhere.

如果骄傲的澳大利亚人也这样做，请不要感到惊讶。澳大利亚有一个不安分的年轻人在国外漂泊的传统由来已久，其中许多人再也没有回来。现在政府正在积极资助澳大利亚学生出国留学和学习亚洲语言，以便他们能够成为澳大利亚矿业公司、大学和医院更有用的海外员工——所有这些公司都意识到了向海外扩张的需要。学生们很乐意效劳，因为他们毕业后平均需要近三年才能找到一份全职工作。难怪这么多澳大利亚年轻人一开始就去散步。

Don’t be surprised if even proud Aussies do the same. Australia has a long tradition of restless youth wandering abroad, with many never returning. Now the government is actively subsidizing Australian students to study abroad and learn Asian languages so that they can be more useful overseas employees of Australian mining companies, universities, and hospitals—all of which are waking up to the need to expand abroad. The students are happy to oblige, since it takes them on average nearly three years after graduation to find a full-time job. No wonder so many Aussie youth go walkabout in the first place.

第9章亚洲人来了

CHAPTER 9 THE ASIANS ARE COMING

未来是棕色的（ish）

The future is brown(ish)

在十八世纪末工业革命前夕，亚洲——尤其是中国和印度——占世界经济的近60%。两百五十年后，它再次出现。西方对技术的掌握、快速工业化、人口增长和帝国野心推动欧洲和美国在 19 世纪和 20 世纪占据全球主导地位。但正如亚洲的复兴所表明的那样，从长远来看，人口较多的社会往往会变得更加富裕，因为它们聚集和传播创新，使其公民更加繁荣。聚集人就等于聚集力量。亚洲人口现在是原来的五倍比美国和欧盟的总和还多——亚洲大国也掌握着最新技术。那么，西方社会将继续失去对亚洲的经济优势，除非它们补充人口——很可能是亚洲人。

On the eve of the late-eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution, Asia—especially China and India—accounted for nearly 60 percent of the world economy. Two hundred and fifty years later, it does again. Western mastery of technology, rapid industrialization, population growth, and imperial ambition propelled Europe and then America to global dominance for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But as Asia’s resurrection illustrates, in the long run societies with larger populations tend to become wealthier, as they aggregate and spread innovations that make their citizens more prosperous. Collecting people equals collecting power. Asia’s population is now five times larger than the US and the European Union combined—and Asian powers command the latest technologies as well. Western societies, then, will continue losing their economic advantage to Asia unless they replenish their populations—most likely with Asians.

殖民遗产已经将印度人融入到世界各国的结构中。印度侨民是世界第二大侨民（仅次于中国），但地域最多元化，在各大洲都有大量人口（南美洲除外）。印度拥有最多的居住在国外但仍然是本国公民的移民（超过 1700 万），远远领先于墨西哥人（不到 1200 万）和中国人（不到 1100 万）。印度人在阿联酋定居得如此之多，以至于那里的大使馆收取外籍人士税，并将其集中起来支持遇到麻烦或需要遣返的国民。圭亚那前总统、爱尔兰前总理、葡萄牙现任总理都是印度裔。

The colonial legacy has already woven Indians into the fabric of countries around the world. The Indian diaspora is the world’s second largest (behind China) but the most geographically diverse, with a large presence on every continent (except South America). India already has the largest number of migrants living abroad who remain citizens of their home country (more than 17 million), far ahead of Mexicans (under 12 million) and Chinese (under 11 million). Indians are so settled in the UAE that the embassy there collects an expatriate tax that it pools to support nationals who run into trouble or need repatriation. The former president of Guyana, the former prime minister of Ireland, and the current prime minister of Portugal are of Indian descent.

医疗、技术和其他领域的人才争夺战将越来越多的南亚家庭吸引到英国和北美，英语使他们在同化方面比其他民族具有优势。我记得学习英语是很困难的，但我还很年轻，到我八岁左右时，非母语已经不再重要了。正是因为 20 世纪 80 年代中期威彻斯特县（纽约市以外）印第安家庭相对较少，同化成为唯一的选择。在欧洲和美国，你会发现“唐人街”，但找不到类似的“印度城镇”。

The war for talent in medical, technology, and other fields has pulled ever more millions of South Asian families to the UK and North America, where English has given them an advantage over other nationalities in assimilation. I remember learning English the hard way, but I was young enough that being a non-native-speaker had ceased to matter by the time I was about eight. And precisely because there were relatively few Indian families in Westchester County (outside of New York City) in the mid-1980s, assimilation was the only option. Across Europe and America you find “Chinatowns” but no equivalent “India towns.”

下一波全球印度移民的规模可能比世界迄今为止所经历的规模要大得多。印度的中位年龄比中国年轻得多，印度有 6 亿 25 岁以下的年轻人。经合组织国家中已有310万高技能外籍工人出生在印度，远远高于中国的220万。鉴于新冠疫情后的经济崩溃和该国严重的污染水平，印度人比以往任何时候都更有动力离开这个国家。随着印度大学规模的扩大，更多的印度人将有资格获得美国、欧洲、澳大利亚、日本和新加坡的研究生学位。目前西方校园中中国学生的数量超过了印度学生，但印度要赶上的路还很长。此外，印度人不会像中国人那样面临怀疑。他们结合英语语言，技术教育和战略上不具有威胁性的身份，印度人在任何地方都受到欢迎，尤其是在中国人不再存在的地方。IBM、谷歌、微软、万事达卡、诺基亚和诺华的首席执行官都是印度人，从波士顿到硅谷的数百家其他公司的创始人和高管也是如此。他们极不可能是中国人。

The next wave of global Indian migrants may be much larger than what the world has experienced so far. With a much younger median age than China, India has 600 million youth under the age of twenty-five. Already 3.1 million of the highly skilled foreign workers in OECD countries were born in India, far higher than China’s 2.2 million. Given the post-Covid economic crash and the country’s sinister levels of pollution, Indians are more motivated to leave the country than ever before. As India expands its universities, even more Indians will qualify for graduate degrees in the US, Europe, Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Chinese students presently outnumber Indians on Western campuses, but the runway for India to catch up is long. Furthermore, Indians do not face the suspicions Chinese do. With their combination of English language, technical education, and strategically nonthreatening identity, Indians are welcome everywhere, especially where Chinese no longer are. The CEOs of IBM, Google, Microsoft, Mastercard, Nokia, and Novartis are all Indian, as are the founders and executives of hundreds of other companies from Boston to Silicon Valley; it’s highly unlikely they could ever be Chinese.

印度人才流向美国，美国资本流向印度，这是一个让越来越多的印度人涌入世界各地的公式。绝大多数美国 H1-B 签证都发给了推动美国软件发展的印度人生产和出口。布鲁金斯学会估计，特朗普总统 2020 年 6 月发布的限制非移民工作签证的行政命令给美国经济造成了 1000 亿美元的损失。¹这也为美国科技巨头提供了扩大其本已庞大的离岸业务的借口：硅谷在印度的投资正在激增，从电信到电子商务再到人工智能。印度希望说服一百所主要大学在印度本土开设校园。

The flow of Indian talent to America and American capital into India is a formula that catapults ever more Indians everywhere. The vast majority of US H1-B visas have gone to Indians who boost America’s software production and exports. The Brookings Institution estimates that President Trump’s June 2020 executive order restricting nonimmigrant work visas cost the US economy $100 billion.¹ It also gave American tech giants an excuse to expand their already massive offshore footprint: Silicon Valley’s investments in India are surging, from telecoms to e-commerce to AI. India wants to convince one hundred major universities to open campuses in India itself.

但请记住：印度所有这些技能提升的综合效应将使印度人更有资格申请到更宜居的地方的工作签证。西方跨国公司滔滔不绝地谈论它们想要向30亿人口的亚洲中产阶级出售产品，但亚洲的数十亿人既热衷于储蓄和迁移，也热衷于留下来和消费。印度男性正面临可用女性短缺的问题（由于几十年来杀害女婴的现象），而印度女性则希望逃离容忍轮奸的文化。两人都鄙视包办婚姻，宁愿出国——在那里他们最常通过社交或约会应用程序找到其他印度人。

But remember: The combined effect of all this upskilling in India will be to make Indians even more qualified to apply for work visas for more livable places. Western multinational companies gush about the 3-billion-strong Asian middle class into which they want to sell, but Asia’s billions are just as keen to save and move as they are to stay and spend. Indian men are suffering from a dearth of available women (due to decades of female infanticide), while Indian women want to escape a culture that tolerates gang rape. Both despise arranged marriages, and would rather go abroad—where they most often find other Indians socially or via dating apps.

整个南亚地区都有受过良好教育、工作勤奋的千禧一代和 Z 世代年轻人，他们准备出国并向国内汇款，家人用这些汇款来升级住房，或者攒钱跟随亲人出国。这正是巴基斯坦人、孟加拉国人和斯里兰卡人在海湾地区、英国和北美扎根的原因，也是乌尔都语成为美国国内增长最快的语言的原因。还有1.3亿巴基斯坦人年龄在30岁以下，而疲软的经济无法为他们中的大多数人找到工作。不管怎样，许多人都会找到出路。

The entire South Asian region contains educated and hardworking millennials and Gen-Z youth ready to go abroad and send home remittances that their families use to upgrade homes—or save up to follow their loved ones abroad. This is precisely how Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Sri Lankans have also rooted themselves across the Gulf, the UK, and North America—and how Urdu came to be the fastest growing language spoken at home in the US. There are another 130 million Pakistanis under the age of thirty, and the flagging economy can’t find jobs for most of them. One way or the other, many will find a way out.

印度人的下一波移动浪潮来得正是时候。墨西哥人移民减少，俄罗斯和中国人口老龄化，而印度仍然年轻，印度男女渴望逃离文化和生态窒息的国家，前往北美、欧洲、海湾国家、俄罗斯、日本、澳大利亚或东南亚。换句话说：任何地方。

The next wave of mobile Indians couldn’t be better timed. Whereas Mexicans are emigrating less and the Russian and Chinese populations are aging, India remains young and its men and women eager to flee their culturally and ecologically stifling country for North America, Europe, the Gulf countries, Russia, Japan, Australia, or Southeast Asia. In other words: anywhere.

亚洲的主要侨民

Asia’s Dominant Diasporas

华人侨民是世界上最大的，但南亚人口（尤其是印度人）在全球范围内不断增长。欧洲、海湾和非洲的印度人口已经明显多于中国人口。在北美，南亚人口的增长速度远远快于中国人。

The Chinese diaspora is the world’s largest, but South Asian populations (particularly Indian) are growing worldwide. The Indian population in Europe, the Gulf, and Africa is already significantly larger than the Chinese. In North America, South Asian populations are growing far more quickly than Chinese.

年轻又躁动的人

The young and the restless

在整个亚洲，技术变革正在推动新一轮移民浪潮。在中国，自动化吞噬了数百万壮年人口的工作工人，从工厂工人到健身教练，将他们送往全国各地及其他地方寻找新的工作。随着电子产品和汽车制造商部署大量工业机器人，泰国和越南的低薪产业工人面临裁员。在以信息技术为主导的印度，算法和聊天机器人正在蚕食呼叫中心的工作岗位，聪明的雅皮士在到达班加罗尔后不久就被定价离开了。数以百万计的亚洲人再也无力留在他们居住的地方，如果没有工作，为什么还要留下来呢？所以他们搬家了。

Across Asia, technological shifts are propelling new waves of migration. In China, automation has devoured the jobs of millions of prime-age workers, from factory workers to fitness trainers, sending them off across the country and beyond, looking for new jobs. Low-wage industrial workers in Thailand and Vietnam face redundancy as electronics and car manufacturers deploy legions of industrial robots. In IT-powered India algorithms and chatbots are eviscerating call center jobs, pricing bright yuppies out of Bangalore not long after they arrived. Millions of Asians can no longer afford to stay where they live, and why stay anyway if there are no jobs? So they move.

经济移民引发了更多的移民。在二十世纪，人们相信临时工最终会在几年后返回家乡：寄钱回家也被认为可以阻止“他们”越来越多地来到“我们”身边。但相反，移民定居并存了足够的钱来安排他们的家人到西方团聚。经济移民变成了链式移民。由于汇款可能不可靠、移民政策可能发生变化、货币价值波动，家庭宁愿背井离乡，也成为移民。在这些散居海外的家庭中，个别成员经常走向不同的方向，并使用 Remitly 等无国界金融应用程序相互分享资金。

Economic migrants beget ever more migration. In the twentieth century it was believed that temporary workers would eventually return home after some years: Sending money home was also supposed to discourage “them” from coming in ever larger numbers to “us.” But instead, migrants settled and saved enough money to arrange for their families to join them in the West. Economic migration became chain migration. Because remittances can be unreliable, immigration policies can change, and currency values fluctuate, families would rather uproot themselves and become migrants as well. In these family diasporas, individual members often go in different directions and share money with one another using borderless financial apps such as Remitly.

亚洲数十亿中产阶级可能想要搬家，要么是因为他们已经变得足够富有，要么是因为国内的工作机会消失了。与此同时，他们在信息技术、建筑和医疗保健领域获得的技能是可移植的，使他们更有资格获得国外高薪工作的签证。根据《国际移民手册》，随着人均收入从大约 2,000 美元上升到 10,000 美元，移民人数大幅增加，这正是大多数国家当今随着人口迅速城市化和经济变得更加以服务业为导向而发现的曲线。在一些国家，一旦人均收入超过 10,000 美元，移民人数就会减少，但自动化正在阻止许多人达到中等收入水平。所以他们搬到有工作的地方。²

Asia’s middle-class billions may want to move either because they’ve become wealthy enough to do so or because jobs have disappeared at home. Meanwhile, the skills they acquire in IT, construction, and healthcare are portable, making them more qualified to get visas for higher-wage jobs abroad. According to the International Handbook on Migration, emigration increases substantially as per capita income rises from roughly $2,000 toward $10,000, exactly the curve on which most countries find themselves today as populations rapidly urbanize and economies become more service oriented. From some countries, emigration has tapered once incomes cross $10,000 per capita—but automation is preventing many people from reaching that middle income status. So they move to places where there is work.²

亚洲人已占 1.5 亿半永久人口中的大多数来往于世界各地农田、建筑工地和其他基础设施项目的客工。除了印度人和巴基斯坦人之外，未得到充分利用的印度尼西亚男性也将受益于木工和金属加工的基本培训，并且在其他国家比在国内就业更有生产力。商业船队和商船队中还有近 100 万水手，他们大多是亚洲人，乘坐巨型货轮在海洋上往返（其中 40 万人在新冠封锁期间滞留在海上），随着新港口的建成和人口的转移，他们的航线蜿蜒曲折。很快我们可能会发现成群的亚洲农民和勤杂工在北极建造城镇。世界需要这些不安分的亚洲年轻人继续前进。

Asians already represent the majority of the 150 million semipermanent guest workers who crisscross the world’s farmlands, construction sites, and other infrastructure projects. Beyond Indians and Pakistanis, underutilized Indonesian men would also benefit from basic training in carpentry and metalworking, and be more productively employed in other countries than at home. There are also nearly 1 million mostly Asian sailors in commercial fleets and merchant navies plying the oceans on giant cargo ships (four hundred thousand of whom were stranded at sea during the Covid lockdown), their routes meandering as new ports are built and populations shift. Soon we might find battalions of Asian farmers and handymen building towns in the Arctic. The world needs these restless young Asians to stay on the move.

跨国女佣

Multinational maids

理性的人可以讨论一个国家到底应该允许多少移民、应该允许他们从哪里来、以及如何保持共同的民族精神。但要成为一个文明社会，一个国家至少应该有一个像样的医疗保健系统，而这需要有足够的医生和护士。20世纪70年代，美国为了应对医生短缺的问题，引进了大量印度医生和药剂师。但正如新冠疫情所暴露的那样，美国和英国都没有为其庞大的医疗承诺提供足够的招募人员。在美国，三分之一的 Covid-19 死亡病例发生在疗养院，这一现实可能会导致当今的婴儿潮一代（及其孩子）在轮到他们时要求更好的护理。

Reasonable people can debate how many total immigrants should be allowed into a country, from where they should be allowed, and how to maintain a common national ethos. But to qualify as a civilized society, a country should at least have a decent healthcare system—and that requires an adequate supply of doctors and nurses. In the 1970s, the US responded to a shortage of medical practitioners by bringing in large numbers of Indian doctors and pharmacists. But as the Covid pandemic bluntly revealed, neither the US nor the UK have adequately recruited for their sprawling medical commitments. One-third of all Covid-19 deaths in the US were in nursing homes, a reality that will perhaps lead today’s baby boomers (and their children) to demand far better care when their turn comes. America’s 3 million nurses are already the largest segment of its healthcare workforce, and America needs a lot more of them.

中国也一样。与美国和日本一样，中国不再是开办幼儿园的最佳地点，但养老院却是一项蓬勃发展的生意。除了没有孩子的中国移民外，目前估计还有五十万至一百万菲律宾人在老年护理行业工作。鉴于世界上一半的香烟在中国销售，似乎相对可以肯定的是，将需要更多的护士来照顾那些患有癌症和其他慢性病的人。

So does China. Like America and Japan, China is no longer the best place to open a kindergarten—but elderly homes are a thriving business. In addition to childless Chinese migrants, an estimated five hundred thousand to 1 million Filipinos work in the elder-care industry today. Given that half the world’s cigarettes are sold in China, it seems relatively certain that even more nurses will be needed to care for those suffering from cancer and other chronic diseases.

菲律宾已经是世界上最大的医院护士供应国，但培训护士的速度却无法满足全球需求——预计未来二十年将新增 1 亿个就业岗位。与此同时，随着菲律宾家庭变得更加富裕，他们希望将护士和保姆留在国内，而不是输出。因此，马尼拉正在进行激烈的国际招聘活动，广告牌上宣传德语课程和欧洲快速签证。德国不仅从亚洲招募人才，还从波兰和保加利亚吸纳了60岁的热心女性，她们每​​周7天、每天24小时工作，照顾德国50万居家的八十多岁和九十多岁的老人。

The Philippines, already the largest supplier of nurses for the world’s hospitals, can’t train nurses fast enough to meet global demand—an expected 100 million new jobs over the next two decades. Meanwhile, as Filipino families get wealthier, they want to keep nurses and nannies at home rather than export them. Hence the intense international recruitment campaigns underway in Manila, where billboards advertise German lessons and fast-track visas to Europe. Germany is not only recruiting from Asia but siphoning hearty sixty-year-old women from Poland and Bulgaria who work 24-7 caring for Germany’s half million homebound octogenarians and nonagenarians.

护士和家庭工人是观察贫困国家年轻女性在全球人才争夺战中所扮演角色的理想镜头。耶鲁大学学者安朱·保罗（Anju Paul）更恰当地将她们称为“跨国女佣”，因为她们利用侨民网络和安置经纪人在亚洲、中东和北美转移以寻求更高的工资。经验丰富的护理人员和女佣的需求量很大，因此他们有议价能力；保罗甚至创建了一个他们可以使用的指数，根据各国可以预期的治疗质量对各国进行排名。对于来自印度和印度尼西亚的下一波外派护士来说，这肯定非常有用，这些国家的年轻女性人口数量远多于菲律宾。³追踪女佣在世界各地的行动揭示了移民（如古代世界的商人）在点对点情报共享方面的效率。一旦他们在某个地方扎根，他们的存在就会成为其他寻找值得去的地方的领头羊。无论是在日本、澳大利亚、沙特阿拉伯还是加拿大，没有哪个专业人士比亚洲女佣更能体现当今和未来的量子工作者。

Nurses and household workers are an ideal lens for viewing the role of young women from poor countries in the global war for talent. Yale scholar Anju Paul more appropriately labels them “multinational maids” for the way in which they leverage diaspora networks and placement brokers to shift across Asia, the Middle East, and North America in search of higher wages. Experienced caregivers and maids are so in demand that they have bargaining power; Paul has even created an index they can use that ranks countries by the quality of treatment they can expect. It’s sure to prove very useful to the next waves of outbound nurses from India and Indonesia, countries with far larger equally young female populations than the Philippines.³ Tracking maids’ movements around the world reveals how effective migrants (like the traders of the ancient world) can be at peer-to-peer intelligence sharing. Once they establish themselves somewhere, their presence is a bellwether for others looking for places worth going to. Whether in Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, or Canada, no professional better embodies the quantum worker of today and tomorrow than the Asian maid.

杂种人性

Mongrel humanity

即将到来的亚洲人口不断向外迁徙将改变地球的面貌。大规模移民不仅改变了人们的居住地，也改变了他们的身份我们是。每年都会有新的考古学、人类学和遗传学研究成果展示出世界上许多部落在几千年来是如何真正融合在一起的，以及几乎渗透到我们所有人身上的遗传多样性。我自己的 DNA 测试揭示了波罗的海和地中海血统，乍一看似乎很奇怪，但考虑到印度的入侵历史，这是相当合理的。人类的血液中流淌着移民的痕迹。这提醒我们，流动性——而不是部落主义——是我们的原始本能，比任何人为的种族或民族忠诚更深刻地根植于我们作为人类的本能。事实上，最近的古生物学研究表明，尼安德特人灭绝的原因之一是他们缺乏我们流动性更强的智人祖先的遗传多样性。流动性刷新并扩大了我们的基因库。

The relentless outward Asian migrations that lie ahead will change the complexion of the planet. Mass migrations have not only altered where people are but also who we are. Each year brings new archaeological, anthropological, and genetic research showing how truly mingled the world’s many tribes have been over the millennia, and the genetic diversity that permeates almost all of us. My own DNA test reveals Baltic and Mediterranean lineage, which at first seems bizarre yet is quite sensible in light of India’s history of invasions. So much of humanity has migration in its blood. This is a reminder that mobility—not tribalism—is our original instinct, more deeply hard-wired into who we are as humans than any contrived racial or ethnic allegiance. Indeed, recent paleontology research suggests that one reason Neanderthals became extinct is that they lacked the genetic diversity of our more mobile Homo sapien ancestors. Mobility refreshed and broadened our gene pool.

与史前时代一样，今天不断增强的流动性加速了人类的基因碰撞。过去八年的大规模移民已经形成了一个日益融合的全球社会，并破坏了种族同质的“民族国家”的理念。虽然中国和孟加拉国等国家仍然以单一民族为主，但所有主要英语国家——美国、加拿大、英国和澳大利亚——除了现有的少数民族人口外，还有超过 20% 的外国出生人口。它们正在逐步成为“少数族裔占多数”的国家，在这些国家中，少数群体共同代表了大多数人口。他们已经挤满了连字符的“印度裔加拿大人”、“华裔美国人”等等。一个世纪前，白人至上主义者三K党坚持用这种连字符来明确区分移民和大多数人。但当大多数人都被连字符连接时，那么连字符的“民族国家”实际上就已经过时了。

As in prehistoric times, today’s intensifying mobility accelerates humanity’s genetic collisions. The past eight decades of mass migrations have already forged an increasingly blended global society and undermined the very idea of the ethnically homogeneous “nation-state.” While countries such as China and Bangladesh remain dominated by a single ethnic group, all major Anglophone states—America, Canada, England, and Australia—have more than 20 percent foreign-born populations in addition to their existing minorities. They’re well on their way to becoming “majority-minority” countries in which minorities collectively represent the majority of the population. Already they’re packed with hyphenated “Indian-Canadians,” “Chinese-Americans,” and so forth. A century ago, the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan insisted on such hyphenation to clearly demarcate immigrants from the majority. But when most people are hyphenated, then it is the hyphenated “nation-state” that has literally become passé.

与气候变化一样，种族稀释是一个渐进的过程跨越了一个临界点。北美已成为欧洲、美洲原住民、拉丁美洲和亚洲的混合体。截至 2015 年，17% 的美国婚姻是混血婚姻，其中白人与亚洲人的混血夫妇如雨后春笋般涌现。如今，一些年轻的亚裔美国女性因嫁给白人男性而受到骚扰，但下一代不太可能面临同样的挑战，因为他们已经变得如此混血。欧洲社会也正在与北非、土耳其、斯拉夫和阿拉伯人民融合。在伦敦，现在超过 10% 的孩子是由非洲或南亚裔与英欧混血的夫妇所生。穆罕默德已成为那里新生儿最受欢迎的名字。2020 年的一项调查显示，十分之九的英国人对社会中的混血婚姻感到满意。⁴在德国和法国，与阿拉伯人、非洲人和土耳其人通婚也已成为主流。我们的人口未来将看起来更像是棕色、黄色、黑色和白色的环境。

Like climate change, racial dilution is a gradual process that has crossed a tipping point. North America has become a European, Native American, Latino, and Asian mélange. As of 2015, 17 percent of American marriages are mixed-race, with Caucasian-Asian mixed-race couples mushrooming. Today some young Asian-American women get harassed for marrying white men, and yet the next generation is unlikely to face the same challenges precisely because it has become so mixed-race. European societies are also melding with North African, Turkish, Slavic, and Arab peoples. In London, more than 10 percent of children are now born to couples mixing African or South Asian with Anglo-European. Mohammed has become the most popular name for newborn boys there. A 2020 survey shows that nine out of ten Britons would be comfortable with a mixed-race marriage in their society.⁴ In Germany and France, inter-marriage with Arab, African, and Turkish populations has also become mainstream. Our demographic future will look ever more like a brown, yellow, black, and white milieu.

亚洲人在远东地区的交往也越来越多。5000万华人侨民已经不可避免地融入到一些国家的结构中，这些国家的名字暗示着种族的特殊性，比如泰国和马来西亚，但实际上这些国家更多的是土著人、华人和印度人的混合体。华人、印度人和其他种族之间的通婚正在增长。在中国，直到 20 世纪 80 年代，异族通婚登记为零，但与其他亚洲国家、欧洲人和非洲人的婚姻数量一直在上升。

Asian people are increasingly mingling in the Far East as well. The 50-million-strong Chinese diaspora has become inextricably woven into the fabric of countries whose names suggest ethnic specificity, such as Thailand and Malaysia, but who in reality are much more a blend of indigenous, Chinese, and Indian people. Intermarriage among Chinese, Indian, and other races is growing. In China itself, zero interracial marriages were registered until the 1980s, but they have been on the rise, with other Asian nationalities, Europeans, and Africans.

没有人被迫与本民族以外的人结婚；我们自愿这样做，而且越来越多的人这样做。种族纯洁性的错觉已经成为种族主义者强加给其他人的政治选择。但现实已经不可逆转地超越了这种倒退的愿景。一些国家的仇外心理无法消除全球范围内的基因混合。因此，我们也应该对“文化就是命运”的观念抱有很大的怀疑，好像有一种固定的民族文化代代相传，没有经过任何修改或适应。正如很少有纯粹的民族国家一样，不存在一成不变的文化。同化可能看起来像是一场恶性竞争，但最终融合占了上风。我们的命运是成为一个全球性的混合文明。

Nobody is forced to marry outside their ethnic group; we do so voluntarily and in ever growing numbers. The delusion of racial purity has become a political choice racists inflict on the rest. But reality has irreversibly overtaken such regressive visions. Xenophobia in some countries can’t unwind genetic mingling worldwide. We should therefore also be very cynical about the notion that “culture is destiny,” as if there is a fixed national culture passed down from generation to generation without modification or adaptation. Just as there are few pure nation-states, there is no immutable culture. Assimilation may seem like a vicious contest, but fusion prevails in the end. Our destiny is to be a global mongrel civilization.

侨民地缘政治

Diaspora geopolitics

越来越多的亚洲移民意味着越来越多的亚洲侨民，即广泛分散的族裔社区，他们的足迹遍布每个国家，并在自己的祖国和在新家园中以自己的名义发挥影响力。^十九世纪和二十世纪的大规模移民为侨民在战后几十年的美国政治中发挥关键作用奠定了基础。著名的例子包括犹太人关于以色列的问题、爱尔兰人关于北爱尔兰争端的问题，以及东欧人在 20 世纪 90 年代末为扩大北约联盟而广泛游说的问题。

More Asian migration means ever larger Asian diasporas, the widely dispersed ethnic communities that keep one foot in each country—and wield influence both in their homelands and on their own behalf in their new homes.^I The mass migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries set the stage for diasporas to play a key role in American politics throughout the postwar decades. Notable examples are Jews with respect to Israel, Irish on the Northern Ireland dispute, and Eastern Europeans who lobbied extensively for the expansion of the NATO alliance in the late 1990s.

所有主要的亚洲侨民——中国人、印度人、孟加拉国人、巴基斯坦人和菲律宾人——都在世界各地扎根。在东南亚，大量华人越来越被认为是潜在的第五纵队。在一代人的时间里，加拿大、澳大利亚、新加坡和美国的中国移民已经从工人阶级的怜悯案件变成了复杂的外国影响行动的嫌疑人。然而，总的来说，在美国被同化的中国移民倾向于采取防御措施，维护他们的新生活方式，而不是引入压迫。这就是为什么两国之间爆发了抗议活动华裔美国人和亲中民族主义阵营在香港和人权问题上的立场。今天到达美国的年轻中国学生比他们的前辈英语说得更好，但这并不一定是为了更好地融入美国。相反，他们对中国的发展更有信心。在《大学日报》微信群的怂恿下，他们炮轰美国本身的诽谤性新闻，维持民族主义，敦促他们回国。似乎正在发挥作用。绝大多数在美国的中国学生毕业后都会回国，或者前往其他更热情好客的国家。当流动性和技术交叉时，就不能再假设同化。身份倍增并处于紧张状态。

All the major Asian diasporas—Chinese, Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Filipino—are digging deeper roots around the world. In Southeast Asia, large ethnic Chinese populations are increasingly considered a potential fifth column. Within one generation, Chinese migrants to Canada, Australia, Singapore, and the US have gone from working-class mercy cases to suspects in sophisticated foreign influence operations. By and large, however, assimilated Chinese immigrants in America have tended to be defensive about preserving their new way of life rather than importing oppression. That’s why protests have broken out between Chinese-Americans and pro-Chinese nationalist camps over Hong Kong and human rights. Today’s young Chinese students arriving in the US speak better English than their predecessors, but not necessarily to better fit in. Rather, they’re more confident in China’s rise, egged on by the “College Daily” WeChat group that blasts out slanderous news about the US itself to maintain nationalism and urge them to return home. It seems to be working. The vast majority of Chinese students in America do return after graduation, or move on to other more hospitable countries. Where mobility and technology intersect, assimilation can no longer be assumed. Identities multiply and exist in tension.

但现在许多中国移民已经取得了当地公民身份（或保持双重国籍），他们的活动不能纯粹被视为外交政策问题。尤其是在加拿大和澳大利亚，“他们”已经成为“我们”的一部分，政府正在努力确定谁忠于哪个国家。澳大利亚最近禁止外国对政党提供财政支持，而加拿大则在争论是否引渡已成为加拿大居民的中国人。

But now that many Chinese immigrants have taken local citizenship (or maintained dual citizenship), their activities can’t be treated purely as a foreign policy matter. Especially in Canada and Australia, “they” have become part of “we,” and governments are struggling to determine who is loyal to which country. Australia recently banned foreign financial support for political parties, while Canada debates whether to extradite Chinese who have become Canadian residents.

随着印度人在美国的财富和影响力的上升，他们对印度和美国政党的资助也随之增加。印度侨民在将印度打造成美国在亚洲的民主盟友方面发挥了重要作用。2019 年 9 月举行的“Howdy Modi”集会吸引了 5 万名侨民聚集在休斯敦的 NRG 体育场，与纳伦德拉·莫迪总理和唐纳德·特朗普举行联合集会。代际鸿沟值得注意：虽然集会中的大多数都是中年人，但外面的年轻印裔美国人却举着标语牌抗议莫迪（和特朗普），称他（和特朗普）是法西斯分子。

As Indians’ wealth and clout in the US have risen, so too has their funding of both Indian and American political parties. The diaspora has been instrumental in branding India as America’s democratic ally in Asia. The “Howdy Modi” gathering in September 2019 packed fifty thousand diaspora members into Houston’s NRG Stadium for a joint rally with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Donald Trump. The generational divide is worth noting: While most in the rally were middle-aged, young Indian-Americans outside protested Modi with placards calling him (and Trump) a fascist.

在过去的三代人中，足够多的印度人获得了最令人垂涎​​的英国公民身份，他们现在可以操纵英国政治。印度人民党海外之友（Bharatiya Janata Party，或印度人民党）（OFBJP）在英国最为活跃，该党在英国集结了 140 万英属印度人，投票支持鲍里斯·约翰逊 (Boris Johnson) 领导的保守党，反对杰里米·科尔宾 (Jeremy Corbyn) 领导的工党。国际社会对克什米尔的干预。工党曾经能够依靠几乎所有少数族裔和移民选民，但现在不行了。（科尔宾的亲巴勒斯坦立场也让犹太侨民反对他。）但是与美国一样，年轻的英属印度人对他们祖先的土地明显表现得比较冷淡。

Enough Indians have gained their most coveted UK citizenship over the past three generations that they now manipulate British politics. The Overseas Friends of BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, or Indian People’s Party), or OFBJP, is nowhere more active than the UK, where it rallied 1.4 million British Indians to vote for Boris Johnson’s Tories against Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party after the latter vocally called for international intervention in Kashmir. The Labour Party used to be able to count on almost all minority and immigrant voters, but no longer. (Corbyn’s pro-Palestinian stance turned the Jewish diaspora against him as well.) But as in the US, younger British Indians are distinctly cooler toward their ancestral land.

美国和英国的印度人数量不断增加，这体现了随着时间的推移，一些国家已经制定了仪式化的协议来管理经常在两国之间流动的数百万家庭和学生。无论是外交关系的高点还是低点，渗透都已经到了不可挽回的地步。

The growing numbers of Indians in America and Britain embody how, over time, some pairs of countries have developed ritualized accords for managing the millions of families and students regularly flowing between them. Whether diplomatic ties stand at a high or low point, the penetration has crossed the point of no return.

我。几千年来，犹太人更像是散居国外的人，而不是一个国家，经历了从古代亚述到纳粹德国的驱逐——因此有句俗话：树有根，犹太人有腿。二战后，犹太侨民在以色列的建立过程中发挥了重要作用，但时至今日，犹太侨民人数估计已达到 800 万，仍然比以色列的 600 万人口还要多。

I. For millennia, the Jewish people existed more as diaspora than nation, enduring expulsions from ancient Assyria to Nazi Germany—hence the saying that while trees have roots, Jews have legs. The Jewish diaspora was instrumental in the creation of Israel after World War II, but to this day the Jewish diaspora numbers an estimated 8 million people, still larger than Israel’s 6 million population.

第10章亚洲太平洋地区的退却与复兴

CHAPTER 10 RETREAT AND RENEWAL IN PACIFIC ASIA

京华城中国

Metropole China

世界上人口最多的国家需要更多的人口，而且速度很快。

The world’s most populous country needs more people—fast.

数亿中国人从农村向城市大规模迁移，已经连根拔起数千年来大家庭同住一屋的传统。随着老年人口达到顶峰，年轻的中国人不再在家照顾两位年迈的父母：到2030年，中国近15亿人口中约有四分之一将超过65岁，这意味着中国的老年人口数量将与美国一样多人们。到那时（及以后），中国年轻人将面临“4-2-1”问题：独自一人，但在经济上要对两名父母和四名祖父母负责。

The mass migration of hundreds of millions of Chinese from rural to urban areas has uprooted thousands of years of tradition by which extended families lived together under one roof. Younger Chinese are no longer home to take care of two aging parents just as the elderly population crests: By 2030, about a quarter of China’s nearly 1.5 billion people will be over sixty-five, meaning China will have as many elderly people as America has people. By that time (and beyond), a young Chinese person will face the “4-2-1” problem: being alone but financially responsible for two parents and four grandparents.

但老年护理不再是勤劳、城市和流动的中国人的工作，就像美国人和德国人的工作一样，因此中国开始大规模引进女性。已经有成千上万的韩国、越南和缅甸妇女被带到中国作为过剩男性人口的新娘。无论有没有孩子，她们的主要工作就是照顾婆婆。

But elder care is no more a job for hardworking, urban, and mobile Chinese as it is for Americans and Germans, hence China has begun a major binge of importing women. Already many thousands of Korean, Vietnamese, and Burmese women have been brought to China as brides for the surplus male population. Whether or not they have children, their main job will be to care for their husbands’ parents.

男人们会做什么？中国飞速发展的城市化、快速自动化和严重的性别失衡造成了大量男性就业不足，其中许多人没有高中学历。他们占了三亿流动人口的大部分，他们在居住地没有登记（户口），这限制了他们获得社会福利的机会。政府最近开始取消户口要求，以便中国人能够更自由地流动，但他们也引入了社会信用体系，使政府能够确定任何人去任何地方旅行的权利。

And what will the men do? China’s breakneck urbanization, rapid automation, and massive gender imbalance have created an enormous rump of underemployed men, many of whom lack high school degrees. They make up the bulk of the 300 million migrants lacking registration (hukou) in the places they live, restricting their access to social benefits. The government recently began to eliminate hukou requirements so Chinese could be more freely mobile—but they also introduced the social credit system, which allows the government to determine anyone’s right to travel anywhere.

中国是否有一个宏伟的计划来解决其巨大的人口不匹配问题？数百万人将继续被征召加入军队和警察，还有数百万人将在全国范围内从事大型水利工程项目，还有数百万人将被派往复兴农田，还有数百万人将在亚洲、非洲的能源和建筑项目上工作，并远至南美，服务中国一带一路倡议。所有这些都应该让他们远离街头。

Does China have a grand plan to sort out its massive demographic mismatches? Millions will continue to be drafted into the military and police, millions more will work on massive hydro-engineering projects across the country, yet more millions will be sent to resuscitate farmlands, and millions more will labor on energy and construction projects across Asia, Africa, and as far as South America in the service of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. All of this should keep them off the streets.

西方和亚洲大国已经建立了联盟，以确保中国不会主宰它们，但外国人能适应一个自成一体的中国吗？在中国居住的外国人仅有100万；即使多五倍也几乎不会被注意到。比数量更重要的是其中的趋势。在中国各地的大学校园里，我们发现了大量的欧洲、非洲、阿拉伯和其他亚洲学生——2019 年总数接近 50 万人（其中只有 1.2 万人是美国学生）。除此之外，从尼日利亚到巴基斯坦，越来越多的年轻专业人士在中国接受职业培训。正如一位北京大学学者对我说的，“即使来自美国的学生数量下降了，来自‘一带一路’的学生数量却大幅增加，

Western and Asian powers have built coalitions to ensure China doesn’t dominate them, but can foreigners adapt to a China that is a world unto itself? Only 1 million foreigners live in China; even five times more would scarcely register. More important than the number are the trends among them. At university campuses across China, one finds large numbers of European, African, Arab, and other Asian students—a total of nearly five hundred thousand in 2019 (only twelve thousand of which were American). On top of this there are growing numbers of young professionals from Nigeria to Pakistan who undertake vocational training in China. As one Peking University scholar put it to me, “Even if the number of students from the USA is down, the students from BRI is way up,” referring to the nearly one hundred countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative.

令人惊讶的是，中国还拥有越来越多的日本科学家，尽管他们拥有高学历，但仍无法在日本找到工作。其中至少有八千个目前分布在中国的大学和研究机构中，推动中国的研究领域从天文学到动物学，最重要的是气候科学和工程。中国在世界舞台上表现得更加民族主义，但是北京也将自己打造成国际化大都市，就像过去几个世纪里伦敦和巴黎对其殖民地人口的定位一样。

China is also, surprisingly, home to growing numbers of Japanese scientists who can’t find jobs in Japan despite their advanced degrees. At least eight thousand of them are currently spread throughout Chinese universities and institutes advancing China’s research into everything from astronomy to zoology, and most importantly climate science and engineering. China is acting more nationalist on the world stage, but Beijing is also branding itself as a cosmopolitan metropole as London and Paris were to their colonial populations in centuries past.

许多人认为中美贸易和技术摩擦表明美国公司及其外籍员工将裁员并回国。但企业遵循的是供应链，而不是政府的指令。外国公司减少在中国的业务的原因有很多，比如当地工资上涨、来自全国冠军企业的激烈竞争、对没有高级学位的英语教师的打击等等。但这并不表明他们会回家。事实上，随着中国消费增长，2019年在华美国人总数增至7.5万人。从苹果到耐克再到特斯拉，美国公司已经采取（或被迫采取）“在中国，为中国”的战略，本地生产本地销售。欧洲人在同一条船上，因为他们的公司比美国公司更依赖亚洲收入。想要在这些公司的运营中担任经理的外籍人士仍然非常需要学习中文。

Many view US-China trade and technological frictions as indications that American firms—and thus their expat employees—will retrench and return home. But companies follow supply chains, not government diktats. There are many reasons for foreign firms to reduce their exposure to China, such as rising local wages, intense competition from national champions, a crackdown on English teachers without advanced degrees, and more. But none of this suggests they’ll come home. Indeed, the total number of Americans in China rose to seventy-five thousand in 2019 on the back of the country’s consumer growth. From Apple to Nike to Tesla, American companies have adopted (or been forced to adopt) an “in China, for China” strategy, making locally what they sell locally. Europeans are in the same boat, for their companies depend even more on Asian revenue than American companies do. Expats who want to be employed as managers in these companies’ operations will very much still need to learn Chinese.

寻找“亚洲梦”

In search of the “Asian Dream”

如今，“家庭价值观”这个词适用于稳定婚姻和忠诚的东亚人，就像适用于西方社会的家庭单位一样，甚至更多。但与西方年轻人一样，要确定亚洲年轻人“安定下来”的年龄变得越来越困难。近100万中国人已经移居日本，在那里从事从出纳员到金融分析师等各种职业的工作，还有25万中国人移居韩国。三个国家的老一辈都心怀深深的相互猜疑，但年轻人却不在乎。正如新加坡一位三十岁的中国科技千禧一代告诉我的那样，“我不想结婚生子。我想在四十五岁退休，在日本的农场度过一段时间，然后更多地旅行。我会将我的资产转移到加密货币中并四处走动。”

These days, the phrase “family values” applies to stably married and loyal East Asians as much as or more than it applies to family units in Western societies. But as with Western youth, it’s ever more difficult to pinpoint an age at which young Asians “settle down.” Nearly 1 million Chinese have already moved to Japan, where they work across professions, from cashier to financial analyst, and a quarter of a million have moved to South Korea. The older generation of all three countries harbors deep mutual suspicions, but youth couldn’t care less. As one thirty-year-old Chinese tech millennial in Singapore told me, “I don’t want to get married and have kids. I’d like to retire by forty-five and spend some time in Japan on a farm, then travel more. I’ll shift my assets into crypto and move around.”

亚洲游客和商务旅行者已经在全球每个角落都不容错过，但他们在自己地区的跨境流动强度是其外部的两倍。几千年来，亚洲孕育了多种独特而深厚的文明，现在它也具备了通用的条件。

Asian tourists and business travelers are already unmissable in every corner of the globe—but the intensity of their cross-border movements is twice as high in their own region as outside of it. For thousands of years, Asia has featured multiple unique and deep civilizations; now it has the makings of a common one as well.

尽管与东北邻国相比，南亚和东南亚社会仍属于中低收入国家，但他们的年轻人也处于类似的境地。千禧一代已经占印度劳动力的一半以上，他们彼此竞争，也与算法竞争。印度制造业和科技领域每年创造的就业机会远低于承诺和预期，印度大学毕业生的失业率高得令人痛苦。对于每年数以百万计的新劳动力进入者以及那些因自动化而失业的人来说，工作不会降临到他们身上。他们将迁往西方或东南亚充满活力的经济体。

While South and Southeast Asian societies are still lower-middle-income compared to their neighbors to the northeast, their youth are in a similar boat. Millennials are already more than half of India’s workforce, competing against one another as well as algorithms. India’s annual job creation in manufacturing and tech is falling way below promises and expectations, and unemployment for India’s university graduates is painfully high. For the millions of new labor force entrants each year—and those laid off due to automation—the jobs won’t come to them. They’ll move to the West or to Southeast Asia’s dynamic economies.

东南亚是继中国和印度之后的世界第三人口大国，也是最年轻的地区之一，其7亿人口中有一半以上年龄在30岁以下。他们也有两件事：搬到城市并获得相关技能。由于整个地区的劳动力自由流动，在新加坡和曼谷发现已经在三四个国家生活过的向上流动的千禧一代并不罕见。东南亚千禧一代的异族通婚率不断上升，并拥有乐观的前景和进步的精神。尽管亚洲国家人口众多，但它们也向外国投资和人才敞开了大门。从20世纪60年代开始，新独立的新加坡邀请跨国公司和工人，这两股力量协同推动该国的经济增长和多元化。五十年后，其三分之一的人口是外国人，并成为世界上最具创新力的经济体之一。印度尼西亚、越南和菲律宾等国家目前正在对公用事业、银行、农场、航空公司和其他大型国有企业进行私有化，从世界各地引入新的资本和管理团队，以引导更具生产力的投资。

Southeast Asia, the world’s third most populous region after China and India, is also one of the youngest, with more than half of its 700 million people under the age of thirty. They too have two things on their minds: moving to cities and gaining relevant skills. With free labor mobility across the region, it’s not uncommon to find upwardly mobile millennials in Singapore and Bangkok who have already lived in three or four countries. Southeast Asian millennials have rising rates of intermarriage and share an optimistic outlook and progressive ethos. Despite their already giant populations, Asian countries have also thrown open their doors to foreign investment and talent. Starting in the 1960s, newly independent Singapore invited in multinational companies and workers, the two forces in tandem propelling the country’s economic growth and diversification. Fifty years later, one-third of its population is foreigners and it ranks as one of the world’s most innovative economies. Countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are now privatizing utilities, banks, farms, airlines, and other large state-controlled companies, bringing in fresh capital and management teams from around the world to guide more productive investments.

随着这些国家以便捷的签证、良好的学校、优质的医疗保健和快速的网络连接铺开红地毯，居住在东南亚的外籍人士数量每年都在增长。在目睹了美国和欧洲大部分地区对冠状病毒处理不当的情况后，在亚洲的西方侨民没有计划自愿返回他们低增长和民粹主义的祖国。疫情期间，一些西方侨民失去了工作，不得不被迫回国，但与此同时，美国和澳大利亚申请泰国“精英居留”计划的人数激增，因为该国感染率较低，且医疗旅游服务价格实惠。

The number of expats populating Southeast Asia is growing every year as these countries roll out the red carpet with easy visas, good schools, quality healthcare, and fast connectivity. After witnessing how the US and much of Europe mishandled the coronavirus, Western expats in Asia have no plans to voluntarily return to their low-growth and populist homelands. During the pandemic, some Western expats lost their jobs and had to return home against their will, but at the same time, American and Australian applications for Thailand’s “Elite Residence” program surged because of the country’s low infection rate and affordable medical tourism offerings.

今天的亚洲有越来越多的人从未想过自己会来到这里：不仅是西方侨民，还有亚洲人自己，他们几十年前离开到西方，但作为高管和企业家及其家人回到了亚洲。如此多的此类“重拍”是伟大的全球移民故事的一部分，我们需要扭转熟悉的表述：我使用“美国亚裔”一词来描述我自己和成千上万返回亚洲的亚裔美国人，尽管我们的父母和兄弟姐妹仍然留在西方。在可预见的未来，一切进展顺利，但如果情况发生变化，我们随时可以再次采取行动。

Asia today features ever more people who never thought they’d be there: not just Western expats but Asians themselves who left decades ago for the West but have returned as executives and entrepreneurs—and with their families. So many such “re-pats” are part of the great global migration story that we need to reverse familiar formulations: I use the term “American-Asians” to describe myself and many thousands of Asian-Americans who have returned to Asia even though our parents and siblings remain in the West. The going is good for the foreseeable future, but should things change, we can always move again.

亚洲气候移民浪潮

Asia’s swirl of climate migrants

虽然世界大部分地区变得更加炎热和干燥，但亚洲的高海拔地区和热带湿地却变得更加湿润。兴都库什和喜马拉雅地区横跨巴基斯坦、印度、尼泊尔、中国和不丹，生活着 2.4 亿人，但约有 16 亿人依赖发源于此的十个河流系统。在中国、印度和巴基斯坦遭受干旱之际，喜马拉雅山脉和青藏高原一万五千座冰川的融化可能被视为一个值得欢迎的进展。但炎热的冰川径流和极端降雨导致水坝决堤，导致印度全境出现危险的洪水和山体滑坡。东北。如果未来十年三分之二的喜马拉雅冰川融化，数亿人的生命将受到威胁。冰川融化已经导致印度和孟加拉国恒河三角洲遭受永久性洪水。但最终，河流将会干涸，洪水取代干旱。未来几十年，由于海平面上升、河流泛滥和干旱，亚洲许多边境地区内和跨境的数亿人将不得不迁移。

While much of the world gets hotter and drier, Asia’s high altitude and tropical wetlands are getting wetter. Two hundred and forty million people live in the Hindu Kush and Himalayan region—across Pakistan, India, Nepal, China, and Bhutan—but about 1.6 billion depend on the ten river systems originating there. At a time when droughts have parched China, India, and Pakistan, the melting of fifteen thousand glaciers in the Himalayan Mountains and Tibetan Plateau might be seen as a welcome development. But torrid glacier runoff and extreme rainfall have caused dams to burst, resulting in treacherous flooding and landslides across India’s northeast. If two-thirds of the Himalayan glaciers melt in the coming decade, hundreds of millions of lives will be imperiled. Melting glaciers are already contributing to the permanent flooding of the Ganges delta across India and Bangladesh. But eventually, the rivers will dry up, with floods giving way to droughts. Over the coming decades, hundreds of millions of people will have to move due to rising seas, flooding rivers, and droughts—both within and across Asia’s many borders.

恒河、雅鲁藏布江和湄公河的源头都在西藏，西藏对中国的重要性不在于人口少，而在于其环境地理：中国希望确保对地球“第三极”的无可争议的控制。中国已经建造或规划了数百个水坝项目，将水引入庞大的南水北调工程。南水北调工程是一个运河系统，将水从长江和黄河输送到供水紧张的东北地区，那里有数亿人口。中国人每天都喝受污染的水。中国是唯一一个能够最终花费1000亿美元并迫使十多个省份协调基础设施投资、同时让数百万人流离失所的国家（就像它建造世界最大水力发电厂三峡大坝那样） 。它也必须这么做，因为它无法让公民或公司更好地节约用水，也不能指望在新西兰等国家购买瓶装水厂，新西兰的抗议活动迫使该国停止抽取原始湖泊。与此同时，中国对其下游邻国的计划不太透明：它与印度、孟加拉国或其他国家没有正式的水资源共享协议。即使确实如此，水位也开始出现不可预测的波动，以至于在一些支流上修建了水坝，以防止可能永远不会到达的水。中国对其下游邻国的计划不太透明：它与印度、孟加拉国或其他国家没有正式的水资源共享协议。即使确实如此，水位也开始出现不可预测的波动，以至于在一些支流上修建了水坝，以防止可能永远不会到达的水。中国对其下游邻国的计划不太透明：它与印度、孟加拉国或其他国家没有正式的水资源共享协议。即使确实如此，水位也开始出现不可预测的波动，以至于在一些支流上修建了水坝，以防止可能永远不会到达的水。

The headwaters of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Mekong Rivers all lie in Tibet, whose importance to China rests not in its tiny population but its environmental geography: China wants to ensure uncontested control over the Earth’s “third pole.” China has built or planned hundreds of dam projects to direct flows into its gargantuan South-to-North Water Diversion Project, a system of canals transferring water from the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers to those supplying the water-stressed northeast, where hundreds of millions of Chinese drink contaminated water every day. China is the only country that can spend the eventual price tag of $100 billion and force more than a dozen provinces to coordinate their infrastructure investments while displacing millions of people (as it did to build the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest hydroelectric power plant). And it has to, since it can’t get its citizens or companies to better conserve water, nor can it count on buying bottled water plants in countries such as New Zealand, where protests have forced a halt on siphoning the country’s pristine lakes. Meanwhile, China has been less than transparent with its downstream neighbors about its plans: It has no formal water sharing agreements with India, Bangladesh, or other countries. Even if it did, water levels have begun to fluctuate so unpredictably that on some tributaries dams have been built for water that may never arrive.

印度有14亿人口，居住在世界上数十个污染最严重、淡水匮乏的城市，但其拥有的淡水甚至比中国还少。这就是为什么印度做出巨大努力将喜马拉雅山的水输送到农场和城市水库。在西方在喜马拉雅山脉的拉达克地区，人们尝试了巧妙的解决方案，例如将冰川径流输送到佛塔形状的结构中（适合该地区盛行的佛教信仰），这些结构缓慢融化，可用于灌溉高海拔农业。莫迪政府还规划了中国式的国家河流连接工程（NRLP），以确保印度继续发挥全球粮仓的作用。

India possesses even less freshwater than China for its 1.4 billion people who inhabit dozens of the world’s most polluted and freshwater-deficient cities. That’s why India has launched enormous efforts to channel Himalayan water to farms and urban reservoirs. In the western Himalayan territory of Ladakh, ingenious solutions have been tried such as piping glacial runoff into stupa-shaped formations (appropriate for the Buddhist faith prevalent in the region) that melt slowly and can be used to irrigate high-altitude farming. The Modi administration has also planned a Chinese-style National River Linking Project (NRLP) to ensure India’s continued role as a global breadbasket.

印度动荡的国内移民不仅是从村庄到城市，而且是从北到南寻找工作和更好的气候。2019 年，在新德里接受调查的受访者中，有 40% 的人表示他们正在考虑搬到更南边的空气更清洁的城市。安得拉邦和卡纳塔克邦等南方大邦在过去的十年里见证了数百万北印度人的迁入，果阿的海滨天堂也被北印度人（和欧洲游客）占领。班加罗尔已经从印度的“花园城市”变成了“垃圾城市”。与此同时，钦奈2019年的水资源短缺要求政府每天调度几辆五十节车厢的机车，从三百多公里外运送数百万升水。

India’s tumultuous internal migration has not only been from villages to cities but also from north to south in search of jobs and better climate. Forty percent of those surveyed in New Delhi in 2019 about their likely response to the city’s worsening air quality said they were considering moving farther south to cities with cleaner air. Large southern states such as Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have witnessed millions of north Indians moving in over just the past ten years, and the beachfront paradise of Goa has been overrun by north Indians (and European tourists) as well. Bangalore has gone from India’s “garden city” to its “garbage city.” Meanwhile, Chennai’s 2019 water shortage required the government to dispatch several fifty-carriage locomotives each day carrying millions of liters of water from more than three hundred kilometers away.

也许许多南迁的印度人会再次向北返回喜马拉雅山。2019年，印度政府在行政上将佛教徒居住的拉达克与穆斯林占多数的查谟和克什米尔分开，取消了它们的半自治特殊地位，并将其转变为由新德里直接管辖的“联邦直辖区”。这种政治策略使任何印度人——不仅仅是穆斯林克什米尔人——都可以在克什米尔购买土地，鉴于其温和的季节性气候和令人惊叹的喜马拉雅风景，许多印度人无疑会渴望这样做。同样重要的是，克什米尔是印度河及其所有支流的源头所在地。印度正在加快印度河上游的大型水坝项目，以增加克什米尔和旁遮普邦的灌溉，这两个地区生产印度10%以上的小麦和谷物。

Maybe the many Indians that have moved south will recirculate back north toward the Himalayas again. In 2019, the Indian government administratively separated Buddhist-populated Ladakh from Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir, revoking their semi-autonomous special status and converting them into “union territories” directly governed from New Delhi. This political maneuver made it possible for any Indian—not just Muslim Kashmiris—to buy land in Kashmir, something many Indians would no doubt be eager to do given its moderate, seasonal climate and breathtaking Himalayan scenery. Equally importantly, Kashmir is home to the headwaters of the Indus River and all of its tributaries. India is expediting major dam projects on the upper Indus to boost irrigation for Kashmir and Punjab, which produces more than 10 percent of India’s wheat and cereals.

七十多年来，克什米尔一直是印度的一部分，但又不完全是印度的一部分。就像汉族人进入穆斯林维吾尔族家园一样新疆、印度教印度人将殖民克什米尔，这表明国内人口转移与国际人口转移一样具有战略意义。这种出于人口动机的决定也可能改变地区权力平衡，因为印度现在可以切断流向巴基斯坦的水源，正如它在 2019 年 2 月克什米尔恐怖袭击后威胁要采取的那样。

For more than seventy years, Kashmir has been part of India but not quite. Like Han Chinese moving into Muslim Uighur homeland Xinjiang, Hindu Indians will colonize Kashmir, showing how domestic population shifts can be just as strategically significant as international ones. Such demographically motivated decisions can also alter the regional power balance, for India can now cut off water flows to Pakistan, as it threatened to do in February 2019 after a terrorist attack in Kashmir.

由于无法以对自己有利的方式解决克什米尔问题，也无法控制其重要的水资源供应，巴基斯坦还必须对其人口和地理采取更具战略性的策略。目前，该国最有潜力的两个省份是人口最稀少的省份。令人惊叹的多山吉尔吉特-巴尔蒂斯坦在过去二十年里更多地因为藏匿伊斯兰恐怖组织而成为新闻焦点，而不是因为拥有一百多座 7,000 米以上的山峰（例如乔戈里峰）。但随着冰川融化加速引发山洪，巴基斯坦政府不得不投入大量资金用于灾害管理和疏导河流径流。总理伊姆兰·汗还承诺在邻近崎岖的开伯尔-普赫图赫瓦省重新造林 100 亿棵树。

With no hope to settle Kashmir in its favor or control its crucial water supplies, Pakistan will also have to become more strategic about its demographics and geography. Currently, the country’s two most potentially livable provinces are its most sparsely populated. Stunning and mountainous Gilgit-Baltistan has for the past two decades been in the news more for harboring Islamist terrorist groups than as home to more than one hundred 7,000-meter plus peaks (such as K2). But with accelerating glacial melt causing torrential flooding, Pakistan’s government has to invest large sums into disaster management and channeling river runoff. Prime Minister Imran Khan has also pledged to reforest neighboring and rugged Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province with ten billion trees. With the country’s teeming megacity of Karachi on the Arabian Sea baking in early summer heat waves and drowning in late summer monsoons, and droughts ravaging Pakistan’s populous breadbaskets of Punjab and Sindh, many more Pakistanis may soon head north as well.

整个喜马拉雅地区规划了四百多座水坝和两百多个水电项目，甚至使尼泊尔和不丹等小王国也成为该地区资源调度的关键参与者。尼泊尔有潜力生产比目前多八十倍的水力发电，它迫切需要避免自身定期停电、为基础工业提供燃料以及向印度出售电力。同样重要的是水力基础设施，将灌溉水输送到印度的恒河平原各邦，例如贫困但肥沃的比哈尔邦。随着政府最终投资于更好的道路和水管理，比哈尔邦可能会从一无所有变成水果和蔬菜强国。¹如果尼泊尔扩大自己的农业，最终可能会导致数百万印度人向北涌入或越过其 1800 公里的开放边界。

More than four hundred dams and two hundred hydropower projects are planned across the Himalayan region, making even small kingdoms such as Nepal and Bhutan key players in the region’s resource maneuvers. Nepal has the potential to produce eighty times more hydropower than it currently does, which it desperately needs to avoid its own regular power cuts, fuel basic industries, and sell electricity to India. Just as significant will be hydro infrastructure to pipe irrigation water to India’s Gangetic plain states such as destitute yet fertile Bihar. As the government finally invests in better roads and water management, Bihar could go from basket case to fruit and vegetable powerhouse.¹ If Nepal expands its own agriculture, it could wind up with millions of Indians filing northward toward—or across—their eighteen-hundred-kilometer open border.

不丹也允许印度人免签证访问，但肯定不允许居住。这个与神秘的香格里拉传说最相关的王国只有八十万人口，每年接待的游客不到三万。广泛的植树造林甚至使其成为负排放碳汇。鉴于其基础设施简陋，不丹更多地被视为印度和孟加拉国的水力发电来源，而不是永久目的地，但很快它将成为地缘政治上令人垂涎的高海拔气候绿洲。中国一直在从北方蚕食其领土，而更多的印度人可能会从南方涌入。即使跨越世界最高边境，人们也会流动。

Bhutan too allows Indians to visit without visas—but certainly not to reside. The kingdom most associated with mystical Shangri-La lore has only eight hundred thousand people and allows fewer than thirty thousand tourists each year. Extensive tree planting has even made it a negative emissions carbon sink. Given its rudimentary infrastructure, Bhutan is viewed more as a source of hydropower for India and Bangladesh than a permanent destination—but soon enough it will be geopolitically coveted as a high-elevation climate oasis. China has been chipping away at its territory from the north, while more Indians may flow in from the south. Even across the world’s highest frontiers, people will be on the move.

中国的喜马拉雅战略将长江上游的水和电力引向工业化的四川省（人口：9000万）和青翠的云南省（人口：5000万），这些省份将巩固其作为风景秀丽、成本低廉的替代品的地位，取代中国价格过高、污染严重的沿海省份。中国年轻人纷纷涌向四川省会成都和云南省会昆明，通往老挝和泰国的新铁路线使这些城市成为南方丝绸之路事实上的首都。

China’s Himalayan strategy of directing water and power from the upper Yangtze River to industrious Sichuan (population: 90 million) and verdant Yunnan (population: 50 million) Provinces will reinforce their status as scenic and low-cost alternatives to China’s overpriced and polluted coastal provinces. Chinese youth have been flocking to Sichuan’s capital, Chengdu, and Yunnan’s capital, Kunming, where new railway lines into Laos and Thailand have made those cities the de facto capitals of the southern silk roads.

云南还吸引了流离失所的东南亚农民和其他贫困劳动力，他们是中国上游水和能源政策的下游受害者。对于地势低洼的东南亚国家来说，水太多和水太少同样是一个问题。该地区的沿海特大城市，如曼谷和胡志明市，可能会在2050年全部沉没。越南的湄公河三角洲海拔仅一米，这意味着数千万越南农村人口可能需要在一两年内撤退到高地。然而，尽管海平面上升将越南沿海推向内陆，但由于中国封锁了分水岭，他们在湄公河下游平原面临着更频繁的干旱，迫使他们向北接近中国本土。如今，有数以万计的老挝人和越南人越境进入云南寻找工作；很快这个数字可能会达到数百万。

Yunnan is also a magnet for displaced Southeast Asian farmers and other poor laborers—downstream victims of China’s upstream water and energy policies. For low-lying Southeast Asian nations, too much water is as much a problem as too little. The region’s coastal megacities, such as Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City, may all be sunk by 2050. Vietnam’s Mekong River delta lies barely one meter above sea level, meaning tens of millions of rural Vietnamese may need to retreat upland within a decade or two. Yet even as sea-level rise nudges coastal Vietnamese inland, they face more frequent droughts in the lower Mekong plains due to China’s hoarding of the watershed, pushing them northward toward China itself. Today there are tens of thousands of Laotians and Vietnamese who have crossed into Yunnan in search of work; soon it could be millions.

毁灭性的气旋已经迫使印度、印度尼西亚和菲律宾的沿海人口向内迁移。孟买需要复制它本身位于更坚固的地面上，而不是它目前所在的裸露半岛上。印度尼西亚正计划将其整个首都雅加达从沿海爪哇岛（世界上人口最多的岛屿，拥有近 1.5 亿人口）迁至更大的婆罗洲岛。无论这种情况是否发生，印度尼西亚都需要为其最大的岛屿苏门答腊岛制定可持续战略，该岛拥有 5000 万人口和茂密的热带丛林。鉴于其广阔的地形和较高的海拔，印度尼西亚明智的做法是保护苏门答腊岛以供未来居住，而不是鲁莽地砍伐其珍贵的雨林。

Devastating cyclones are already driving the coastal populations of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines inward. Mumbai needs to replicate itself on sturdier ground rather than the exposed peninsula on which it currently sits. Indonesia is planning to relocate its entire capital, Jakarta, from coastal Java (the world’s most populous island, with nearly 150 million people) to the far larger island of Borneo. Whether or not that ever happens, Indonesia needs a sustainable strategy for its largest island, Sumatra, which is home to 50 million people and lush tropical jungle. Given its much vaster terrain and higher elevation, Indonesia would be wise to conserve Sumatra for future habitation rather than recklessly slashing its precious rain forests.

大洋洲的低洼岛国没有能力在印度尼西亚广阔的群岛上重新安置公民。相反，他们正在计划自己的撤离。马绍尔群岛、图瓦卢、基里巴斯和所罗门群岛等太平洋岛国的230万公民率先申请了新西兰的“气候签证”计划。最终，所有人都将不得不搬迁到澳大利亚或其他与他们有密切人口或政治联系的国家。一些国家要求中国资助修建公路，以便能够更长时间地抵御海平面上升，但中国肯定更希望腾出岛屿，这样中国就可以在没有当地抗议的情况下开采磷酸盐矿床和海底矿物。

Oceania’s low-lying island nations don’t have the luxury of relocating citizens across Indonesia’s sprawling archipelago. Instead, they’re planning for their own evacuation. The 2.3 million citizens of Pacific island states such as the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands have been the first to take up New Zealand’s “climate visa” program. Eventually all will have to relocate there, to Australia, or other countries with which they have strong demographic or political associations. Some have asked China to help finance raising their roads so they can withstand rising seas awhile longer, but China surely prefers the islands vacated so China can mine the phosphate deposits and seabed minerals without local protest.

也许最糟糕的命运降临在那些同时是政治难民和气候难民的人身上，比如缅甸的穆斯林罗兴亚人。超过 100 万受迫害的罗兴亚人逃往孟加拉国，他们的主要难民营（称为考克斯集市）在季风降雨期间被洪水淹没。由于孟加拉国很难说是一个气候避风港，很快就会有数百万孟加拉国人向相反的方向逃往中国边境附近的缅甸北部温带高地（以及印度东北部的山丘），伊洛瓦底江从这里向南流淌，滋养着孟加拉国的人民。该国的农场和渔业。如果缅甸齐心协力，它可能会在一代人的时间内从军方管理的废墟变成气候绿洲。

Perhaps the worst fate has been dealt to those who are both political and climate refugees at the same time, such as the Muslim Rohingya of Myanmar. More than 1 million persecuted Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh—where their main refugee camp (known as Cox’s Bazaar) gets flooded during monsoon rains. Since Bangladesh is hardly a climate haven, soon there will be millions of Bangladeshis fleeing in the opposite direction toward the temperate highlands of northern Myanmar (and the hills of northeast India) near the Chinese border, from which the Irrawaddy River flows southward and nourishes the country’s farms and fisheries. If Myanmar gets its act together, it could go from military-run basket case to climate oasis within a generation.

来自孟加拉国的气候难民和穆斯林政治难民来自缅甸的气候很可能会向南延伸到穆斯林同胞马来西亚，这个地区国家最不容易受到不利气候影响，拥有茂密的森林和滋润的季风降雨。方便的是，所有这些国家的整体关系都在大力改善。作为“向东行动”政策的一部分，印度正在投资建设从孟加拉国和缅甸到马来西亚的强大公路连接，寻求促进能源、原材料和纺织品的跨境贸易。这种连通性并不是为了为大规模迁移铺平道路，但无论如何这很可能会发生。

Climate refugees from Bangladesh and Muslim political refugees from Myanmar may well wind up farther south, in fellow Muslim Malaysia, the regional nation least vulnerable to adverse climate effects with its dense forests and hydrating monsoon rains. Conveniently, all these countries are undergoing a strong improvement in their overall ties. As part of its “Act East” policy, India is investing in robust road connections through Bangladesh and Myanmar to Malaysia, seeking to boost cross-border trade in energy, raw materials, and textiles. Such connectivity isn’t designed to smooth the path for mass migrations, but that’s likely what will happen anyway.

日本：高科技熔炉？

Japan: High-tech melting pot?

整个二十世纪末，东京一直保持着世界最大大城市的称号。如今，在世界上两打大城市中，东京是唯一一个人口明显下降的城市——就像整个日本一样。在全国范围内，日本拥有世界上最大的空置住房存量：每七套房屋中就有一套被废弃，预计未来十年这一比例将上升至三分之一。随着老年人的去世和年轻人搬到城市，整个城镇都在空置。

Throughout the late twentieth century, Tokyo held the title of world’s largest megacity. Today, of the world’s two-dozen megacities, Tokyo is the only one registering a noticeable population decline—much like Japan as a whole. Nationwide, Japan has the world’s largest vacant housing stock: One out of every seven homes is abandoned, a share expected to rise to one-third in the coming decade. Entire towns are emptying as the elderly pass away and the young move to cities.

为了说服人们占领该国迷人的城镇，日本实际上向年轻夫妇赠送了房屋，并承诺他们将生孩子并为公民生活的复兴做出贡献。至少他们正在做一些事情，这对于六百多名失业的中年男性（大部分是蛰居族）来说是难以想象的，他们过着完全与世隔绝的生活，无法或不愿意找到工作。随着越来越多的女性参加工作（以及越来越多的老年人留在劳动力市场），日本的出生率大幅下降。

To convince people to occupy the country’s charming towns, Japan is literally giving away homes to young couples on the promise that they’ll have children and contribute to the revival of civic life. At least they’re doing something, which is more than one can say for the more than six hundred unemployed middle-age (mostly) men known as hikikomori, who live in total seclusion, unable or unwilling to find jobs. With more women working (and more elderly staying in the workforce), Japan’s birth rate has collapsed.

反常的是，这就是为什么长期日本观察家 Jesper Koll 认为现在是转世为 23 岁日本千禧一代的理想时机。你的父母将是世界上最富有的婴儿潮一代，拥有自己的房屋的完全所有权和低债务，世界一流的医疗保健和受保护的养老金。你可以靠他们的积蓄住在多代同堂的房子里，并让廉价的移民女佣或机器人（或两者兼而有之）来照顾他们和你的需求。在专业领域，大学生在毕业后一周内找到工作，兼职工人转为全职员工，随着公司重组和部门分拆到新企业，企业老男孩俱乐部正在裂开。 。日本企业也开始认真投资区块链和物联网传感器，软银和其他风险投资公司（国内外）对初创企业进行了大量投资。贬低日本已经成为过去。如果国家走向复兴怎么办？如果日本扭转人口急剧下降的趋势，这种情况不仅是合理的，而且是有可能发生的。

Perversely, this is why longtime Japan watcher Jesper Koll argues that now would be the ideal time to be reincarnated as a twenty-three-year-old Japanese millennial. Your parents would be the world’s richest baby boomers, with full ownership of their homes and low debt, world-class medical care, and protected pensions. You could live off their savings in multigenerational homes and have cheap immigrant maids or robots (or both) taking care of their and your needs. Out in the professional world, university students get jobs within a week of graduation, part-time workers are moving into full-time employee status, and the corporate old boys’ club is cracking open as firms restructure and divisions are spun off into new ventures. Japanese corporations are also getting serious about investing in blockchain and IoT sensors, with SoftBank and other VCs (both domestic and foreign) making big investments in startups. Writing off Japan has become passé. What if the country is headed for a renaissance? The scenario is not only plausible but likely—if Japan reverses its demographic freefall.

即使是自动化程度较高的国家也需要移民。日本以海豹机器人作为老年人的陪伴而闻名。机器人在酒店办理入住手续，甚至还有一位机器人佛教僧人在京都的一座寺庙里讲经。但农业、医疗保健、教育和其他基本服务领域仍然存在工人短缺。然而，除了周期性地有大批韩国人被带到日本作为劳工或工匠之外，日本历来一直反对移民——直到现在。

Even countries with high automation need migrants. Japan is famous for having robotic seals as companions for the elderly; robots handle check-in at hotels, and there’s even an android Buddhist priest who delivers sermons at a temple in Kyoto. But still there are worker shortages in farming, healthcare, education, and other essential services. However, other than the periodic waves of Koreans who have been brought to Japan as laborers or artisans, Japan has historically been averse to immigration—until now.

事实上，日本从来没有像今天这样对来自世界各地的移民开放，而且移民人数也创下了纪录。事实上，日本每年入境的移民人数名列前茅，约为四十万人。日本的外国人口已达到 300 万，随着学生、职业培训生和熟练专业人员数量的不断增加，这一记录每年都会被刷新。另一个惊喜是：至少有 100 万是中国人。十年前，当日本开始向更多移民开放时，它希望除中国人之外的几乎所有人都能前来定居。然而如今，中国人在外国人中所占比例最大，每年的游客人数也最多。紧随中国人口比例之后的是 70 万韩国人和 30 万越南人，这三个国家都各民族在日本的存在不断增加。印度人的数量也每五年增加三分之一，达到五万多人。在全国各地的建筑工地和便利店收银台上都可以看到印度人和尼泊尔人的身影。但随着人口持续老龄化，再加上劳动力短缺，印度医生和护士可能会成为下一个。

Indeed, Japan has never been as open to migrants from all over the world as today—and they have come in record numbers. In fact, Japan ranks in the top tier for the number of migrants entering the country each year, about four hundred thousand. The foreign population in Japan is touching 3 million, a record that gets reset each year as the number of students, vocational trainees, and skilled professionals continues to expand. Another surprise: At least 1 million are Chinese. When Japan began to open to increased migration a decade ago, it hoped for almost anyone but Chinese to come and settle. Yet today, Chinese constitute the largest share of foreigners, and the largest number of annual tourists as well. Chinese are followed in share of the population by seven hundred thousand South Koreans and three hundred thousand Vietnamese, with all three nationalities continuously increasing their presence in Japan. The number of Indians has also risen by one-third every five years and stands at more than fifty thousand. Indians and Nepalis are visible at construction sites and convenience store checkouts across the country. But with continuous aging combined with labor shortages, Indian doctors and nurses could be next.

对于普通外国工人来说，日本的管制方式依然存在：移民根据教育水平和行业（例如建筑业或造船业）进行分类，并且通常限制携带家庭成员。这是一个明显的迹象，表明日本主要感兴趣的是解决劳动力短缺问题，而不是成为美国、澳大利亚或加拿大那样的国家。但正如人们在北美发现的那样，一旦移民到达，很少有人愿意离开——特别是如果人权组织成功地倡导提高移民工人的工资，从而使日本（无意中）变得更具吸引力。这已经导致了新的文化冲突：来自印度尼西亚和巴基斯坦的长期穆斯林移民寻求埋葬死者，但在火葬之地，墓地空间受到严重限制，导致建立特殊墓地的请愿和谈判。²

For rank-and-file foreign workers, Japan’s regimented ways persist: Migrants are classified based on their education level and sector, such as construction or shipbuilding, and are usually restricted from bringing family members. That is a telltale sign that Japan is primarily interested in plugging labor shortages, not in becoming like America, Australia, or Canada. But as one finds in North America, once migrants arrive, few want to leave—especially if rights groups succeed in advocating for higher pay for migrant workers, making Japan (inadvertently) even more attractive. This has already led to novel culture clashes: Long-term Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and Pakistan seek to bury their dead, but in a land of cremation, space for cemeteries is heavily restricted, leading to petitions and negotiations to establish special graveyards.²

在价值链的更高层面，日本不断发展的移民政策代表着一个彻底开放的新时代。为了吸引金融和科技人才，政府正在削减税收。蓝领工人获得五年期可更新签证，高收入专业人士（包括他们的家人）获得永久居留权。为这些长期新移民提供服务需要来自泰国、菲律宾、印度尼西亚和缅甸的大量厨师、清洁工和保姆。毫不奇怪，日本长期以来一直是最受外籍人士欢迎的目的地，这与艰苦的工作完全相反。从时尚的东京开发区到滑雪胜地城镇，四十多个都道府县的外国人口都在增加。日本不仅成为了豪华的外籍人士合同地，而且还成为了自己的家乡。

Higher up the value chain, Japan’s evolving immigration policy represents a new era of radical openness. Taxes are being slashed to attract finance and tech talent. Blue-collar workers are offered five-year renewable visas, and high-earning professionals are granted permanent residency, including for their families. Servicing these new long-term arrivals requires legions of cooks, cleaners, and nannies from Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Myanmar. Not surprisingly, Japan has long been a favorite expat destination, the utter antithesis of a hardship post. From chic Tokyo developments to ski resort towns, the foreign population is rising in all of more than forty prefectures. Japan is becoming not just a posh expat contract, but home.

日本政府向当地人提供购买废弃房产的激励措施，但购买者还远远不够。专门为购买空置房屋提供融资的所谓akiya银行将很快就会向外国人提供服务。外籍人士已经开始以低至 20,000 美元的价格抢购土地，并修缮传统住宅或建造拥有十几个或更多单元的新公寓式大院。他们正在适应当地的习俗，即邻里分享从竹子到啤酒的一切东西。日本和中国一样，不会出现人口稀化或演变成多民族熔炉，但它的大门向更多的“新日本人”敞开。

The Japanese government has favored locals with incentives to buy abandoned properties, but there aren’t nearly enough takers. So-called akiya banks dedicated to financing the purchase of vacant homes will soon expand their offerings to foreigners. Expats are already snapping up land for as little as $20,000 and fixing up traditional homes or building new condo-style compounds with a dozen or more units. They’re taking to the local customs of neighborhood sharing of everything from bamboo to beer. Japan, like China, is not going to become demographically diluted or evolve into a multiethnic melting pot, but its doors are open to more “new Japanese” than ever.

鉴于日本的岛国历史，人们普遍认为外国人永远无法“融入”日本的旧世界习俗。但与日本的许多事情一样，现实更加违反直觉。年长的日本人代表“日本公司”走向世界，追求商业征服，学习英语并采用国际化的举止，而年轻的日本人则代表“日本公司”走向世界，追求商业征服。日本人是在沾沾自喜地享受着父母的劳动成果的过程中长大的，只说日语，几乎不出国旅行。日本一次接待超过三十万名外国学生，大学积极招收并提供全英语学位，这也许也是为了补偿年轻人的隐居生活。新的国际学校可以招收外国学生和本地学生，日本领先的游戏公司乐天也已采用英语作为其办公语言。东京新宿区大学和语言学校密集，其中 50% 的人口都是外国人——不仅来自中国和韩国，还来自非洲和巴西等遥远的地方。

Given Japan’s insular history, there is a generic notion that foreigners could never “fit in” with Japan’s old-world customs. But as with many things in Japan, reality is more counterintuitive. It’s the older Japanese who went out into the world in pursuit of commercial conquest on behalf of “Japan Inc.,” learning English and adopting cosmopolitan mannerisms, while younger Japanese have grown up complacently enjoying the fruits of their parents’ labor, speaking only Japanese and barely traveling abroad. It’s perhaps also to compensate for the reclusiveness of its youth that Japan hosts more than three hundred thousand foreign students at a time, with universities actively recruiting and offering entire degrees in English. New international schools are allowed to mix foreign and local students, and Japan’s leading gaming company, Rakuten, has adopted English as its office language. Densely packed with colleges and language schools, Tokyo’s Shinjuku ward is fully 50 percent populated by foreigners—not just from China and South Korea but from places as far-flung as Africa and Brazil.

所有这一切都是在气候变化摧毁澳大利亚、印度和中国之前发生的，气候变化促使更多的亚洲及其他地区的人逃往日本，从很多方面来说，日本都是最终的岛屿堡垒。其超现代化的基础设施和庞大的医疗保健支出使其成为卓越的蓝色区域，这里的预期寿命是世界上最高的，而人均新冠死亡人数是所有大国中最低的。

All of this is before climate change wrecks Australia, India, and China, prompting even more people from Asia and beyond to decamp to Japan, which is in many ways the ultimate island fortress. Its ultramodern infrastructure and massive healthcare spending have made it a blue zone par excellence, with the highest life expectancy in the world and lowest Covid deaths per capita of any large country.

毫无疑问，日本很容易遭受严重台风的袭击，这些台风会导致严重的洪水和强烈的地震，例如 2011 年的地震和海啸组合摧毁了沿海城市仙台（位于日本主岛上）。本州）并淹没了福岛核反应堆。在北部，北海道附近的小岛已经沉入鄂霍次克海，而在南部，2018 年的台风飞燕淹没了大阪关西机场的跑道。2019年九州地区创纪录的降雨导致超过100万人被迫疏散。西伯利亚气流使本州成为世界上降雪最多的地方之一，而夏季热浪导致东京马拉松等赛事向北转移到北海道的札幌举行。

No doubt Japan is vulnerable to severe typhoons that lead to intense flooding and strong earthquakes, such as the 2011 earthquake-tsunami combo that devastated the coastal city of Sendai (on the main island of Honshu) and flooded the Fukushima nuclear reactor. In the north, tiny islands off Hokkaido have already sunk into the Sea of Okhotsk, while in the south, Typhoon Jebi in 2018 flooded the runway of Osaka’s Kansai Airport. Record rainfall on Kyushu in 2019 led to the forced evacuation of more than 1 million people. The Siberian air stream has made Honshu one of the world’s snowiest places, while summer heat waves led to events such as the Tokyo Marathon being shifted north to Sapporo on Hokkaido island.

但日本也拥有巩固自身实力的政治意愿、财力和技术实力。在本州，工程师们正忙着部署替代能源系统，对建筑物进行结构加固以抵御地震，设计高通量洪水控制和灌溉系统，并保护城镇和道路免受山体滑坡和超强台风造成的其他破坏。在富士山山麓，丰田正在破土动工建设一座新城市，那里只有可再生能源和无人驾驶汽车在街道上行驶。如今，本州岛的 1 亿居民（在未来几十年内可能会增加一倍）的生活状况比地球上几乎任何其他地区的居民都要好。

But Japan also has the political will, financial firepower, and technical prowess to fortify itself. On Honshu, engineers are busily deploying alternative energy systems, structurally reinforcing buildings against earthquakes, designing high-throughput floodwater control and irrigation systems, and protecting towns and roads against landslides and other damage resulting from super-typhoons. In the foothills of Mount Fuji, Toyota is breaking ground on a new city where only renewable and driverless cars will ply the streets. Honshu’s 100 million residents today—and perhaps double that in the coming decades—are better off than people in almost any other geography on Earth.

距离著名的拥挤的涩谷十字路口仅几步之遥，是一个名为 EDGEof 的八层高科技修缮仙境。EDGEof 是一个时尚的创意空间，让人想起麻省理工学院媒体实验室，但有一个热带主题的屋顶休息室，是硅谷和日本风险投资资助的神经健康等领域初创公司的所在地，其中一家公司生产冥想椅。地下室还有一个禅宗茶园，竹制天花板滑动打开，露出一个用于 4K 视频会议的大型平板电视屏幕。EDGEof 由科技公司、开发机构和研究中心资助，拥有来自加拿大、法国、瑞典和以色列的孵化器，这些孵化器轮流举办产品演示、游戏之夜和艺术展览。一百米外，通过高架花园相连，EDGEof 及其合作伙伴还与各个县的市长合作，将他们田园诗般但人口稀少的城镇转变为“繁荣村庄”，以千禧一代想要的阴阳城乡生活为特色，以及多代住房、混合教育和其他生活方式产品。因此，EDGEof 的企业体现了日本的未来：充满了来自世界各地的年轻人，多种族文明正在取代古老的日本文明。

Just steps from the famously crowded Shibuya crossing is an eight-story wonderland of high-tech tinkering called EDGEof. A sleek creative space that brings to mind the MIT Media Lab—but with a tropical-themed rooftop lounge—EDGEof is home to Silicon Valley and Japanese VC-funded startups in areas such as neuro-wellness, with one company making meditation-inducing chairs. There is also a zen tea garden in the basement where the bamboo ceiling slides open to reveal a large flat-panel TV screen for 4K video conferencing. Funded by tech companies, development institutes, and research centers, EDGEof hosts incubators from Canada, France, Sweden, and Israel, who alternate in putting on product demos, game nights, and art exhibitions. One hundred meters away and connected via elevated gardens, EDGEof is opening a co-living (three or more biologically unrelated tenants) property, a pay-as-you-go-style residence for startup hipsters, making the heart of Tokyo affordable. EDGEof and its partners are also working with mayors in various prefectures to turn their idyllic but depopulated towns into “Prosperity Villages” that will feature the yin and yang of urban and rural life that millennials want, as well as multigenerational housing, blended education, and other lifestyle offerings. EDGEof’s ventures thus embody the future of Japan: Full of young people from just about everywhere, a multiracial civilization is displacing an older Japanese one.

在所有开放大规模移民的国家中，只有日本也是人类与各种技术共存的活生生的实验。在日本的任何地方，你都会看到完好无损的空置建筑、道路上的交通很少、闲置的渡船以及平静水面上连接人烟稀少的地区的桥梁。今天我们摸索着与穿着西装、打着领带、戴着白手套、戴着白色抗菌口罩的日本出租车司机进行交流，但很快每个手机上都会安装语言翻译装置，汽车也将实现无人驾驶。如果所有标志都是数字的，那么语言也可以更改。

Of all the countries opening to mass migration, only Japan is also a living experiment in the coexistence of humans and all manner of technologies. Everywhere you look in Japan you see vacant buildings in immaculate condition, minimal traffic on roads, ferryboats sitting idle, and bridges connecting sparsely inhabited districts over calm waters. Today we fumble through communicating with the Japanese taxi driver who wears a suit and tie, white gloves, and a germ-protecting white mask, but soon there will be language translation devices on every mobile phone, and the cars will be driverless. Where all signs are digital, the language can also be changed.

第11章量子人

CHAPTER 11 QUANTUM PEOPLE

欢迎来到外籍斯坦

Welcome to Expatistan

就所有意图和目的而言，MBA 就是一本护照。遍布全球五十个国家的八百所商学院或许是全球人才争夺战中搅局的主要推动者。他们在世界各地招募学生，并激烈竞争将毕业生输送到跨国公司，然后跨国公司将他们输送到世界各地。每一位新的 MBA 骨干都加入了不断壮大的实际上无国籍的科技和咨询公司的行列，他们往往对自己的职业圈子有比对任何一个国家都更大的归属感。

For all intents and purposes, an MBA is a passport. The world’s eight hundred business schools spread across fifty countries are perhaps the leading agents in stirring the pot in the global war for talent. They recruit worldwide for students and compete fiercely to feed their graduates into multinationals, which then circulate them around the world. Each new cadre of MBAs joins the growing ranks of effectively stateless tech and consulting firms, often feeling a greater sense of belonging to their professional circuit than to any one country.

移民专家 Malte Zeeck 将其归类为“积极进取者”（例如追求更高薪水的 IT 技术人员或国际学校教师）、“优化者”（寻求更好的生活方式或医疗保健的人）、“浪漫主义者”（追随配偶回国）和“追随者”（利用原籍国经济增长的机会，例如数以百万计的“海龟”返回中国或正在购买特拉维夫房地产的欧洲千禧一代犹太人）。

The same goes for a wide range of nomadic tribes that migration expert Malte Zeeck categorizes as “go getters” (for example, IT technicians or international schoolteachers who chase higher salaries), “optimizers” (those seeking better lifestyle or medical care), “romantics” (who follow a spouse to his or her home country), and “re-pats” (who take advantage of economic growth in their country of origin, such as the millions of “sea turtles” who have returned to China or the millennial Jews of Europe who are buying up Tel Aviv’s real estate).

冠状病毒大流行并没有改变外籍人士的动机。在经济停滞时期，每个人都想通过削减开支来扩大储蓄。住在比旧金山便宜三倍的地方比在旧金山神奇地赚三倍的钱要容易得多，而且技术工作会永久存在远程，这可能意味着搬到任何你想居住的地方。在墨西哥或泰国等繁荣的东南亚国家，租房或买房要便宜得多。正如一位房地产高管在大流行偏执期间向我透露的那样，“我的工作是将美国的房屋卖给外国人，但也许我应该把国外的房屋卖给美国人。”

The coronavirus pandemic has done nothing to change expats’ motivations. In a time of economic stagnation, everyone is seeking to stretch their savings by cutting their expenses. It’s much easier to live somewhere three times cheaper than San Francisco than to magically earn three times more in San Francisco, and with tech jobs going permanently remote, that could mean moving anywhere you’ve ever wanted to live. Renting or buying a house is much cheaper in Mexico or thriving Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. As one real estate executive confided to me during the pandemic paranoia, “My job is to sell homes in America to foreigners, but maybe I should be selling homes abroad to Americans instead.”

人才不以国籍来区分；它把自己定位为人才。它在地理上是唯利是图的。凭借合适的技能，当今的年轻人才几乎可以在较低的税收下流动到任何他们想去的地方；更好的公共服务；更实惠的住房、教育和医疗保健；更可预测的政治；或其他偏好。Nomad List、Expatica 和 Expatistan 等大量网站都有生活成本计算器，可以帮助当前和有抱负的游牧者在数百个城市之间进行套利，并继续在这些城市之间移动。^那些久坐的人会觉得这种生活方式复杂得难以忍受，但当你已经在运动时，运动就更容易了。

Talent doesn’t identify itself by nationality; it identifies itself as talent. It is geographically mercenary. With the right skills, today’s young talent can move practically anywhere they want based on lower taxes; better public services; more affordable housing, education, and healthcare; more predictable politics; or other preferences. Ample websites such as Nomad List, Expatica, and Expatistan have cost-of-living calculators to help current and aspiring nomads arbitrage across hundreds of cities—and keep moving among them.^I Those who are sedentary find such a lifestyle unbearably complicated, but movement is easier when you are already in motion.

当人才遇到机会时，就会发生迁移。全球教育和身份、远程工作以及不断变化的增长市场的结合将大大增加所谓“永久居民”的数量，对他们来说，无论他们身在何处，无论他们在那里多久，家都是他们的。就像骑自行车一样，第一步可能是最困难的，无论是逻辑上还是情感上。但在那之后，搬家就成了家常便饭。每年，都有更多的国家、城市和公司加入全球人才争夺战，而且还有更多的人加入。

Where talent meets opportunity, migration will occur. The combination of global education and identity, remote work, and shifting growth markets will add considerably to the number of so-called “perma-pats” for whom home is wherever they are, for however long they’re there. Like riding a bicycle, the first move may be the hardest, both logistically and emotionally. But after that, moving becomes routine. Each year, more countries, cities, and companies join the global war for talent—and more people too.

永久直到离开的时候

Permanent until it’s time to go

在线表格上很少有字段比“地址”更让年轻的专业人​​士烦恼。这是否意味着他们必须等待一封信并亲自签署形式？如果他们几个月后不再住在那里怎么办？他们必须转发邮件吗？为什么有人仍然使用纸张？

Few fields on an online form annoy a young professional more than “Address.” Does it mean they’ll have to wait for a letter and physically sign a form? What if they no longer live there in a few months? Will they have to get the mail forwarded? Why does anyone still use paper anyway?

他们的沮丧是有道理的。毕竟，在数字世界中，您可以在比物理世界更多的地方找到您。年轻人的名片上列出的不是办公室地址，而是大量数字联系人：Facebook、Twitter、LinkedIn、Instagram、WhatsApp、Telegram 等的多个电子邮件地址和用户名。在中国，它只是微信的一个二维码，大约 10 亿人通过微信这个移动门户组织自己的大部分生活——无论是现实的还是虚拟的。在移动企业家时代，文件不是存储在柜子里而是存储在云端，付款不是通过支票而是通过应用程序进行，管理不是在桌子周围而是在 Slack 上进行，文件不是用墨水签名而是在 DocuSign 上进行，Webex 和 BlueJeans 是会议室。你不用去办公室；您就是办公室，而且您也拥有 VR 世界中的办公室。《复仇者联盟：终局之战》、《正义联盟》和其他国际热门影片）与总部位于加州的 Magic Leap 合作，创建沉浸式 AR 环境和 3D 远程呈现系统，以实现逼真的互动和永久直播。整个虚拟城市在网络空间中如雨后春笋般涌现，其中的陈列室、大使馆、展馆、会议和其他聚会一次聚集了数千名参与者。对于许多年轻人来说，现实世界的目的是为他们的在线生活提供最大的便利，他们越来越多地在这个沉浸式的“空间网络”中度过。

Their frustration is warranted. After all, you can be found in far more places in the digital world than the physical one. Rather than an office address, young people’s business cards list a slew of digital contacts: multiple email addresses and handles for Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, and others. In China, it’s just a QR code for WeChat, the mobile portal through which about 1 billion people organize most of their lives—real and virtual. In the age of the mobile entrepreneur, files are not stored in cabinets but in the cloud, payments are not made by check but through apps, management isn’t done around tables but on Slack, documents aren’t signed with ink but on DocuSign, and Webex and BlueJeans are the conference rooms. You don’t go to an office; you are the office—and you have one in a VR world as well. New Zealand’s fabled animation studio Weta Digital (which brought you Avengers: Endgame, Justice League, and other international hits) has partnered with California-based Magic Leap to create immersive AR environments and 3D telepresence systems for lifelike interaction and perpetual live streaming. Entire virtual cities have sprung up in cyberspace in which showrooms, embassies, pavilions, conferences, and other gatherings convene thousands of participants at a time. For many youth, the purpose of the real world is to enable maximum convenience for their online lives, which are increasingly spent inside this immersive “spatial web.”

但仅仅因为您可以住在任何地方（只要互联网速度足够），并不意味着您会满足于任何地方。年轻人适应了他们现在的处境和他们想要达到的目标之间的差距，所以他们不断前进。根据国际数据公司 (IDC) 的数据，约有 15 亿移动员工可以远程完成工作，相当于全球劳动力的近 40%。在全球税收的猫鼠游戏中，老鼠的数量正在大幅增加。

But just because you can live anywhere (so long as the Internet speed is adequate), it doesn’t mean you will settle for just anywhere. Youth are attuned to the gap between where they are and where they want to be, so they keep moving. According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), there are about 1.5 billion mobile workers who can do their jobs remotely, which amounts to nearly 40 percent of the global workforce. In the cat-and-mouse game of global taxation, the number of mice is rising substantially.

忙碌就是生活——而且它不会停滞不前。基本美德对于当今有才华的年轻人来说，连通性和移动性是：随时随地工作的技能和去任何地方的意愿。“枢纽”一词被定义为人们或企业聚集的地方；现在它也是一个动词：年轻人“聚集”出城市并在城市之间流动。这种新的“云生活方式”还需要在各种会员社区中“按需生活”，具体取决于您需要去哪里或只是想去哪里，或者最好的优惠出现在哪里。

Hustling is life—and it’s not done standing still. The cardinal virtues for talented youth today are connectivity and mobility: the skills to work from anywhere and the willingness to go anywhere. The word “hub” is defined as a place where people or businesses converge; now it’s also a verb: Young people “hub” out of cities and move around between them. This new “cloud lifestyle” entails “living on demand” in various membership communities as well, depending on where you need to be or simply want to be, or where the best offer presents itself.

爱沙尼亚的两家初创公司为不断壮大的数字游牧民族铺平了道路，这些数字游牧民每年仅在签证办理上就花费约 20 亿美元。Jobbatical 根据技能和地理兴趣为年轻专业人士安排职位，现在还提供搬迁服务。它的座右铭是：“你的技能比你的护照更重要。” 同样，Teleport 为在世界各地寻找短期职位的技术人才创建了一个市场，在此过程中建立了一个关于他们的偏好的庞大数据集，并就如何吸引他们向城市提供了建议。¹其座右铭是：“让人们自由行动”。流动性越容易，就越多的年轻人会利用它，用 Jobbatical 创始人 Karoli Hindriks 的话说，将每个地点视为“永久的，直到离开的时候”。

A pair of Estonian startups has paved the way for the growing caste of digital nomads who spend an estimated $2 billion per year just on visa processing. Jobbatical, which arranges positions for young professionals based on skills and geographic interests, now also provides relocation services. Its motto is: “Your skills matter more than your passport.” Similarly, Teleport created a marketplace for tech talent seeking short-term positions around the world, along the way building an enormous dataset of their preferences and advising cities on how to attract them.¹ Its motto: “Free People Move.” The easier mobility becomes, the more youth will take advantage of it, treating each location as, in the words of Jobbatical founder Karoli Hindriks, “permanent until it’s time to go.”

从加拿大到新加坡，随着各国寻求招募技术工人，高技术移民项目正在激增。^II一些国家已经拥有法律基础设施，可以尽可能轻松地成为游牧的全球公民。爱沙尼亚的电子居留计划提供可进入欧盟的商业登记，并配有光滑的身份证和时尚的黑色 USB 密钥，可解密您进入该国的在线服务（即所有服务）。到目前为止，该产品吸引了大多数其他欧洲人，但也吸引了远至巴西的企业家，他们利用爱沙尼亚作为基地，为针对亚洲的在线学习平台筹集欧洲资金。在2020年，该国采用了“数字游牧签证”，允许游客为外国公司远程居留和工作，并且正在开发基于云的养老金系统，移动工作人员可以在任何地方付款和领取。在电子钱包和加密货币的世界中，当今的年轻人不必受制于单一的国家金融体系。

From Canada to Singapore, highly skilled migrant programs are proliferating as countries seek to recruit skilled workers.^II Some already have the legal infrastructure to make it as easy as possible to be a nomadic global citizen. Estonia’s e-residency program offers business registration with EU access, and comes with a glossy ID card and sleek black USB key that decrypts your entry to the country’s online services—which is all services. So far the offering has attracted mostly other Europeans, but also entrepreneurs from as far as Brazil, who are using Estonia as a base to raise European capital for online learning platforms targeting Asia. In 2020, the country adopted a “digital nomad visa” allowing visitors to stay and work remotely for foreign companies, and it is developing a cloud-based pension system that mobile workers can pay into and collect anywhere. In a world of e-wallets and cryptocurrencies, today’s youth need not be tied to a single national financial system.

在世界各地，债务给公共财政带来负担，高税收则抑制了公民支出。从逻辑上讲，有进取心的年轻人将逃往当今金融资本海洋实际上转化为他们切实机会的地方，无论是通过众筹还是软件和设备的回扣。在瑞典和新加坡，政府也积极向初创企业发放补助金。年轻人还希望生活在工资和福利有保障以及每周工作四天（或更短的工作日）的国家。芬兰和新西兰已成为此类政策的先驱，这些政策提高了生产力，降低了精神疾病的发病率，并为女性带来了更好的工作与生活平衡。

Across the world, debt is saddling public finances and higher taxes are stifling citizen spending. Logically, enterprising youth will decamp to places where today’s oceans of financial capital actually translate into tangible opportunities for them, whether through crowdfunding or rebates for software and equipment. In Sweden and Singapore, governments actively distribute grants to startups as well. Youth also want to live in countries with guaranteed wages and benefits, as well as four-day workweeks (or shorter workdays). Finland and New Zealand have become the pioneers of such policies, which have resulted in higher productivity, lower incidence of mental illness, and for women better work-life balance.

很明显，在竞争力和抗干扰能力方面排名靠前的国家都是小国。²他们几乎没有土地，也没有犯错的余地，他们将人才视为最宝贵的资源，定期对工人进行再培训，以从事更高技能的工作。新加坡不遗余力地帮助年轻人为金融科技投资者、数字医疗专家、数据科学家和网络安全专家等职业做好准备。³葡萄牙和加拿大等许多国家正在重组自身，以吸引那些在数字世界中生活但又希望在当地过上最好生活的人们。在《孤独星球》和《孤独星球》上的文章的推动下，注重生活方式的欧洲人开始青睐小国家的小城市。Monocle将洛桑、卑尔根、因斯布鲁克、波尔图、雷克雅未克和埃因霍温纳入了他们的雷达范围。

It’s revealing that the countries ranking high in both competitiveness and resilience to disruptions are all small countries.² With little land or margin for error, they treat people as their most precious resource, regularly retraining workers for higher-skilled jobs. Singapore is relentless in preparing youth for careers as fintech investors, digital healthcare specialists, data scientists, and cybersecurity experts.³ Many countries, such as Portugal and Canada, are retooling themselves to attract those who are digitally global but want the best of life that is physically local. Lifestyle-conscious Europeans have come to favor small cities in small countries, motivated by articles in Lonely Planet and Monocle that put Lausanne, Bergen, Innsbruck, Porto, Reykjavik, and Eindhoven on their radar.

并不是每个人都有能力搬到这样的田园环境并远程工作，但借助数字移动性，即使您（尚未）在地理位置上不移动，工作也可以找到您。技术已经使商品、服务和金钱非物质化，将它们变成瞬间扭曲到世界各地的碎片。人类的思想也不可避免地会发生这种情况。正如哈佛大学经济学家里卡多·豪斯曼 (Ricardo Hausmann) 所解释的那样，在知识经济中，我们每个人都是生产软件和应用程序的生态系统中的一个“人字节”。我们编写代码、进行翻译、上传照片、编辑文本和其他功能。日内瓦大学的理查德·鲍德温（Richard Baldwin）同样指出了当人们成为“远程移民”时，他们的大脑如何“迁移”。⁴ “知识社会”一词比任何单一国家都更能描述这种跨国数字环境。

Not everyone has the ability to move to such bucolic settings and work remotely, but with digital mobility, jobs can come to you even if you are not (yet) geographically mobile. Technology has dematerialized goods, services, and money, turning them into bits instantaneously warped around the world. It was inevitable that this would happen to human minds too. As Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann explains, in the knowledge economy, each of us is a “person-byte” in the ecosystem that produces software and apps. We make code, do translations, upload photos, edit text, and other functions. Richard Baldwin of the University of Geneva similarly points to how people’s brains “migrate” when they become “tele-migrants.”⁴ The very phrase “knowledge society” better describes this transnational digital milieu than it does any single country.

美国最大的科技公司总部位于加利福尼亚州，但实际上它们在云中无处不在。他们的人工智能招聘平台评估来自地球各个角落的数百万份工作申请，并管理分布在全球的虚拟团队。特朗普政府不明智地暂停了 H1-B 签证计划，以阻止印度软件工程师来到美国，但硅谷做出了明智的回应，将更多工作外包给海得拉巴和河内。无论是在 Amazon Mechanical Turk 还是 GitHub 上，数以千万计的人已经通过数字移动实现了经济移动——无需移动的移动。但正如从农村到城市再到国际的逐步迁移一样，经济流动之后是身体流动：搬到更好的家乡或城市，或者出国寻找更高薪水的更好工作。

America’s biggest tech companies are headquartered in California, but in reality they’re everywhere in the cloud. Their AI-powered recruitment platforms evaluate millions of job applications from every corner of the planet, and they manage globally distributed virtual teams. The Trump administration unwisely suspended the H1-B visa program to prevent Indian software engineers from coming to America, but Silicon Valley smartly responded by outsourcing more work to Hyderabad and Hanoi. Whether on Amazon Mechanical Turk or GitHub, tens of millions of people have already achieved economic mobility through digital mobility—mobility without moving. But as with step migration from rural to urban to international, economic mobility is followed by physical mobility: moving to a better home or city, or abroad for a better job with a higher salary. The more people get educated and employed online, the more we can expect this chain reaction to catapult people away from home.

云公司及其员工已经为移动世界做好了准备，而他们的原籍国却没有这样做。少数主权政府已经意识到有机会向世界各地的公民提供数字服务。事实上，许多新的“居住”计划的共同点是它们实际上并不要求您成为居民。爱沙尼亚对全球游牧民族使用其银行并在欧盟各地开展业务感兴趣，就像对他们实际居住在爱沙尼亚一样感兴趣。（适当地，如果俄罗斯再次占领，爱沙尼亚将其所有数据和功能备份到分布在世界各地的服务器上，因此如果需要的话，它可以成为侨民云国家。）同样，迪拜的虚拟商业城（VCC）许可证为外国企业提供了一个门户免税国家的境内存在，改变了阿联酋最近提供离岸“自由区”的历史。据估计，全球有 3500 万家公司不受地点限制，可以在任何地方注册。迪拜希望获得更大的份额。

Cloud companies and their workers are prepared for a mobile world in ways their countries of origin are not. A handful of sovereign governments have awoken to the opportunity to offer digital services to citizens of anywhere. Indeed, what a number of these new “residency” schemes have in common is that they do not actually require you to be a resident. Estonia is just as interested in global nomads using its banks and doing business across the EU as it is in them physically living in Estonia. (Appropriately, in the event of another Russian occupation, Estonia has all of its data and functions backed up onto servers distributed around the world, so it could become a diaspora cloud nation if need be.) Similarly, Dubai’s Virtual Commercial City (VCC) license provides a portal for foreign businesses to have an onshore presence in a tax-free country, a modification of the UAE’s recent history of providing offshore “freezones.” There are an estimated 35 million companies in the world that are location independent and could register anywhere. Dubai wants to get a bigger slice.

作为下一阶段，迪拜政府首席未来学家诺亚·拉福德希望城邦国家超越陆上与海上的区别，转向“无岸”模式，在这种模式下，各国积极向创新者租赁空间，为新技术、法规寻求试验台。和社区。他们不是出售主权，而是升级为提供金融、医疗和教育认证的物理和数字混合共和国。在这个新兴的治理服务市场中，物理-数字序列是相反的：您与政府服务提供商（不一定是您自己的）建立数字关系，无论您身在何处都可以使用其服务，并利用其可信度来获得对该服务的物理访问国家或相关国家。

As a next phase, chief futurist of the Dubai government Noah Raford wants city-states to look beyond onshore-versus-offshore distinctions toward a “no shore” model in which countries actively lease space to innovators seeking test beds for their new technologies, regulations, and communities. They are not selling their sovereignty but rather upgrading into hybrid physical and digital republics that provide financial, medical, and educational certifications. In this emerging marketplace of governance services, the physical-digital sequence is inverted: You build a digital relationship with a government service provider (not necessarily your own), use its services wherever you are, and leverage its credibility to gain physical access to that country or associated ones.

当我们的世界变得越来越混合现实时，接下来会发生什么？想象一个在盟国建立并托管其服务器的企业或民间平台。使用区块链协议，它的运作就像 Tor（加密浏览器）、GitHub（编码协作）、比特币（加密货币）和 TransferWise（跨境金融）之间的交叉，支持使用屏蔽 IP 进行数字工作并在全球范围内获取现金。数以百万计的远程工作人员加入这个云共和国，对其内部政策进行投票，并建立对他们各自居住地的政府的议价能力。各国将有两种选择：

What comes next as our world becomes ever more a hybrid reality? Imagine a corporate or civic platform established in an allied state that hosts its servers. Using blockchain protocols, it operates like a cross between Tor (encrypted browser), GitHub (coding collaboration), Bitcoin (cryptocurrency), and TransferWise (cross-border finance), enabling digital work with masked IPs and global access to cash. Millions of remote workers join this cloud republic, voting on its internal policies and building bargaining power over the governments where they each physically reside. Countries will then have two choices: either extort the cloud-based workforce within your country—which may prompt many to leave—or join with other host states in forming a digital version of the medieval Hanseatic League that grants access to more members of this nomadic class and benefits from its innovations.

请记住，大多数国家无论是在地理上还是在人口上都很小。它们就像原子一样，其中大部分人口和经济体位于首都，其余的是内陆地区。随着人口老龄化或离开，他们可能别无选择，只能出售从陆地或岛屿到初创国家寻找合适的司法管辖区。这可能是量子时代的地缘政治。

Remember that most countries are small—both geographically and demographically. They resemble atoms in which most of the population and economic mass is located in the capital city and the rest is hinterland. As their populations age or depart, they may have little choice but to sell off land or islands to startup nations shopping for the right jurisdiction. This may be geopolitics in a quantum age.

衰老但速度并未减慢

Aging but not slowing down

五十岁不是新的二十岁。但现在五十多岁的人必须像他们的孩子一样玩同样的流动性套利游戏。2008年，许多海滨退休的梦想化为泡影。随着工人在鼎盛时期被迫提前裁员，舒适的养老金消失了。这次流行病也造成了同样的后果，但当自动化和经济复苏乏力的情况下，会产生更持久的后果。许多在金融危机期间下岗的人再也没有恢复过来；他们搬到更便宜的城镇，在那里从事各种工作，例如为优步开车，以支付账单或照顾配偶。他们必须继续工作：平均而言，如今的退休人员的寿命只有他们所需的一半。随着债务飙升，退休年龄将会提高，所得税也会提高。现在，这种情况再次发生在更年轻的群体身上——只不过对于当今大流行性萧条的职业中期受害者来说，退休还为时过早——他们负担不起。对于即将发生的事情，最好的委婉说法是“生活转变”。

Fifty is not the new twenty. But fifty-somethings now have to play the same mobility arbitrage game as their children. In 2008, many dreams of beachfront retirement went up in smoke. Comfy pensions evaporated as workers were shoved into early redundancy in their prime. The pandemic has done the same—but with even longer-lasting consequences when compounded by automation and an anemic economic recovery. Many laid off during the financial crisis never recovered; they moved to cheaper towns, where they string together various gigs, such as driving for Uber, to cover their bills or care for their spouse. They’ll have to keep working: On average, today’s retirees have only half of what they need given their longer lifespans. And as the debt soars, the retirement age will rise, as will income taxes. Now it’s happening all over again to an even younger cohort—except it’s way too early for today’s mid-career victims of the pandemic depression to retire—not that they could afford to. The nicest euphemism for what lies ahead is “life transition.”

对于只有精力或现金进行最后一步的美国人来说，加拿大已成为明智的选择。在国外领取社会保障的美国退休人员人数最多的是加拿大，其次是墨西哥和日本。^III许多网站已经刊登了加拿大最佳退休地点的广告，而且这个名单还在变得越来越长。但现在墨西哥、哥斯达黎加和巴拿马已经明确推出退休签证和实体社区来吸引美国人，它们也将吸引更多老龄化的美国人。这些中美洲国家幸福感调查中的排名远高于财富排名，这表明生活成本较低，社会总体稳定。随着佛罗里达州气候恶化，加拿大“雪鸟”（曾经涌入佛罗里达州过冬的退休人员）很可能也会迁徙到中美洲。或者，随着加拿大变暖，他们也可能在温暖的冬天留在加拿大。

For Americans who only have the energy or cash for one last move, Canada has become the sensible choice. The number of American retirees collecting their Social Security abroad is highest in Canada, followed by Mexico and Japan.^III Many websites already advertise the best places to retire in Canada—and the list just keeps getting longer. But now that Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama have launched retirement visas and physical communities explicitly to attract Americans, they’ll also attract ever more aging Americans. These Central American countries rank far higher in happiness surveys than they do in wealth, indicating a low cost of living with general societal stability. Canadian “snowbirds” (retirees who used to flock to Florida for the winter) may well migrate to Central America too as Florida’s climate worsens. Or, as Canada warms, they might as well stay in Canada during the milder winters as well.

对于那些患有慢性病或担心医疗费用的人来说，出国医疗旅游将成为医疗住院。每年已有超过 140 万美国人出国接受膝关节置换、生育治疗和整形手术等手术，其中大部分是中老年。甚至千禧一代也报告说，他们曾远赴埃及和哥伦比亚进行皮肤治疗和牙科治疗。虽然最受美国医疗游客欢迎的目的地是印度、以色列、马来西亚、泰国和韩国，但如果加拿大将自己打造成美国退休人员负担得起的气候和健康绿洲，它很容易占据榜首。在目睹医疗系统在冠状病毒大流行期间对老年人进行分类后，他们将积蓄转移到其他地方是情有可原的。

For those with chronic conditions or concerns about healthcare costs, medical tourism abroad will become medical residency. Already more than 1.4 million mostly middle-aged and elderly Americans travel abroad annually for operations ranging from knee replacements to fertility treatments to plastic surgery. Even millennials have reported traveling as far as Egypt and Colombia for skin treatments and dental work. While the most popular destinations for American medical tourists have been India, Israel, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea, Canada could easily take top spot if it brands itself as an affordable climate and health oasis for American retirees. They can be forgiven for taking their savings elsewhere after witnessing their medical system triage away elderly lives during the coronavirus pandemic.

欧洲人的预期寿命比美国人更长，养老金可转移性也更高，这使得国际退休生活更加顺畅。随着欧盟国家削减福利并提高退休年龄，越来越多的老年人将转向更便宜的“地中海俱乐部”南欧——西班牙、意大利和希腊（而这些国家则将年轻人送往北方）。对于现金短缺的西方退休人员来说，亚洲目的地的避风港地位也将继续上升。2018年，泰国向英国人发放的退休签证数量创历史新高，其次是美国人和德国人。即使在一个国家（例如美国）生活了一辈子，他们的命运也是全球性的。

Europeans have a higher life expectancy than Americans as well as greater pension portability, making international retirement even more seamless. As EU countries cut benefits and raise the retirement age, ever more elderly will shift to cheaper “Club Med” southern Europe—Spain, Italy, and Greece (while those countries send youth northward). Asian destinations will also continue to rise in the ranks of havens for cash-strapped Western retirees. In 2018, Thailand issued its highest ever number of retirement visas to Brits, followed by Americans and Germans. Even after a lifetime living in one country, such as America, their destiny is global.

富有的退休人员已经选择流动性作为一种生活方式的选择。有些人每年在维京太阳号等游轮上居住 250 天或更长时间，永久环游世界，停靠在 50 个国家的 100 多个港口。一艘被称为“世界”的船 由永久居住在其上的 130 个家庭拥有，使其成为一个微型移动主权。健康的退休人员的经济状况较为温和，他们通过每隔几个月更换一次游轮来巧妙地观察世界，每月支付的费用比在辅助生活设施中的费用要低。在疫情爆发之前，全球每年 2500 万名游轮乘客中，有一半是退休人员或婴儿潮一代。虽然封锁导致许多游轮滞留在海上，但大洋洲号和乌托邦号等越来越多的游轮，已改造为住宅和全职医疗服务，以容纳永久流动的退休人员。游轮越多，对数十万厨师、清洁工、歌手、卡片经销商、医生和护士的需求就越大，尤其是来自印度、印度尼西亚和菲律宾的人。未来，他们很可能比那些留在陆地上的人更安全。

Rich retirees have already opted for mobility as a lifestyle choice. Some reside 250 days or more per year on cruise ships such as the Viking Sun, perpetually sailing around the world, docking in more than one hundred ports across fifty countries. One ship known as The World is owned by the 130 families who permanently reside on it, making it something of a micro mobile sovereign. Healthy retirees with more modest means cleverly see the world by changing cruise ships every few months, paying less per month than they would in assisted living facilities. Before the pandemic, half of the 25 million annual cruise ship passengers worldwide were retirees or baby boomers. While the lockdown stranded many cruise ships at sea, a growing number, such as Oceania and Utopia, have been retrofitted with residences and full-time medical care to accommodate permanently mobile retirees. And the more cruise ships there are, the greater the demand for hundreds of thousands of cooks, cleaners, singers, card dealers, doctors, and nurses, especially from India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the future, they may well be safer than those staying on land.

为什么现在是全球“护照”的时候了

Why it’s time for a global “passport”

第一次世界大战前的几个世纪里，人们在没有护照的情况下环游​​世界。欧洲定居者以逃离君主制的朝圣者或逃离饥荒的移民的身份抵达北美，他们的名下既没有金钱也没有证件。大英帝国等帝国地区的流动性培育了一代又一代的臣民从东非到东南亚的殖民地。护照的起源与其说是一种表明排他性身份的限制性证书，不如说是一种安全通行的通行证。1780年，本杰明·富兰克林在担任驻法国大使期间，自己制作了美国护照，以申请进入荷兰。但第一次世界大战后，移民变得如此官僚化，以至于护照现在成为更明智的人文地理学的主要障碍之一。

For centuries before World War I, people traveled the world without passports. European settlers arrived in North America as pilgrims fleeing monarchy or migrants fleeing famine, with neither money nor documents to their name. The fluidity of imperial zones such as the British empire nurtured generations of subjects moving across colonies from East Africa to Southeast Asia. The origin of the passport is much less as a restrictive certificate denoting exclusive identity than a laissez passer, a request for safe passage. While serving as ambassador to France in 1780, Benjamin Franklin made his own American passport to request entry into the Netherlands. But after World War I, migration became so bureaucratized that passports are now one of the chief barriers to a more sensible human geography.

我们怎样才能回到这样一个世界：护照并不代表你是谁，而只是在你前往目的地的途中识别你的身份？第一步将是区块链交叉点的技术平台和生物识别技术。如今，大使馆和领事馆充斥着大量的签证申请，每个签证申请的要求略有不同，但很容易简化。全球数据库还可以消除物理身份证和数字身份证之间的差异，并且边境检查站可以更好地与其连接。这些数据可以存储在区块链上，进行更新和验证以供持续使用。多年来，国际航空旅行协会 (IATA)、海关机构和预订网站一直致力于将这些痛点数字化。他们主张建立一个选择性加入的旅行者数据存储库，以便根据需要进行共享，以实现快速批准。请记住，几乎所有国家及其企业都希望这些游客和商人，但他们的活动在前技术官僚炼狱中受到抑制。您是玻利维亚人、尼日利亚人或越南人并不重要，更重要的是您作为个人提供了足够准确的信息以获得入境许可，例如您最近的行踪、犯罪记录、就业记录和健康状况。许多美国人肯定能理解与同胞区别对待的愿望：由于未能充分封锁，美国人受到集体惩罚，被禁止前往加拿大、欧洲和大多数其他冠状病毒得到更有效控制的理想目的地。

How can we return to a world where passports don’t stand for who you are, but simply identify you on your way to where you’re going? The first step would be a technological platform at the intersection of blockchain and biometrics. Embassies and consulates today are overwhelmed with visa applications, each with marginally different requirements that could easily be streamlined. Global databases could also iron out the discrepancies between physical and digital IDs, and border checkpoints could be better connected to them. This data could be stored on the blockchain, updated and verified for ongoing usage. For several years, the International Air Travel Association (IATA), customs agencies, and booking websites have been working to digitize these pain points. They advocate an opt-in repository of traveler data to be shared as needed for speedy approval. Remember that almost all countries and their businesses want these tourists and businesspeople, but their movement is stifled in pre-technological bureaucratic purgatory. It should matter less that you are Bolivian, Nigerian, or Vietnamese, and more that you as an individual have provided sufficient accurate information to gain entry, such as your recent whereabouts, criminal history, employment records, and health status. Many Americans can surely appreciate the desire to be differentiated from their countrymen: Having failed to sufficiently lock down, Americans were collectively punished, barred from travel to Canada, Europe, and most other desirable destinations where the coronavirus was more effectively contained.

同样的制度最终可以将数十亿工人阶级从与其民族身份相关的摩擦中解放出来，无论是来自中国、印度和东南亚国家的亚洲人，还是阿拉伯人、土耳其人和南美人。正如经济学家布兰科·米拉诺维奇（Branko Milanovic）所说，他们的公民身份是根据他们的出生地任意分配的税收。然而，这些地区拥有数十个国家所需的劳动力资源，无论是农民、建筑工人还是护士。未来最重要的护照是技能和健康而不是国籍。我们不应根据出生的偶然性来评判一个人，而应该根据他们对社会做出贡献的潜力来判断。通过将流动性与国籍分开，我们可以规避人们因来自贫穷或战争国家而面临的偏见。世界上的移动工作者没有集体的议价能力，但每个人都会从证明其流动性中受益。

This same system could eventually liberate billions of working-class individuals from the friction associated with their national identity, whether Asians from China, India, and Southeast Asian nations, or Arabs, Turks, and South Americans. As economist Branko Milanovic argues, their citizenship is a tax arbitrarily assigned based on their location of birth. Yet these regions are home to the labor pool dozens of countries need, whether farmers or construction workers or nurses. The most important passports of the future are skills and health rather than nationality. We should judge individuals not by the accident of birth, but on their potential to contribute to society. By divorcing mobility from nationality, we circumvent biases people face for coming from countries that are poor or at war. The mobile workers of the world don’t have collective bargaining power, but everyone would benefit from certifying their mobility.

全球教育部门也迫切需要这样一个系统，既可以维持西方大学所依赖的大量外国学生，也可以确保在发展中国家进行现场授课的国际分校的稳定供应。对于跨国公司来说，在供应链上调动员工也是如此。大学和企业应该联手推动大规模的通行证，以克服在世界各地输送学生和专业人士时面临的裁员问题。

The global education sector also desperately needs such a system, both to maintain the large number of foreign students on which Western universities depend and to ensure a steady supply for their international branches that deliver classes on-site in developing countries. The same goes for global companies moving employees around along their supply chains. Universities and companies should team up and push for a large-scale laissez passer to overcome the redundancies they face in moving students and professionals around the world.

规避不必要的官僚机构的并行数字识别并不是对国家公民身份和护照的竞争对手或威胁。公民身份赋予土地所有权、投票权和法律保护的权利，并意味着从服兵役到纳税等重大义务。我们需要的是补充协议和信息交换所，其中包含大量数据：国民身份证、护照照片、指纹、手机账户、银行对账单、犯罪记录、就业记录、旅行日志、健康状况等等。一旦经过验证，这些信息只能根据需要暂时向相关当局可见。事实上，它对于数字投票等国内优先事项和国际流动性同样有用。

A parallel digital identification that circumvents unnecessary bureaucracy is not a competitor or threat to national citizenship and passports. Citizenship confers rights to land ownership, voting, and legal protections, and denotes significant obligations ranging from military service to taxation. What is needed is a supplemental protocol and clearinghouse that crowds in data: national ID cards, passport photos, fingerprints, mobile phone accounts, bank statements, criminal history, employment records, travel logs, health status, and so forth. Once verified, this information could be visible only temporarily, as needed, to relevant authorities. Indeed, it would be just as useful for domestic priorities such as digital voting as for international mobility.

全球可信的身份数据库将帮助各国了解哪些人可以根据其良好信誉安全地进入，也可以帮助他们更轻松地决定将哪些人排除在外——包括一些本国公民。2015 年 11 月巴黎袭击事件中的 8 名恐怖分子中有 4 名是法国公民。从美国到澳大利亚，数千名西方护照持有者已宣誓效忠基地组织或伊斯兰国，并在伊拉克和叙利亚为他们而战。无论是白人、阿拉伯人还是非洲人，他们的护照都让他们可以轻松返回家园并造成严重破坏。反移民的欧洲政客以恐怖主义为借口限制难民流入，但移民限制不会减少本土激进分子的数量。要求个人严格证明他们去过哪里，然后验证信息是领先于各种肤色的灵活恐怖分子的更好方法。

A globally trusted ID database would help countries know whom they can safely let in based on their good standing, and it can also help them more easily decide whom to keep out—including some of their own citizens. Four of the eight terrorists in the November 2015 attacks in Paris were French citizens. Thousands of Western passport holders from America to Australia have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda or ISIS and fought on their behalf in Iraq and Syria. Whether racially Caucasian, Arab, or African, their passports have allowed them to easily return home and wreak havoc. Anti-immigrant European politicians have cited terrorism as an excuse to restrict refugee inflows, but migration restrictions won’t diminish the pool of homegrown radicals. Requiring individuals to rigorously demonstrate where they have been and then verifying that information is a better way to stay ahead of nimble terrorists of all complexions.

现在是一个独特的机会，可以建立一个制度，赋予数十亿人权力，而不是限制他们的自由流动，从而造福世界社会。这也是一个为政治崩溃和气候变化导致的大规模移民时代做好数字化准备的机会，在这个时代，数亿人可能会在不可预测的多向流动中不断流动。人类有能力采用更好的方法来管理跨境流动，无论是在区块链上还是最终嵌入我们皮肤下的芯片上。流动性是我们抵御波动的最佳保障。当下一次危机到来时，我们会很高兴我们拥有它。

Now is a unique opportunity to bring about a system that empowers rather than restrains the billions of individuals whose freer mobility could benefit world society. It’s also a chance to digitally prepare for an era of mass migrations resulting from political collapse and climate change, in which hundreds of millions of people may circulate in a constant flux of unpredictable multidirectional movements. Mankind is capable of a better approach to managing cross-border movements, whether on the blockchain or eventually chips embedded under our skin. Mobility is our best insurance against volatility. When the next crisis comes, we’ll be glad we have it.

全球公民套利

The global citizenship arbitrage

在全球冠状病毒封锁最严重的时候，没有新冠病毒的斐济岛试图吸引超级富豪进行无限期的逗留，邀请他们乘坐私人飞机或游艇抵达，在热带舒适的环境中安然度过疫情。巴巴多斯和百慕大也做了同样的事情——不需要签证。这些依赖旅游业的国家肯定会让你留下来，只要你能负担得起，没有任何问题。

At the height of the global coronavirus lockdown, the Covid-free island of Fiji sought to lure the ultra-rich for an open-ended sojourn, inviting them to arrive in their private jets or yachts and ride out the pandemic in tropical comfort. Barbados and Bermuda did the same—no visa required. These tourism-depending nations would surely let you stay as long as you could afford to, no questions asked.

我们的公民观念起源于地中海和底格里斯-幼发拉底河流域的古代城邦，它们竞相扩张领土并将人民吸收到他们的帝国中，但建立了有利于占主导地位的部落的等级制度。几千年来，一个部落为其他部落定义公民权（和其他权利）的观念在世界范围内一直存在。但这些过时的做法正在被一个广阔的全球市场所取代，在这个市场中，人们根据哪个国家为他们提供最多的利益来选择自己的国籍。在人口通货紧缩的世界里，各国都在竞相吸引人才和富人在其境内定居。各国不会对他们发号施令，而是会竭尽全力引诱他们。

Our idea of citizenship originates in the ancient city-states of the Mediterranean and Tigris-Euphrates River Valley, which competed to expand territory and absorb people into their empires but established hierarchies favoring the dominant tribe. The idea that one tribe defines the right to (and the rights of) citizenship for the rest has held across the world for millennia since. But these antiquated practices are giving way to a vast global marketplace in which people choose their nationality based on which country offers the most benefits to them. In a world of demographic deflation, countries are competing to attract talented and wealthy people to settle within their borders. Countries don’t dictate to them but bend over backwards to lure them.

公民身份市场的兴起代表着个人与国家之间关系的重要转变。美国法律学者戴维·弗兰克 (David Franck) 谈到个人变得更加“自主、更有权力的行为者”。⁵护照正变得像里程计划、方便旗，而不是个人身份的体现。法国大革命的理想是“自由、平等、博爱”。今天的机会主义喷气式飞机的座右铭是“机动性、流动性、选择性”。

The rise of a citizenship marketplace represents an important turning of the tables in the relationship between individuals and states. American legal scholar David Franck speaks of individuals becoming more “autonomous, empowered actors.”⁵ Passports are becoming like mileage programs, flags of convenience, not the embodiment of one’s identity. The French Revolution’s ideals were “liberty, equality, fraternity.” Today’s opportunistic jet set lives by the motto “mobility, liquidity, optionality.”

因此，一个人携带的护照很少告诉其他人谁是谁一是。在公民套利方面，一个国家的损失就是另一个国家的收益，一个地方的每一次危机都是更稳定的国家挖走人才的机会。至少有 10 亿人生活在一个近乎后公民身份的世界，其中国籍的重要性不如银行存款或技能。他们将公民身份视为一种服务，将护照视为会员卡，可以升级以获得更大的自由、保护、流动性和其他特权。过去五年来，数以千万计的人改变了国籍。随着发展中国家高净值人士数量的增加，许多人认为自己的国籍是一种负担，并且一直利用自己的公民身份，这也就不足为奇了。事实上，第二本护照的绝大多数申请人都是亚洲人。国家不是母亲：你出生在其中，但可以否认它。一位专家声称，2017 年只有 5000 人购买了“黄金签证”（投资公民身份），但仅在 2020 年前六个月，这一数字就上升到了 2.5 万人。⁶

The passport one carries therefore tells others ever less about who one is. When it comes to citizenship arbitrage, one country’s loss is another’s gain, and each crisis in one place is an opportunity for more stable countries to poach talent. At least 1 billion people live in an almost post-citizenship world where nationality matters less than their bank balance or skills. They think of citizenship as a service and a passport as a membership card that can be upgraded for greater freedoms, protections, mobility, and other privileges. Tens of millions of people have changed their nationality in the past five decades. As the number of high-net-worth individuals in developing countries expands, it should come as no surprise that many consider their nationality to be a liability and have been mercenary with their citizenship. Indeed, the strong majority of applicants for second passports are Asian. The state is not a mother: You are born in it but can disown it. One expert claims that only five thousand people purchased “golden visas” (citizenship by investment) in 2017, but in the first six months of 2020 alone, that figure rose to twenty-five thousand.⁶

从历史上看，公民身份是通过出生（ius solis）或血统（ius sanguinis）授予的，在最近几代移民浪潮中，通过居住入籍的现象不断增加。我们现在添加ius doni，意思是通过投资获得公民身份。这个想法在财政上是明智的。对于像圣基茨、圣卢西亚或安提瓜这样税基较小且借贷成本较高的贫穷加勒比国家来说，吸引“主权股权”——出售自己的一块土地，例如土地——比购买更多的资产更可取。债务。理想情况下，他们将利用新移民的投资为更好的基础设施和经济多元化提供资金，最终建立更健全的福利体系。

Historically, citizenship has been granted by birth (ius solis) or descent (ius sanguinis), with naturalization by residency rising during recent generations of migration waves. To this we now add ius doni, meaning citizenship via investment. The idea is fiscally sensible. For poor Caribbean nations, like St. Kitts, St. Lucia, or Antigua, that have a small tax base and face high borrowing costs, attracting “sovereign equity”—selling a piece of themselves such as land—is preferable to taking on more debt. Ideally, they’ll use this investment from new migrants to finance better infrastructure and economic diversification, eventually building a more robust welfare system.

总部位于伦敦的 Henley & Partners 首创了ius doni概念，并为数百家中的数十家提供咨询服务拥有此类投资公民计划的国家。如果将这种现象视为只由阴暗的避税天堂所造成的边缘现象，那就是只见树木、不见森林。具有讽刺意味的是，长期以来一直实行严格国籍法的欧洲国家在向印度人、尼日利亚人、俄罗斯人、中国人和其他人出售公民身份方面表现得最为活跃。毕竟，它们是这些移民最向往的国家：在亨利国籍质量指数（基于政治稳定性、人类发展、公共服务和护照准入）中，欧洲横扫前二十位，而美国仅排名二十七位澳大利亚第三十二。塞浦路斯和奥地利特别受俄罗斯人欢迎。^四号西班牙的黄金签证计划向投资 50 万欧元房地产的投资者及其家人授予居留权。葡萄牙已向富有的英国人和中国人出售了两千多个黄金签证，带来了超过 20 亿美元的投资。考虑到该国的气候适应能力，这是一个不错的选择。在邻近的比利牛斯山脉安道尔飞地，投资者签证费用为 40 万欧元，并享有 300 天的阳光。

London-based Henley & Partners pioneered the ius doni concept and advises dozens of the more than one hundred countries that have such citizenship-by-investment programs. To consider this a fringe phenomenon perpetrated only by shady tax havens would be to miss the forest for the trees. Ironically, European countries that have long had strict nationality laws have run the most brisk business in selling citizenships to Indians, Nigerians, Russians, Chinese, and others. They are, after all, the most desirable for these migrants: Europe sweeps the top twenty spots in Henley’s Quality of Nationality Index (based on political stability, human development, public services, and passport access), while the US ranks only twenty-seventh and Australia thirty-second. Cyprus and Austria are particularly popular with Russians.^IV Spain’s golden visa program grants residency to investors and their families upon investing 500,000 euros in real estate. Portugal has sold more than two thousand golden visas to wealthy Britons and Chinese, generating more than $2 billion in investment. Given the country’s climate resilience, it’s a good bet. In the neighboring enclave of Andorra in the Pyrenees, an investor visa is 400,000 euros and comes with three hundred days of sunshine.

每次一个国家加入欧盟，就会对外国投资移民产生吸引力。苏联时期，俄罗斯统治拉脱维亚等波罗的海国家。现在拉脱维亚是欧盟成员国，俄罗斯公民正在购买拉脱维亚护照。在冠状病毒封锁期间，黑山申请护照的人数激增，尤其是在它即将加入欧盟之际。正如瑞士法律学者克里斯蒂安·约普克（Christian Joppke）所指出的，欧盟公民身份是后国家“工具性”公民身份的体现因为它不预设或要求任何共同的欧洲身份。

Each time a country joins the EU, it becomes attractive for foreign investor migrants. During the Soviet era, Russia dominated Baltic countries such as Latvia. Now that Latvia is an EU member, Russian citizens are buying Latvian passports. Montenegro saw a surge of applicants for its passport during the coronavirus lockdown—especially as it’s on the cusp of joining the EU. As Swiss legal scholar Christian Joppke points out, EU citizenship is the embodiment of a post-national “instrumental” citizenship because it doesn’t presuppose or demand any common European identity.

招募更多投资移民可以帮助欧洲避免人口紧缩。随着中国和印度人涌入欧洲大学城，亚洲私募股权公司和主权财富基金也紧随其后，购买并改造学生宿舍，进行德国十多年来一直忽视的投资。现在，美国正在阻止中国学生和旅游生育妈妈，这两个群体很可能会在欧洲国家的投资居留和公民身份上花费更多，而这些妈妈们可能会在那里生孩子。

Recruiting more investor migrants could help Europe stave off its demographic deflation. As Chinese and Indians pour into Europe’s university towns, Asian private equity firms and sovereign wealth funds follow, buying up and retrofitting student dorms, making investments Germany has neglected for more than a decade. And now that America is blocking Chinese students and birth tourist mothers, these two groups may well spend more on investment residency and citizenship in European countries, and the mothers may have their children there instead.

一些欧洲保守派认为，公民身份只能授予那些与国家有“真正”联系的人。这种“真正”的用法是似是而非的，有效地将公民身份还原为出生的任意偶然事件，很难衡量真正的意志。当然，批评公民身份出售计划的实际目的是为了避免损失税收。“天堂文件”（包含 1300 万份文件，披露了世界各地精英的离岸金融资产）揭示了富裕个人（例如无国籍跨国公司）将其资产隐藏在离岸司法管辖区的程度——其中大量其中有英国公民。尝试解开其中的讽刺：英国对泽西岛和英属维尔京群岛等避税天堂拥有主权，英国人民（以及无数其他人）通过这些避税天堂洗钱。但英国脱欧后，英国护照的全球通行能力被削弱，导致英国人在爱尔兰、德国或葡萄牙获得公民身份的人数激增。还有550万英国侨民在海外生活了太久，他们已经正式失去了投票权，这让他们更没有动力保持英国公民身份。毫无疑问，英国政府本身对将许多本国公民转变为其他地方的公民负有最大责任。英国财政如此糟糕有什么奇怪的吗？英国本身就以 260 万美元的价格出售投资者签证？英国护照的全球通行能力被削弱，导致越来越多的英国人在爱尔兰、德国或葡萄牙获得公民身份。还有550万英国侨民在海外生活了太久，他们已经正式失去了投票权，这让他们更没有动力保持英国公民身份。毫无疑问，英国政府本身对将许多本国公民转变为其他地方的公民负有最大责任。英国财政如此糟糕有什么奇怪的吗？英国本身就以 260 万美元的价格出售投资者签证？英国护照的全球通行能力被削弱，导致越来越多的英国人在爱尔兰、德国或葡萄牙获得公民身份。还有550万英国侨民在海外生活了太久，他们已经正式失去了投票权，这让他们更没有动力保持英国公民身份。毫无疑问，英国政府本身对将许多本国公民转变为其他地方的公民负有最大责任。英国财政如此糟糕有什么奇怪的吗？英国本身就以 260 万美元的价格出售投资者签证？让他们更没有动力保持英国公民身份。毫无疑问，英国政府本身对将许多本国公民转变为其他地方的公民负有最大责任。英国财政如此糟糕有什么奇怪的吗？英国本身就以 260 万美元的价格出售投资者签证？让他们更没有动力保持英国公民身份。毫无疑问，英国政府本身对将许多本国公民转变为其他地方的公民负有最大责任。英国财政如此糟糕有什么奇怪的吗？英国本身就以 260 万美元的价格出售投资者签证？

Some European conservatives argue that citizenship should only be conferred on those with a “genuine” link to the country. This usage of “genuine” is specious, effectively reducing citizenship back to the arbitrary happenstance of birth, hardly a measure of genuine volition. The actual intent of criticizing citizenship-for-sale programs, of course, is to avoid losing tax revenue. The “Paradise Papers” (a trove of 13 million documents disclosing offshore financial holdings of elites from around the world) revealed the extent to which wealthy individuals, like stateless global companies, will go to hide their assets in offshore jurisdictions—with a strong number of them being British nationals. Try to untangle the ironies: Britain has sovereignty over tax havens such as Jersey and the British Virgin Islands through which British people (and countless others) launder their investments. But after Brexit, its own passport has weakened in global access, leading to a surge of Brits taking citizenship in Ireland, Germany, or Portugal. Then there are the 5.5 million British expats who have lived overseas for so long that they have formally lost the right to vote, giving them even less incentive to maintain their UK citizenship. There should be little doubt that the UK government itself is most responsible for turning many of its own citizens into citizens of somewhere else. Is it any wonder that British finances are so dire? And that Britain itself sells investor visas for $2.6 million?

欧盟肯定会反击，要求公司注册在低税收国家证明其“经济实质”涉及居住在那里的实际居民。换句话说，必须有员工，而不仅仅是空壳公司。各国政府正在计算人们在其境内停留的天数，并根据他们工作的地点对其征税；很快，他们不仅会检查您的护照日期和印章，还会检查您声称从事的工作的 IP 地址以及您为谁做的工作。不过，可能的结果是，人们会用钱包投票，将自己或员工转移到税收效率更高的地方。无论是戴森将其总部从伦敦迁至新加坡，还是软银的愿景基金从伦敦迁至阿布扎比，企业肯定会这样做。

The EU is certainly pushing back, demanding that companies registered in low-tax countries to prove that their “economic substance” involves actual people living there. In other words, there must be employees, not just shell companies. Governments are counting the number of days people spend within their borders to tax them based on the location at which they work; soon they will check not just your passport dates and stamps, but the IP address from which you did the work you claimed to do, and for whom you did it. The likely result, though, is that people will vote with their wallets, moving themselves or their staff to more tax-efficient places. Companies certainly are, whether Dyson shifting its headquarters from London to Singapore or SoftBank’s Vision Fund relocating from London to Abu Dhabi.

爱尔兰已经成为全球科技公司的避税天堂，每年还接纳数万名新的技术居民，其中许多人居住在都柏林市中心的“Googleville”。只需一年并支付 100 万欧元，居民就有资格申请公民身份，使他们能够随意移居到其他竞争吸引移民投资者的欧盟国家。（2020 年中，香港大亨何鸿燊提议在爱尔兰建造一座名为 Nextpolis 的新城市，以重新安置 5 万香港公民。）

Ireland is already a tax haven for global tech companies and also takes in tens of thousands of new skilled residents each year—many living in “Googleville” in central Dublin. After just one year and paying 1 million euros, residents are eligible to apply for citizenship, enabling them to move at will to other EU countries competing to attract migrant investors. (In mid-2020, Hong Kong tycoon Ivan Ho proposed building a new city in Ireland called Nextpolis to which to relocate fifty thousand Hong Kong citizens.)

如果各国不更好地提高其护照的全球准入排名，那么其公民就会迁移并改变公民身份。虽然日本、韩国和新加坡的亚洲护照目前位居最强护照排行榜榜首，但中国排名第 74 位，印度的排名还要低得多。每年，大约有十万（主要是中国人和印度人）进入新西兰，要么留下来，要么利用新西兰作为进入澳大利亚的后门。警钟敲响后，新西兰取消了允许任何外国人（除了少数友好国家或选定的亿万富翁之外）购买房产的决定。现在，那些未来的新西兰人很可能会成为加人队。中国有句谚语，聪明的兔子总是钻三个洞。中国人应该知道：

If countries don’t do a better job moving their passports up the rankings of global access, their citizens will just move and change citizenship. While Asian passports from Japan, South Korea, and Singapore now sit atop the ranking of most powerful passports, China ranks seventy-fourth, and India far lower still. Each year, about one hundred thousand mostly Chinese and Indians have come into New Zealand either to stay or use it as a back door to enter Australia. After alarm bells sounded, New Zealand backtracked on allowing any foreigners (save for those from a handful of friendly countries, or selected billionaires) to buy property at all. Now those would-be Kiwis will likely become Canucks instead. A Chinese proverb advises that a wise rabbit always has three holes to burrow in. Chinese should know: They’re buying up properties and passports from Canada to Portugal to Singapore.

美国人也是如此。从历史上看，美国人只有在美国纳税申报多年受挫后才会移居国外。1% 的美国超级富豪可以轻松放弃或保留美国公民身份，但只有 2%、5%、10% 和其他所有人在同时在两个国家纳税的同时努力省钱。时间。^V整个 2010 年代，惩罚性税收政策、政治民粹主义和新冠疫情管理不善都导致越来越多的美国人退出。仅 2020 年上半年，全球美国侨民就达到近 6000 人，比 2019 年全年总数增长 1,200%，如果不是各使馆申请积压的话，这个数字还会更高。精英们的离职有自己的选择：威权民粹主义共和党人或觉醒的社会主义民主党人。具有讽刺意味的是，意大利和爱尔兰在十九世纪为美国提供了如此多心存感激的移民，却成为美国人利用其血统为自己和孩子获得欧洲护照的首选目的地。谁知道美国不断增长的侨民接下来会去哪里？

So too are Americans. Historically, Americans only expatriate after many years of frustration at US tax filings. The ultra-rich 1 percent of American expats can easily afford either to renounce or to keep US citizenship, but it’s the 2 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and everyone else that struggles to save money while paying taxes in two countries at the same time.^V Punitive tax policy, political populism, and Covid mismanagement all drove a growing number of Americans to the exits throughout the 2010s. In the first half of 2020 alone, American expatriation reached nearly six thousand worldwide, a 1,200 percent jump over the entire total of 2019—and would have been even higher if not for the backlog of applicants at various embassies. Departing elites have their pick of justifications: authoritarian populist Republicans or woke socialist Democrats. Ironically, Italy and Ireland, which provided so many grateful migrants to America in the nineteenth century, are top destinations for Americans using their lineage to obtain European passports for themselves—and for their children too. Who knows where America’s growing diaspora will go next?

即使那些持有美国护照或绿卡以抵御国内动荡的人也不再认为美国是一个安全的避风港。据估计，有 600 万美国公民还持有其他护照——它们在纸面上是“美国”护照，但美国对他们来说更多的是一个后备计划，而不是效忠的誓言。现在，美国人和这些美国第二护照持有者都在重新考虑。事实上，每年放弃绿卡的外国人比放弃护照的美国人还要多。就像美国失去了对最优秀和最聪明的学生的主导地位一样，它也失去了作为一个国籍的吸引力，就像其他国家（包括美国人）在全球财富和人才的战争中激烈竞争一样。

Even those for whom an American passport or green card has been a hedge against turbulence at home no longer consider America a safe haven. An estimated 6 million American citizens also hold other passports—they’re “American” on paper, but America for them is more a backup plan than a pledge of allegiance. Now both Americans and these secondary US passport holders are having second thoughts. In fact, even more foreigners give up their green cards each year than Americans give up passports. Much as America has lost its dominant grip on the best and brightest students, it’s also losing appeal as a nationality just as other countries are vigorously competing in a war for global wealth and talent—including Americans.

我。Expatistan 使用布拉格市作为基准价格城市，并给出了居住在那里的高于和低于的百分比。在纽约、湾区、瑞士或伦敦的生活成本几乎是布拉格的三倍，而在河内或布宜诺斯艾利斯，您只需花费布拉格预算的一半多一点即可舒适地生活。

I. Expatistan uses the city of Prague as the base price city, and gives percentages above and below living there. Living in New York, the Bay Area, Switzerland, or London costs nearly triple the cost of Prague, while you could live comfortably in Hanoi or Buenos Aires for just over half the Prague budget.

二．英国等许多国家都有四步移民政策，其中包括由 World-Check（汤森路透旗下公司）进行的基本尽职调查，该公司在公共数据库中搜索犯罪记录，然后对居住和就业进行更深入的调查记录、核实某人未受到金融行动特别工作组 (FATF) 等国际机构的制裁，最后获得外交部的批准。如果更多的记录存储在区块链上，几乎所有这些都可以更有效地完成。

II. Numerous countries, such as the UK, have a four-step immigration policy involving basic due diligence done by World-Check (a firm owned by Thomson Reuters), which searches public databases for criminal history, followed by a deeper investigation of residency and employment records, verification that a person is not under sanction by international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and lastly approval from the foreign ministry. Almost all of this could be done much more efficiently if more records were stored on blockchains.

三．该数据可能并不代表美国海外退休人员的真实数量，因为有些人尽管居住在海外，但可能仍在美国领取社会保障，或者根本没有领取社会保障。

III. This data might not represent the real number of American retirees abroad, since some might be receiving their Social Security in the US despite residing overseas, or not receiving Social Security at all.

四．摩纳哥不是欧盟成员国，但与其签有海关协定。其三万八千名居民中的大多数是其他欧洲国家的超级富有的纳税公民。

IV. Monaco is not an EU member but has a customs agreement with it. Most of its thirty-eight thousand residents are ultra-wealthy tax citizens of other European countries.

五。美国国税局显然缺乏对海外美国公民施加的纪律，每年都会增加更多的文书工作，例如《海外账户税收合规法案》(FATCA) 法规，这些法规旨在针对拥有离岸账户的在岸美国人，但最终却惩罚了数百万已经在国外诚实生活的美国人。

V. The IRS clearly lacks the discipline it imposes on US citizens abroad, piling on more paperwork each year such as FATCA regulations, which are meant to target onshore Americans with offshore accounts, but wind up penalizing millions of Americans already making an honest living abroad.

第12章城市和平

CHAPTER 12 PAX URBANICA

绿区网络

Green zone networks

大多数咖啡桌不够坚固，无法支撑一些咖啡桌书籍。其中一本是宏伟的《Architekturtheorie im deutschsprachigen Kulturraum》（1486-1648），这是一本 750 页的巨著，其周长如果不是那么珍贵，它本身就可以用作咖啡桌。该书由瑞士领先的苏黎世联邦理工学院编写，讲述了文艺复兴时期的公爵和王子如何委托当时的顶尖建筑师重新设计欧洲的中世纪城市，以适应日益增多的在熙熙攘攘的贸易中心之间穿梭的商人。贸易路线成为城市本质的一部分。连通性和移动性改变了空间的意义。

There are some coffee table books that most coffee tables just aren’t sturdy enough to support. One is the magnificent Architekturtheorie im deutschsprachigen Kulturraum (1486–1648), a 750-page tome of such girth it might itself be used as a coffee table were it not so precious. Compiled by Switzerland’s leading ETH Zurich University, it captures how Renaissance dukes and princes commissioned the leading architects of the day to redesign Europe’s medieval cities to accommodate the rising number of merchants shuttling between its bustling trading hubs. Trade routes became part of the city’s essence. Connectivity and mobility transformed the meaning of space.

人们普遍认为外交诞生于欧洲民族国家形成的时期，但事实上，外交的根源在于美索不达米亚古代城邦之间刚刚萌芽的贸易关系。（外交确实是第二古老的职业。）巴格达、大马士革和贝鲁特都是比此后出现和消失的任何特定帝国或国家都要古老的城市。古往今来，城市间的外交——我称之为“外交”——一直是人类文明的一个持续特征。它未来的模式很可能会模仿过去的模式。

It’s commonly thought that diplomacy was born during this period when European nation-states took shape, but in fact, diplomacy’s origins lie in the nascent trade relations between the ancient city-states of Mesopotamia. (Diplomacy truly is the second oldest profession.) Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut are far older cities than any particular empire or nation that has appeared—and disappeared—since. Across the ages, the diplomacy among cities—what I call “diplomacity”—has been a continuous feature of human civilization. Its future patterns may well mimic those of the past.

中世纪可能特别具有启发性。在十四世纪至十六世纪期间，北欧汉萨同盟由横跨北海和波罗的海的城市组成，形成了一个默契的联盟，以捍卫自己的贸易权和政治自治权，对抗外国势力。神圣罗马帝国、英格兰和其他敌人的侵犯。他们的织物、盔甲、雕刻木材和金属贸易也加速了文艺复兴思想传入北欧的速度。汉萨城市在内部安全和外部联系之间取得的平衡对于想象下一个“外交”时代如何展开、领先城市之间进行健康的竞争合作至关重要。未来可以由小国家和城市之间渐进的新和平来定义：Pax Urbanica。

The Middle Ages may be particularly instructive. During the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, the northern European Hanseatic League, comprising cities spanning the North and Baltic Seas, formed a tacit alliance to defend their trading rights and political autonomy against the encroachments of the Holy Roman Empire, England, and other foes. Their trade in fabrics, armor, engraved woods, and metals also accelerated the arrival of Renaissance ideas to northern Europe. The balance Hanseatic cities struck between internal security and external connectedness is fundamental to imagining how the next era of “diplomacity” could unfold, with leading cities engaged in a healthy competitive cooperation with each other. The future could be defined by a progressive new peace among small states and cities: a Pax Urbanica.

在2020年春季的疫情期间，我们的美索不达米亚和汉萨本能就像骑自行车一样自然地焕发了活力。澳大利亚和新西兰、瑞士和奥地利、芬兰和爱沙尼亚——这对志同道合、人口稀少的邻国重新向彼此开放了边界。“绿色通道”和“免疫泡沫”开始出现，这表明对彼此卫生系统的信任比几个世纪以来的国家间外交公约更重要。美国护照突然只在 30 个国家受到欢迎，而不是通常的 150 个国家。

During the pandemic spring of 2020, our Mesopotamian and Hanseatic instincts refreshed as naturally as riding a bicycle. Australia and New Zealand, Switzerland and Austria, Finland and Estonia—pairs of like-minded neighbors with small populations reopened borders exclusively to each other. “Green lanes” and “immunity bubbles” kicked in, signifying how trust in each other’s health systems mattered more than centuries of inter-state diplomatic conventions. The US passport was suddenly welcome in just 30 countries instead of the usual 150.

没有人愿意在健康和财富之间进行权衡。与我们内心渴望安身于绿色区域的愿望相比，我们对国家的模糊忠诚显得黯然失色。治理良好的地区宁愿相互连接，也不愿被束缚在隔壁的薄弱环节上。事实上，最引人注目的是那些没有正式权利关闭内部边界的国家内各州和省的行为。夏威夷寻求为澳大利亚人和日本人重新开放旅游业，但不包括美国同胞。罗德岛州警方在各个街区搜查纽约车牌；甚至汉普顿的纽约同胞也怀疑来自纽约市的富有难民不公平地掠夺了他们的杂货店。随着苏格兰控制了新冠疫情，它没有兴趣让不守纪律的英格兰同胞入境。

Nobody wants a trade-off between health and wealth. Our vague loyalty to the nation pales in comparison to our visceral desire to be ensconced inside a green zone. Well-governed territories would rather connect to one another than be chained to weak links next door. Indeed, most striking was the behavior of states and provinces within countries that had no formal right to close internal borders. Hawaii sought to reopen tourism for Australians and Japanese—but not fellow Americans. Police in Rhode Island searched neighborhoods for New York license plates; even fellow New Yorkers in the Hamptons suspected wealthy refugees from New York City of unfairly plundering their grocery stores. As Scotland brought Covid under control, it had no interest in letting in undisciplined compatriots from England.

任何有能力的人都正在从红色区域转移到绿色区域，那里有强大的病毒检测和疫苗接种计划。在美国国内，这意味着放弃武装民兵占领国会大厦的州，以防止在反疫苗者和其他“新冠白痴”横行时实施封锁。更广泛地说，绿区往往是政治不存在的国家干扰科学，以及技术被积极应用于公共卫生的国家，例如韩国。加拿大的 BlueDot 系统集成了医疗记录、地理定位网络搜索元数据和手机模式，以警告病毒爆发。瑞典人已经开始将带有 RFID 标签的芯片植入皮肤下，以确认他们的健康状况。在中国、新加坡和其他地方，人工智能现在可以扫描健康记录，并免费筛查预测癌症和其他疾病的潜在发病情况。接下来我们可能会看到政府主动提供使用基因组学和合成生物学的治疗方法。

Anyone who can afford to is on the move away from red zones and into green zones, places with robust virus testing and vaccination programs. Within the US, that means ditching states where armed militias occupy capitol buildings to prevent lockdowns while anti-vaxxers and other “Covidiots” run amok. More broadly, green zones tend to be countries where politics doesn’t interfere with science, and where technology is aggressively being applied to public health, such as South Korea. Canada’s BlueDot system integrates medical records, geolocated web search metadata, and mobile phone patterns to warn of virus outbreaks. Swedes have begun having RFID-tagged chips inserted under their skin that can affirm their health status. In China, Singapore, and elsewhere, AI now scans health records, and free screenings anticipate the potential onset of cancer and other conditions. Next we might see governments proactively offer treatments using genomics and synthetic biology.

毫无疑问，公共卫生将成为未能通过新冠病毒测试的国家的首要任务——就像黑死病之后欧洲社会引入下水道和铺设道路一样。但当生命不再短暂时，为什么还要拿自己的生命去赌博呢？事实上，当今的流动阶层正在寻找将预防措施和长寿干预措施结合起来的“蓝色区域”。意大利的撒丁岛和日本的冲绳岛等地因其清新的环境、有机饮食、定期锻炼和牢固的社区联系而赢得了蓝色地带的绰号，这些因素使当地人的寿命成为地球上最长的地方。大多数人类的生活会因蔬菜、谷物、种子、水果、坚果、豆类和鱼类的蓝色区域饮食而变得更好。更长的生物寿命可以提高人们生活在没有任意暴力的地方的愿望。由于美国是唯一一个经常发生大规模枪击事件的富裕国家，具有健康自我保护意识的人才要么继续提高安全墙，要么搬到更值得信赖的社区。2019 年，旧金山将 NRA 标记为“国内恐怖组织”，但现在枪支可以通过 3D 打印，明智的地方也必须监控这些技术。在绿色区域和蓝色区域的交汇处，人们会发现社会拥有负担得起的住房和工资保护，以及女性领导人和社区警务。但既然枪支可以 3D 打印，明智的场所也必须监控这些技术。在绿色区域和蓝色区域的交汇处，人们会发现社会拥有负担得起的住房和工资保护，以及女性领导人和社区警务。但既然枪支可以 3D 打印，明智的场所也必须监控这些技术。在绿色区域和蓝色区域的交汇处，人们会发现社会拥有负担得起的住房和工资保护，以及女性领导人和社区警务。^我

No doubt public health will become a major priority in countries that failed the Covid test—much as after the Black Death European societies introduced sewers and paved roads. But why gamble with your life when life is no longer short? Indeed, today’s mobile class are looking for “blue zones” that combine preventive measures and pro-longevity interventions. Places such as Sardinia in Italy and Okinawa in Japan have earned the blue zone moniker for their combination of fresh environment, organic diet, regular exercise, and strong community bonds that have propelled locals to the longest lifespans of any place on Earth. Most of humanity would be better off with the blue zone diet of vegetables, grains, seeds, fruits, nuts, beans, and fish. Longer biological lifespans could elevate people’s desire to live in places free of arbitrary violence. Since America is the only rich country with frequent mass shootings, talented people with a healthy sense of self-preservation will either continue to raise their security walls or move to more trustworthy communities. In 2019, San Francisco labeled the NRA a “domestic terrorist organization,” but now that guns can be 3D-printed, sensible locales will have to monitor those technologies as well. At the intersection of green zones and blue zones one finds societies that have affordable housing and wage protections, as well as female leaders and community policing.^I

这提醒人们，人们不会为了寻求 GDP 高增长而计划下一步行动。GDP 作为衡量福利的指标，在​​统计上相当于黄金：只有人们相信它，它才有价值。相反，今天的年轻人更倾向于相信可持续经济、多元化和包容性社会以及权利和健康文化。一场军备竞赛正在进行，以根据社会经济包容性和环境可持续性的平衡对各国进行排名。将各国的 GDP 与最近推出的社会进步指数 (SPI) 中的排名进行比较，结果令人震惊。例如，美国的人均富裕程度高于欧洲少数几个小型避税天堂以外的所有国家。但考虑到其糟糕的医疗保健、暴力和不平等，它在 SPI 中仅排名第 26 位。SPI排名靠前的国家不仅有北欧以及瑞士、爱尔兰、澳大利亚和新西兰等常见国家，还有德国、日本、加拿大和法国等大国。即使在欧洲的低增长轨迹中，公平调节的财富也表明社会更加稳定。

This is a reminder that people don’t plan their next moves searching for high GDP growth. GDP as a measure of welfare is the statistical equivalent of gold: It’s only valuable if people believe in it. Instead, today’s youth are more inclined to put their faith in sustainable economies, diverse and inclusive societies, and a culture of rights and wellness. There is an arms race underway to rank countries according to their balance of socioeconomic inclusion and environmental sustainability. Comparing countries by their GDP versus their rank in the recently launched Social Progress Index (SPI) is startling. The US, for example, is wealthier per capita than all but a few small European tax havens. But given its poor healthcare, violence, and inequality, it ranks only twenty-sixth in the SPI. The top tier of SPI countries is made up not only of the usual suspects in northern Europe as well as Switzerland, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand, but also large countries such as Germany, Japan, Canada, and France. Even amid Europe’s low-growth trajectory, wealth tempered by fairness suggests greater social stability.

最进步的社会

The Most Progressive Societies

社会进步指数衡量各国在满足基本需求（如营养、水、住房和安全）、为福祉奠定基础（教育、医疗保健、信息获取和清洁环境）以及创造机会方面的表现（政治权利、个人自由和包容性经济）。过去五年来，非洲和亚洲的许多贫穷国家一直在稳步进步。在较富裕的国家，增长速度较慢，而一些发达国家则出现了倒退。

The Social Progress Index measures countries by their performance in meeting basic needs (such as nutrition, water, shelter, and safety), providing the foundations for well-being (education, healthcare, access to information, and clean environment), and enabling opportunity (political rights, personal freedoms, and inclusive economies). Many poor countries in Africa and Asia have been making steady improvements over the past five years. In wealthier countries, gains have been slower, while several advanced countries have been backsliding.

然而，许多社会进步排名靠前的国家（例如斯堪的纳维亚国家）由于采矿、建筑、运输和航空的碳消耗，在可持续发展指数（SDI）中表现不佳。相比之下，最能以低资源消耗满足人民需求的国家是哥斯达黎加、斯里兰卡、阿尔巴尼亚和格鲁吉亚。在这些国家，大多数人有足够的收入和教育，预期寿命和幸福感很高，但人均温室气体排放量较低。¹这一经济层的国家通常被描述为陷入“中等收入陷阱”，生产力停滞，而价格上涨使它们失去竞争力。但他们也利用土地改革、教育和技术来实现经济多元化并提高年轻人的技能。在一个不再痴迷于国内生产总值的世界中，他们可能成为那些无法为自身利益而增长的社会（所有社会都是如此）的榜样。

Many countries ranking high in social progress (such as the Scandinavians), however, fare horribly in the Sustainable Development Index (SDI) due to their carbon consumption from mining, construction, transport, and aviation. By contrast, the countries that come closest to meeting their people’s needs with low resource consumption are Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Albania, and Georgia. In these countries, most people have sufficient income and education, life expectancy and happiness are high, but per capita greenhouse gas emissions are low.¹ Countries in this economic tier are often described as being caught in a “middle-income trap” in which productivity stalls while rising prices make them uncompetitive. But they’re also using land reform, education, and technology to diversify their economies and upskill youth. In a world no longer obsessed with GDP, they may be role models for societies that can’t afford growth for its own sake—which is all societies.

真正可持续发展的社会

Truly Sustainable Societies

可持续发展指数（SDI）根据各国满足人口需求同时保持低碳足迹的能力对各国进行排名。与由欧洲国家或其他人口较少的西方国家主导的社会进步指数（SPI）不同，SDI 由以审慎资源管理着称的小国主导。

The Sustainable Development Index (SDI) ranks countries according to their ability to meet their population’s needs while also maintaining a low carbon footprint. In contrast to the Social Progress Index (SPI), which is led by European countries or other Western nations with small populations, the SDI is led by small countries known for prudent resource management.

供给、燃料和循环

Fed, fueled, and circular

冠状病毒袭击时，收成和粮食储备稳定，但突然的加工中断使全球粮食供应系统陷入混乱。数千吨蒙大拿州的土豆被浪费了，通常从贫穷国家出口的数百万鸡蛋也被浪费了。由于边境关闭导致移民工人无法进入，法国经济部长呼吁同胞承担起爱国责任，成为农民。比利时人被敦促每周吃两次薯条，以吸收丰收的马铃薯。新冠疫情封锁还迫使各国援引“粮食民族主义”，俄罗斯禁止出口小麦，越南禁止出口大米，塞尔维亚禁止出口蔬菜和食用油。如果我们自己种植更多的食物，或者住在有食物的地方，我们会变得更好吗？

The coronavirus hit at a time of steady harvests and food reserves, but sudden processing breakdowns threw the global food supply system into disarray. Thousands of tons of Montana potatoes went to waste, as did millions of eggs normally exported from poor countries. As border closures kept out migrant workers, the French economy minister called on his countrymen to take up their patriotic duty to become farmers. Belgians were urged to eat fries twice a week to absorb the huge potato harvest. The Covid lockdown also forced countries to invoke “food nationalism,” with Russia banning the export of wheat, Vietnam of rice, and Serbia of vegetables and food oils. Would we all be better off growing more of our own food, or living in places that do?

这场大流行迫使每个国家重新考虑对世界末日情景的准备。像新西兰这样的岛屿堡垒拥有良好的运气和远见，使其农业独立于世界其他地区。中国的粮食进口量几乎与美国相当，因此加快了农村的拆除速度，以增加耕地面积。日本、韩国等国家不仅养牛、种植农作物，还大力发展水培粮食生产和城市农业。韩国没有浪费食物，而是将食物垃圾堆肥成城市农场使用的肥料。

The pandemic forced every country to rethink its preparedness for apocalyptic scenarios. Island fortresses such as New Zealand had the good fortune and foresight to have engineered their agricultural independence from the rest of the world. China, which imported almost as much food as America, sped up the demolition of rural villages to increase its acreage of farmland. Then there were countries such as Japan and South Korea that not only raise cattle and grow crops, but also ramped up hydroponic food production and urban farming. Rather than waste food, South Korea composted food waste into fertilizer used in urban farms.

以城市为基础的文明让我们误以为一切都可以随时获得，但城市消耗的能源、水和食物远远多于它们生产的能源、水和食物。尽管城市是我们最强大的基础设施，但由于其固定性，它们很容易受到攻击。十世纪，干旱迫使玛雅人放弃了他们强大的要塞城市，例如尤卡坦半岛的奇琴伊察。一千年后，墨西哥城的含水层严重排水，导致城市因下沉而下沉。墨西哥城可能成为下一个奇琴伊察：它的人们可以移动，但城市却不能。

Our city-based civilization has lulled us into thinking anything is available anytime, but cities consume vastly more energy, water, and food than they produce. Though cities are our most formidable infrastructural constructs, they’re vulnerable in their immobility. In the tenth century, droughts forced the Mayan people to abandon their mighty fortress cities such as Chichen Itza on the Yucatán Peninsula. One millennium later, Mexico City has so badly drained its aquifers that it’s sinking due to subsidence. Mexico City could be the next Chichen Itza: Its people can move, but the city can’t.

早在玛雅人出现之前，干旱就对埃及人造成了致命的打击还有罗马帝国。当今最大的粮食生产商面临着潜在的危机，因为工业化农业破坏了种子和土壤之间的自然共生，而缺水耗尽了土地的养分。相反，我们应该推广再生农业技术，例如轮作和固氮细菌，而不是化肥。

Long before the Mayans, droughts dealt fatal blows to the Egyptian and Roman empires as well. Today’s largest food producers face a potential crisis as industrial farming has disrupted the natural symbiosis between seeds and soil, and water shortages deplete the ground’s nutrients. Instead, we should expand regenerative agriculture techniques such as crop rotation, and nitrogen-fixing bacteria instead of chemical fertilizers.

我们必须改变我们从农业发展到城镇再到城市的叙述——前者为后者服务，而不考虑环境成本。相反，我们应该重新思考我们如何以及在哪里生产食物和能源，如何以及在哪里消费它们，以及两者之间的距离。在世界未来理事会主席赫伯特·吉拉代特的框架下，我们必须放松“石油城”时代遥远的能源和食品供应链，将我们的每一个主要定居点变成一个自我维持的“生态城”，实现本地化食品生产、可再生能源能源和材料回收。

We must modify the narrative that we have evolved from agriculture to towns to cities—with the former serving the latter without regard to environmental cost. Instead, we should rethink how and where we produce food and energy, how and where we consume it, and the distance between the two. In the framing of World Future Council president Herbert Girardet, we must unwind the far-flung energy and food supply chains of the “Petropolis” era and turn each of our major settlements into a self-sustaining “Ecopolis” of localized food production, renewable energy, and material recycling.

缺水和人口稠密的地方必须使用最新技术来度过更频繁的干旱期。一座占地一英亩的建筑每天可生产近两吨农产品，其用水量比传统农业少十八倍，并且配备了可将淡水循环回植物根部的冷却系统。在繁华的城市，集装箱被改造成“食物发生器”，里面装有水培设备。中国已经破土动工建设一座整座城市，其目标是既能抵御大流行病，又能实现粮食和能源自给自足。马略卡岛是西班牙收入最高的旅游中心之一，并且正在迅速中产阶级化，但它的水正在耗尽。但西班牙也是 Arpa 和 Genaq 等公司的所在地，这些公司开发了一些最先进的大气水发生器，已经销往世界各地数十支军队。马略卡岛可能成为一个圆形岛屿。

Water-stressed and densely populated places will have to use the latest technologies to ride out more frequent drought periods. A single one-acre building can generate almost two tons of produce daily using eighteen times less water than conventional agriculture and with a cooling system that recycles freshwater back to plant roots. In bustling cities, shipping containers are being repurposed into “food generators” with hydroponic equipment inside. China has broken ground on an entire city that aims to be both pandemic-proof and self-sufficient in food and energy. Mallorca is one of Spain’s highest-grossing tourist hubs and gentrifying rapidly, yet it’s running out of water. But Spain is also the home of companies such as Arpa and Genaq, which have developed some of the most advanced atmospheric water generators, already sold to dozens of militaries around the world. Mallorca could become a circular island.

循环饮食是循环能量的重要补充。以植物为基础的饮食进一步减少了我们的碳和水足迹，以及居住在冷冻肉类供应的杂货店附近的需要。美国人越来越多地认为自己是“弹性素食主义者”（他们只是偶尔吃肉），而英国则将素食主义视为一种哲学信仰，并且等同于素食主义。到一种宗教。Covid-19期间的一个病毒式笑话表明，对抗流行病、气候变化和社会动荡等弊病的解决方案是表现得更像印度教：打招呼时双手合十，说“合十礼”，而不是握手，先洗脚。进入家中，练习瑜伽和冥想，遵循素食，用水而不是卫生纸清洁，并焚烧死者。印度教如果不是循环宗教就什么都不是。

A circular diet is an important complement to circular energy. Plant-based diets further reduce our carbon-and-water footprint, as well as the need to live near grocery stores that chill our meat supplies. Americans increasingly identify as “flexitarians” (who only occasionally eat meat), while the UK has recognized veganism as a philosophical belief and tantamount to a religion. One viral joke during Covid-19 suggested that the solution to combating the ills of pandemics, climate change, and social unrest was to act more Hindu: greet with joining one’s own hands and saying “Namaste” rather than shaking hands, wash your feet before entering homes, practice yoga and meditation, follow a vegetarian diet, use water for cleansing rather than toilet paper, and burn the dead. Hinduism is nothing if not a circular religion.

加拿大、欧洲和澳大利亚的城市在转向太阳能、风能和核能等替代能源和可再生能源方面取得了最大进展。没有哪个国家的脱碳速度比法国更快，法国邀请了一个跨国财团建造世界上最强大的聚变反应堆。冷聚变技术得到了谷歌和日本三菱的支持，比尔·盖茨也支持Heliogen，这是一种聚光太阳能技术，甚至可以为工业水泥制造提供足够的电力。（Carbon Cure 等公司还将水泥制造过程中捕获的碳注入水泥中。）氢能已经可以取代煤炭和天然气用于炼钢和能源开采（另外两个排放密集型行业）。日本正在建设两打新的燃煤发电厂，以弥补福岛灾难后关闭核电站的影响，但它也从澳大利亚进口压缩液氢，以期成为世界清洁能源领导者。韩国正在努力让多个城市采用氢燃料来供暖、制冷和供电。聚变、氢能、太阳能和风能也可用于冷却我们的数据中心，这是增长最快的排放源。任何规模的城市都应该能够自行供电。风力发电还可用于冷却我们的数据中心，这是增长最快的排放源。任何规模的城市都应该能够自行供电。风力发电还可用于冷却我们的数据中心，这是增长最快的排放源。任何规模的城市都应该能够自行供电。

Canadian, European, and Australian cities have made the greatest strides in shifting toward alternative and renewable energy such as solar, wind, and nuclear power. No country is decarbonizing faster than France, which has invited a multinational consortium to construct the world’s most powerful fusion reactor. Cold fusion technology has the support of Google and Japan’s Mitsubishi, as well as Bill Gates, who also backs Heliogen, a concentrated solar technology that could provide enough power even for industrial cement making. (Companies such as Carbon Cure also inject carbon captured from cement making back into the cement.) Hydrogen power can already replace coal and gas for steel making and energy extraction (two other emissions-intensive sectors). Japan is building two dozen new coal-fired power plants to compensate for its closing of nuclear plants after the Fukushima disaster, but it’s also importing compressed liquid hydrogen from Australia in a bid to become the world’s clean energy leader. South Korea is well on its way to having multiple cities fueled by hydrogen for heating, cooling, and electricity. Fusion, hydrogen, solar, and wind power can also be used to cool our data centers, the fastest growing source of emissions. A city of any size should be able to power itself.

这也意味着我们在城市内部和城市之间的流动性对环境的影响应该小得多。由于美国的特斯拉、中国的比亚迪以及许多欧洲和日本汽车制造商提高电动汽车产量，电动汽车在全球汽车总销量中的份额正在稳步上升。但是，尽管德国和瑞典拥有可以为行驶在其上的电动汽车充电的道路，但全球供应链对于锂离子电池来说（像石油一样）既脏又脆弱。这就是为什么中国宁德时代正在（为特斯拉）开发不需要在非洲和南美开采的无钴电池。氢动力公共交通和汽车正在日本、韩国和中国蓬勃发展。有机废物可以转化为合成气体，为垃圾车提供动力，正如塞拉能源公司在加拿大所做的那样。丰田的太阳能电池板汽车无需充电即可满足一天的城市驾驶需求。

This also means that our mobility within and between cities should have a far smaller environmental footprint. Thanks to Tesla in the US, BYD in China, and the many European and Japanese carmakers ramping up electric vehicle production, the EV share of total car sales is rising steadily worldwide. But even though Germany and Sweden have roads that charge electric vehicles that drive on them, the global supply chain for lithium-ion batteries is (like oil) both dirty and vulnerable. That’s why China’s CATL is developing (for Tesla) cobalt-free batteries that don’t require mining in Africa and South America. Hydrogen-powered public transport and cars are taking off in Japan, South Korea, and China. Organic waste can be turned into synthetic gas to power garbage trucks, as Sierra Energy is doing in Canada. And Toyota’s solar panel–covered car provides a day’s worth of urban driving with no charging required.

自给自足的城市还应该拥有可持续供电的住宅和办公室。仅屋顶太阳能就可以提供大多数建筑物使用的大约一半的能源，而白色油漆可以反射太阳热量，建筑物中种植的树木和灌木可以提供自然遮阳和冷却。新建筑设计中还融入了许多其他功能，使其更加循环：吸收雨水并将其引导至水库的屋顶、执行加热和冷却功能的气泵系统以及集成通风和隔热系统。与传统制冷相比，固态热电冷却和加热设备消耗的电力少得多，排放的蒸汽也少得多。但如果我们使用传统的建筑方法和材料建造房屋，例如采用蜂窝状设计的陶土石膏，可以吸走湿气和自然凉爽的空气，我们也可以减少对空调的依赖。从加拿大到挪威，大量的木结构建筑被建造为宿舍和办公室，几十年来它们一直在吸收碳。已经构思但尚未部署的技术可以进一步帮助我们解决问题：例如，树木在摇摆时发电，以及液氮制冷。这就是我们应该如何改造当前的城市，并为我们的下一个城市提供动力。已经构思但尚未部署的技术可以进一步帮助我们解决问题：例如，树木在摇摆时发电，以及液氮制冷。这就是我们应该如何改造当前的城市，并为我们的下一个城市提供动力。已经构思但尚未部署的技术可以进一步帮助我们解决问题：例如，树木在摇摆时发电，以及液氮制冷。这就是我们应该如何改造当前的城市，并为我们的下一个城市提供动力。

A self-sufficient city should also have sustainably powered homes and offices. Rooftop solar power alone can already provide about half the energy most buildings use, while white paint reflects solar heat, and trees and shrubs planted into buildings provide natural shading and cooling. Dozens of other features are being integrated into new building designs to make them more circular: rooftops that absorb and channel storm water into reservoirs, air pump systems that perform both heating and cooling functions, and integrated ventilation and insulation systems. Solid-state thermoelectric cooling and heating devices use far less power and emit fewer vapors than traditional refrigeration. But we can also rely less on air-conditioning if we build homes using traditional building methods and materials such as terra-cotta plaster in honeycomb designs that wick away moisture and naturally cool air. From Canada to Norway, mass timber wood buildings are built as dorms and offices, and they continue to absorb carbon for decades. Technologies that have been conceived but not yet deployed could further allow us to square the circle: trees that generate electricity as they sway and liquid nitrogen refrigeration, for example. This is how we should retrofit our current cities—and power our next ones.

许多国家尚未进行的最昂贵的投资是海水淡化厂，该厂已经为以色列和海湾国家提供了一半或更多的供水；阿联酋 90% 的用水量是海水淡化水。印度、日本和哈萨克斯坦也拥有核动力海水淡化厂，可大幅降低与生产水相关的能源输入成本（和排放）对农业和公共消费安全。这些大型水过滤厂的输水管道可以通过管道输送到内陆的美国、印度、澳大利亚、中国和其他受到特大干旱威胁的国家的农场。如果水是新石油，各国就应该对输水管道进行相应投资，否则人们就会迁移到有更多水的地方。

The most expensive investment many countries have yet to make is in desalination plants, which already provide half or more of the water supply of Israel and the Gulf countries; 90 percent of the UAE’s water consumption is desalinated ocean water. India, Japan, and Kazakhstan also have nuclear-powered desalination plants, which massively reduce the energy input costs (and emissions) associated with producing water safe for agriculture and public consumption. Water pipelines from these large water filtration plants could be piped inland to farms in America, India, Australia, China, and other countries threatened by mega droughts. If water is the new oil, countries should invest accordingly in water pipelines—otherwise people will move to where there is more water.

空调国家

Air-conditioned nations

人类可以改变他们的地理位置；城市不能。它们只能适应时代的需要，无论是竖立沿海屏障以抵御海平面上升，还是增设自行车道以减少汽车拥堵。特别是对于赤道附近的沿海城市，要做的适应工作相当长。

Humans can change their geography; cities can’t. They can only be adapted to the needs of the times, whether erecting coastal barriers to ward off rising seas or adding bicycle lanes to reduce automobile congestion. Especially for coastal cities near the equator, the to do list of adaptations is quite long.

新加坡和迪拜是许多处于类似情况的城市为在未来几十年生存而需要做的重要实验。两者都是高度多元化的全球人口的家园，人口超过 400 万，其中包括全球精英、向上流动的年轻人和大量忙于建设未来基础设施的外来工人。新加坡和迪拜的气候当然有很大不同：迪拜位于干旱沙漠的边缘，而新加坡则位于热带丛林中。迪拜很少下雨；新加坡的情况是不变的。但这两个城市都积极利用填海造地：新加坡整个岛国四分之一以上的土地都建在填海土地上（使其成为全球市场上最贪婪的沙子消费者之一），而迪拜（以及阿联酋联邦首都阿布扎比）则开展了雄心勃勃的人工岛项目。两者都可以承担加高道路、扩建海水运河和为海水淡化提供动力的巨额成本。两家公司都在投资水培食品生产（室内和地下）、近海养鱼场和植物性肉类公司。但他们能抵御高温吗？

Singapore and Dubai stand out as crucial experiments in what many cities in similar circumstances may need to do to survive the decades ahead. Both are home to highly diverse global populations above 4 million people comprising a mixture of the global elite, upwardly mobile youth, and legions of guest workers busily building future infrastructure. The climates of Singapore and Dubai of course differ considerably: Dubai lies at the fringe of an arid desert, while Singapore is in a tropical jungle. Dubai’s rains are infrequent; Singapore’s are constant. But both cities have made aggressive use of land reclamation: More than one-quarter of the entire island nation of Singapore is built on reclaimed land (making it one of the most voracious consumers in the global market for sand), while Dubai (as well as the UAE federal capital Abu Dhabi) has undertaken ambitious artificial island projects. Both can afford the significant costs of raising roads, expanding seawater canals, and powering water desalination. And both are investing in hydroponic food production (indoors and underground), offshore fish farms, and plant-based meat companies. But can they beat the heat?

阿联酋：一个圆顶国家？

UAE: A Domed Country?

大约四十年前，作为阿联酋的一名幼儿园老师，我记得父亲从办公室回家吃一顿较晚的午餐，与家人一起放松，然后在下午晚些时候返回办公室几个小时。刚在烈日下的操场上嬉戏回来，我每天都需要冷毛巾来缓解我的头痛。至少我们有空调。

Nearly forty years ago, as a kindergartener in the UAE, I remember my father coming home from the office for a late lunch and relaxing with the family before returning to the office for a few hours in the late afternoon. Just in from frolicking in the playground under the hot sun, I was in daily need of cold towels to thwart my throbbing headaches. At least we had air-conditioning.

对于居住在海湾地区的数十万西方侨民来说，日常生活几十年来都没有改变：在学年期间享受宜人的天气，在欧洲的家乡度过夏天，而海湾地区则在干燥的沙漠炎热中度过三个月，然后一旦空气降温并且学校重新开放，他们就会返回。但现在情况不同了。多哈、利雅得、迪拜和阿布扎比等富裕的海湾城市都配备了全速空调——而尽管热浪袭来，只有不到 10% 的西欧人拥有空调——许多欧洲人现在都避免回国在夏季，选择在海湾保持凉爽。（2020 年底，欧洲因新冠肺炎疫情而实施冬季封锁，迪拜的海滨酒店突然连续几个月售空。）

For hundreds of thousands of Western expats living in the Gulf region, the routine hasn’t changed for decades: enjoy balmy weather during the school year, spend the summers back home in Europe while the Gulf bakes in dry desert heat for three months, then return once the air cools down and schools reopen. But now things are different. With wealthy Gulf cities such as Doha, Riyadh, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi fully outfitted with full-blast air-conditioning—while less than 10 percent of Western Europeans have air-conditioning despite their intense heat waves—many Europeans are now avoiding returning home during the summer and opting to stay cool in the Gulf instead. (And amid Europe’s Covid-induced winter lockdowns in late 2020, Dubai’s seaside hotels were suddenly sold out for several straight months.)

空调在迪拜的办公室、购物中心、公寓和住宅开发项目中无处不在，但该市未来的规划实际上是将所有这些都集中在一个屋檐下。该市最新的大型项目迪拜广场将成为城中之城，从学校到体育公园的所有环境都分布在覆盖着玻璃穹顶的宽阔室内林荫道上。虽然这种气候控制环境只在最热的月份或一天中最热的时候才需要，但它全年都可用。空调是一个很大的电力消耗和CO ₂排放源，但至少迪拜广场的居民不必在任何地方开车。

Air-conditioning is ubiquitous in Dubai’s offices, malls, apartments, and residential developments, but the city’s future plan features bringing all of these under one roof—literally. The city’s latest mega-project, Dubai Square, will be a city within a city with all environments from schools to sports parks spread across broad indoor boulevards covered with glass domes. While this climate-controlled environment will only be necessary during the hottest months or times of day, it will be available year-round. Air-conditioning is a big electricity drain and CO₂ emitter, but at least Dubai Square residents won’t have to drive cars anywhere.

由于大多数迪拜居民仍然更喜欢单户住宅，他们的社区可能会类似于新的零排放“可持续城市”区，每个家庭的顶部都有太阳能电池板，停车位。迪拜还开设了一个光伏太阳能公园，为超过 100 万户家庭提供足够的电力。马斯达尔城位于阿联酋首都阿布扎比郊外，最初被设想为一个独立的步行和电动高尔夫球车社区，但也加入了这个由阿联酋城市组成的空调群岛。距离迪拜更远的北部，哈伊马酋长国将自己打造成负担得起的外籍人士中心，这里每天都是泳池派对。人们可以想象许多海湾国家在未来几年建造这样的空调城市，以及它们之间的超级高铁。

Since most Dubai residents still prefer single-family accommodation, their neighborhoods might come to resemble the new zero-emission “Sustainable City” district that has solar panels atop every home and parking space. Dubai has also inaugurated a photovoltaic solar park generating enough power for more than 1 million homes. Just outside the UAE’s capital of Abu Dhabi lies Masdar City, which was originally conceived as a stand-alone pedestrian and electric golf cart community, but is also joining this air-conditioned archipelago of Emirati cities. Farther north from Dubai, the emirate of Ras-al-Khaimah has branded itself as an affordable expat hub where every day is a pool party. One can imagine numerous Gulf states building such air-conditioned cities in the years ahead, as well as Hyperloop trains between them.

面积大得多的沙特阿拉伯有 40% 的人口由外籍移民组成，超过 1100 万人，其中印度人 400 万，埃及人 300 万，巴基斯坦人 200 万。但2014年后油价暴跌，加上该国努力让沙特人承担更多国内工作，导致150万移民回流本国。沙特人确实在从事机械操作等手工行业的蓝领工作——大约有五万人。期待印度人回来建造新的空调圆顶和其他基础设施，让这个国家在酷热中保持宜居。

Far larger Saudi Arabia has 40 percent of its population made up of migrant expatriates—more than 11 million people, with Indians representing 4 million, Egyptians 3 million, and Pakistanis 2 million. But the post-2014 slump in oil prices combined with the country’s efforts to get Saudis to take on more domestic jobs led to an outflow of 1.5 million migrants back to their home countries. Saudis are indeed taking blue-collar jobs in manual industries like operating machinery—about fifty thousand of them. Count on the Indians to be back—building new air-conditioned domes and other infrastructures to keep the country livable amid the searing heat.

沙特阿拉伯和印度具有建设性的互补性，沙特向印度出口石油，印度向沙特出口劳动力和软件。随着沙特阿拉伯试图实现经济多元化和升级，它将需要IT人员、职业学院和其他白领技术人员来运营其各种智慧城市项目。事实上，该国的后新冠愿景包括将利雅得变成气候绿洲和文化中心，种植数千万棵新树。谁来打理园艺、开出租车和运营数据中心？这就是为什么沙特阿拉伯刚刚废除了其长期存在的卡法拉外籍工人的担保和监督制度。到2021年，农民工可以自由进出境，并根据市场机会更换工作。最终，无人驾驶汽车和机器人可能会消除对印度和巴基斯坦劳动力的需求，但沙特阿拉伯也希望在境内制造更多汽车和无人机，为技术工人创造更多就业机会。沙特王国甚至采取了向外国企业家提供完全公民身份的步骤。一个寻求重新定义自己的国家无法独自做到这一点。

Saudi Arabia and India have a constructive complementarity of the Saudis exporting oil to India and India exporting laborers and software to the Kingdom. As Saudi Arabia attempts to diversify and upgrade its economy, it will need IT workers, vocational institutes, and other white-collar technicians to operate its various smart city projects. Indeed, the country’s post-Covid vision involves turning Riyadh into a climate oasis and cultural hub with tens of millions of new trees planted. Who will do the gardening, drive the taxis, and operate the data centers? This is why Saudi Arabia has just scrapped its long-standing kafala system of sponsorship and supervision of foreign workers. As of 2021, migrants can travel freely in and out of the country and change jobs based on opportunities in the market. Eventually, driverless cars and robots may eliminate the need for Indian and Pakistani laborers, but Saudi Arabia will also want to build more cars and drones inside its borders, leading to more jobs for skilled workers. The Kingdom has even taken the step of offering full citizenship to foreign entrepreneurs. A country seeking to redefine itself can’t do so alone.

尽管有警告称，到 2075 年或更早，阿联酋和其他海湾国家将不再适合居住，但人们仍在继续迁移到那里，而海湾国家也在继续建设以吸纳他们。海湾合作委员会 (GCC) 成立于 1981 年，尽管其成员国之间存在激烈的竞争（例如 2017 年开始的对卡塔尔的持续封锁），但它们也在通过管道、铁路和新法规进行融合，允许任何人获准沙特阿拉伯居民在阿联酋购买房产并居住在那里。他们知道，他们的国家既不是人们迁徙的第一个地方，也不是最后一个地方，但至少他们拥有最强的空调。

Despite warnings that the UAE and other Gulf countries will be unlivable by 2075 or sooner, people keep moving there—and Gulf states keep building to absorb them. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded in 1981, and though there are bitter rivalries among its members (such as the ongoing blockade of Qatar that began in 2017), they are also fusing through pipelines, railways, and new regulations that allow any approved resident of Saudi Arabia to buy property in the UAE and go live there instead. They know that their countries are neither the first nor the last place people move to or from, but at least they have the strongest air-conditioning.

新加坡：为热岛降温

Singapore: Cooling the Heat-Island

周末早晨，在新加坡中心地带的丛林麦里芝水库，来自世界各地的健康居民在慢跑小径上交流，同时讨论房地产交易、清洁技术投资和早午餐计划——时刻留意顽皮的猴子和狡猾的巨蜥。与仍然有季节的海湾国家不同，新加坡直接位于赤道上：几乎每天都炎热潮湿。当地人已经习惯了清晨锻炼，一天中的大部分时间（从上午 9 点到下午 6 点）都待在室内，然后出来在海滩、公园和屋顶享受微风徐徐的夜晚。这里有充足的户外遮阳区域和吊扇，白天坐在户外虽然有点粘，但也可以让人神清气爽，尤其是在强雷雨天气。

On weekend mornings at MacRitchie Reservoir, a jungle in the heart of Singapore, healthy residents from all corners of the world mingle on jogging trails while discussing real estate deals, clean tech investments, and brunch plans—always keeping an eye out for playful monkeys and sneaky monitor lizards. Unlike the Gulf countries, which still have seasons, Singapore lies directly on the equator: It’s hot and humid almost every day. Locals have grown accustomed to a routine of early morning exercise, staying indoors much of the day, from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m., and then coming out to enjoy breezy evenings by the beach, in public parks, and on rooftops. With plenty of outdoor shaded areas and ceiling fans, sitting outside during the day can be refreshing if a bit sticky, especially during the powerful thunderstorms.

新加坡国父李光耀在回顾他将新加坡转变为标志性的第一世界城邦的成功时，列出了一些数字这个年轻国家众所周知的美德，例如廉洁政治和多民族和谐。但随后他变得非常哲学：“空调对我们来说是一项最重要的发明，也许是历史上最重要的发明之一。它使热带地区的发展成为可能，从而改变了文明的本质。” ²

Reflecting on his success in turning Singapore into an iconic first world city-state, Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew listed a number of the young nation’s well-known virtues, such as corruption-free politics and multiethnic harmony. But then he got really philosophical: “Air-conditioning was a most important invention for us, perhaps one of the signal inventions of history. It changed the nature of civilization by making development possible in the tropics.”²

在全球变暖的情况下，世界上一些最热的国家吸引了更多的居民，这颇具讽刺意味，但它也揭示了哪些地方有能力和意志力投资适应气候变化。当然，另一个讽刺是，通过安装数百万台空调来维持宜居性，而空调的排放会加剧温室效应。尽管我们共享全球气候，但区域甚至当地的微气候也非常重要，特别是当城市工业活动导致气温升高时。新加坡和其他人口稠密的城市存在这种“热岛效应”，交通拥堵会滞留热量，使气温比自然温度高出七度。此外，将进口石油和天然气泵入发电站会产生大量热量（其中一半以上浪费在生产中），这些热量会飘入城市本身。所有这些都会导致人们进一步提高空调温度。这就是我们解决炎热问题的空调如何让炎热的天气变得更糟。

There is an irony to some of the hottest countries in the world attracting more residents amid global warming, but it also reveals which places have the capacity and willpower to invest in adaptation. Another irony, of course, is maintaining livability through installing millions more air-conditioning units whose emissions exacerbate greenhouse effects. Even though we share a global climate, regional and even local micro-climates matter a great deal, especially as urban industrial activities elevate temperatures. Singapore and other dense cities have such a “heat island effect” in which transport congestion traps heat and raises the temperature as much as seven degrees above what it would naturally be. Furthermore, pumping imported oil and gas into power stations generates massive amounts of heat (more than half of it wasted in production) that wafts into the city itself. All of this leads to people cranking up their air conditioners even further. This is how air-conditioning, our solution to heat, makes the heat even worse.

但空调的未来可能比现在更具可持续性。新加坡国立大学开发了一种空调，既使用太阳热能发电，又从空气中吸水，利用前者来冷却后者，这意味着电力消耗不到一半，而且不含化学氟氯化碳。岛上的每个区都在建设综合中心，这些中心包含在一个太阳能电池板覆盖的空调区域设施中，如购物、图书馆、游泳池、儿童保育、餐厅和医疗诊所。利用烈日给我们降温是未来的潮流。

But the future of air-conditioning may be much more sustainable than its present. The National University of Singapore has developed an air conditioner that uses solar thermal energy both to generate power and to wick water from the air, using the former to chill the latter, meaning less than half the electricity and none of the chemical CFCs. Each district of the island is getting integrated centers that enclose in a single solar panel–covered and air-conditioned area amenities like shopping, libraries, swimming pools, childcare, restaurants, and medical clinics. Using the scorching sun to cool us is the wave of the future.

新加坡也是一个领先的例子，说明树木覆盖的人行道和宽敞的公园的天然树冠仍然是保护城市生物多样性的最佳策略。新的绿洲露台是一个微风徐徐的室内外空间混合用途综合体，由树木覆盖的倾斜走道、屋顶花园和用于降温的公共喷泉组成。

Singapore is also a leading example of how natural canopies of tree-covered walkways and spacious parks remain the best strategy for preserving urban biodiversity. The new Oasis Terrace is a breezy indoor-outdoor mixed-use complex of tree-covered slanted walkways with rooftop gardens, and public fountains for cooling.

即使是依赖食品和水进口的城市也可以变得更加循环。新加坡已经拥有广泛的雨水收集和先进的水处理系统，可以生产“新水”并通过管道输送到全岛。它可以而且也许应该禁止私人瓶装水进口。瑞士苏黎世联邦理工学院的“冷却新加坡”项目汇集了来自麻省理工学院、伯克利分校、普林斯顿大学和其他大学的气候专家，以确定这些和其他减少城市热岛效应的方法。从发电厂获取热量并将其引导至工业是显而易见的一步。由于高额汽车保有税和密集的公共交通，新加坡 580 万人仅拥有 46 万辆汽车。将所有这些车辆以及公共巴士改装为电动汽车将使温度至少降低一度，这将使空调负荷减少 20%，并减少天然气进口。减少空调使用量所节省的电力可以为整个电动汽车车队提供动力。

Even cities dependent on food and water imports can become more circular. Singapore already has extensive rainwater collection and a sophisticated water treatment system that produces “New Water” piped across the island. It could, and perhaps should, ban private bottled water imports. The Swiss university ETH Zurich’s “Cooling Singapore” project brings together climate specialists from MIT, Berkeley, Princeton, and other universities to identify these and other ways to reduce the urban heat island effect. Capturing heat from power plants and directing it toward industry is one obvious step. Thanks to high taxes on car ownership and dense public transport, Singapore has only 460,000 cars for 5.8 million people. Converting all those vehicles as well as public buses into EVs would lower the temperature by at least one degree, which would reduce the air-conditioning load by 20 percent and reduce natural gas imports as well. The same electricity saved in less air-con usage could power the whole EV fleet.

几十年来，新加坡北部一直依赖从马来西亚进口水。但如今，新加坡的水库网络为“新水”处理厂供水，该处理厂通过管道将饮用水输送到全国各地。作为其“30 by 30”计划的一部分，该计划旨在到 2030 年从国内来源满足 30% 的营养需求，该计划还开始大规模水培食品生产，并正在大力发展鱼类养殖和植物蛋白生产。Covid-19 之后，新加坡决定将时间表提前至 2023 年。如果一个几乎 100% 依赖进口食品的城市国家能够生产更多的国内食品供应，那么几乎任何地方都可以。

For decades, Singapore has been dependent on importing water from Malaysia to its north. But today, Singapore’s reservoir network feeds “New Water” treatment plants that pipe potable water across the country. As part of its “30 by 30” initiative to generate 30 percent of nutritional needs from domestic sources by 2030, it has also started large-scale hydroponic food production and is ramping up fish farming and plant-based proteins. After Covid-19, Singapore decided to bring the time line forward to 2023. If an urban city-state that’s almost 100 percent dependent on imported food can generate more of its domestic food supply, then so can almost any place.

在莲花形状的艺术科学博物馆，艺术家阿尔文·庞（Alvin Pang）举办了名为“ 2219：想象的未来”的引人注目的展览，描绘了洪水情景下新加坡等沿海城市的城市生活：街道被宽阔的威尼斯式运河取代，汽车被船只取代，建筑物通过天桥和空中花园连接滴水的藤蔓。每个家庭都堆满了种植蔬菜的水培装置和用于堆肥的蠕虫箱。从今天的角度来看，这是一幅反乌托邦的图画，但却是一幅适应性的图画。

At the lotus flower–shaped ArtScience Museum, artist Alvin Pang’s arresting exhibit titled 2219: Futures Imagined depicts urban life in coastal cities such as Singapore under the deluge scenario: Streets have been replaced with broad Venetian-style canals, cars have given way to boats, and buildings are connected by sky bridges and hanging gardens with dripping vines. Every home is stuffed with hydroponic units growing vegetables, and boxes of worms for composting. It’s a dystopian picture from today’s standpoint, but an adaptive one.

公共城市

Communal cities

今天的城市是为前一个时代的工业和生活方式而建造的。甚至在大流行和远程工作之前，商业房地产和购物中心就已经陷入困境。自助仓储单元代表了婴儿潮一代和年长 X 一代的囤积文化；他们的孩子不想要他们的东西。城市需要在物质和政治上进行重建，以适应年轻人的喜好：经济适用房、廉价交通、绿色空间和自由的生活方式。吸引流动青年的城市将是那些为少数儿童提供更短的工作周、工资保险、技能培训计划和儿童保育服务的城市。

Today’s cities were built for a previous era’s industries and lifestyles. Commercial real estate and shopping malls were struggling even before the pandemic and remote work. Self-storage units represent the hoarding culture of boomers and older Gen-Xers; their kids don’t want their stuff. Cities need to be physically and politically regenerated to suit youth preferences: affordable housing, cheap transportation, green space, and liberal lifestyle. The cities that attract mobile youth will be those that offer shorter workweeks, wage insurance, skills training programs, and childcare—for the few children that exist.

在讨论相对没有孩子的未来时，有一个显而易见但合乎逻辑的观点经常被忽视：那些有孩子的千禧一代和 Z 世代将倾向于儿童友好型社区，这些社区有足够的空间容纳他们活泼的 X 一代父母，他们会在他们照顾孩子时照顾孩子。工作。根据一项根据安全、成本、健康、教育和福利对 30 个“养育孩子的最佳地点”国家进行排名的指数，前 25 名几乎全部位于欧洲，除了新西兰、日本和加拿大。 ，而美国和墨西哥并列垫底。³瑞典和芬兰不仅拥有世界上最慷慨的育儿福利政策，而且咖啡馆和社区中心还为年轻父母举办带孩子的项目，这样无论是养育孩子还是童年都不再是一种孤独的经历。

Here is an obvious but logical point often overlooked when discussing the relatively childless future: Those millennials and Gen-Zers that do have kids will gravitate toward child-friendly communities with enough space to accommodate their sprightly Gen-X parents who’ll babysit while they work. According to an index ranking thirty countries as the “best places to raise children” based on safety, cost, health, education, and benefits, almost all of the top twenty-five are in Europe, except for New Zealand, Japan, and Canada, while the US ranks with Mexico at the bottom of the list.³ Sweden and Finland not only have among the world’s most generous parental benefit policies, but cafes and community centers run programs for young parents to bring their children so that neither parenting nor only childhood are such a lonely experience.

20 世纪 70 年代，未来学家阿尔文·托夫勒 (Alvin Toffler) 预测，家庭将聚集在多户公社中，共同抚养孩子。如今，夫妇越来越多地一起购买或租赁房屋，分担拥有和维护财产的成本和任务。即使在芝加哥和波士顿等大城市的高价社区，共享居住也能营造出一种社区感。⁴从奥克兰到底特律，社区土地信托为合作社提供建造经济适用住房的折扣优惠。在纽约，铁狮门施派尔 (Tishman Speyer) 的共享居住物业名为“Kin”，是一组为年轻父母提供的多户住宅，他们在其中共享共同生活空间和托儿服务。这些经过改造的房产让专业人士能够在承担纽约市生活的同时还能养家糊口。

In the 1970s, futurist Alvin Toffler predicted that families would convene in multi-family communes and raise children together. Today, couples increasingly buy or rent homes together in groups, sharing the costs and tasks of owning and maintaining property. Co-living creates a sense of community even in higher-priced neighborhoods of big cities such as Chicago and Boston.⁴ From Oakland to Detroit, community land trusts give cooperatives discounted access to build affordable family housing. In New York, the Tishman Speyer co-living property called “Kin” is a set of multi-family buildings for young parents where they share common spaces and childcare services. Such retrofitted properties allow professionals to afford New York City life while still raising a family.

在其短暂的鼎盛时期，WeWork 试图将其社群基布兹模式部署到社会生活的各个领域。除了联合办公之外，它还涉足学校 (WeGrow)、医疗保健 (Rise by We) 和联合居住 (WeLive)。这样的城市基布兹设施现在随处可见。有些（例如旧金山的 PodShare）是按月提供的宿舍，类似于微型房间的圆形监狱。与成为一名超级通勤者相比，任何牺牲隐私都是值得的，单程要花两个或更多小时才能上班。StarCity 还在加州各地建造价格实惠的共享居住物业，以留住该州的普通年轻人。布鲁克林的部落为那些难以交到朋友、漂泊无依的千禧一代提供了实体社区空间。在新泽西州，空置的办公园区正在改建为公寓和联合办公空间；他们的停车场现在是小型住宅、快闪零售店、城市农场和公共活动的场所。数字环境还可以促进积极的社会关系。麻省理工学院的媒体实验室正在测试可穿戴设备，帮助人们发现与陌生人的共同兴趣。欢迎来到新的数字社群主义。

During its brief heyday, WeWork sought to deploy its communitarian kibbutz model across all spheres of social life. Beyond co-working, it dabbled in schools (WeGrow), healthcare (Rise by We), and co-living (WeLive). Such urban kibbutz facilities are now popping up everywhere. Some (like PodShare in San Francisco) are month-by-month dorms that resemble a panopticon of micro-rooms. Any sacrifice of privacy is worth it compared to being a super-commuter traveling two or more hours each way to work. StarCity is also building affordable co-living properties across California to keep rank-and-file youth in the state. Tribe in Brooklyn provides physical community space for transient, rootless millennials who struggle to make friends. In New Jersey, vacant office parks are being converted into apartments and co-working spaces; their parking lots are now the sites of small homes, pop-up retail, urban farms, and public events. The digital environment could also promote positive social relations. MIT’s Media Lab is testing wearable devices that help people discover common interests with strangers. Welcome to the new digital communitarianism.

亚洲拥有世界上大多数人口和年轻人，是共同生活的归零地。数以亿计的流动千禧一代，无论是学生还是工人，都在多个城市度过不确定的时期，因为他们要么远程办公，要么在该地区打工。对于年轻的亚洲或西方侨民来说，在巴厘岛度过几个月或一年，同时节省大部分高薪，有什么理由不喜欢呢？跨国公司甚至出租岛上的整个共享居住和共享工作空间，以降低兼职或合同工的成本。随着新冠肺炎 (Covid-19) 疫情大幅削减澳大利亚和中国的入境旅游业，巴厘岛发起了一项新活动，以吸引数字游民购买别墅并在岛上永久定居。

With the majority of the world’s population and youth, Asia is ground zero for co-living. Hundreds of millions of mobile millennials, whether students or workers, are spending indeterminate periods in multiple cities as they either telecommute or gig their way around the region. For a young Asian or Western expat, what’s not to love about spending a few months or a year in Bali while saving most of a good salary? Multinationals even rent out entire co-living and co-working spaces on the island to reduce the costs of part-time or contract workers. With Covid-19 slashing inbound tourism from Australia and China, Bali launched a new campaign to attract digital nomads to buy villas and make the island their permanent home.

欧洲是另一个长寿和财务压力相结合的地区，正在产生新颖的解决方案。米兰的两个人中的大多数十万名学生来自城外，其中许多人无法独自生活。根据“Meglio Milano”计划，老年夫妇或寡妇“收养”一名学生住在他们的家中，学生支付减免的租金，以换取做家务和提供陪伴。老人在原地老去，而年轻人却不受束缚。在这个世界上，多代人共存于一个屋檐下，但并不总是来自同一个家庭，这种家庭共享是一种新的“家庭”。

Europe is another region where the combination of longevity and financial stress are yielding novel solutions. Most of Milan’s two hundred thousand students come from outside the city, and many can’t afford to live alone. Under the “Meglio Milano” scheme, elderly couples or widows “adopt” a student to live in their homes, where the student pays reduced rent in exchange for doing chores and providing companionship. The old get to age in place while the young remain untethered. Such home sharing is the new “household” in a world where multiple generations coexist under one roof but not always from the same family.

欧洲还率先向公民提供“出行即服务”，以抑制汽车拥有量。在新冠疫情封锁期间，人们开始更加关注他们周围的五个街区半径内是否有绿地、医疗服务和食物。巴黎市长安妮·伊达尔戈 (Anne Hidalgo) 计划为距家步行 15 分钟以内的任何人提供所有基本服务。从米兰到多伦多再到西雅图，市中心禁止车辆通行，以方便行人和骑自行车的人通行。专用自行车和踏板车车道迎合了越来越多没有汽车甚至没有驾驶执照的年轻人的需求。移动计划正变得像数据计划：一个单一的应用程序，可以通过租赁自行车、电动滑板车、火车、公共汽车或拼车来建议和协调您的旅程，并根据需要将您的单笔付款分配给各个提供商。赫尔辛基的 Whim 应用程序涵盖出租车、公共汽车、自行车、踏板车，甚至租车。最终将会有无人驾驶班车、无人驾驶出租车直升机（由空中客车子公司 Voom 驾驶）在城市上空盘旋，并将人们与郊区连接起来。

Europe also leads in offering citizens “mobility as a service” to discourage car ownership. During the Covid lockdown, people began to pay closer attention to whether their immediate five-block radius contained green space, medical care, and food. Paris’s mayor, Anne Hidalgo, plans to make all essential services available to anyone within a fifteen-minute walk from their home. From Milan to Toronto to Seattle, downtown centers are being closed to vehicles in favor of pedestrians and cyclists. Dedicated bicycle and scooter lanes cater to the growing share of youth who don’t own cars or even have a driver’s license. Mobility plans are becoming like data plans: a single app that suggests and coordinates your journey via rent-a-bike, e-scooter, train, bus, or rideshare, and divides your single payment up as needed across the various providers. Helsinki’s Whim app covers taxis, buses, bicycles, scooters, and even rental cars. Eventually there will be driverless shuttles, drone taxi copters (piloted by Voom, an Airbus subsidiary), buzzing around above cities and connecting people out to suburbs as well.

对于地理范围更广、人口密度更低的美国城市来说，此类服务可能会改变游戏规则。SolarCity 的离网住房和充电可能意味着巨大的新郊区将通过平坦的道路连接起来，让乘坐无人驾驶汽车的人们去开会。这些自动驾驶车队可能会变得如此受欢迎，以至于使公共火车和公共汽车黯然失色，这也许最终证明了美国在公共交通上花费如此之少的原因。美国拥有资金、技术和人才，可以将自己重组为一系列面向未来的城市，但是政治意愿和经济资源的分配并不均匀——因此未来也是如此。

Such services could be a game-changer for American cities with their wider geographic sprawl and lower population density. SolarCity’s off-grid housing and charging could mean huge new suburbs that would be connected via smooth roads that take people in driverless cars to meetings. Those autonomous vehicle fleets could become so popular that they eclipse public trains and buses, perhaps in the end justifying why America spends so little on public transport. America has the money, technology, and talent to re-sort itself into a collection of future-ready cities, but political will and economic resources are not evenly distributed—thus neither is the future.

智能生活的未来

The future of smart living

对于年轻人来说，“用户体验”这个词既适用于城市，也适用于公司。他们要求地方治理从破旧的基础设施和劣质服务跨越到管理交通的传感器和实时收集他们观点的数字公投。小而富裕的国家往往会提供年轻人寻求的安全和生活方式的最佳组合，但在美国等大国内，城市将竞相比其他国家“更聪明”。^二

For youth, the term “user experience” applies as much to cities as it does to companies. They demand that local governance leapfrog from decrepit infrastructure and shoddy services to sensors managing traffic and digital referenda gathering their views in real time. Small and wealthy countries tend to offer the best combination of security and lifestyle that youth seek, but within large countries such as the US, cities will compete to be “smarter” than their peers.^II

“智慧城市”现在指的是从远程医疗到普遍监控的一切。智慧城市生活的技术层面既诱人又令人不安。公寓正在成为可配置的空间，家具可以自行折叠以适应空间，具体取决于您是否需要沙发、床、厨房或办公室。IoT、5G 和 AR/VR 将提供完全沉浸式的街道和建筑。无人机或机器人的移动送货意味着即时便利，但可能会堵塞人行道和天空。配备 3D 打印机的卡车可以移动制造维修零件。必胜客正在试行装有烤箱的面包车，在运送披萨的途中制作新鲜的披萨。（最后一个没有什么不值得喜欢的。）

“Smart city” now denotes everything from tele-medicine to pervasive surveillance. The technological dimension of smart city life is a mix of alluring and discomforting. Apartments are becoming configurable spaces where furniture folds itself up to fit the space depending on whether you need a couch, bed, kitchen, or office. IoT, 5G, and AR/VR will deliver fully immersive streets and buildings. Mobile delivery by drone or robot means instant convenience but potentially clogged sidewalks and skies. Trucks outfitted with 3D printers can mobile-manufacture repair parts. Pizza Hut is piloting vans with ovens inside that make fresh pizzas while en route to deliver them. (There’s nothing not to love about that last one.)

年轻人希望生活在技术为人民服务的地方，而不是相反。目前，从谷歌到万事达卡等科技和支付公司正在将地方政府服务（软件）数字化，而亚马逊等电子商务、房地产和汽车公司则正在将地方政府服务（软件）数字化。Waymo 一直在改造建筑环境（硬件）。数据分析部门正在全国各地的市长办公室中涌现。但由于数字原住民对数据隐私的意识越来越高，未来可能会更加务实，而不是极端。

Youth want to live in places where technology serves the people rather than the reverse. Right now, tech and payment companies from Google to Mastercard are digitizing local government services (software) while e-commerce, real estate, and automotive companies from Amazon to Waymo have been retrofitting the built environment (hardware). Data analytics units are popping up in mayors’ offices from coast to coast. But because digital natives have taken on a heightened awareness of data privacy, the future is likely to be more pragmatic than extreme.

智慧城市言论的第一个体现散发出企业化数字窒息的气息。在加强公民指导的情况下，新兴的智慧城市将成为物联网无缝融入背景的地方，为居民提供无忧无虑的生活方式——一个让科技让你成为你自己的地方。西门子施塔特（工业巨头的旧工厂城镇）复兴为柏林郊外的未来住宅中心，其中包括明确的指导方针，即数据将首先属于公共信托。

The first incarnation of smart city rhetoric gave off the whiff of corporatized digital smothering. With greater civic guidance, the emerging smart cities will be places where the Internet of things seamlessly blends into the background and affords residents a hassle-free lifestyle—a place where technology allows you to be you. The resurrection of Siemensstadt (an old factory town of the industrial giant’s) into a futuristic residential hub outside of Berlin includes clear guidelines that the data will belong first and foremost to public trusts.

接下来我们可以预期更多的州将采用“数字权利法案”法规或像加州所提议的那样提供“数据红利”（为用户的数据付费），并禁止企业和执法部门使用面部识别。人们还大力推动数字身份验证，以防止深度造假和阻止网络克隆，并压制仇恨言论和事实核查病毒阴谋论。如果到处都有安全摄像头，那么至少它们可以用来阻止每年窃取数千万包裹的“门廊海盗”。

Next we can expect that more states will adopt “Digital Bill of Rights” statutes or offer a “data dividend” (paying users for their data) as California has proposed, and ban the use of facial recognition by corporations and law enforcement. There is also a strong push for digital authentication to prevent deep fakes and block cyber-clones, and to suppress hate speech and fact-check viral conspiracy theories. If there are going to be security cameras everywhere, then at least they could be used to stop the “porch pirates” who steal tens of millions of packages annually.

在发展中国家，智慧城市似乎是摆脱基础设施陈旧、公寓过度拥挤、交通拥堵和腐败猖獗等无法修复的局面的必要举措。例如，这就是埃及破土动工建设“新开罗”城市的原因。然而，这些项目是否能够完成还有待观察。印度的阿马拉瓦蒂被誉为印度南部安得拉邦的清洁技术之都，但政府在 2019 年突然将其废弃，尽管该项目的建设已经在进行中。从洪都拉斯到马达加斯加，诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·罗默（Paul Romer）所称的“特许城市”也曾被尝试过，但到目前为止，失败多于成功。仅仅因为您可以构建某些东西并不意味着您应该这样做。制作现有的城市更具可持续性，投资于居民的流动性将是更好的花钱方式。

In the developing world, smart cities represent a seemingly necessary departure from the unfixable landscape of decrepit infrastructure, overcrowded tenements, snarling traffic, and rampant corruption. That’s why Egypt has broken ground on a “New Cairo” city, for example. It remains to be seen if such projects will ever be completed, however. Amaravati in India was hailed as a cleantech capital for southern India’s Andhra Pradesh state, but the government suddenly scrapped it in 2019 though construction was already underway. From Honduras to Madagascar, what Nobel laureate economist Paul Romer calls “charter cities” have also been attempted, but thus far more have failed than succeeded. Just because you can build something doesn’t mean you should. Making existing cities more sustainable and investing in their residents’ mobility would be money better spent.

这提醒我们，在富裕和贫穷的国家，“智慧城市”可能是促进新中世纪分层的代名词：特权阶级建造新的城市或地区，以将自己与不守规矩的外部世界隔离开来。现在位于爱丁堡步行区或巴塞罗那哥特区的中世纪城墙提醒我们，这种结构是历史常态。事实上，柏拉图在《理想国》中写道“任何城市，无论多么小，实际上都分为两部分，一个是穷人的城市，另一个是富人的城市。” 我们可能正在走向一种开明的封建主义，其中进步的城市声称对所有人开放，但促进秩序的成本正在巩固一种新的等级制度。即使在纽约等没有内部防御工事的城市，2012 年的桑迪飓风和 2020 年的冠状病毒等事件也暴露了邮政编码与苦难的相关程度。美国生活质量地图就像一架飞机，有独立的入口、客舱、休息区和浴室。

This is a reminder that in countries rich and poor, “smart city” may be code for promoting a neo-medieval stratification: the privileged class building new cities or districts to isolate themselves from the unruly outside world. The medieval walls now located in the pedestrian areas of Edinburgh or Barcelona’s Barri Gòtic remind us that such formations are the historical norm. Indeed, Plato wrote in The Republic that, “any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich.” We may be heading toward an enlightened feudalism in which progressive cities profess to be open to all, but the cost of promoting order is entrenching a new kind of hierarchy. Even in cities without internal fortifications, such as New York, episodes such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and the coronavirus in 2020 laid bare the extent to which zip codes correlated to suffering. A quality-of-life map of America best resembles an airplane with separate entrances, cabins, seating areas, and bathrooms.

城市世界的大部分地区已经以这种方式分层，但具有不同的特征。目前，迪拜、新加坡和香港等城市与大量临时外国工人密切相关，他们生活在与整个社会隔离的有效隔离条件下。但随着大国在不保证居住或生活水平的情况下引进更多人口，国内和国外、熟练和非熟练、富人和穷人之间的分层将不可避免地扎根。

So much of the urban world is already stratified in this way, but with a different cast of characters. At the moment, cities like Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong are most associated with a bulging temporary foreign worker population living in effectively quarantined conditions separate from society at large. But as large states bring in more people without guaranteeing residency or living standards, stratification will inevitably take root among domestic and foreign, skilled and unskilled, rich and poor.

在我们变得更聪明之前，智慧城市不会真正变得聪明。将自己与外界的不安全感隔离开来并没有给我们带来更多的安全感。相反，它加剧了不平等和恐惧，同时削弱了我们的经济，因为越来越多的人陷入困境。包容性系统——无论是城市还是国家——赋予每个人力量，使整体大于部分之和。在过去的十年里，许多首次无家可归的人都是超过年龄的退休人员五十岁，积蓄不足。然而，我们有应用程序可以帮助无家可归者、刑满释放囚犯和贫困学生找到负担得起的住所。从纽约到内罗毕，因Covid-19而停业的数百家酒店难道不应该被改造成下层阶级的住所吗？测试我们有多“聪明”并不困难。

Smart cities won’t truly be smart until we get smarter. Walling ourselves off from the insecurity outside hasn’t brought us more security. Instead, it has stoked inequality and fear, while weakening our economy as more and more people have fallen out of it. Inclusive systems—whether cities or nations—empower everyone such that the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Over the past decade, many of those who have become homeless for the first time have been retirees over the age of fifty with insufficient savings. Yet we have apps to help the homeless, released prisoners, and struggling students find affordable places to live. Shouldn’t the hundreds of hotels going out of business due to Covid-19, from New York to Nairobi, be converted into residences for this underclass? The test of how “smart” we are isn’t very difficult.

我。根据医疗保健可及性和质量（HAQ）指数，三个最好的医疗保健系统位于冰岛、挪威和荷兰。十八个国家提供全民医疗保健：澳大利亚、加拿大、芬兰、法国、德国、匈牙利、冰岛、爱尔兰、以色列、荷兰、新西兰、挪威、葡萄牙、斯洛伐克共和国、斯洛文尼亚、瑞典、瑞士和英国。此外，奥地利、比利时、日本和西班牙几乎实现了全民健康覆盖。

I. According to the Healthcare Access and Quality (HAQ) Index, the three best healthcare systems are in Iceland, Norway, and the Netherlands. Universal healthcare is offered in eighteen countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In addition, Austria, Belgium, Japan, and Spain have near universal health coverage.

二．瑞士洛桑国际管理发展学院 (IMD) 和新加坡科技设计大学 (SUTD) 的最新联合报告根据城市改善公民体验的技术部署情况对城市进行排名。2019 年十大智慧城市依次为新加坡、苏黎世、奥斯陆、日内瓦、哥本哈根、奥克兰、台北、赫尔辛基、毕尔巴鄂和杜塞尔多夫。智慧城市指数，IMD，2019。

II. The most recent joint report by IMD of Switzerland and the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) ranks cities based on their deployment of technology to improve citizen experience. The top ten smartest cities for 2019 were (in order) Singapore, Zurich, Oslo, Geneva, Copenhagen, Auckland, Taipei, Helsinki, Bilbao, and Dusseldorf. Smart City Index, IMD, 2019.

第13章文明3.0

CHAPTER 13 CIVILIZATION 3.0

充分利用移动性

Making the most of mobility

今天，经常听到有关“全球化死亡”的言论。过去的几代人对他们的时代也有同样的假设。然而，就像第一次世界大战后的欧洲一样，每一次紧缩时期都会伴随着更广泛、更深层次的全球化浪潮。再次如此。石油贸易可能会减少，但数字交易正在爆炸式增长。制成品贸易已经衰退，但资本流动和加密货币却在蓬勃发展。民粹主义和新冠疫情已经收紧了一些边界，但气候变化将迫使更多的人跨越边界。请记住古往今来关于人类最基本的真理：我们不断在全球范围内建立连通性，并且不断使用它。流动性就是命运。

It’s common today to hear pronouncements about the “death of globalization.” Generations past have presumed the same about their times. Yet much like Europe after World War I, each period of retrenchment is followed by an even wider and deeper globalization wave. So it shall be again. Oil trade may decrease, but digital exchange is exploding. Trade in manufactured goods has ebbed, but capital flows and cryptocurrencies are thriving. Populism and the pandemic have tightened some borders, but climate change will drive ever more people across them. Remember the most fundamental truth about humanity through the ages: We keep building connectivity across the planet—and we keep using it. Mobility is destiny.

2020年世界人口分布图显示，人口主要集中在北美和环太平洋沿岸，以及欧洲、非洲和南亚的密集城市群。但当我们将地图动画化到 2050 年时，北美和亚洲的海岸线将被淹没，他们的人民将撤退到内陆。随着农田荒漠化和经济崩溃，南美和非洲人将涌向北方。随着海平面上升和河流干涸，南亚——印度、巴基斯坦和孟加拉国——将成为更多人口外流的发源地，而自动化使劳动力变得多余，政府也无法提供稳定和福利。随着几十年的发展，数十个新城市将会出现在以前无人居住的地区，从加拿大北极和格陵兰岛到俄罗斯西伯利亚和中亚草原。一些城镇会随着居民一起迁移。

A map of the world population distribution in 2020 shows large concentrations along the coasts of North America and the Pacific Rim, as well as the dense urban clusters of Europe, Africa, and South Asia. But as we animate that map toward 2050, the coastlines of North America and Asia will submerge and their people will retreat inland. South Americans and Africans will surge northward as their farmland desertifies and their economies crumble. South Asia—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—will be the origin of an even greater exodus as sea levels rise and rivers dry up, while automation makes human labor redundant and governments fail to provide stability and welfare. As the decades unfold, dozens of new cities will pop up in previously uninhabited regions, from the Canadian Arctic and Greenland to Russian Siberia and the Central Asian steppe. Some towns will move with their inhabitants.

我们的政治、经济、环境和人文地理会再次实现稳定的和谐吗？我们将非常幸运能够穿那根针。我们在产业、生态、人口、技术和其他因素之间引发的复杂连锁反应意味着持续的动荡。更有可能的是，在一个人的一生中，更多的人会出于多种原因向多个方向多次搬家：寻找工作、逃离气候变化、寻求更好的政治制度或出于其他动机而行动。未来几十年，我们将不断循环，努力纠正资源、边界、产业和人员之间的严重错配。

Will there ever be a stable harmony of our political, economic, environmental, and human geographies again? We would be very lucky to thread that needle. The complex chain reactions we have unleashed among industry, ecology, demographics, technology, and other factors spell continuous turbulence. It’s more likely that over the course of one’s lifetime, many more people will move multiple times for multiple reasons in multiple directions: in search of work, fleeing climate change, seeking a better political system, or acting from some other motivation. The decades ahead will witness constant circulation as we attempt to rectify the grave mismatch among resources, borders, industries, and people.

这听起来很混乱。但如果是进化呢？我们的旧石器时代的祖先在适应新环境的过程中，在生物、社会和技术上不断进化。为了生存，野牛、鸟类和蝴蝶都会改变迁徙行为。今天，我们拥有使地球任何地方可持续居住的技术，从赤道雨林到北极高纬度地区。

This sounds like chaos. But what if it’s evolution? Our Paleolithic ancestors evolved biologically, socially, and technologically as they adapted to new environments. Bison, birds, and butterflies all shift their migratory behavior in order to survive. Today we possess the technology to make any part of the planet sustainably habitable, from equatorial rain forests to high Arctic latitudes.

在人类必须集体、主动地做出重大变革的时刻，历史并不是最好的指南。但也许现在就是这样。尽管全球对 Covid-19 大流行的反应是随意的，但它避免了今天更多的人口遭受黑死病（1 亿）、西班牙流感（5000 万）或艾滋病（4000 万）流行病期间所经历的大规模伤亡。人类并没有接受我们对抗未知的命运，而是比以往任何时候都更快地组织起来。

History is not the best guide to this moment in which humanity has to collectively and proactively make big transformations. But perhaps the present is. As haphazard as the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic was, it prevented today’s much larger population from suffering the scale of casualties experienced during the Black Death (100 million), Spanish Flu (50 million), or AIDS (40 million) epidemics. Rather than accept our fate against the unknown, mankind organized itself more rapidly than ever before.

如果我们能够协调大封锁，我们是不是也可以预先设计下一次大迁徙？

If we could coordinate the Great Lockdown, can we not also pre-design the next Great Migration?

过去的文明之所以崩溃，是因为它们未能适应它们自己创造的复杂性。这表明人类的伟大使命是理清这种复杂性，重新定位保持全球联系。与大量人口集中在容易受到海平面上升和疾病影响的沿海特大城市相比，一个拥有更紧凑、甚至是流动公社的世界风险可能更小。

Civilizations of the past collapsed because they failed to adapt to the complexity they themselves created. This suggests that the great mission for mankind is to untangle that complexity, to re-localize while remaining globally connected. A world of more compact, even mobile communes could be less risky than one where huge populations are concentrated in coastal megacities vulnerable to sea-level rise and disease.

我们不仅仅是从一个地方转移到另一个地方，我们还必须从一种文明模式发展到另一种文明模式。1.0文明是游牧和农业文明：世界人口少且本地化；环境决定了我们能够生存的地方。然后是 2.0 文明，我们变得久坐和工业化。我们定居在越来越大的城市，并通过全球供应链将自然商品化。人与自然之间的负反馈循环正在杀死我们双方。现在我们必须再次适应。3.0 文明需要具有移动性和可持续性：我们将向内陆移动，向海拔更高的方向发展，进入广阔的北方地区。我们的碳足迹将通过可再生能源减少，但由于社会经济和环境的波动，我们可能会更频繁地迁移。更多的人将成为游牧民族；定居点可能是暂时的。

Much more than a shift from one place to another, we must evolve from one model of civilization to another. Civilization 1.0 was nomadic and agricultural: The world population was small and localized; the environment dictated where we could survive. Then came Civilization 2.0, in which we became sedentary and industrial. We settled in ever larger cities and commoditized nature through global supply chains. The negative feedback loop between man and nature is killing us both. Now we must adapt again. Civilization 3.0 will need to be mobile and sustainable: We will move inland toward higher elevation and into our vast northern expanses. Our carbon footprint will decrease through renewable energy, but we may migrate more frequently due to socioeconomic and environmental volatility. More people will be nomadic; settlements may be temporary. We will disperse, but we will remain connected.

英国传奇历史学家阿诺德·汤因比谈到“带大‘C’的文明”，询问什么样的政治或科学实践能够促进我们作为一个物种的进步，甚至跨越（小“c”）文明鸿沟。他写道，我们大“C”文明的旅程“是一种运动，而不是一种条件，是一次航行，而不是一个港口。” ¹如果我们允许的话，这就是文明 3.0 的样子。

The legendary British historian Arnold Toynbee spoke of “Civilization with a big ‘C,’ ” asking what political or scientific practices advance our progress as a species, even across (small “c”) civilizational divides. The journey of our big “C” Civilization, he wrote, “is a movement and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour.”¹ This is what Civilization 3.0 can be if we allow it.

3.0文明的场景是我们不断优化人文地理的场景。我们在加拿大和北欧建立中型、低层的定居点来度过夏季，并根据气候条件向南迁移到墨西哥或地中海。亚洲人从沿海大城市撤退，向喜马拉雅山、中亚和俄罗斯广阔的东部地区扩展。我们在毫无意义的摩天大楼上投入更少，而在碳纤维和氢动力飞机、超级高铁和气垫船上投入更多；对海水淡化和可再生能源的投资多于对燃煤电厂的投资；通过局部水培农业而不是开垦来种植更多粮食森林来养牛。更多的社会继续走上开放移民的道路，而那些没有这样做的社会将在经济上萎缩并被移民收买。这些和其他步骤将使人类更接近在复杂的二十一世纪生存所需的新地理。到达那里的唯一方法就是移动。

This Civilization 3.0 scenario is one in which we constantly optimize our human geography. We create medium-size, low-rise settlements across Canada and northern Europe for the summer, and migrate south toward Mexico or the Mediterranean depending on climate conditions. Asians retreat from their coastal megacities and spread out farther toward the Himalayas, Central Asia, and Russia’s vast eastern region. We spend less on pointless skyscrapers and more on carbon-fiber- and hydrogen-powered aircraft, Hyperloops, and hovercraft; invest more in water desalination and renewable energy than in coal-fired power plants; and grow more food through localized hydroponic agriculture rather than clearing forests to raise cattle. More societies continue on the path toward open immigration, and those that haven’t will wither economically and be bought by migrants anyway. These and other steps will bring humanity closer to the new geography it needs to survive the complex twenty-first century. The only way to get there is to move.

有一条暴力路径会导致类似的支离破碎的结果：大国之间没有赢家的冲突，一场让每个人都变得更弱的战争。罗马帝国崩溃后，欧洲恢复了小型、本地化的市场。人们制造他们可以出售的东西，并交换他们需要的东西。美国的衰落和中国的撤退可能会使世界陷入高度分裂的新中世纪情景。装备精良的游荡团体——无论是伊斯兰国的衍生组织、难民还是末日民兵——将宣称自己的“流动主权”，无论他们在哪里扎根，都将进行统治，而不是由许多相互承认的国家组成的一个文明。这种后现代封建主义的形象吸引了一些自称无政府共产主义者、无政府原始主义者或生存主义末日准备者的人：让人口自然衰退，让自然重新狂野，并回到我们狩猎采集的方式。但瓦尔登湖的景象并不能解释我们的智能手机、3D 打印机、活动房屋和太阳能电池板从何而来。人们很容易认为我们不需要互联互通、贸易和移民，但我们确实需要。

There is a violent path to a similarly fragmented outcome: conflict among major powers with no winner, a war that makes everyone weaker. After the collapse of the Roman empire, Europe reverted to small and localized markets; people made what they could sell and bartered for what they needed. America’s decline and China’s retreat could plunge the world into such a hyper-fragmented, neo-medieval scenario. Rather than one civilization of many mutually recognized countries, well-armed bands of roaming groups—whether ISIS spin-offs, refugees, or prepper militias—will assert their “mobile sovereignty,” ruling wherever they take root. This image of a postmodern feudalism appeals to some who call themselves anarcho-communists, anarcho-primitivists, or survivalist preppers: Let populations naturally decline, rewild nature, and return to our hunter-gatherer ways. But visions of Walden Pond don’t explain where our smartphones, 3D printers, prefab houses, and solar panels come from. It’s tempting to believe that we don’t need connectivity, trade, and migration, but we do.

我们目前的现实介于两者之间：地缘政治猜疑和有毒的气候波动。如果不对我们的共同资源进行协调，我们就会发生土地掠夺和资源战争。在产权薄弱的地方，政府及其企业盟友可以通过命令夺取土地。居住在约旦河西岸定居点的以色列人数量已从 1995 年的不到二十万增加到今天的六十万以上；中国剥夺了新疆和内蒙古的任何自治权，并加大了能源和矿产储量的开采力度；印度已开始将印度教徒推入穆斯林占多数的克什米尔，以获取其冰川水域并在风景秀丽的山谷中建造房地产。俄罗斯和越南是政府拥有的其他国家全部令状和财产纠纷可以通过坦克解决。加拿大土著人民经过数十年的斗争，成功地获得了该国北部大片领土的自治权。保守派政府及其石油公司盟友可以在一夜之间扭转这些成果。我们在行动，但同时也带着我们的政治。

Our present reality is somewhere in between: geopolitical suspicions and climate volatility in a toxic brew. Without coordination over our common resources, we get land grabs and resource wars. In places with weak property rights, governments and their corporate allies can seize land by fiat. The number of Israelis living in West Bank settlements has grown from under two hundred thousand in 1995 to more than six hundred thousand today; China has stripped Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia of any autonomy and ramped up extraction of their energy and mineral reserves; and India has begun pushing Hindus into Muslim-majority Kashmir to access its glacier waters and build real estate in its scenic valleys. Russia and Vietnam are other countries where the government has total writ and property disputes can be resolved with a tank. Canada’s indigenous people successfully fought for decades to gain self-governance over vast swaths of the country’s northern territories; those gains can be reversed overnight by a conservative government and its oil company allies. We are moving, but bringing our politics with us.

从主权到管理

From sovereignty to stewardship

新冠疫情封锁摧毁了经济，但（暂时）放晴了天空。直到 2020 年 3 月，数十年的压抑烟雾暂时消散，数百万生活在喜马拉雅山脚下的印度人才第一次见到喜马拉雅山的顶峰。我们能否在保持经济活力的同时消除有毒温室气体排放？

The Covid lockdown crushed the economy but (temporarily) cleared the skies. Millions of Indians living in the foothills of the Himalayas had never seen its peaks until March 2020 when decades of oppressive smog temporarily cleared. Can we maintain economic vibrancy while also eliminating noxious greenhouse gas emissions?

巴黎气候协议一直被视为世界的路线图，但没有任何集体行动支持它。美国总统可以做出其继任者拒绝的承诺，而国会也无法立法，而这将需要数十年的时间才能实现。加拿大是《巴黎协定》的签署国，但刚刚批准开发一个大型新油砂油田。欧洲正在减少排放，但其努力远远超过其他地方排放的增长。中国正在国内进行清理，但将污染煤炭出口到国外。印度和巴西谴责气候殖民主义，而印度仍然依赖煤电，巴西则伐木亚马逊。碳税正在普及，但这些充其量只是半途而废的措施。许多批评家认为，市场是导致我们陷入困境的首要原因。

The Paris climate agreement has been held up as a road map for the world, but no collective action has backed it up. American presidents can make promises that their successors reject and Congress fails to legislate, and that would take decades to implement. Canada is a signatory to the Paris Agreement but has just approved development of a massive new tar sands oil field. Europe is reducing its emissions, but its efforts are more than outweighed by their growth everywhere else. China is cleaning up at home but exporting dirty coal abroad. India and Brazil decry climate colonialism while India remains reliant on coal power and Brazil logs the Amazon. Carbon taxes are gaining ground, but these are at best half measures. Markets, many critics argue, are what got us into this mess in the first place.

我们许多殖民时代的任意边界阻碍了针对当今存在的人口和环境挑战的合作。例如，印度和巴基斯坦就锡尔溪河口存在争议，该河口形成费尼河三角洲，注入阿拉伯海。在这里和其他地方，各国无法就河流边界应该划定在中点还是河岸达成一致。然而，正如马里兰大学教授萨利姆·阿里所说，如此脆弱生态系统早就应该变成湿地保护区，而不是军事化。一些撒哈拉以南非洲国家，如博茨瓦纳和赞比亚，以及莫桑比克和南非，已经成功建立了跨境生态保护区。在朝鲜和韩国之间的不稳定但生态珍贵的非军事区也应该做同样的事情。全世界都需要这样的思考。尽管臭名昭著的 1885 年柏林会议是非洲获得许多直线边界的地方，但欧洲人也使用了do ut des的法律概念，意思是“给予以接受”，或者只是针锋相对。今天，各国可以做得更好：它们还可以分享主权。

Our many arbitrary colonial-era borders hinder cooperation on today’s existential demographic and environmental challenges. For example, India and Pakistan dispute the Sir Creek estuary that forms the Feni River’s delta into the Arabian Sea. Here and elsewhere, countries can’t agree whether a river border should be defined at the midpoint or the banks. Yet as University of Maryland professor Saleem Ali argues, such fragile ecosystems should have long ago been turned into wetland conservation areas rather than being militarized. Some sub-Saharan African nations, such as Botswana and Zambia, as well as Mozambique and South Africa, have managed to establish cross-border ecological preserves. The same should be done in the precarious but ecologically precious Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. Such thinking is needed across the world. Though the notorious 1885 Congress of Berlin is where Africa got many of its straight-line borders, Europeans also utilized the legal concept of do ut des, meaning “giving to receive,” or simply tit-for-tat. Today countries can do better than that: They can also share sovereignty.

今天的主权用于划定政治控制区域，但它也使政府免于履行跨国责任。然而，气候变化引发了新的问题，即各国在保护栖息地、减少温室气体排放和接受移民方面有哪些义务。这些问题的核心在于一个严峻的选择。哪个更重要：国籍还是可持续性？是否应该允许国家拥有为我们所有人毁掉地球的领导人？加拿大或俄罗斯的领土对世界来说是否太重要，以至于不能仅由加拿大人和俄罗斯人来统治？我们能否从主权演变为管理权？

Sovereignty today serves to demarcate zones of political control, but it also shields governments from complying with transnational responsibilities. Yet climate change raises new questions about what obligations countries have to conserve habitats, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and accept migrants. At the heart of these queries lies a stark choice. What matters more: nationality or sustainability? Should states be permitted to have leaders who ruin the Earth for all of us? Is the territory of Canada or Russia too important to the world to be left to Canadians and Russians alone to govern? Can we evolve from sovereignty to stewardship?

重新利用地球上的整个地区进行大规模重新安置需要将严格主权的领土重新编码为指定用于农业、林业、海洋生物或居住的行政保护地。本着这种精神，各国可以将重要的栖息地出租给国际合作社进行可持续种植。当空间如此重要以至于任何一个国家都不应独家控制时，我们可以设计平衡可持续性和公平准入的机制。国际自然保护联盟（IUCN）帮助各国指定自然保护区、荒野地区、国家公园和可持续资源开发区，并寻找合适的合作伙伴来协助他们保护、再生或吸引游客前往这些生态区。迄今为止，地球陆地面积的百分比被指定为保护区。EO Wilson 认为我们的目标应该是 50%，即地球的一半。连接生物圈将使许多目前濒临灭绝的物种和自然栖息地得以再生，从北美森林到亚马逊河流域再到非洲草原。

Repurposing entire swaths of the planet for large-scale resettlement requires re-coding territory away from strict sovereignty into administrative protectorates designated for agriculture, forestry, marine life, or habitation. In this spirit, countries could lease critical habitats to international cooperatives for their sustainable cultivation. When spaces are so important that no one country should control them exclusively, we can design mechanisms that balance sustainability with fair access. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) helps countries designate nature reserves, wilderness areas, national parks, and sustainable resource development areas and finds the right partners to assist them to protect, regenerate, or attract tourists to these eco zones. To date, such technical support by IUCN and the World Wildlife Fund has led to 15 percent of the Earth’s land area being designated as protected areas. E. O. Wilson argued our target should be 50 percent—half the Earth. Linking biospheres would allow many currently endangered species and natural habitats to regenerate, from North American forests to the Amazon river basin to African grasslands.

同样重要的海洋领域不仅包括渔业和海底，还包括从潮汐发电机到风力涡轮机的可再生能源潜力。地球表面百分之七十是水，其中一半以上位于任何国家管辖范围之外。目前正在修订海洋法，以保护这些公海的生物多样性。接下来，世界海洋理事会可以被授权召集政府、公司和环保组织进行海洋空间规划。

The equally important oceanic sphere includes not just fisheries and seabeds but also its renewable power potential, from tidal generators to wind turbines. Seventy percent of the Earth’s surface is water, more than half of which lies outside any state jurisdiction. The Law of the Sea is currently being amended to protect the biodiversity of these high seas. Next, the World Ocean Council could be empowered to convene governments, companies, and environmental groups to undertake maritime spatial planning.

所有这些都是预防原则的明智应用，即一分预防胜过一分治疗——尤其是在可能无法治愈的情况下。但如果我们需要加强环境保护怎么办？哈佛大学教授斯蒂芬·沃尔特（Stephen Walt）询问是否应该援引国际人道主义法来证明军事干预措施的合理性，以保护生态系统。前奥巴马政府科学顾问约翰·霍尔德伦呼吁建立一个“行星政权”，一个监管全球环境、管理所有自然资源、甚至监管全球贸易和设定地区人口配额的超级机构。

All of this constitutes a sensible application of the precautionary principle that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure—especially when there may be no cure. But what if we need to enforce environmental protection? Harvard professor Stephen Walt has asked whether international humanitarian law should be invoked to justify military interventions to protect ecosystems. Former Obama administration science advisor John Holdren called for a “planetary regime,” a super-agency to regulate the global environment, managing all natural resources and even regulating global trade and setting regional population quotas.

然而，更有可能的是，俄罗斯和巴西等国家将不得不在经济上受到胁迫或贿赂，以像捍卫主权一样大力保护其栖息地。2019 年，巴西部署了近 5 万名士兵来控制森林火灾——这或许并非巧合，因为法国和爱尔兰威胁要阻止其欧盟贸易协定，除非采取严厉行动打击森林砍伐。全球适应委员会认为，用于适应投资（例如保护沿海红树林、提高旱地作物产量和提高灌溉效率）的 1.8 万亿美元可以产生 7.1 万亿美元的经济效益。在里面由于缺乏更强硬的大棒，因此需要使用一些胡萝卜来迫使采取亲生态行动。

Far more likely, however, is that countries such as Russia and Brazil will have to be economically coerced or bribed into protecting their habitats as dearly as they guard their sovereignty. In 2019, Brazil deployed nearly fifty thousand troops to control forest fires—perhaps not coincidentally because France and Ireland threatened to block its EU trade agreement until serious action was taken against deforestation. The Global Commission on Adaptation argued that $1.8 trillion spent on adaptation investments (such as protecting coastal mangroves, boosting dryland crop production, and more efficient irrigation) could generate $7.1 trillion in economic benefits. In the absence of stronger sticks, these are some of the carrots that will need to be deployed to compel pro-ecological action.

地球工程解决方案

The geo-engineering solution

当今的气候民族主义还有另一种方式可能会带来一定的军国主义：通过拒绝向他人提供自然资源来保护自己的自然资源。一些本土主义者认为，允许更多移民将提高贫困移民的生活水平，从而提高他们的总排放量。但按照同样的逻辑，稳定贫困和人口过剩地区的气候可能是北方首选的战略，以防止南方人民首先需要迁移。

There is another way in which today’s climate nationalism could entail a certain militarism: preserving one’s own natural resources by denying them to others. Some nativists argue that allowing more immigration would raise poor migrants’ living standards and thus their total emissions. But by the same logic, stabilizing the climate of poor and overpopulated regions could be the North’s preferred strategy to keep the people of the South from needing to migrate in the first place.

当各国出于自身利益行事时，并不羞于进行环境工程。自 20 世纪 70 年代以来，美国一直在利用人工降雨来对抗干旱，最近又利用降雨来改善滑雪条件。自 20 世纪 80 年代以来，印度和从摩洛哥到阿联酋的阿拉伯国家一直在种植云，以弥补降雨量不足的影响。阿联酋现在几乎每天都播种云，并在巨型水坝和水库中收集雨水。在印度尼西亚和马来西亚，播云对于平息丛林大火造成的污染雾霾至关重要。全球云播种计划至少可以暂时缓解缺水农业地区的情况。

When acting in their own interest, countries have not been shy at environmental engineering. The US has been using cloud seeding to combat drought since the 1970s, and more recently to precipitate snowfall to improve ski conditions. India and Arab countries from Morocco to the UAE have been seeding clouds since the 1980s to compensate for weak rainfall; the UAE now seeds clouds almost daily and captures rainwater in giant dams and reservoirs. In Indonesia and Malaysia cloud seeding has been essential to quell the polluting haze from brushfires. A global cloud seeding initiative could bring at least temporary relief for water-stressed farming regions.

重新造林举措也可以使整个地区和大气受益。树木是吸收 CO _{2的活性冷却剂}并捕获水蒸发，特别是在热带国家，它们在那里生长得更快。（因此，砍伐亚马逊流域比在加拿大伐木更糟糕，而重新种植亚马逊流域比在加拿大种植更多树木更重要。）根据苏黎世联邦理工学院的数据，大规模植树造林面积总计达 10 亿公顷（大约相当于美国大陆的面积）俄罗斯、加拿大、美国、澳大利亚、巴西和中国的碳排放量将占我们三分之二的碳排放量。但尽管最近全球发起了一项呼吁种植 1 万亿棵树的运动，但目前我们每年正在失去超过 1000 万公顷的森林，而且新种植的树木仍需要数十年才能达到其全部碳吸收能力。

Reforestation initiatives could also benefit entire regions and the atmosphere. Trees are active cooling agents that absorb CO₂ and capture water evaporation, especially in tropical countries, where they grow much faster. (Hence cutting down the Amazon is worse than logging in Canada, and replanting the Amazon is more important than planting more trees in Canada.) According to ETH Zurich, extensive tree planting, totaling 1 billion hectares (about the size of the continental US), across Russia, Canada, America, Australia, Brazil, and China would capture two-thirds of our carbon emissions. But despite a recent global campaign calling for the planting of 1 trillion trees, we are currently losing more than 10 million hectares of forest per year, and newly planted trees still take decades to reach their full carbon absorption capacity.

进步国家可能会带头启动地球工程计划，例如碳封存（用养分给海洋施肥，以提高CO ₂吸收），高大气层部署二氧化硫颗粒来偏转阳光，或者用反射更多光线的白沙覆盖新鲜冰，这样冰就可以强化而不是融化。人们希望世界上的慈善亿万富翁（如比尔·盖茨和杰夫·贝佐斯）、美国宇航局和其他机构已经在秘密地启动此类计划。学者们认为，跨纬度范围反射太阳辐射可以为全世界赢得时间并减少气候不公正。但仅惠及某一地区的解决方案可能会产生不利影响。如果人们知道这些地球工程计划是什么以及哪些地方会受益，他们就会去那里。除非我们找到适合所有人的解决方案，否则大规模移民和大规模苦难将继续存在。

Progressive powers may take the lead in launching geo-engineering schemes such as carbon sequestration (fertilizing the ocean with nutrients to enhance CO₂ absorption), high atmosphere deployment of sulphur dioxide particles to deflect sunlight, or coating fresh ice with white sand that reflects more light, so the ice can strengthen rather than melt. One hopes the world’s philanthropic billionaires (such as Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos), NASA, and other bodies are already working in secret to launch such schemes. Scholars have argued that reflecting solar radiation across a range of latitudes could buy the whole world time and reduce climate injustice. But solutions benefiting just one region could have adverse effects. If people find out what these geo-engineering plans are and which places will benefit, they’ll go there. Unless we find a solution for everyone, both mass migration and mass suffering will continue.

大规模移民与道德

Mass migrations and morality

二十年前，我们仍然担心人口严重过剩。然而，今天最紧迫的任务几乎相反：我们需要培育那些活着的和尚未出生的人，以确保人类在本世纪最大限度地生存。这意味着人们将不得不搬家——但我们会让他们搬家吗？

Twenty years ago we still feared rampant overpopulation. Yet today’s most urgent task is almost the opposite: We need to nurture those alive and yet to be born to ensure the maximal survival of humanity through this century. This means people will have to move—but will we let them?

对于一个资源丰富但人口减少的大国关闭边界，而那些对气候变化责任最小的国家却正在下沉或耗尽水的系统来说，有什么理由呢？将世界人口限制在目前的状况无异于生态灭绝——但它不会让那些幸存下来的人过上更好的生活。我们的经济仍将面临严重的劳动力短缺，全球交换创造的财富也将停止。相反，我们应该可持续地培育地球上的宜居绿洲，并将人们迁往那里。

What justification is there for a system in which large and resource-rich but depopulating countries close their borders, while those countries least responsible for climate change are sinking or running out of water? To lock the world population into its present position amounts to ecocide—yet it won’t make those who survive better off. Our economies will still face acute labor shortages, and the wealth created from global exchange will halt. Instead, we should sustainably cultivate the planet’s habitable oases and move people there.

尽管如此，道德哲学家仍然把国家置于人类之上在他们的询问中。例如，十七世纪的英国哲学家约翰·洛克提出了一个务实的案例，即通过移民入籍来扩大劳动力资源并扩大生产和贸易。但他明确表示，移民不应剥夺当地人的财产权。十八世纪的普鲁士哲学家伊曼纽尔·康德更进一步主张所有人都有受接待的权利，但这更多地被理解为临时逗留而不是永久居住，并且与洛克一样，它的条件是访客不造成伤害给他的主人。^二

Moral philosophers have nonetheless put the nation ahead of mankind in their inquiries. Seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke, for example, made a pragmatic case for naturalizing immigrants to enlarge the labor pool and expand production and trade. He was clear, however, that migration should not deprive locals of their property rights. The eighteenth-century Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant went a step further in advocating a right to hospitality for all people, but this was understood more as a temporary sojourn rather than permanent residence, and as with Locke, it was conditioned on the visitor not causing harm to his hosts.^II

康德的思想继续激发了二十世纪关于移民权利的辩论。已故牛津哲学家迈克尔·达米特经历了战后几十年英国及其前殖民地之间的大规模移民，他呼应康德的观点，即道德国家应该为公民和非公民提供基本权利。移民权本身就是这样一种权利，无国籍人成为某个国家公民的权利也是如此。雅克·德里达（Jacques Derrida）同样主张软化严格的国家主权，以支持对外国人更加道德的款待。但即使对于约翰·罗尔斯等著名哲学家来说，移民在他关于自给自足国家的思想实验中也没有发挥什么作用。他支持人民的迁徙权，但不支持任何强加国家主权的行为。反而，

Kant’s ideas continued to animate twentieth-century debates about migrant rights. Living through the postwar decades of significant migrations between Britain and its former colonies, the late Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett echoed Kant in his view that a moral state should provide fundamental rights to both citizens and noncitizens alike. The right to migrate is itself such a right, as is the right of stateless people to become citizens of some state. Jacques Derrida similarly argued for strict national sovereignty to soften in favor of a more ethical hospitality toward foreigners. But even for famed philosophers such as John Rawls, migration played little role in his thought experiments about self-contained states. He supported people’s right to move, but not any imposition on national sovereignty. Instead, a just global system would eliminate the root causes of poverty, corruption, or other motivations for migration.

但仅仅进行思想实验的时代已经过去了——我们的全球体系远非公平。人类共有一种气候，北方的工业给其带来了灾难性的破坏，而南方则首当其冲。我们南方的土地和农业土地都已荒漠化北方地势丰富。我们放弃了北方充满现代住宅的城镇和南方数百万流离失所的难民。我们北方劳动力严重短缺，南方劳动力过剩。布莱恩·卡普兰 (Bryan Caplan) 精彩的叙述《开放边界》( Open Borders)认为，大多数移民既不是入学年龄，也不是退休年龄，而是工作年龄的 X 一代和千禧一代，仅在美国，他们的长期财政福利就达到每位移民约 259,000 美元。全球发展中心的经济学家迈克尔·克莱门斯估计，向临时移民工人开放世界边界实际上可以使世界 GDP 翻一番。

But the time for mere thought experiments has passed—our global system is far from fair. Humanity shares one climate that the North’s industry has cataclysmically devastated, with the South bearing the brunt of the consequences. We have desertified lands across the South and agriculturally abundant terrain in the North. We have abandoned towns full of modern homes in the North and millions of displaced refugees in the South. We have huge labor shortages in the North and labor surpluses in the South. Bryan Caplan’s wonderfully illustrated narrative Open Borders argues that most migrants are neither school age nor retirement age but rather working age Gen-Xers and millennials whose long-term fiscal benefit amounts to about $259,000 per migrant in just the US alone. Economist Michael Clemens of the Center for Global Development estimates that opening the world’s borders to even temporary migrant workers could literally double world GDP.

尽管所有伦理和经济理由都支持大规模移民，但我们没有全球移民政策。相反，我们面临着越来越多的道德考验：非洲人穿越地中海、拉丁美洲人穿越格兰德河，以及其他危机。在几乎所有西方民主国家，移民已成为一项政治罗夏测试，但仍然没有足够的移民被接纳，而太多人在途中死亡。鉴于他们遭受的外部痛苦（例如军事干预和生态破坏）和他们自己的内部缺陷（例如腐败和不计后果的人口增长），修复家园的努力也不够。康德和罗尔斯都会对我们感到非常失望。

Despite all ethical and economic arguments in favor of mass migrations, we have no global migration policy. Instead, we face a growing number of moral tests: Africans crossing the Mediterranean and Latinos crossing the Rio Grande, and other crises. Migration has become a political Rorschach test in almost every Western democracy, yet still not enough migrants are let in while too many die on the way. Nor is enough done to repair their homelands in light of the external pain inflicted on them (such as military interventions and ecological ruin) and their own internal failings (such as corruption and reckless population growth). Both Kant and Rawls would be very disappointed in us.

在世的哲学家中，很少有比彼得·辛格（Peter Singer）更深入地思考过我们因失败而承担的义务。辛格认为，让所有人平等（世界主义）以及争取最大的集体幸福（功利主义）的逻辑结论是：幸运者尽可能多地帮助那些不幸的人，无论他们的地理位置或国籍如何。本论文的最高纲领是开放边界和大规模财富再分配，而最低纲领则是对贫穷国家提供更多援助。

Few other living philosophers have thought harder about what our obligations are in light of our failures than Peter Singer, who argues that the logical conclusion of holding all people as equal (cosmopolitanism) as well as striving for maximum collective happiness (utilitarianism) is that the fortunate give as much as possible to those less fortunate, irrespective of their geography or nationality. The maximalist version of this thesis is open borders and mass wealth redistribution, while the minimalist case is far greater aid to poor countries.

然而，我们有充分的证据表明，援助几乎无法维持人们的生命，而转移人们却可以给他们一个生存的机会。对于世界上大多数生活在贫穷国家的人来说，3D 打印的房屋不会神奇地飓风过后，水培食品也不会实现，内战期间他们的手机钱包里也不会出现大笔钱。最真实的关怀方式是让受害者成为邻居。西方国家在国外促进人权，知道他们的压力不会产生什么结果，而改善人类状况的最可靠途径是移民。移民与言论自由或正当程序一样都是一项人权——事实上，对许多人来说，跨越边境是获得这些权利的唯一途径。因此，流动性应该成为二十一世纪最重要的人权之一。

We have ample evidence, however, that aid barely keeps people alive, while moving people gives them a chance to live. For most of the world population that lives in poor countries, 3D-printed homes won’t magically materialize after a cyclone, nor will hydroponic food after a drought, nor will large sums of money appear in their mobile wallets during civil wars. The truest way to care is to let victims become neighbors. Western countries promote human rights abroad knowing that their pressure will yield few results, whereas the surest path to improving the human condition is migration. Migration is as much a human right as freedom of speech or due process—and indeed, for many, crossing a border is the only way to attain these rights. Mobility thus ought to be one of the paramount human rights of the twenty-first century.

如果有一个术语来形容我的立场，那就是“世界主义功利主义”：我们应该重新调整我们的地理分布，为当代和子孙后代带来最大的福利。这也是一种世界主义的现实主义：各国自己做出决定，但更多的移民非常符合国家利益。事实上，聪明的政府不会将移民视为“全有或全无”的主张。相反，他们预测各部门的劳动力需求，并招募外国人来填补这些缺口，以便即使在人口增长的情况下，国内失业率仍保持在较低水平。请记住，本地工人和外国工人之间不存在零和竞争：更多的劳动力涌入本身会刺激经济并创造更大的劳动力需求。同时，可以做出妥协来维持对开放的支持，例如加强对非法移民的限制和当地在雇用方面的偏好。维持支持移民倾向的另一种方法是：将外国投资的收入作为股息分配给本国公民。这些措施只是为了实现世界各地人口更加富有成效和人道的分配而付出的很小的代价。

If there is a term for my position, it’s “cosmopolitan utilitarianism”: We should realign our geographies to bring maximum welfare to current and future generations. It’s also a cosmopolitan realism: States make their own decisions, but more migration is very much in the national interest. Indeed, smart governments don’t talk about immigration as an all-or-nothing proposition. Instead, they forecast labor demand by sector and recruit foreigners to fill those gaps so that domestic unemployment remains low even as the population grows. Remember there is no zero-sum competition between local and foreign workers: A greater influx of labor itself stimulates the economy and creates greater demand for labor. At the same time, compromises can be made to maintain support for openness such as stronger curbs on illegal immigration and local preferences in hiring. Another way to sustain a pro-migration orientation: distribute the revenues from foreign investment to native citizens as a dividend. Such measures are a small price to pay to achieve a more productive and humane distribution of people around the world.

为了实现更加公平和合理的人文地理学，需要基于权利和义务的论据——特别是因为在政治上，两者都不够。2018年，各国政府同意了《安全、有序和正常移民全球契约》，承认移民有工作和贡献的权利，而不是成为经济负担。但美国拒绝了这两项移民契约和平行的全球难民契约。在 2016 年阿拉伯移民涌入欧洲的浪潮中，德国总理安格拉·默克尔 (Angela Merkel) 最初主张寻求庇护者的权利，但后来转向更严格的控制，以避免在政治上输给极右翼反移民政党。也许，这个困境与其说是道德问题，不如说是道德上合理且人口必要的移民与民主政治的自我挫败性短视之间的对比。

To achieve a more fair and sensible human geography will require arguments based on both rights and obligations—especially since politically, neither is sufficient. In 2018, governments agreed to a “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration” that recognized the rights of migrants to work and contribute rather than be a financial burden. But the US has rejected both the Migration Compact and a parallel Global Compact for Refugees. During the 2016 wave of Arab migrants into Europe, German chancellor Angela Merkel initially advocated for the rights of asylum seekers, but later shifted toward stricter controls to avoid losing political ground to far right anti-immigrant parties. Perhaps then the dilemma is less about morality than the contrast between ethically sound and demographically necessary immigration and the self-defeating shortsightedness of democratic politics.

几乎没有西方民主国家为大规模移民的新时代做好准备。正如印裔美国小说家苏克图·梅塔 (Suketu Mehta) 指出的那样：“以前从未有过如此多的人类活动。从来没有出现过如此大规模的针对人类活动的有组织的抵抗。” ²梅塔主张将赔偿作为南北赎罪的一种形式，但也指出无论如何，北方比以往任何时候都更需要移民。人才流失也可能会持续下去。但对于历史上无知且财政拮据的西方公众来说，关于赔偿的争论长期以来一直没有进展。此外，加拿大和俄罗斯等未来可能吸收最多移民的国家从未殖民过非洲和南亚。重温过去的争端并不会让我们对未来产生集体感。

Almost no Western democracies are prepared for the new age of mass migrations. As the Indian-American novelist Suketu Mehta points out, “Never before has there been so much human movement. And never before has there been so much organized resistance to human movement.”² Mehta argues for reparations as a form of North-South atonement, but also points out that the North needs migrants more than ever anyway. The brain drain may as well continue. But reparations arguments have long fallen flat among historically ignorant and fiscally constrained Western publics. Furthermore, the countries that may be absorbing the most migrants in the future, such as Canada and Russia, never colonized Africa and South Asia. Reliving past disputes won’t bring us to our collective senses about the future.

我们也不能假装人口控制很快就会使我们的人口负担减轻。美国地理学会主席克里斯·塔克认为，理想的世界人口是 30 亿，大致相当于 20 世纪中叶的人口数量，当时我们受益于工业化，但在全球变暖加速之前。但今天我们的人数几乎是这个数字的三倍，这使得到底有多少人的问题有点没有实际意义。无论未来人口的状况如何，我们仍然应该转移现有的人口。

We also can’t pretend that population control will revert us to a less burdensome demography anytime soon. American Geographical Society chairman Chris Tucker argues that the ideal world population is 3 billion, roughly what it was in the mid twentieth century, a time when we benefited from industrialization but before the acceleration of global warming. But today we stand at nearly triple that number of people, making the question of how many people there should be somewhat moot. Whatever the human population settles at in the future, we still should move those we do have now.

事实是，人类从来没有停滞不前，舒适地局限于预先确定的国界的现状——而且永远不会有。今天我们讨论移民是否应该允许；明天我们将重点关注我们对新移民的吸收能力。每个国家和地区集团都应该积极回答以下问题：移民应该去哪里？他们能做什么工作？他们怎样才能被同化？我们如何以最可持续的方式设计扩大的栖息地？正如人类学家大卫·格雷伯（David Graeber）明智地指出的那样：“世界上隐藏的终极真相是，它是我们创造的，并且可以很容易地做出不同的改变。” ³

The fact is that there has never been a status quo where mankind stood still, comfortably confined to predetermined national boundaries—and there never will be. Today we debate whether or not migrants should be allowed; tomorrow we will focus on our absorptive capacity for new migrants. Each country and regional group should proactively be formulating answers to questions such as: Where should migrants go? What work can they do? How can they be assimilated? How can we design expanded habitats in the most sustainable fashion? As anthropologist David Graeber wisely noted, “The ultimate, hidden truth of the world is that it is something that we make, and could just as easily make differently.”³

北美、欧洲和亚洲的许多富裕大国已经需要大规模移民来维持其生活水平，但没有一个国家吸收的移民数量几乎满足其需要。富裕国家的人口下降引发社会经济紧张，而贫穷国家的人口激增则阻碍了公平发展。更多的移民可以平衡这些因素，防止世界同时变得更加贫穷和更加不平等。因此，对全球人口进行大规模重新分类将符合每个人的最佳利益。我们的选择要么是逐步将世界青年尤其是世界青年重新部署到他们可以获得有酬就业的地区，要么是全球下层阶级的反抗。近年来，我们已经尝到了后者的滋味。我们有足够的勇气走另一条路吗？

Many large and wealthy countries across North America, Europe, and Asia already require mass immigration to maintain their standard of living, yet none are absorbing nearly as many migrants as they need. Demographic decline in rich countries sparks socioeconomic tension, while booming populations in poor countries retard equitable development. More migration could balance these out, preventing the world from collectively becoming poorer and more unequal at the same time. A large-scale re-sorting of the global population would therefore be in everyone’s best interest. Our choice is either a progressive redeployment of especially the world’s youth to geographies where they can be gainfully employed or a global underclass revolt. Recent years have given us a taste of what the latter looks like. Are we brave enough to take the other path?

重新填充世界

Repopulating the world

世界正在同时耗尽人口和居住地。将资源转移给人类对环境造成了灾难性的影响；现在我们必须让人们获得资源，但不能在此过程中摧毁他们。北美主要国家——美国和加拿大、英国和德国、俄罗斯和日本——需要更广泛的移民以及对农业和基础设施的大量新投资，为未来做好准备。但各国在接受移民方面的慷慨程度必须权衡太多人同时到达可能给公地带来的悲剧。

The world is running out of people and places to live at the same time. Moving resources to people has been environmentally catastrophic; now we must move people to resources, without destroying them in the process. The major states of the North—America and Canada, Britain and Germany, Russia and Japan—need more expansive immigration as well as substantial new investments in agriculture and infrastructure to prepare for what lies ahead. But the generosity of countries in accepting migrants must be weighed against the potential tragedy to the commons of having too many people arriving at once.

世界各地尤其是年轻人的不断流动，加上人口老龄化和气候压力，也意味着我们需要积极重新调整现有基础设施和其他设施的用途，以服务人类。闲置的飞机可以空运穷人和受困者，空荡荡的游轮和酒店可以容纳难民和无家可归者，购物中心可以变成仓库和创客空间，高尔夫球场可以变成农场。人们想知道，随着当今婴儿潮一代的去世，我们是否可以腾出土地来建造所有必需的墓地。

The constant movement of especially young people around the world combined with aging demographics and climate stress also mean we need to actively repurpose existing infrastructure and other facilities to serve humanity. Idle planes can airlift the poor and stranded, empty cruise ships and hotels can house refugees and the homeless, shopping malls can become warehouses and makerspaces, and golf courses can become farms. One wonders if we can spare land for all the cemeteries that will be necessary as today’s baby boomers expire.

现在去哪里？

Where to Now?

过去十万年里，人类的迁徙使我们走出了非洲，来到了其他各大洲，并集中在沿海和河流沿岸。未来100年或1000年我们将走向何方？

Mankind’s migrations over the past 100,000 years brought us out of Africa and onto every other continent, where we have concentrated along coasts and rivers. Where will we move over the next 100 or 1,000 years?

在我们的黄金地段，人口自然消亡，但又被来自四面八方的年轻人动态补充，这在人口统计学上是一种诗意。如果我们顺其自然——向内陆、高地、向北移动，并利用可持续性和流动性的最新进展——我们不仅将向人类文明的新模式发展，甚至可能重拾振兴人口的信心。正如莫辛·哈米德 (Mohsin Hamid) 在《国家地理》中尖锐地写道：“一种移民终于安然地成为了一种移民。对我来说，那是一个值得徘徊的目的地。” ⁴

There is something demographically poetic about populations organically dying off in our prime geographies yet being dynamically backfilled by youth from far and wide. If we allow ourselves to go with the flow—moving inland, upland, and northward, and taking advantage of the latest advances in sustainability and mobility—we will not only evolve toward a new model of human civilization, but may even regain the confidence to revitalize our population. As Mohsin Hamid poignantly writes in National Geographic, “A species of migrants at last comfortable being a species of migrants. That, for me, is a destination worth wandering to.”⁴

乔治城大学令人向往的本科生课程“现代世界地图”的成绩是及格/不及格。今天，我们要么通过，要么失败，设计一种新的地理学哲学。1946年，美国地理学家约翰·科特兰·赖特（John Kirtland Wright）创造了“地智学”（geosophy）一词，以表示地理学与人性之间密切且不断发展的关系。⁵地智学激励我们克服人为权威：边界可以弯曲，基础设施可以转移，人们可以流动。不断变化的气候的卫星图像与数十亿个政治、经济和社会数据点融合在一起，为人类如何重新安置和繁荣提供了生动的场景。难怪地理再次在高中受到欢迎，地球观测 (EO) 和地理信息系统 (GIS) 成为大学里炙手可热的课程，其毕业生找到的工作具有切实的积极影响。对于年轻人来说，没有什么比学习更重要的了。这些领域是我们如何度过未来复杂几十年的关键。地理在发展，人类社会也必须随之发展。

“Map of the Modern World,” that coveted undergraduate class at Georgetown, was pass/fail. Today we can either pass or fail the test of devising a new philosophy of geography. In 1946, American geographer John Kirtland Wright coined the term “geosophy” to signify the intimate and ever evolving relationship between geography and human nature.⁵ Geosophy inspires us to overcome artificial authority: Borders can bend, infrastructure can shift, people can move. Satellite imagery of our changing climate fuses with billions of political, economic, and social data points to produce vivid scenarios for how humankind can relocate and thrive. No wonder geography is once again gaining popularity in high schools, and Earth Observation (EO) and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are sought-after courses in universities, with their graduates getting jobs that have tangible positive impact. There is nothing more important for youth to study. These fields hold the key to how we survive the complex decades ahead. Geography evolves, and human society must evolve with it.

我。特别是富含花岗岩且地震不活跃的国家是掩埋核废料的关键地点。目前，世界上大部分核废料都储存在芬兰、瑞典、法国、西班牙和捷克共和国等国家的非地震花岗岩山中，或者储存在美国现有反应堆的现场（由于当地反对掩埋）它位于内华达州丝兰山、死亡谷和拉斯维加斯附近）。但随着这些国家因全球移民而增加人口，核废料可以更好地储存（并转移）到阿根廷巴塔哥尼亚地区的塞拉德尔梅迪奥等地，该地区由于气候变化而人口减少和干旱。

I. Especially countries rich in granite and not seismically active are crucial locations to bury nuclear waste. Currently, most of the world’s nuclear waste is stored in non-seismic granite mountains in countries such as Finland, Sweden, France, Spain, and the Czech Republic, or on-site of existing reactors in the US (due to local opposition to burying it in places such as Yucca Mountain, Nevada, near Death Valley and Las Vegas). But as these countries gain population from global migration, nuclear waste is better stored (and relocated) to places such as Sierra del Medio in Argentina’s Patagonia region, which is depopulated and drying out due to climate change.

二．康德是最早将地理学视为一门学科的哲学家之一，他概述了它的子类别，例如物理、经济和道德，这并非偶然。他写了一种“哲学地形学”来解释空间和地点如何塑造人类的经验和知识。Malpas 和 Thiel，“康德的理性地理学”，阅读康德的地理学(2011)，参见 Robert B. Louden，“最后的前沿：康德地理学的重要性”，环境与规划 D：社会与空间32，第 3 期（ 2014 年 1 月）：450–465。

II. Kant was, not incidentally, one of the first philosophers to treat geography as a discipline, outlining its subcategories, such as physical, economic, and moral. He wrote of a “philosophical topography” to explain how spaces and places shape human experience and knowledge. Malpas and Thiel, “Kant’s Geography of Reason,” Reading Kant’s Geography (2011), in Robert B. Louden, “The Last Frontier: The Importance of Kant’s Geography,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32, no.3 (January 2014): 450–465.

致谢

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

本书谨献给著名的政治理论家大卫·赫尔德（David Held），他指导了我在伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）的博士论文。大卫是一位无私的导师和朋友，他真实而现实的世界主义仍然是永恒的灵感源泉。对博士奋斗的温暖记忆似乎并不常见，但我每天都想念他，这证明了大卫的性格。

This book is dedicated to the memory of David Held, the celebrated political theorist who supervised my PhD thesis at LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science). David was the selfless mentor and friend, and his authentic but realistic cosmopolitanism remains a perpetual source of inspiration. It does not seem common to have warm memories of doctoral struggles, but it is a testament to David’s character that I miss him every day.

与我的前一本书一样，新加坡耶鲁大学-新加坡国立大学的教师和学生已被证明是宝贵的智力资源。与我的好朋友拉维·奇丹巴拉姆（Ravi Chidambaram）的对话再次需要我不停地做笔记，他关于“好公司”的精彩演讲以及我们关于重新定义人力资本的联合文章对于塑造这一叙述非常有用。安朱·保罗 (Anju Paul) 对低收入移民现实的深入研究对她的实地观点同样产生了影响。Ravi 和 Anju 的杰出耶鲁-新加坡国立大学学生群体很高兴能够与他们交流并向他们学习。我还要感谢我的老朋友布莱恩·麦卡杜 (Brian McAdoo) 和保罗·威尔特 (Paul Wilt)，他们在思想上始终如一地提供意见，并引导我认识耶鲁大学-新加坡国立大学的本科生，他们对本书做出了如此深刻的贡献。海伦娜·奥尔斯瓦尔德、拉亚·柳贝诺娃、富有洞察力的研究以及他们乐观的前景。莫晓尤 (Xiao You Mok)、阿迪蒂·拉马钱德兰 (Adity Ramachandran) 和赛·苏哈斯·科帕拉普 (Sai Suhas Kopparapu) 也再次镇定自若、勤奋而富有创造力地引导我走上有趣的文化之路。

As with my previous book, the faculty and students at Yale-NUS in Singapore have proven to be an invaluable intellectual resource. Conversations with my good friend Ravi Chidambaram again required my nonstop note-taking, and his masterful lecture on “the good company” and our joint article on redefining human capital were very useful in shaping this narrative. Anju Paul’s deep scholarship on the realities of low-income migrants was equally impactful for her on-the-ground perspective. Both Ravi and Anju’s brilliant cohorts of Yale-NUS students were a pleasure to engage with and learn from. I’d also like to thank my old friends Brian McAdoo and Paul Wilt for being consistent sounding boards intellectually, and directing me to the Yale-NUS undergraduates who made such a deep contribution to this book. Helena Auerswald, Raya Lyubenova, and Anmei Zeng have my deepest appreciation for their meticulous and insightful research as well as their cheery outlook. Xiao You Mok, Adity Ramachandran, and Sai Suhas Kopparapu were also once again unflappably diligent and creative in steering me down interesting cultural avenues.

我在 FutureMap 的团队由新老同事和朋友组成，他们在本书各个方面的专业化方面发挥了不可估量的作用。Kailash K. Prasad 是一位跨学科思想家，他找到了将定性见解与数据相结合的新颖方法。Jeff Blossom 和 April Zhu 制作了精美的地图和可视化，将想法变为现实，而 Scott Malcomson 再次对本书的几乎每个段落提供了实质性反馈。如果没有 Jennifer Kwek，我都不知道如何找到时间写作。

My team at FutureMap, composed of colleagues and friends old and new, has been invaluable in professionalizing every aspect of this book. Kailash K. Prasad is an interdisciplinary thinker who found novel ways to combine qualitative insights with data. Jeff Blossom and April Zhu produced superb maps and visualizations to bring ideas to life, and Scott Malcomson once again provided substantive feedback, on almost every paragraph of the book. And without Jennifer Kwek, I don’t know how I would even find time to write.

许多组织慷慨地聚集了具有丰富观点的下一代领导者，我认为这是无价的。我要感谢牛津大学布拉瓦尼克管理学院的 Ngaire Woods、牛津互联网研究所的 Jonathan Bright 和牛津城市主义者对这项研究的慷慨支持。我还很高兴与柏林墨卡托基金会主办的消息灵通、雄心勃勃的年轻人以及由 Amjad Attalah、Amy Selwyn、Caroline Scullin 和 Nelufar Hedayat 组成的多哈辩论团队进行讨论。特别感谢 Twitter 的 Maya Hari 召集了来自亚洲各地的不拘一格的跨国“Tweeps”小组。我还要感谢资深的全球探险家马丁·格雷，他在精神漫游的短暂休息期间抽出了时间对整个手稿进行了评论。

A wide range of organizations generously assembled next-generation leaders with rich perspectives which I found invaluable. For their generous support of this research, I’d like to thank Ngaire Woods of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Governance, Jonathan Bright of the Oxford Internet Institute, and the Oxford Urbanists. I also enjoyed discussions with well-informed and ambitious youth hosted by the Mercator Stiftung in Berlin, and the Doha Debates team of Amjad Attalah, Amy Selwyn, Caroline Scullin, and Nelufar Hedayat. Special thanks to Maya Hari of Twitter for convening an eclectic and multinational group of “Tweeps” from across Asia. I am also grateful to veteran global explorer Martin Gray, who found time during a brief respite from his spiritual wanderings to comment on the entire manuscript.

我还要感谢许多其他人，他们的对话（面对面或虚拟）有助于制定和测试本书中提出的想法（按字母顺序排列）：KD Adamson、David Adelman、Rukhsana Afzaals、Ellie Alchin、Nick Alchin、Tracey亚历山大、阿利舍尔·阿里、拉法特·阿里、萨利姆·阿里、阿米特·阿南德、西蒙·安霍尔特、新井佑介、Lorig Armenian、玛哈·阿齐兹、理查德·巴克汉姆、乌梅吉·巴蒂亚、海伦娜·罗宾·博迪、法比奥·布里奥斯奇、克里斯·布鲁克、马特·布罗斯、潘妮·贝尔特,陈恒荣,周克里斯,安德里亚·切古特,张冬青,雷纳托·奇佐拉,尼尔·乔杜里,迈克尔·崔,安迪·克拉克,史蒂夫·克莱蒙斯,安迪·科恩,詹姆斯·克拉布特里,路易斯·库兰,戴安娜,休斯·德尔科特,詹姆斯·德·德里安,詹姆斯·多西 / 史蒂夫·德雷珀 / 布鲁克斯·恩特威斯尔 / 克里斯·欧阳 / 雷扎·艾泰达利 / Hany Fam / 尼克·方 / 詹姆斯·法齐 / 迈克尔·法拉利 / 埃利·芬戈尔德 / 丹尼斯·弗伦奇曼 / 船桥阳一 / 米盖尔·加米诺 / 大卫·詹保罗 / 洛雷塔·吉拉代 / 布鲁诺·吉萨尼 / Jan-菲利普·戈尔茨,劳伦斯·格鲁,桑德罗·格鲁南菲尔德,阿莫尔·古普特,尼娜·哈奇吉安,凯尔·哈格蒂,尼尔斯·哈托格,杰森·希克尔,大卫·霍夫曼,保罗·霍尔索斯,大卫·霍洛克,约翰·霍金斯,格雷格·亨特,皮科·艾耶,约瑟夫·詹宁,纳姆拉塔​​·乔利,克里斯蒂安·凯林、 So-Young Kang、Prakash Kannan、Sagi Karni、Tarun Kataria、Gerry Keefe、Shane Kelly、Sanjay Khanna、Sid Khanna、Gaurang Khemka、Eje Kim, 布雷特·金, 小平龙四郎, 娜塔莎·科恩, 丹尼尔·科尔斯基, 李成, 马克·伦纳德, 史蒂夫·伦纳德, 大卫·莱昂哈特, 亚当·莱文森, 李贝贝, 李盈盈, 迈克·莱特曼, 格雷格·林赛, 克里斯托弗·洛根, 皮埃尔-伊夫·隆巴德,凯伦·槙岛、亚伦·曼尼亚姆、阿里·曼苏尔、格雷格·曼努埃尔、克里斯·马林、松川瑞伊、肖恩·麦克法特、苏克图·梅塔、潘卡吉·米什拉、阿夫辛·莫拉维、布伦特·摩根斯、马兹亚尔·莫尔塔扎维、玛丽·蒙特、卡梅伦·纳杰菲、基米·小野田、托马斯·庞、查尔斯·皮尔特尔托德·波特 / 凯拉什·普拉萨德 / 诺亚·拉福德 / 亚当·拉赫曼 / 朱莉娅·莱斯金 / 阿迪·拉马钱德兰 / 安妮·理查兹 / 奥利弗·里佩尔 / 安西娅·罗伯茨 / 温迪妮·鲁格 / 阿尔波·鲁西 / 曼尼·雷巴赫 / 卡里姆·萨贾德普尔 / 里克·萨曼斯 / 拉纳·萨卡 / 格哈德·施密特 / 安妮特舍梅尔、彼得·施瓦茨、泽伊内普·森、尼拉吉·塞斯、雷瓦·塞斯、安德烈斯·塞夫特苏克、安库尔·沙阿、卢特菲·西迪奇、格雷厄姆·西尔弗索恩、JT·辛格、杰森·索萨, 巴拉吉·斯里尼瓦桑, 于尔格·史蒂芬, 塞布·斯特拉斯堡, 乔·滕, 雅各布·特普-汉森, 芭芭拉·托勒, 瑞安·托马斯, 克里斯·塔克, Jan Vapaavuori, Sriram Vasudevan, Ivan Vatchkov, Dominic Volek, Kirk Wagar, DA Wallach, Yukun Wang,内莉·沃托夫特、史蒂夫·威卡尔、欧内斯特·威尔逊、吴肖恩、萨沙·杨、莫沙拉夫·扎伊迪、米哈伊尔·泽尔多维奇、格雷厄姆·辛克、迈克尔·辛克和塔勒·齐亚多夫。

I also wish to thank numerous others with whom conversations (in person or virtual) have been helpful in formulating and testing ideas presented in this book (in alphabetical order): K. D. Adamson, David Adelman, Rukhsana Afzaals, Ellie Alchin, Nick Alchin, Tracey Alexander, Alisher Ali, Rafat Ali, Saleem Ali, Amit Anand, Simon Anholt, Yusuke Arai, Lorig Armenian, Maha Aziz, Richard Barkham, Umej Bhatia, Helena Robin Bordie, Fabio Brioschi, Chris Brooke, Mat Burrows, Penny Burtt, Heng Wing Chan, Chris Chau, Andrea Chegut, Holly Cheung, Renato Chizzola, Neel Chowdhury, Michael Chui, Andy Clarke, Steve Clemons, Andy Cohen, James Crabtree, Louis Curran, Anna Dai, Hugues Delcourt, James Der Derian, James Dorsey, Steve Draper, Brooks Entwistle, Chris Eoyang, Reza Etedali, Hany Fam, Nick Fang, James Fazi, Michael Ferrari, Elie Finegold, Dennis Frenchman, Yoichi Funabashi, Miguel Gamino, David Giampaolo, Loretta Girardet, Bruno Giussani, Jan-Philipp Goertz, Lawrence Groo, Sandro Gruenenfelder, Amol Gupte, Nina Hachigian, Kyle Hagerty, Niels Hartog, Jason Hickel, David Hoffman, Paul Holthaus, David Horlock, John Howkins, Greg Hunt, Pico Iyer, Josef Janning, Namrata Jolly, Christian Kaelin, So-Young Kang, Prakash Kannan, Sagi Karni, Tarun Kataria, Gerry Keefe, Shane Kelly, Sanjay Khanna, Sid Khanna, Gaurang Khemka, Eje Kim, Brett King, Ryushiro Kodaira, Natasha Kohne, Daniel Korski, Sung Lee, Mark Leonard, Steve Leonard, David Leonhardt, Adam Levinson, Beibei Li, Yingying Li, Mike Lightman, Greg Lindsay, Christopher Logan, Pierre-Yves Lombard, Karen Makishima, Aaron Maniam, Ali Mansour, Greg Manuel, Chris Marlin, Rui Matsukawa, Sean McFate, Suketu Mehta, Pankaj Mishra, Afshin Molavi, Brent Morgans, Mazyar Mortazavi, Mary Mount, Cameron Najafi, Kimi Onoda, Thomas Pang, Charles Pirtle, Todd Porter, Kailash Prasad, Noah Raford, Adam Rahman, Julia Raiskin, Adi Ramachandran, Anne Richards, Oliver Rippel, Anthea Roberts, Undine Ruge, Alpo Rusi, Manny Rybach, Karim Sadjadpour, Rick Samans, Rana Sarkar, Gerhard Schmitt, Annette Schoemmel, Peter Schwartz, Zeynep Sen, Neeraj Seth, Reva Seth, Andres Sevtsuk, Ankur Shah, Lutfey Siddiqi, Graham Silverthorne, J. T. Singh, Jason Sosa, Balaji Srinivasan, Juerg Steffen, Seb Strassburg, Joe Teng, Jakob Terp-Hansen, Barbara Thole, Ryan Thomas, Chris Tucker, Jan Vapaavuori, Sriram Vasudevan, Ivan Vatchkov, Dominic Volek, Kirk Wagar, D. A. Wallach, Yukun Wang, Nellie Wartoft, Steve Weikal, Ernest Wilson, Shawn Wu, Sasha Young, Mosharraf Zaidi, Mikhail Zeldovich, Graham Zink, Michael Zink, and Taleh Ziyadov.

在我出生之前，我的家人就一直在践行这本书的主题，这也是感谢爸爸妈妈孜孜不倦的支持、自发的轶事以及持续愿意从头到尾阅读我的手稿的另一个原因。我的妻子阿伊莎（Ayesha）也不断地向我提供相关材料，她对我们家庭旅行目的地的直觉以非常有用的方式倾斜了我的思维。当我写作时，我们的全球孩子扎拉和祖宾不再出现在我的脑海中，而是出现在我的脑海中，他们向我们询问有关世界的事实，并对他们去过的所有地方进行观察和判断。想去。我的兄弟 Gaurav 和嫂子 Anu 也对本文涵盖的许多主题发表了见解，

My family has been living the thesis of this book since before I was born, yet another reason to thank Mom and Dad for their tireless support, spontaneous anecdotes, and continued willingness to read my manuscripts start to finish. My wife, Ayesha, has also peppered me with a continuous stream of relevant material, and her intuitions about our own family travel destinations have tilted my thinking in very useful ways. Our global kids, Zara and Zubin, are no longer in the back of my mind as I write but front and center as they quiz us on facts about the world and weigh in with their observations and judgments about all the places they’ve been and want to go. My brother Gaurav and sister-in-law Anu also radiated insights about so many topics covered herein, and my niece Anisha and nephew Roshan are the finest incarnations of the next-gen digital natives shaping the future.

本书在其最初的表述基础上有了很大的发展，其中许多改进都归功于我的跨大西洋编辑团队，即 Scribner（西蒙与舒斯特）的 Rick Horgan 和 Orion（Hachette）的 Jenny Lord。衷心感谢双方对这一真正富有成效的伙伴关系的自信指导。一如既往，我永远感激 ICM 的 Jenn Joel；“代理人”这个词根本无法体现她明智的建议和友谊在我工作的各个方面所发挥的作用。在伦敦的柯蒂斯·布朗，杰克·史密斯-博桑奎特、理查德·派克和萨凡娜·威克斯组成的团队在确保我的作品受到全球观众欢迎方面发挥了彻底的积极作用。最深切地感谢我的整个梦之队。

This book evolved considerably from its original formulation, and many of those improvements are thanks to my transatlantic editorial team of Rick Horgan at Scribner (Simon & Schuster) and Jenny Lord at Orion (Hachette). Thanks deeply to both for their confident guidance in this genuinely fruitful partnership. As ever, I am eternally indebted to Jenn Joel at ICM; the word “agent” does not even remotely capture the role her wise counsel and friendship plays in all aspects of my work. At Curtis Brown in London, the team of Jake Smith-Bosanquet, Richard Pike, and Savanna Wicks have been a thoroughly positive force in ensuring that my work receives a global audience. Deepest thanks to my entire dream team.

关于作者

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

© 努斯拉特·杜拉尼

© NUSRAT DURRANI

帕拉格·卡纳 (PARAG KHANNA)是全球战略咨询公司 FutureMap 的创始人和执行合伙人，也是《Connectography》和《The Future Is Asian》等七本书的国际畅销书作者。他拥有伦敦经济学院博士学位以及乔治城大学外交学院学士和硕士学位。

PARAG KHANNA is the founder and managing partner of FutureMap, a global strategic advisory firm, and the internationally bestselling author of seven books, including Connectography and The Future Is Asian. He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and both bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

西蒙和舒斯特.com

SimonandSchuster.com

www.SimonandSchuster.com/Authors/Parag-Khanna

www.SimonandSchuster.com/Authors/Parag-Khanna

@ScribnerBooks

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帕拉格·卡纳 (Parag Khanna) 的作品

ALSO BY PARAG KHANNA

第二世界：全球新秩序中的帝国与影响

The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order

如何管理世界：为下一次文艺复兴制定路线

How to Run the World: Charting a Course to the Next Renaissance

混合现实：在新兴的人类技术文明中蓬勃发展

Hybrid Reality: Thriving in the Emerging Human-Technology Civilization

连接图谱：绘制全球文明的未来

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization

美国的技术统治：信息国家的崛起

Technocracy in America: Rise of the Info-State

未来属于亚洲：21 世纪的商业、冲突和文化

The Future Is Asian: Commerce, Conflict, and Culture in the 21st Century

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笔记

NOTES

第一章：流动性就是命运

Chapter 1: Mobility Is Destiny

1. 1 达克、彼得. 《动荡时代的管理》（纽约：Harper & Row，1980 年）。
2. 1 Ducker, Peter. Managing in Turbulent Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).
3. 2  Marie McAuliffe 和 Martin Ruhs，《2018 年世界移民报告》（日内瓦：国际移民组织，2017 年）。
4. 2 Marie McAuliffe and Martin Ruhs, World Migration Report 2018 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2017).
5. 3  Jonathan Woetzel 等人，“流动人口：全球移民的影响和机遇”，麦肯锡全球研究院，2016 年 12 月。
6. 3 Jonathan Woetzel et al., “People on the Move: Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity,” McKinsey Global Institute, December 2016.
7. 4  Bill McKibben，“非常炎热的一年”，《纽约书评》，2020 年 3 月 12 日。
8. 4 Bill McKibben, “A Very Hot Year,” New York Review of Books, March 12, 2020.
9. 5  Chi Xu 等人，“人类气候利基的未来”，《美国国家科学院院刊》， 117，第 1 期。21（2020）：11350–11355。
10. 5 Chi Xu et al., “Future of the Human Climate Niche,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 21 (2020): 11350–11355.
11. 6  “2020 年小型企业赚取数百万美元的十大类别”，《商业内幕》，2019 年 12 月 16 日；“2020 年美国最适合企业家创业的 10 个州”，《商业内幕》，2020 年 1 月 3 日。
12. 6 “The Top 10 Categories for Small Businesses to Make Millions in 2020,” Business Insider, December 16, 2019; “The 10 Best US States for Entrepreneurs to Start Businesses in 2020,” Business Insider, January 3, 2020.
13. 7  Paul Salopek，“穿越人类历史的两万四千英里”，《纽约客》，2019 年 6 月 17 日。
14. 7 Paul Salopek, “A Twenty-Four-Thousand-Mile Walk Across Human History,” New Yorker, June 17, 2019.

第二章：年轻人才之战

Chapter 2: The War for Young Talent

1. 1  “这是您可能没有预料到的 2008 年危机的影响”，世界经济论坛，2018 年 11 月 15 日。
2. 1 “This Is the Impact of the 2008 Crisis You Might Not Have Expected,” World Economic Forum, November 15, 2018.
3. 2  Jeanna Smialek 和 Zolan Kanno-Youngs，“为什么特朗普高级助手说‘我们迫切需要’更多移民”，《纽约时报》，2020 年 2 月 27 日。
4. 2 Jeanna Smialek and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Why a Top Trump Aide Said ‘We Are Desperate’ for More Immigrants,” New York Times, February 27, 2020.
5. 3  Neil Irwin 和 Emily Badger，“特朗普称美国已‘满员’。” 美国大部分地区都存在相反的问题”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 4 月 9 日。
6. 3 Neil Irwin and Emily Badger, “Trump Says the U.S. Is ‘Full.’ Much of the Nation Has the Opposite Problem,” New York Times, April 9, 2019.
7. 4  Eduardo Porter，“低技能移民的危险：没有他们”，《纽约时报》，2017 年 8 月 8 日。
8. 4 Eduardo Porter, “The Danger from Low-Skilled Immigrants: Not Having Them,” New York Times, August 8, 2017.
9. 5  Lazaro Zamora 和 Theresa Cardinal Brown，“EB-5 计划：各州和地方的成功、挑战和机遇”，两党政策中心，2015 年 9 月。
10. 5 Lazaro Zamora and Theresa Cardinal Brown, “EB-5 Program: Successes, Challenges, and Opportunities for States and Localities,” Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2015.
11. 6  Mohsin Hamid，“在 21 世纪，我们都是移民”，《国家地理》，2019 年 8 月，第 7 页。20.
12. 6 Mohsin Hamid, “In the 21st Century, We Are All Migrants,” National Geographic, August 2019, p. 20.
13. 7 马修·史密斯 (Matthew Smith)，“国际调查：全球化仍被视为世界的一股向善力量”，YouGov，2016 年 11 月 17 日。
14. 7 Matthew Smith, “International Survey: Globalisation Is Still Seen as a Force for Good in the World,” YouGov, November 17, 2016.
15. 8  Yasmeen Serhan，“意大利的‘沙丁鱼’是民粹主义的解药吗？” ，大西洋月刊，2020 年 1 月 24 日。
16. 8 Yasmeen Serhan, “Are Italy’s ‘Sardines’ the Antidote to Populism?,” Atlantic, January 24, 2020.
17. 9  David Hasemyer，“美国军队对气候威胁毫无准备，战争学院和退役黄铜警告”，《内部气候新闻》，2019 年 12 月 23 日。
18. 9 David Hasemyer, “U.S. Military Precariously Unprepared for Climate Threats, War College & Retired Brass Warn,” InsideClimate News, December 23, 2019.

第3章：世代迁移

Chapter 3: Generation Move

1. 1 Karl Mannheim， 《知识社会学论文集》 中的“世代的社会学问题” （牛津大学出版社，1952 [1929]）。
2. 1 Karl Mannheim, “The Sociological Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 1952 [1929]).
3. 2  Kim Parker 等人，“Z 世代在关键社会和政治问题上看起来很像千禧一代”，皮尤研究中心，2019 年 1 月 17 日。
4. 2 Kim Parker et al., “Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues,” Pew Research Center, January 17, 2019.
5. 3  Christopher Kurz 等人，“千禧一代与众不同吗？”金融和经济讨论系列（华盛顿特区：美联储系统理事会，2018 年 11 月）；德里克·汤普森 (Derek Thompson)，“经济杀死了千禧一代，而不是相反”，大西洋月刊，2018 年 12 月 6 日。
6. 3 Christopher Kurz et al., “Are Millennials Different?,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series (Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 2018); Derek Thompson, “The Economy Killed Millennials, Not Vice Versa,” Atlantic, December 6, 2018.
7. 4  “2017 年德勤千禧一代调查”，德勤，2017 年。
8. 4 “The Deloitte Millennial Survey 2017,” Deloitte, 2017.
9. 5 马尔科姆·哈里斯，《凯恩斯错了。Z 世代的情况会更糟，” 《麻省理工科技评论》，2019 年 12 月 16 日。
10. 5 Malcolm Harris, “Keynes Was Wrong. Gen Z Will Have It Worse,” MIT Technology Review, December 16, 2019.
11. 6  Kim Hong-Ji 和 Hayoung Choi Ju-min Park，“没有钱，没有希望：韩国的‘肮脏勺子’反对月亮”，The Wider Image，路透社，2019 年 11 月 30日。
12. 6 Kim Hong-Ji and Hayoung Choi Ju-min Park, “No Money, No Hope: S. Korea’s ‘Dirty Spoons’ Turn Against Moon,” The Wider Image, Reuters, November 30, 2019.
13. 7  Jeanna Smialek，“千禧一代如何让美联储的工作变得更加困难”，《纽约时报》，2020 年 2 月 17 日。
14. 7 Jeanna Smialek, “How Millennials Can Make the Fed’s Job Harder,” New York Times, February 17, 2020.
15. 8  2012 年至 2017 年间，提供 IB 课程的学校数量增加了 40%，此后更是增加了 10% 以上。三分之一的 IB 学校位于美国，近 30% 位于欧洲，20% 位于亚洲，这些地区 IB 入学率的增长速度是全球的两倍。
16. 8 The number of schools offering IB programs jumped by 40 percent between 2012 and 2017, and more than 10 percent since. One-third of IB schools are in the US, nearly 30 percent in Europe, and 20 percent in Asia, where the IB uptake is expanding at double the global rate.
17. 9 艾耶、皮科. 这可能是家：莱佛士酒店和明日之城（新加坡：Epigram，2019），34。
18. 9 Iyer, Pico. This Could Be Home: Raffles Hotel and the City of Tomorrow (Singapore: Epigram, 2019), 34.
19. 10  Lisa O'Carroll，“自脱欧公投以来，移民到欧盟的英国公民数量增加了 30%”，《卫报》，2020 年 8 月 4 日。
20. 10 Lisa O’Carroll, “Number of UK Citizens Emigrating to EU Has Risen by 30% since Brexit Vote,” Guardian, August 4, 2020.
21. 11 苏克图·梅塔。这片土地是我们的土地：移民宣言（纽约：麦克米伦，2019）。
22. 11 Suketu Mehta. This Land Is Our Land: An Immigrant’s Manifesto (New York: Macmillan, 2019).
23. 12  Allison Schrager，“迫在眉睫的 78 万亿美元养老金危机”，Quartz，2019 年 2 月 27 日。
24. 12 Allison Schrager, “The Looming $78 Trillion Pension Crisis,” Quartz, February 27, 2019.
25. 13  Len Kiefer 等人，“为什么成人变得越来越难？年轻人和家庭组建”，房地美，2018 年 3 月 16 日。
26. 13 Len Kiefer et al., “Why Is Adulting Getting Harder? Young Adults and Household Formation,” Freddie Mac, March 16, 2018.
27. 14 一家领先咨询公司的一项调查显示，四十岁以下的高净值人士寻求私人财富服务的首要任务是房地产、税务和继承咨询。凯捷集团，2020 年世界财富报告。
28. 14 One survey by a leading consultancy revealed that the top priorities for high-net-worth individuals under the age of forty seeking private wealth services were real estate, tax, and inheritance advisory. CapGemini, World Wealth Report 2020.
29. 15  Jun Suzuki，“亚洲千禧一代寻找政治声音”，《日经亚洲评论》，2019 年 3 月 27 日。
30. 15 Jun Suzuki, “Asia’s Millennials Finding Their Political Voice,” Nikkei Asian Review, March 27, 2019.
31. 16 劳里·S·古德曼 (Laurie S. Goodman) 和克里斯托弗·梅耶尔 (Christopher Mayer)，“住房所有权和美国梦”，《经济展望》杂志，第 32 期，第 16 期。1（2018）：31-58。
32. 16 Laurie S. Goodman and Christopher Mayer, “Home Ownership and the American Dream,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32, no. 1 (2018): 31–58.
33. 17  Hillary Hoffower，“全球两居室公寓租金最贵的 25 个城市”，《新加坡商业内幕》，2020 年 1 月 14 日。
34. 17 Hillary Hoffower, “The 25 Most Expensive Cities Around the World to Rent a Two-Bedroom Apartment,” Business Insider Singapore, January 14, 2020.
35. 18  “年轻的美国人被捕的可能性比前几代；白人和女性的增幅最大”，兰德公司，2019 年 2 月 25 日。
36. 18 “Younger Americans Much More Likely to Have Been Arrested Than Previous Generations; Increase Is Largest Among Whites and Women,” RAND Corporation, February 25, 2019.
37. 19  Ben Schott，《哪些国家是民主国家？有些公民可能不同意，”彭博社，2020 年 6 月 26 日。
38. 19 Ben Schott, “Which Nations Are Democracies? Some Citizens Might Disagree,” Bloomberg, June 26, 2020.
39. 20 皮科·艾耶，《家在哪里？》TED 演讲。2013 年 7 月 17 日。
40. 20 Pico Iyer, “Where is Home?” TED Talk. 17 July 2013.
41. 21  Brandon Busteed，“美国人将 Google 实习置于哈佛大学学位之上”，《福布斯》，2020 年 1 月 6 日。
42. 21 Brandon Busteed, “Americans Rank a Google Internship over a Harvard Degree,” Forbes, January 6, 2020.

第四章：下一个美国梦

Chapter 4: The Next American Dream

1. 1 美国人口普查局，“住房库存估算：美国空置住房单元”，FRED，圣路易斯联邦储备银行，2020 年 7 月 28 日。
2. 1 U.S. Census Bureau, “Housing Inventory Estimate: Vacant Housing Units for the United States,” FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July 28, 2020.
3. 2  William H. Frey，“有史以来第一次，一年内搬家的美国人少于 10%”，布鲁金斯学会，2019 年 11 月 22 日；James Manyika 等人，“21 世纪的社会契约：发达经济体中工人、消费者和储蓄者迄今为止的成果”，麦肯锡全球研究院，2020 年 2 月。
4. 2 William H. Frey, “For the First Time on Record, Fewer Than 10% of Americans Moved in a Year,” Brookings Institution, November 22, 2019; James Manyika et al., “The Social Contract in the 21st Century: Outcomes So Far for Workers, Consumers, and Savers in Advanced Economies,” McKinsey Global Institute, February 2020.
5. 3  Raj Chetty 等人，“机遇之地在哪里？美国代际流动的地理”，《经济学季刊》 129，第 1 期。4（2014 年 11 月）：1553–1623。
6. 3 Raj Chetty et al., “Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (November 2014): 1553–1623.
7. 4  Kyle Nossaman，“Skoolie 的一年：我们喜欢什么（以及我们不喜欢什么）”，Gear Junkie，2019 年 1 月 23 日。
8. 4 Kyle Nossaman, “A Year in a Skoolie: What We Love (and What We Don’t),” Gear Junkie, January 23, 2019.
9. 5  Rilwan Balogun，“协会表示，在冠状病毒大流行期间房车销量猛增 170%”，WAFB 第 9 频道，2020 年 5 月 25 日。
10. 5 Rilwan Balogun, “RV Sales Jump 170% During Coronavirus Pandemic, Says Association,” WAFB Channel 9, May 25, 2020.
11. 6 莎拉·贝尔德，《移动国土》，Curbed，2017 年 9 月 13 日。
12. 6 Sarah Baird, “Mobile Homeland,” Curbed, September 13, 2017.
13. 7 在拥有住房的 32% 的千禧一代中，三分之二的人因保险、财产税、可变抵押贷款和维护等额外费用而感到遗憾。Megan Leonhardt，“63% 的千禧一代买房后感到后悔”，CNBC，2019 年 3 月 1 日。
14. 7 Of the 32 percent of millennials that own homes, two-thirds have regrets because of the additional costs such as insurance, property taxes, variable mortgages, and maintenance. Megan Leonhardt, “63% of Millennials Who Bought Homes Have Regrets,” CNBC, March 1, 2019.
15. 8 海伦·爱德华兹 (Helen Edwards) 和戴夫·爱德华兹 (Dave Edwards)，“从经济上来说，住在拖车公园里变得越来越理想”，Quartz，2018 年 1 月 16 日。
16. 8 Helen Edwards and Dave Edwards, “It’s Becoming Economically Desirable to Live in a Trailer Park,” Quartz, January 16, 2018.
17. 9  Caleb Robinson 等人，“美国海平面上升下的移民模式建模”，PLoS ONE 15，第 1 期。1（2020 年 1 月）。
18. 9 Caleb Robinson et al., “Modeling Migration Patterns in the USA Under Sea Level Rise,” PLoS ONE 15, no. 1 (January 2020).
19. 10  Christopher Flavelle，“美国防洪战略转向‘不可避免’的整个社区搬迁”，《纽约时报》，2020 年 8 月 26 日。
20. 10 Christopher Flavelle, “U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’ Relocation of Entire Neighborhoods,” New York Times, August 26, 2020.
21. 11  James S. Clark、C. Lane Scher 和 Margaret Swift，“控制生物多样性变化的新兴相互作用”，《美国国家科学院院刊》 117，第 11 期。29（2020）：17074–17083。
22. 11 James S. Clark, C. Lane Scher, and Margaret Swift, “The Emergent Interactions That Govern Biodiversity Change,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 29 (2020): 17074–17083.
23. 12  Nancy Gupton，“科罗拉多州博尔德：美国最幸福的城市”，国家地理，2017 年 10 月 27 日。
24. 12 Nancy Gupton, “Boulder, Colorado: The Happiest City in the United States,” National Geographic, October 27, 2017.
25. 13  Kendra Pierre-Louis，“想逃避全球变暖吗？这些城市承诺提供凉爽的救济”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 4 月 15 日。
26. 13 Kendra Pierre-Louis, “Want to Escape Global Warming? These Cities Promise Cool Relief,” New York Times, April 15, 2019.
27. 14 玛丽·卡珀顿·莫顿 (Mary Caperton Morton)，“波士顿因海平面上升而无处可躲，为更加潮湿的未来做好准备”，《科学新闻》，2019 年 8 月 6 日。
28. 14 Mary Caperton Morton, “With Nowhere to Hide from Rising Seas, Boston Prepares for a Wetter Future,” Science News, August 6, 2019.
29. 15  Steven Luebke，“如何帮助员工购买房屋并帮助公司实现盈利”，《密尔沃基商业杂志》，2017 年 3 月 28 日。
30. 15 Steven Luebke, “How to Help Employees Buy Homes—and Help Your Company’s Bottom Line,” Milwaukee Business Journal, March 28, 2017.
31. 16 Auren Hoffman，“如果所有工作机会都必须以税后价格并以购买力平价调整后的美元报价，会发生什么？（关于补偿的思想实验），Auren Hoffman 的总结 (summation.net)，2019 年 3 月 27 日。
32. 16 Auren Hoffman, “What Would Happen If All Job Offers Had to Be Quoted Post-Tax and in PPP-Adjusted Dollars? (Thought Experiment on Compensation),” Summation by Auren Hoffman (summation.net), March 27, 2019.
33. 17  William H. Frey，“自大衰退以来千禧一代和老年人的移民发生了怎样的变化”，布鲁金斯学会，2019 年 1 月 31 日。
34. 17 William H. Frey, “How Migration of Millennials and Seniors Has Shifted Since the Great Recession,” The Brookings Institution, January 31, 2019.
35. 18  “为什么 18 小时城市吸引商业地产兴趣”，仲量联行，2019 年 2 月 5 日。
36. 18 “Why 18-Hour Cities Are Attracting Commercial Real Estate Interest,” JLL, February 5, 2019.
37. 19  Robert D. Atkinson 等人，“增长中心案例：如何在美国传播技术创新”，布鲁金斯学会，2019 年 12 月 9 日。
38. 19 Robert D. Atkinson et al., “The Case for Growth Centers: How to Spread Tech Innovation Across America,” The Brookings Institution, December 9, 2019.
39. 20  Mohamed Younis，“美国人第一次想要更多而不是更少的移民”，盖洛普，2020 年 7 月 1 日。
40. 20 Mohamed Younis, “Americans Want More, Not Less, Immigration for First Time,” Gallup, July 1, 2020.
41. 21  Alex Nowrasteh 和 Andrew C. Forrester，“移民认识到美国的伟大：移民及其后代爱国并信任美国的治理机构”，卡托研究所，2019 年 2 月 4 日。
42. 21 Alex Nowrasteh and Andrew C. Forrester, “Immigrants Recognize American Greatness: Immigrants and Their Descendants Are Patriotic and Trust America’s Governing Institutions,” Cato Institute, February 4, 2019.
43. 22  Anjali Enjeti，“过去白人的幽灵：见证白人从亚洲民族郊区逃离”，《太平洋标准》，2017 年 6 月 14 日。
44. 22 Anjali Enjeti, “Ghosts of White People Past: Witnessing White Flight from an Asian Ethnoburb,” Pacific Standard, June 14, 2017.

第五章：欧洲联邦

Chapter 5: The European Commonwealth

1. 1  Paul Hockenos，“如果不能为自己辩护，欧洲的未来看起来很黯淡”，CNN，2019 年 3 月 4 日；Bruce Stokes，“欧洲的千禧一代是谁？”，皮尤研究中心，2015 年 2 月 9 日。
2. 1 Paul Hockenos, “Europe’s Future Looks Bleak If It Can’t Make the Case for Itself,” CNN, March 4, 2019; Bruce Stokes, “Who Are Europe’s Millennials?,” Pew Research Center, February 9, 2015.
3. 2 Richard Wike 等人，“共产主义垮台三年后的欧洲舆论”，皮尤研究中心，2019 年 10 月 14 日。
4. 2 Richard Wike et al., “European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism,” Pew Research Center, October 14, 2019.
5. 3  “罗马尼亚、匈牙利在亚洲招聘以填补劳动力短缺”，亚洲新闻频道，2019 年 10 月 28 日。
6. 3 “Romania, Hungary Recruit in Asia to Fill Labour Shortage,” Channel News Asia, October 28, 2019.
7. 4  Dany Mitzman，“拯救帕尔马干酪的锡克教徒”，BBC 新闻，2015 年 6 月 25 日。
8. 4 Dany Mitzman, “The Sikhs Who Saved Parmesan,” BBC News, June 25, 2015.
9. 5  Andrew Nash，“国家人口预测”，国家统计局，2019 年 10 月 21 日。
10. 5 Andrew Nash, “National Population Projections,” Office for National Statistics, October 21, 2019.

第 6 章：桥接区域

Chapter 6: Bridging Regions

1. 1  Bruce Bower，“在西伯利亚发现了亚洲人和美洲原住民之间最古老的基因联系”，《科学新闻》，2020 年 5 月 20 日。
2. 1 Bruce Bower, “The Oldest Genetic Link Between Asians and Native Americans Was Found in Siberia,” Science News, May 20, 2020.

第7章：北方主义

Chapter 7: Northism

1. 1  Mary Beth Sheridan，“跨越美墨边境的鲜为人知的激增：美国人正在向南前进”，《华盛顿邮报》，2019 年 5 月 19 日。
2. 1 Mary Beth Sheridan, “The Little-Noticed Surge Across the U.S.-Mexico Border: It’s Americans, Heading South,” Washington Post, May 19, 2019.
3. 2  Abrahm Lustgarten，“气候大迁移”，纽约时报杂志，2020 年 7 月 23 日。
4. 2 Abrahm Lustgarten, “The Great Climate Migration,” New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2020.
5. 3  Rahul Mehrotra，“无常城市的建筑奇迹”，TED 演讲，2019 年 7 月 22 日。
6. 3 Rahul Mehrotra, “The Architectural Wonder of Impermanent Cities,” TED Talk, July 22, 2019.

第8章：“南方”会幸存吗？

Chapter 8: Will “The South” Survive?

1. 1  Sunil John 等人，“2017 年阿拉伯青年调查”，ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller，2017 年；“受过高等教育的失业率（受过高等教育的劳动力总数的百分比）”，世界银行，2019 年。
2. 1 Sunil John et al., “Arab Youth Survey 2017,” ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2017; “Unemployment with Advanced Education (% of Total Labor Force with Advanced Education),” The World Bank, 2019.
3. 2  《世界各地宗教的年龄差距》，皮尤研究中心，2018 年 6 月 13 日，《世界各地的年轻人宗教信仰从几方面来看都较低》。
4. 2 “Young Adults Around the World Are Less Religious by Several Measures,” in The Age Gap in Religion Around the World, Pew Research Center, June 13, 2018.
5. 3  Kristofer Hamel 和 Constanza Di Nucci，“超过 1 亿年轻人仍然生活在极端贫困中”，布鲁金斯学会，2019 年 10 月 17 日。
6. 3 Kristofer Hamel and Constanza Di Nucci, “More Than 100 Million Young Adults Are Still Living in Extreme Poverty,” The Brookings Institution, October 17, 2019.
7. 4  Nicole Flatow，“瓦坎达黄金之城的社会责任”，彭博城市实验室，2018 年 11 月 5 日。
8. 4 Nicole Flatow, “The Social Responsibility of Wakanda’s Golden City,” Bloomberg CityLab, November 5, 2018.
9. 5  “富人和穷人之间的‘气候种族隔离’”，BBC 新闻，2019 年 6 月 25 日。
10. 5 “ ‘Climate Apartheid’ Between Rich and Poor Looms,” BBC News, June 25, 2019.
11. 6  Steve Pyne，“澳大利亚大火是未来的预兆。不要忽视他们的警告，”卫报，2020 年 1 月 7 日。
12. 6 Steve Pyne, “The Australian Fires Are a Harbinger of Things to Come. Don’t Ignore Their Warning,” Guardian, January 7, 2020.

第9章：亚洲人来了

Chapter 9: The Asians Are Coming

1. 1  Danny Bahar、Prithwiraj Choudhury 和 Britta Glennon，“美国因移民签证禁令而损失 1000 亿美元的那一天”，布鲁金斯学会，2020 年 10 月 20 日。
2. 1 Danny Bahar, Prithwiraj Choudhury, and Britta Glennon, “The Day That America Lost $100 Billion Because of an Immigration Visa Ban,” Brookings Institution, October 20, 2020.
3. 2 迈克尔·克莱门斯 (Michael Clemens)，《发展会减少移民吗？》，《国际》移民与经济发展手册（英国切尔滕纳姆：Edward Elgar Publishing，2014 年）。
4. 2 Michael Clemens, “Does Development Reduce Migration?,” in International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014).
5. 3  Stefan Trines，“流动护士：护理领域国际劳动力移民的趋势”，《世界教育新闻与评论》，2018 年 3 月 6 日。
6. 3 Stefan Trines, “Mobile Nurses: Trends in International Labor Migration in the Nursing Field,” World Education News and Reviews, March 6, 2018.
7. 4  Kully Kaur-Ballagan，“英国对种族和不平等的态度”，Ipsos MORI，2020 年 6 月 15 日。
8. 4 Kully Kaur-Ballagan, “Attitudes to Race and Inequality in Great Britain,” Ipsos MORI, June 15, 2020.

第10章：亚太地区的撤退与复兴

Chapter 10: Retreat and Renewal in Pacific Asia

1. 1  Amarnath Tewary，“过去三年比哈尔邦经济增长速度高于印度经济”，《印度教徒报》，2020 年 2 月 24 日。
2. 1 Amarnath Tewary, “Bihar’s Economy Registers Higher Growth Than Indian Economy in Last Three Years,” Hindu, February 24, 2020.
3. 2  Junya Hisanaga，“在火葬国家日本，穆斯林努力埋葬死者”，《日经亚洲》，2020 年 11 月 29 日。
4. 2 Junya Hisanaga, “Muslims Struggle to Bury Their Dead in Japan, a Nation of Cremation,” Nikkei Asia, November 29, 2020.

第11章：量子人

Chapter 11: Quantum People

1. 1  Teleport 被出售给总部位于伦敦的 MOVE。指南，Topia 公司网络的一部分，为专业人员的搬迁提供便利。
2. 1 Teleport was sold to London-based MOVE. Guides, part of the Topia network of companies facilitating relocation for professionals.
3. 2  “2020 年 IMD 世界竞争力排名”，IMD 世界竞争力中心，2020 年；“新经济驱动因素和破坏因素报告”，彭博社，2019 年。
4. 2 “IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2020,” IMD World Competitiveness Centre, 2020; “The New Economy Drivers and Disruptors Report,” Bloomberg, 2019.
5. 3  “2020 年新加坡新兴就业报告”，LinkedIn，2020 年。
6. 3 “2020 Emerging Jobs Report Singapore,” LinkedIn, 2020.
7. 4  Ricardo Hausmann，“经济发展与专业知识的积累”，《世界经济评论》第 24 期（2016 年春季）；理查德鲍德温，《环球机器人剧变》（伦敦：牛津大学出版社，2019 年）。
8. 4 Ricardo Hausmann, “Economic Development and the Accumulation of Know-how,” World Economic Review 24 (Spring 2016); Richard Baldwin, The Globotics Upheaval (London: Oxford University Press, 2019).
9. 5  Christian Joppke，“工具性公民的兴起”，《全球公民评论》（2018 年第四季度）。
10. 5 Christian Joppke, “The Rise of Instrumental Citizenship,” Global Citizenship Review (Fourth Quarter, 2018).
11. 6  Kate Springer，“购买护照：精英人士如何度过疫情”，CNN，2020 年 8 月 7 日。
12. 6 Kate Springer, “Passports for Purchase: How the Elite Get Through a Pandemic,” CNN, August 7, 2020.

第12章：乌尔班尼卡治下的和平

Chapter 12: Pax Urbanica

1. 1 请参阅杰森·希克尔 (Jason Hickel)，“是否有可能让地球范围内的所有人都过上美好生活？” 世界第三季刊，2018；“可持续发展指数：衡量人类世人类发展的生态效率”，《生态经济学》 167（2020）。
2. 1 See Jason Hickel, “Is It Possible to Achieve a Good Life for All Within Planetary Boundaries?” Third World Quarterly, 2018; “The Sustainable Development Index: Measuring the Ecological Efficiency of Human Development in the Anthropocene,” Ecological Economics 167 (2020).
3. 2 李光耀，“东亚方式——空调”，新观点季刊第 26 期（2009 年 10 月）。
4. 2 Lee Kuan Yew, “The East Asian Way—With Air Conditioning,” New Perspectives Quarterly 26 (October 2009).
5. 3  “2020 年最适合组建家庭的国家”，Asher & Lyric，2020 年 7 月 24 日。
6. 3 “The Best Countries to Raise a Family in 2020,” Asher & Lyric, July 24, 2020.
7. 4  Melanie Curtin，“成千上万的千禧一代选择不租自己的公寓，转而选择自己的公寓”，Inc.，2017 年 9 月 28 日。
8. 4 Melanie Curtin, “Thousands of Millennials Are Opting Out of Renting Their Own Apartments and Going for This Instead,” Inc., September 28, 2017.

第13章：文明3.0

Chapter 13: Civilization 3.0

1. 1  Arnold J. Toynbee，引自《读者文摘》，1958 年 10 月。
2. 1 Arnold J. Toynbee, quoted in Reader’s Digest, October 1958.
3. 2 苏克图·梅塔，这片土地是我们的土地。
4. 2 Suketu Mehta, This Land Is Our Land.
5. 3 大卫·格雷伯（David Graeber），《规则的乌托邦》（伦敦：企鹅兰登书屋，2015 年）。
6. 3 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules (London: Penguin Random House, 2015).
7. 4  Mohsin Hamid，“在 21 世纪，我们都是移民”，《国家地理》（2019 年 9 月）。
8. 4 Mohsin Hamid, “In the 21st Century, We Are All Migrants,” National Geographic (September 2019).
9. 5  Innes M. Keighren，“地智学、想象力和未知之地：探索约翰·科特兰·赖特的思想史”，《历史地理学杂志》，第 31 期，第 1 期。3（2005 年 7 月）：546-562。
10. 5 Innes M. Keighren, “Geosophy, Imagination, and Terrae Incognitae: Exploring the Intellectual History of John Kirtland Wright,” Journal of Historical Geography 31, no. 3 (July 2005): 546–562.

• 阿富汗, 10 , 56 , 124 , 130 , 140 , 175
• Afghanistan, 10, 56, 124, 130, 140, 175
• 非洲。查看各个国家/地区
• Africa. See individual countries
• 非洲开发银行，183–184
• African Development Bank, 183–184
• 人口老龄化和婴儿潮一代
  • 在中国, 198–199 , 205–206
  • 住房领域的气候变化，99 , 103
  • 与年轻一代的金融竞争, 64–67 , 73–75
  • 代际认同，63–64
  • 永久移动，228–230
  • 28岁、35岁退休
  • 全球医疗保健系统，198–199
  • 与父母同住的年轻人，107 , 117
• aging population and baby boomers
  • in China, 198–199, 205–206
  • climate change in housing, 99, 103
  • financial competition with younger generations, 64–67, 73–75
  • generational identity, 63–64
  • as perpetually mobile, 228–230
  • retirement of, 28, 35
  • worldwide healthcare systems and, 198–199
  • young adults living with parents, 107, 117
• 阿尔巴尼亚, 243
• Albania, 243
• 阿里·萨利姆，267–268
• Ali, Saleem, 267–268
• 亚马逊，21、94–95、105、226 _ _ _ _ _
• Amazon, 21, 94–95, 105, 226
• 安德森，本尼迪克特，110
• Anderson, Benedict, 110
• 安道尔，235
• Andorra, 235
• 西蒙·安霍尔特，52 岁
• Anholt, Simon, 52
• 南极洲，188
• Antarctica, 188
• Antifa 运动，78
• Antifa movements, 78
• 苹果，86
• Apple, 86
• 阿拉伯人和阿拉伯国家。另请参阅各个国家/地区
  • 2011 年阿拉伯之春, 23 , 176 , 178
  • 海水淡化，247
  • 经济问题, 22–23 , 175–180
• Arabs and Arab countries. See also individual countries
  • Arab Spring of 2011, 23, 176, 178
  • desalination by, 247
  • economic issues of, 22–23, 175–180
• 北极, 162–168 , 164
• Arctic, 162–168, 164
• 阿根廷，186
• Argentina, 186
• 亚美尼亚, 143 , 145–146
• Armenia, 143, 145–146
• 亚洲，193–204，205–220 。 _ 另请参阅各个国家/地区
  • 亚欧人口激增，119–121
  • 全球亚洲人口，193–195 , 196
  • 气候移民，209-215
  • 共同居住, 257
  • 欧亚大陆和北向主义潜力，160–161（另见 北向主义（北半球））
  • 塑造流动性的力量，2-3
  • 亚洲人的遗传多样性，200–202
  • 地缘政治和，202–204
  • 198-199 年的医疗保健
  • 209中的“重新拍拍”
  • 占世界经济的份额，193
  • 技术与移民，194–198
  • 生活在207-209年的年轻一代
• Asia, 193–204, 205–220. See also individual countries
  • Asian-European population surge, 119–121
  • Asian populations worldwide, 193–195, 196
  • climate migrants of, 209–215
  • co-living in, 257
  • Eurasia and Northism potential, 160–161 (See also Northism (northern hemisphere))
  • forces shaping mobility and, 2–3
  • genetic diversity of Asians, 200–202
  • geopolitics and, 202–204
  • healthcare of, 198–199
  • “re-pats” in, 209
  • share of world economy, 193
  • technology and migration, 194–198
  • younger generations living in, 207–209
• 阿特什，塞兰，132
• Ateş, Seyran, 132
• 奥达城市，170–171
• AudaCities, 170–171
• 澳大利亚，12、41、188–191 _ _ _
• Australia, 12, 41, 188–191
• 奥地利，133–134，235 _
• Austria, 133–134, 235
• 阿塞拜疆，143–145
• Azerbaijan, 143–145
• 巴哈马, 98
• Bahamas, 98
• 理查德·鲍德温，226
• Baldwin, Richard, 226
• 巴厘岛, 257
• Bali, 257
• 孟加拉国，170、195、214–215 _ _ _
• Bangladesh, 170, 195, 214–215
• 门口的野蛮人场景， 25–28，26
• Barbarians at the Gate scenario, 25–28, 26
• 基地，108
• The Base, 108
• 贝克·乌尔里希，63 岁
• Beck, Ulrich, 63
• 加里·贝克尔，89 岁
• Becker, Gary, 89
• 阿德里安·贝让，162
• Bejan, Adrian, 162
• 比利时, 118
• Belgium, 118
• 丹尼尔·贝尔，84 岁
• Bell, Daniel, 84
• 本杰明·沃尔特，5岁
• Benjamin, Walter, 5
• 柏林，以赛亚，72
• Berlin, Isaiah, 72
• 不丹, 209 , 212–213
• Bhutan, 209, 212–213
• 穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（沙特阿拉伯王储），177
• bin Salman, Mohammed (Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia), 177
• 生物圈（亚利桑那州），162–163
• biosphere (Arizona), 162–163
• 出生率
  • 加速流动性，16-17
  • 家庭公共城市，256–259
  • 在欧盟，120 , 129 , 140
  • 哈萨克斯坦，153
  • 人类巅峰, 29–35 , 32, 33 , 35
• birth rate
  • accelerated mobility and, 16–17
  • communal cities for families, 256–259
  • in EU, 120, 129, 140
  • in Kazakhstan, 153
  • peak humanity, 29–35, 32, 33, 35
• 黑人的命也是命，78
• Black Lives Matter, 78
• 贝莱德，98
• BlackRock, 98
• 蓝色区域, 16 , 241
• blue zones, 16, 241
• 博克洛克，95
• BoKlok, 95
• 奉俊昊，67 岁
• Bong Joon Ho, 67
• 博茨瓦纳, 184
• Botswana, 184
• 巴西, 59 , 185–186
• Brazil, 59, 185–186
• 英国脱欧
  • 公民投资者，以及，236
  • 欧盟移民/同化，137–139
  • 投资，23
  • 大熔炉城市，80
  • 年轻一代的政治认同，72
  • 关于修辞，37-38
• Brexit
  • citizen investors and, 236
  • EU immigration/assimilation, 137–139
  • investment and, 23
  • melting pot cities and, 80
  • political identity of younger generations and, 72
  • rhetoric about, 37–38
• 约翰·西利·布朗，89 岁
• Brown, John Seely, 89
• 杰西卡·布鲁德，93
• Bruder, Jessica, 93
• 巴菲特、沃伦，94 岁
• Buffett, Warren, 94
• 保加利亚, 46
• Bulgaria, 46
• 喀麦隆，184
• Cameroon, 184
• 加拿大
  • 塑造流动性的力量，3
  • 作为移民目的地，52 , 110–114
  • 国际学生, 41–43 , 43
  • 北主义情景和, 159–160 , 162 , 164–168 , 188–189 , 277
• Canada
  • forces shaping mobility and, 3
  • as immigration destination, 52, 110–114
  • international students in, 41–43, 43
  • Northism scenario and, 159–160, 162, 164–168, 188–189, 277
• 布莱恩·卡普兰，274
• Caplan, Bryan, 274
• 凯斯，史蒂夫，105
• Case, Steve, 105
• 乍得，184
• Chad, 184
• 雨果·查韦斯，186–187
• Chavez, Hugo, 186–187
• 拉吉·切蒂，92 岁
• Chetty, Raj, 92
• 智利, 76 , 187–188
• Chile, 76, 187–188
• 中国
  • 198-199岁、205-206岁人口老龄化
  • 自动化，21
  • 一带一路, 121 , 206
  • 出生率，31
  • 气候变化, 188 , 213 , 214
  • 能源使用，245
  • 种族多样性，54–55
  • 外籍人士, 107 , 136 , 201 , 202 , 207 , 216–217 , 236
  • 40-41岁、206-207岁的外国人口
  • 前苏联加盟共和国和移民模式, 146 , 148–155 , 157
  • 代际金融竞争，74–75
  • 内部迁移, 7
  • 移民和宗教认同，60–61
  • 千禧一代人口，17
  • 民族主义和征兵，58
  • 2020年国家安全法, 68 , 82
  • 北主义情景和，166
  • 政治认同，65–66
  • 人口下降和劳动力，36
  • 旅游业, 254
  • 与非洲的贸易，181–182
  • 交通和住房，96
  • 劳动力中的女性人数为44
  • 全球人口, 193–195 , 196
• China
  • aging population of, 198–199, 205–206
  • automation and, 21
  • Belt and Road Initiative of, 121, 206
  • birth rate in, 31
  • climate change in, 188, 213, 214
  • energy use, 245
  • ethnic diversity of, 54–55
  • expatriates of, 107, 136, 201, 202, 207, 216–217, 236
  • foreigner population in, 40–41, 206–207
  • former Soviet republics and migration patterns, 146, 148–155, 157
  • intergenerational financial competition in, 74–75
  • internal migration in, 7
  • migration and religious identity, 60–61
  • millennial population in, 17
  • nationalism and conscription in, 58
  • National Security Law of 2020, 68, 82
  • Northism scenario and, 166
  • political identity in, 65–66
  • population decline and workforce, 36
  • tourism in, 254
  • trade with Africa, 181–182
  • transportation and housing, 96
  • women in workforce of, 44
  • worldwide population from, 193–195, 196
• 基督徒人口，60
• Christian population, 60
• 徐迈克尔，87
• Chui, Michael, 87
• 世界公民，68、71–72
• citizens of the world, 68, 71–72
• 公民主义，84
• civicism, 84
• 文明3.0，265 。另请参阅 移动性
• Civilization 3.0, 265. See also mobility
• 文明国家，53
• civilizational states, 53
• 迈克尔·克莱门斯，274
• Clemens, Michael, 274
• 气候变化。另见 北向主义（北半球）；“南方”（南半球）
  • 加速流动性，因为，14-17
  • 适应，20-21
  • 欧洲的农业，119
  • 亚洲的气候移民，209–215
  • 亿万富翁的“末日保险”，以及，174
  • 循环能量和饮食，244–248
  • 北欧国家的气候移民，141–142
  • 播云和，271
  • 位移预测，184–185
  • 环境作为塑造流动性的力量，1-2
  • 塑造流动性的力量，2
  • 前苏联加盟共和国和移民模式, 144 , 147–151 , 156
  • 淡水供应量, 18–21 , 19, 133–134 , 138 , 149 , 185–186 , 209–215 , 247–248 , 253
  • 地球工程，271–272
  • 小冰河时代带来的历史性变化，162
  • 住房和, 97–104 , 106 , 113
  • 日本和基础设施工作，218–220
  • 军事国内任务，59
  • 核废料和，270 n
  • 海洋圈和，269
  • 巴黎气候协议，267
  • 人口增长/下降以及, 32–33 , 33
  • 打击建议，19
  • 重新造林计划, 114 , 145 , 151 , 157 , 271
  • 青年与政府之间的紧张关系，79-80
  • 运输和, 96 , 246–247
• climate change. See also Northism (northern hemisphere); “The South” (southern hemisphere)
  • accelerated mobility due to, 14–17
  • adaptation to, 20–21
  • agriculture in Europe and, 119
  • Asia’s climate migrants, 209–215
  • billionaires’ “apocalypse insurance” and, 174
  • circular energy and diet, 244–248
  • climate migrants to Nordic countries, 141–142
  • cloud seeding and, 271
  • displacement projection, 184–185
  • environment as force shaping mobility, 1–2
  • forces shaping mobility and, 2
  • former Soviet republics and migration patterns, 144, 147–151, 156
  • freshwater availability, 18–21, 19, 133–134, 138, 149, 185–186, 209–215, 247–248, 253
  • geo-engineering for, 271–272
  • historic change due to Little Ice Age, 162
  • housing and, 97–104, 106, 113
  • Japan and infrastructure work, 218–220
  • military domestic missions for, 59
  • nuclear waste and, 270n
  • oceanic sphere and, 269
  • Paris climate agreement, 267
  • population growth/decline and, 32–33, 33
  • proposals to combat, 19
  • reforesting programs, 114, 145, 151, 157, 271
  • tension between youth and governments, 79–80
  • transportation and, 96, 246–247
• 比尔·克林顿, 59 , 70
• Clinton, Bill, 59, 70
• 罗马俱乐部，31
• Club of Rome, 31
• 共同生活，256–257
• co-living, 256–257
• 哥伦比亚, 187
• Colombia, 187
• 交流活动，灵性，85–87
• communing events, spirituality of, 85–87
• 刚果，124
• Congo, 124
• 连接图（Khanna），3–4
• Connectography (Khanna), 3–4
• 朱塞佩·孔特，51
• Conte, Giuseppe, 51
• 杰里米·科尔宾，203
• Corbyn, Jeremy, 203
• 世界主义功利主义，275
• cosmopolitan utilitarianism, 275
• 哥斯达黎加, 228 , 243
• Costa Rica, 228, 243
• 2019冠状病毒病大流行
  • 加速流动性，15–16
  • 适应, 264
  • 澳大利亚的经济和，190
  • 自动化，21
  • 欧盟就业/工资回应，116–117
  • 绿区和，240
  • 医疗保健行业招聘和，198–199
  • 高等教育，87
  • 住房和, 91–93 , 104–107 , 138
  • 移民政策，39
  • 军事国内任务，59
  • 民族主义和，50
  • 超级传播者事件，61
  • 第233章
• Covid-19 pandemic
  • accelerated mobility and, 15–16
  • adaptation to, 264
  • Australia’s economy and, 190
  • automation and, 21
  • EU employment/wage response to, 116–117
  • green zones and, 240
  • healthcare industry recruitment and, 198–199
  • higher education and, 87
  • housing and, 91–93, 104–107, 138
  • immigration policy and, 39
  • military domestic missions for, 59
  • nationalism and, 50
  • superspreader events, 61
  • tourism incentives during, 233
• 瑞士信贷，69
• Credit Suisse, 69
• 克罗地亚, 76
• Croatia, 76
• 游轮，229–230
• cruise ships, 229–230
• 加密货币, 74 , 148 , 161 , 186 , 225 , 227 , 263
• cryptocurrencies, 74, 148, 161, 186, 225, 227, 263
• 塞浦路斯, 235
• Cyprus, 235
• 捷克共和国，119
• Czech Republic, 119
• 人口统计。看看 人口老龄化和婴儿潮一代；出生率；千禧一代 (Gen-Y) 和 Gen-Z；种族和种族主义；城市人口
• demographics. See aging population and baby boomers; birth rate; millennials (Gen-Y) and Gen-Z; race and racism; urban population
• 邓小平，66 岁
• Deng Xiaoping, 66
• 丹麦，139–142、167–168、173、255、258 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
• Denmark, 139–142, 167–168, 173, 255, 258
• 雅克·德里达，273
• Derrida, Jacques, 273
• 海水淡化厂，247–248
• desalination plants, 247–248
• 约翰·杜威，5
• Dewey, John, 5
• 第欧根尼，70–71
• Diogenes, 70–71
• 城市间外交，239–242
• diplomacy among cities, 239–242
• 多哈辩论，72
• Doha Debates, 72
• 马里奥·德拉吉，51 岁
• Draghi, Mario, 51
• 彼得·德鲁克，4
• Drucker, Peter, 4
• 迪拜, 83–84 , 226–227 , 248–250
• Dubai, 83–84, 226–227, 248–250
• 迈克尔·达米特, 137 , 273
• Dummett, Michael, 137, 273
• 生态威权主义，79–80
• ecological authoritarianism, 79–80
• 经济学。另请参阅 人口老龄化和婴儿潮一代；住房；千禧一代 (Gen-Y) 和 Gen-Z；北主义（北半球）；生活质量；“南方”（南半球）；技术；劳动力；个别国家
  • 加速流动性，因为，14-17
  • 亚洲占世界经济的比重，193
  • 亿万富翁的“末日保险”，174
  • 加密货币, 74 , 148 , 161 , 186 , 225 , 227 , 263
  • 欧洲移民/同化，128
  • 外国直接投资 (FDI), 40 , 274–275
  • 收入差距和自动化，21-22
  • 移民投资者/投资者居住权, 133 , 233–238
  • 身体流动性作为经济流动性，91–92
  • 人口增长/下降以及, 32 , 37–40
  • 区域移民和, 11–14 , 12, 13
  • 汇款水平, 11 , 12 , 46 , 197
  • 旅游业, 83 , 141 , 151 , 229 , 233 , 254–255
  • 工资和生活成本（20世纪90年代至今），65–67
• economics. See also aging population and baby boomers; housing; millennials (Gen-Y) and Gen-Z; Northism (northern hemisphere); quality of life; “The South” (southern hemisphere); technology; workforce; individual countries
  • accelerated mobility due to, 14–17
  • Asia’s share of world economy, 193
  • billionaires’ “apocalypse insurance,” 174
  • cryptocurrencies, 74, 148, 161, 186, 225, 227, 263
  • European immigration/assimilation, 128
  • foreign direct investment (FDI), 40, 274–275
  • income gap and automation, 21–22
  • migrant investors/investor residency, 133, 233–238
  • physical mobility as economic mobility, 91–92
  • population growth/decline and, 32, 37–40
  • regional migration and, 11–14, 12, 13
  • remittance levels, 11, 12, 46, 197
  • tourism, 83, 141, 151, 229, 233, 254–255
  • wages and cost of living (1990s–present), 65–67
• 厄瓜多尔，187
• Ecuador, 187
• 边缘，219–220
• EDGEof, 219–220
• 教育
  • 2008 年金融危机，87
  • 全球“护照”，以及，232
  • 国际文凭（IB），68
  • 国际学生, 40–43 , 43 , 190–191 , 206
  • MBA 作为护照，221
  • 居住在欧盟的美国侨民，118
  • 愿意为了工作而搬家，87–90
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，76
• education
  • financial crisis of 2008 and, 87
  • global “passports” and, 232
  • international baccalaureate (IB), 68
  • international students, 40–43, 43, 190–191, 206
  • MBA as passport, 221
  • US expatriates living in EU, 118
  • willingness to move for jobs and, 87–90
  • youth-government tension, 76
• 埃及，177–179，260 _
• Egypt, 177–179, 260
• “18小时城市” 105
• “18-hour cities,” 105
• 就业。查看 劳动力
• employment. See workforce
• 埃尔多安、雷杰普·塔伊普、53、75、126、128 _
• Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 53, 75, 126, 128
• 厄立特里亚, 124 , 182–183
• Eritrea, 124, 182–183
• 爱沙尼亚, 76 , 145–146 , 224–225 , 226
• Estonia, 76, 145–146, 224–225, 226
• 埃塞俄比亚, 59 , 179
• Ethiopia, 59, 179
• 苏黎世联邦理工学院, 239 , 253 , 271
• ETH Zurich, 239, 253, 271
• 欧亚大陆，北方主义潜力，160–161
• Eurasia, Northism potential of, 160–161
• 欧洲。另请参阅 欧盟 (EU)
  • 东欧和加拿大移民，113
  • 东欧劳动力和移民，45–46
  • 欧亚大陆和北向主义潜力，160–161（另见 北向主义（北半球））
  • 塑造流动性的力量，3
  • 代际间对资源的金融竞争，74
  • 国际学生, 42–43 , 43
  • 移民处理中心，12
  • 人口下降和劳动力，36–37
  • 劳动力和移民，45
• Europe. See also European Union (EU)
  • Eastern Europe and Canadian immigrants, 113
  • Eastern European workforce and emigration, 45–46
  • Eurasia and Northism potential, 160–161 (See also Northism (northern hemisphere))
  • forces shaping mobility, 3
  • intergenerational financial competition for resources in, 74
  • international students in, 42–43, 43
  • migrant processing centers, 12
  • population decline and workforce, 36–37
  • workforce and emigration, 45
• 欧盟 (EU)
  • 英国脱欧, 23 , 37–38 , 72 , 80 , 137–139 , 236
  • 公民投资者，235
  • 区域移民模式，12
  • 居住在国外的退休人员，229–230
• European Union (EU)
  • Brexit, 23, 37–38, 72, 80, 137–139, 236
  • citizen investors in, 235
  • regional migration patterns and, 12
  • retirees living abroad, 229–230
• 欧盟（EU）和同化，115–142
  • 在阿尔卑斯山国家，133–134
  • 亚欧人口激增，119–121
  • 同化作为挑战，124–127
  • 欧盟作为社会民主福利国家，115–119
  • 欧盟成立，115
  • 在德国，127–133
  • 意大利帕达尼亚地区，134–137
  • 在北欧国家，139–142
  • 南欧对移民的激励措施，121–124
  • 在英国，125–126 , 137–139
• European Union (EU) and assimilation, 115–142
  • in Alpine countries, 133–134
  • Asian-European population surge and, 119–121
  • assimilation as challenge, 124–127
  • EU as social democratic welfare state, 115–119
  • EU inception and, 115
  • in Germany, 127–133
  • in Italy’s Padania region, 134–137
  • in Nordic countries, 139–142
  • Southern Europe incentives for immigrants, 121–124
  • in UK, 125–126, 137–139
• 进化与自由（贝让），162
• Evolution and Freedom (Bejan), 162
• 外籍人士，222
• Expatistan, 222
• 奈杰尔·法拉奇，37 岁
• Farage, Nigel, 37
• 芬兰, 3 , 44 , 117 , 118 , 139–142 , 225
• Finland, 3, 44, 117, 118, 139–142, 225
• 闪光森林，114
• Flash Forest, 114
• 乔治·弗洛伊德，109
• Floyd, George, 109
• 足球（英式足球），86–87，131
• football (soccer), 86–87, 131
• 杰拉德·福特，29 岁
• Ford, Gerald, 29
• 法国
  • 高山供水和，133
  • 自动化，22
  • 能源使用，246
  • 住房，95
  • 移民/同化，131
  • 经济吸引力部，74
  • 移动即服务，258
  • 论民粹主义，51
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，77
• France
  • Alpine water supply and, 133
  • automation and, 22
  • energy use, 246
  • housing in, 95
  • immigration/assimilation in, 131
  • Ministry of Economic Attractiveness, 74
  • mobility as a service, 258
  • on populism, 51
  • youth-government tension, 77
• 弗兰克·大卫，234
• Franck, David, 234
• 房地美，94 岁
• Freddie Mac, 94
• 淡水供应量, 18–21 , 19, 20 , 133–134 , 149 , 185–186 , 209–215 , 247–248 , 253
• freshwater availability, 18–21, 19, 20, 133–134, 149, 185–186, 209–215, 247–248, 253
• 加蓬，184
• Gabon, 184
• 加内什，贾南，85–86
• Ganesh, Janan, 85–86
• 比尔·盖茨, 69 , 246
• Gates, Bill, 69, 246
• Gen Alpha, 出生率, 34 , 35
• Gen Alpha, birth rate and, 34, 35
• Y 世代和 Z 世代。查看 千禧一代 (Gen-Y) 和 Gen-Z
• Gen-Y and Gen-Z. See millennials (Gen-Y) and Gen-Z
• 乔治城大学，1–2，279
• Georgetown University, 1–2, 279
• 格鲁吉亚, 143–144 , 243
• Georgia, 143–144, 243
• 地球学，279
• geosophy, 279
• 德国
  • 人口老龄化，199
  • 高山供水和，133
  • 亚裔欧洲人，119
  • 欧盟就业/新冠疫情应对措施，116–117
  • 移民/同化，127–133
  • 小冰河时代，162
  • 民族主义和征兵，55–59
  • 北主义情景和, 165 , 277
  • 论民粹主义，51
  • 智能生活，260
  • 作为首要移民目的地，52
  • 交通和住房，96
• Germany
  • aging population of, 199
  • Alpine water supply and, 133
  • Asian-Europeans in, 119
  • EU employment/Covid response, 116–117
  • immigration/assimilation in, 127–133
  • Little Ice Age in, 162
  • nationalism and conscription in, 55–59
  • Northism scenario and, 165, 277
  • on populism, 51
  • smart living in, 260
  • as top immigrant destination, 52
  • transportation and housing, 96
• 安东尼·吉登斯，70 岁
• Giddens, Anthony, 70
• 赫伯特·吉拉尔特，245
• Girardet, Herbert, 245
• 全球适应委员会，269-270
• Global Commission on Adaptation, 269–270
• “安全、有序和正常移民全球契约”（2018 年），275–276
• “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration” (2018), 275–276
• 全球主义和全球化。另请参阅 移动性
  • 世界公民以及, 68 , 71–72
  • “全球化之死”，263
  • 全球公民，68–71
  • “全球化是向善的力量” 50
• globalism and globalization. See also mobility
  • citizens of the world and, 68, 71–72
  • “death of globalization,” 263
  • global citizens and, 68–71
  • “globalization as force for good,” 50
• 全球和平指数，117
• Global Peace Index, 117
• 全球人才竞争力指数，38 n
• Global Talent Competitiveness Index, 38n
• 谷歌、88、128、172、246 _ _ _ _
• Google, 88, 128, 172, 246
• 大卫·格雷伯，277
• Graeber, David, 277
• 希腊, 51 , 124 , 255
• Greece, 51, 124, 255
• 格陵兰岛，167–168
• Greenland, 167–168
• 绿色区域, 16 , 239–242
• green zones, 16, 239–242
• 海湾合作委员会（GCC），251
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 251
• 乔纳森·海特，50 岁
• Haidt, Jonathan, 50
• 穆赫辛·哈米德, 49 , 279
• Hamid, Mohsin, 49, 279
• 马尔科姆·哈里斯，66 岁
• Harris, Malcom, 66
• 谢赫哈西娜，170 岁
• Hasina, Sheikh, 170
• 里卡多·豪斯曼，225
• Hausmann, Ricardo, 225
• 健康和医疗保健。另请参阅 Covid-19 大流行
  • 黑死病历史, 9 , 34 , 77 , 241 , 264 , 295
  • 绿色区域和，240–241
  • 医疗保健获取和质量指数，241 n（另见 生活质量）
  • 从事医疗保健工作的移民，37
  • 医疗旅游, 83 , 229
• health and healthcare. See also Covid-19 pandemic
  • Black Death history, 9, 34, 77, 241, 264, 295
  • green zones and, 240–241
  • Healthcare Access and Quality Index, 241n (See also quality of life)
  • immigrants working in healthcare, 37
  • medical tourism, 83, 229
• 大卫·霍尔德，70 岁
• Held, David, 70
• 亨利合伙人事务所，235
• Henley & Partners, 235
• 伊达尔戈，安妮，258
• Hidalgo, Anne, 258
• 辛德里克斯，卡罗利，224
• Hindriks, Karoli, 224
• 约翰·霍尔德伦，269
• Holdren, John, 269
• 香港, 40 , 67 , 81–82
• Hong Kong, 40, 67, 81–82
• 住房，91–114
  • 气候变化, 97–104 , 106 , 113
  • 共同生活，256–257
  • 公共城市，256–259
  • 英国新冠疫情大流行，91–93 , 104–107 , 138
  • 加拿大移民，110–114
  • 美国移民，107–110
  • 移民和劳动力，40
  • 日本的激励措施，215–216、217–218
  • 移动房地产，92–97
  • 身体流动性作为经济流动性，91–92
  • 对于量子人，94、221–222、228–230 _
  • 远程工作，103–107
  • 在西伯利亚，149
  • 智能生活，259–262
  • 南欧的激励措施，121–124
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，77–78
• housing, 91–114
  • climate change in, 97–104, 106, 113
  • co-living, 256–257
  • communal cities, 256–259
  • Covid pandemic in UK and, 91–93, 104–107, 138
  • immigrants in Canada and, 110–114
  • immigrants in US and, 107–110
  • immigration and workforce, 40
  • Japanese incentives, 215–216, 217–218
  • mobile real estate, 92–97
  • physical mobility as economic mobility, 91–92
  • for quantum people, 94, 221–222, 228–230
  • remote work and, 103–107
  • in Siberia, 149
  • smart living, 259–262
  • Southern Europe incentives for, 121–124
  • youth-government tension, 77–78
• 人力资本，89
• human capital, 89
• 人文地理学。另见 流动性；北主义（北半球）；生活质量；量子人
  • 未来情景, 25–28 , 26
  • 地球学，279
  • 北方主义和角色, 160 , 162
  • 研究, 1–3
• human geography. See also mobility; Northism (northern hemisphere); quality of life; quantum people
  • future scenarios for, 25–28, 26
  • geosophy, 279
  • Northism and role of, 160, 162
  • study of, 1–3
• 匈牙利, 50
• Hungary, 50
• 塞缪尔·亨廷顿，69 岁
• Huntington, Samuel, 69
• 冰岛, 139–142 , 163 , 166
• Iceland, 139–142, 163, 166
• 图标，95
• Icon, 95
• 宜家，95
• IKEA, 95
• 移民。另见 气候变化；经济学；政治身份；量子人；劳动力；个别国家
  • 来自亚洲（参见 亚洲；各个亚洲国家）
  • 英国脱欧以及, 23 , 37–38 , 72 , 80 , 137–139 , 236
  • 公民计划，123
  • 投资者居住权（移民投资者）, 133 , 233–238
  • 大熔炉城市，80–81
  • 移民的道德问题，272–277
  • 基于积分的系统，42–43
  • 政治身份和住房决定，107–114
  • 富裕国家人口下降，35-37
  • 民粹主义和反移民政策，38、50–51、129–130
  • 前往/在前苏联加盟共和国内（参见 苏联加盟共和国（前））
  • 特朗普上, 35–37 , 112 , 195 , 226
• immigration. See also climate change; economics; political identity; quantum people; workforce; individual countries
  • from Asia (See Asia; individual Asian countries)
  • Brexit and, 23, 37–38, 72, 80, 137–139, 236
  • citizenship programs, 123
  • investor residency (migrant investors), 133, 233–238
  • melting pot cities and, 80–81
  • moral issues of migration, 272–277
  • points-based systems, 42–43
  • political identity and housing decisions, 107–114
  • population decline in wealthy countries and, 35–37
  • populism and anti-immigration policies, 38, 50–51, 129–130
  • to/within former Soviet republics (See Soviet republics (former))
  • Trump on, 35–37, 112, 195, 226
• 印度
  • 出生率，31
  • 气候变化，209-215
  • 海水淡化，247
  • 作为欧洲公民投资者的移民，236
  • 能源和冷却，251
  • 种族多样性，54
  • 外籍人士和政治身份，83、109、111-112、131、135、140 _ _ _ _ _
  • 前苏联加盟共和国和移民模式, 150 , 153–154
  • 印度裔美国人人口，203–204
  • 医疗保健行业的印度人，198–199
  • 代际间对资源的金融竞争，74–75
  • 内部迁移, 7
  • 国际学生来自, 41
  • 千禧一代, 17 , 208
  • 国家河流连接项目 (NRLP)，211
  • 北主义情景和，171
  • 巴基斯坦分裂和移民, 10 , 54 n
  • 智慧城市，260
  • 与非洲的贸易，181
  • 北方邦人口统计，175
  • 劳动力中的女性人数为44
  • 全球人口, 193–195 , 196
• India
  • birth rate in, 31
  • climate change in, 209–215
  • desalination by, 247
  • emigrants as citizen investors in Europe, 236
  • energy and cooling, 251
  • ethnic diversity of, 54
  • expatriates of, and political identity, 83, 109, 111–112, 131, 135, 140
  • former Soviet republics and migration patterns, 150, 153–154
  • Indian-American population, 203–204
  • Indians in healthcare industry, 198–199
  • intergenerational financial competition for resources in, 74–75
  • internal migration in, 7
  • international students from, 41
  • millennials in, 17, 208
  • National River Linking Project (NRLP), 211
  • Northism scenario and, 171
  • Pakistan partition and migration, 10, 54n
  • smart city in, 260
  • trade with Africa, 181
  • Uttar Pradesh population statistics, 175
  • women in workforce of, 44
  • worldwide population from, 193–195, 196
• 印度尼西亚，77，213–214 _
• Indonesia, 77, 213–214
• 罗纳德·英格尔哈特，50 岁
• Inglehart, Ronald, 50
• 境内流离失所者 (IDP)，6
• internally displaced peoples (IDPs), 6
• 国际移民组织 (IOM)，6 , 158
• International Organization of Migration (IOM), 6, 158
• 国际自然保护联盟，268–269
• International Union for Conservation of Nature, 268–269
• 因纽特人, 166 , 167
• Inuit people, 166, 167
• 投资者居住权（移民投资者）, 133 , 233–238
• investor residency (migrant investors), 133, 233–238
• 伊朗, 76 , 145 , 154–155 , 179–180
• Iran, 76, 145, 154–155, 179–180
• 伊拉克, 10 , 56 , 140 , 175
• Iraq, 10, 56, 140, 175
• 爱尔兰，236
• Ireland, 236
• 伊斯兰教
  • 阿拉伯国家的经济问题，177-178
  • 欧洲移民/同化，125–126，132
  • 在日本，217
  • 穆斯林罗兴亚人, 61 , 214
  • 维吾尔族, 60 , 154
• Islam
  • economic issues of Arab countries and, 177–178
  • European immigration/assimilation, 125–126, 132
  • in Japan, 217
  • Muslim Rohingya, 61, 214
  • Uighurs, 60, 154
• 以色列, 10 , 202 n, 247
• Israel, 10, 202n, 247
• 意大利
  • 高山供水和，133
  • 蓝色区域，241
  • 帕达尼亚地区的移民/同化，134–137
  • 移民处理中心，12
  • 米兰, 136 , 257–258
  • 民粹主义，51
  • 南欧对移民的激励措施，121–122 , 124
  • 劳动力, 36–37 , 45
• Italy
  • Alpine water supply and, 133
  • blue zones in, 241
  • immigration/assimilation in Padania region, 134–137
  • migrant processing centers, 12
  • Milan, 136, 257–258
  • populism in, 51
  • Southern Europe incentives for immigrants, 121–122, 124
  • workforce, 36–37, 45
• 国际工作组，118
• IWG, 118
• 艾耶·皮科, 71 , 85
• Iyer, Pico, 71, 85
• 日本
  • 蓝色区域，241
  • 海水淡化，247
  • 66-67 岁青年就业情况
  • 外国人, 207 , 216–217 , 228
  • 作为高科技熔炉，215–220
  • 生活在中国的日本人，206–207
  • 民族主义和征兵，58
  • 北主义情景和，277
  • 人口下降和劳动力，36
• Japan
  • blue zones in, 241
  • desalination by, 247
  • employment of youth in, 66–67
  • foreigners in, 207, 216–217, 228
  • as high-tech melting pot, 215–220
  • Japanese living in China, 206–207
  • nationalism and conscription in, 58
  • Northism scenario and, 277
  • population decline and workforce, 36
• 犹太人口，202 n
• Jewish population, 202n
• 工作，224
• Jobbatical, 224
• 鲍里斯·约翰逊，80，203–204
• Johnson, Boris, 80, 203–204
• 约翰逊、奈杰尔，37–38
• Johnson, Nigel, 37–38
• 乔普克，克里斯蒂安，235
• Joppke, Christian, 235
• 康德，伊曼纽尔，70 , 273
• Kant, Immanuel, 70, 273
• 克什米尔，211–212
• Kashmir, 211–212
• 卡特拉，95
• Katerra, 95
• 哈萨克斯坦, 148 , 152–158 , 247
• Kazakhstan, 148, 152–158, 247
• 肯尼亚, 183
• Kenya, 183
• 伊姆兰·汗，212
• Khan, Imran, 212
• 萨迪克·汗，80 岁
• Khan, Sadiq, 80
• 卡纳，帕拉格，3–4
• Khanna, Parag, 3–4
• 亲属，256–257
• Kin, 256–257
• 亨利·基辛格，29 岁
• Kissinger, Henry, 29
• 科尔，杰斯珀，215
• Koll, Jesper, 215
• 吉尔吉斯斯坦, 155 , 157
• Kyrgyzstan, 155, 157
• 拉姆达学院，88
• Lamda Academy, 88
• 老挝，213
• Laos, 213
• 拉美。查看各个国家/地区
• Latin America. See individual countries
• 拉脱维亚，235
• Latvia, 235
• 黎巴嫩, 177 , 178
• Lebanon, 177, 178
• Lebensraum（生活空间），150
• Lebensraum (living space), 150
• 李光耀，81，251–252 _
• Lee Kuan Yew, 81, 251–252
• 利比亚，124
• Libya, 124
• 增长的极限（罗马俱乐部），31
• The Limits to Growth (Club of Rome), 31
• 约翰·洛克，273
• Locke, John, 273
• 马, 杰克, 34 , 66
• Ma, Jack, 34, 66
• 魔法跳跃，223
• Magic Leap, 223
• 托马斯·马尔萨斯，30–32，150
• Malthus, Thomas, 30–32, 150
• 卡尔·曼海姆，63 岁
• Mannheim, Karl, 63
• 马林·桑娜，44 岁
• Marin, Sanna, 44
• 婚姻, 81 , 109–110 , 178–179 , 201
• marriage, 81, 109–110, 178–179, 201
• 马克思·卡尔，89
• Marx, Karl, 89
• 特蕾莎·梅，71–72
• May, Theresa, 71–72
• 比尔·麦基本，18 岁
• McKibben, Bill, 18
• 麦肯锡，87 岁
• McKinsey, 87
• 麦克尼尔，JR，19 n
• McNeill, J. R., 19n
• 医疗旅游, 83 , 229
• medical tourism, 83, 229
• 特大城市, 7 , 24
• megacities, 7, 24
• 拉胡尔·梅赫罗特拉，171
• Mehrotra, Rahul, 171
• 梅塔、苏克图, 72 , 276
• Mehta, Suketu, 72, 276
• 大熔炉城市，80–85
• melting pot cities, 80–85
• 梅赛德斯，92
• Mercedes, 92
• 默克尔、安吉拉，51、133、276 _
• Merkel, Angela, 51, 133, 276
• 墨西哥, 58–59 , 95 , 159–160 , 170 , 228
• Mexico, 58–59, 95, 159–160, 170, 228
• 强大的建筑，95
• Mighty Buildings, 95
• 移民。另见 移民；流动性
  • 移民投资者（投资者居住权），133 , 233–238
  • 过去 10 万年的模式，278
• migration. See also immigration; mobility
  • migrant investors (investor residency), 133, 233–238
  • patterns of past 100,000 years, 278
• 布兰科·米兰诺维奇，231
• Milanovic, Branko, 231
• 军事，55–59
• military, 55–59
• 千禧一代 (Gen-Y) 和 Gen-Z。另见 住房；政治身份；劳动力
  • 加速流动性，16
  • 出生率和, 34–35 , 35
  • 家庭公共城市，256–259
  • 与老一辈人的金融竞争, 64–67 , 73–75
  • 224的“中心” （另见 量子人）
  • 生活在亚洲，207–209
  • 与父母同住, 107 , 117
  • 征兵，57
  • 基于积分的移民系统，以及，42
  • 工资和生活费用（20 世纪 90 年代至今），65
• millennials (Gen-Y) and Gen-Z. See also housing; political identity; workforce
  • accelerated mobility and, 16
  • birth rate and, 34–35, 35
  • communal cities for families, 256–259
  • financial competition with older generations, 64–67, 73–75
  • “hub” of/by, 224 (See also quantum people)
  • living in Asia, 207–209
  • living with parents, 107, 117
  • military recruitment and, 57
  • points-based immigration systems and, 42
  • wages and cost of living (1990s–present) and, 65
• 密涅瓦学校，71
• Minerva Schools, 71
• 三菱，246
• Mitsubishi, 246
• 拉纳·米特，66 岁
• Mitter, Rana, 66
• 流动性，1–28、263–279。另见气候变化；教育；住房；移民；劳动力
  • 文明3.0和，265
  • 世界主义功利主义和，275
  • 国内移民与国际移民，6-7
  • 经济与区域移民, 11–14 , 12, 13
  • 从主权演变为管辖权，267-270
  • 塑造加速流动性的力量，14-17
  • 淡水供应量以及, 18–21 , 19, 20 , 133–134 , 149 , 185–186 , 209–215 , 247–248 , 253
  • 未来情景, 25–28 , 26
  • 遗传多样性，200–202
  • 地球工程解决方案，271–272
  • 谐波势，263–267
  • 人文地理学的重要性，1–3
  • 人类历史和大迁徙，7-10
  • 人口（2021 年），6
  • 就业和自动化，21–22
  • 作为物质和哲学概念，5
  • 移民与道德，272–277
  • 移动房地产，92–97
  • 移动即服务，258
  • “流动性就是命运” 3-7
  • 永恒的（见 量子人）
  • 重新填充, 276–279 , 278
  • 腾出州，270
  • 作为美德，46
• mobility, 1–28, 263–279. See also climate change; education; housing; immigration; workforce
  • Civilization 3.0 and, 265
  • cosmopolitan utilitarianism and, 275
  • within countries vs. international migration, 6–7
  • economics and regional migration, 11–14, 12, 13
  • evolving from sovereignty to sewardship for, 267–270
  • forces shaping accelerated mobility, 14–17
  • freshwater availability and, 18–21, 19, 20, 133–134, 149, 185–186, 209–215, 247–248, 253
  • future scenarios of, 25–28, 26
  • genetic diversity and, 200–202
  • geo-engineering solutions for, 271–272
  • harmonic potential for, 263–267
  • human geography importance and, 1–3
  • human history and great migrations, 7–10
  • human population (2021), 6
  • jobs and automation, 21–22
  • as material and philosophical concept, 5
  • migration and morality, 272–277
  • mobile real estate, 92–97
  • mobility as a service, 258
  • “mobility is destiny,” 3–7
  • as perpetual (See quantum people)
  • repopulation with, 276–279, 278
  • vacated states from, 270
  • as virtue, 46
• 莫迪、纳伦德拉，54、150、203、211 _ _ _
• Modi, Narendra, 54, 150, 203, 211
• 摩纳哥，235 n
• Monaco, 235n
• 蒙古，151–152
• Mongolia, 151–152
• 黑山, 235
• Montenegro, 235
• 文在寅，58 岁
• Moon Jae-in, 58
• 移民的道德问题，272–277
• moral issues of migration, 272–277
• 摩洛哥，176–177
• Morocco, 176–177
• 可移动的村庄（AudaCities），170–171
• Movable Village (AudaCities), 170–171
• “跨国女佣” 198-199
• “multinational maids,” 198–199
• 亚历克·墨菲，160
• Murphy, Alec, 160
• 埃隆·马斯克，34 岁
• Musk, Elon, 34
• 穆斯林反对十字军东征，125–126
• Muslims Against the Crusades, 125–126
• 缅甸，61，214–215 _
• Myanmar, 61, 214–215
• 我在路上的生活（斯泰纳姆），93
• My Life on the Road (Steinem), 93
• 美国国家科学院，20
• National Academy of Sciences, 20
• 民族主义
  • “民族主义时代” 9
  • 在中国，54–55
  • 公民主义 vs., 84
  • 征兵，55–59
  • 非殖民化，10
  • 全球主义 vs., 48–54
  • 身份对比，46–47
  • 政治认同和, 63–67 , 64 , 72
  • 民粹主义和反移民政策，38、50–51、129–130
  • 美国的白人民族主义，107–110
• nationalism
  • “age of nationalism,” 9
  • in China, 54–55
  • civicism vs., 84
  • conscription and, 55–59
  • decolonization and, 10
  • globalism vs., 48–54
  • identity vs., 46–47
  • political identity and, 63–67, 64, 72
  • populism and anti-immigration policies, 38, 50–51, 129–130
  • white nationalism in US, 107–110
• 新加坡国立大学，252
• National University of Singapore, 252
• 大自然保护协会，101
• Nature Conservancy, 101
• 尼泊尔, 209 , 212
• Nepal, 209, 212
• 荷兰, 95 , 117 , 172–173
• Netherlands, 95, 117, 172–173
• 新中世纪情景, 25–28 , 26
• New Middle Ages scenario, 25–28, 26
• 新西兰, 3 , 188 , 214 , 225 , 237
• New Zealand, 3, 188, 214, 225, 237
• 内科斯, 70
• Nexus, 70
• 尼日尔，184
• Niger, 184
• 尼日利亚, 124 , 182 , 184
• Nigeria, 124, 182, 184
• 诺基亚，141
• Nokia, 141
• 游牧之地（布鲁德），93
• Nomadland (Bruder), 93
• 北主义（北半球）
  • 亿万富翁的“末日保险”，以及，174
  • 欧亚大陆的战略优势，160–161
  • 粮食生产和，161
  • 塑造流动性的力量，3
  • 北部主要州，已定义，277
  • 北美的战略稳定性, 159–160 , 162 , 164–168 , 188–189
  • 北极光场景, 25–28 , 26
  • 重新人口需求, 276–279 , 278
  • 北极环境改造, 162–168 , 164
  • 北半球世界总人口159
  • 城市群及其潜力，168, 169–174
• Northism (northern hemisphere)
  • billionaires’ “apocalypse insurance” and, 174
  • Eurasia’s strategic advantages for, 160–161
  • food production and, 161
  • forces shaping mobility, 3
  • major states of North, defined, 277
  • North America’s strategic stability for, 159–160, 162, 164–168, 188–189
  • Northern Lights scenario of, 25–28, 26
  • repopulation needs, 276–279, 278
  • terraforming of Arctic for, 162–168, 164
  • total world population of northern hemisphere, 159
  • urban clusters and potential for, 168, 169–174
• 挪威，139–142、163、166 _ _ _
• Norway, 139–142, 163, 166
• 凯尔·诺斯曼，92
• Nossman, Kyle, 92
• 核废料，270 n
• nuclear waste, 270n
• 肥胖, 32 , 57
• obesity, 32, 57
• 开放边界（卡普兰），274
• Open Borders (Caplan), 274
• 维克多·欧尔班，50 岁
• Orban, Victor, 50
• “重叠的命运共同体” 70
• “overlapping communities of fate,” 70
• 印度人民党海外之友，203
• Overseas Friends of BJP, 203
• 托马斯·潘恩，70 岁
• Paine, Thomas, 70
• 巴基斯坦
  • 气候变化, 209 , 212
  • 来自195 的移民
  • 欧洲移民/同化, 120 , 123 , 125–126 , 137 , 140
  • 印度教徒从公元54年返回印度
  • 分区和迁移, 10 , 54 n
• Pakistan
  • climate change in, 209, 212
  • emigrants from, 195
  • European immigration/assimilation, 120, 123, 125–126, 137, 140
  • Hindus returning to India from, 54n
  • partition and migration, 10, 54n
• 巴勒斯坦人，60–61
• Palestinians, 60–61
• 巴拿马, 228
• Panama, 228
• 松下，36
• Panasonic, 36
• 庞阿尔文，253
• Pang, Alvin, 253
• 巴黎气候协议，267
• Paris climate agreement, 267
• 帕特尔·普里蒂，38 岁
• Patel, Priti, 38
• 保罗，安居，199
• Paul, Anju, 199
• “城市和平”，239
• “Pax Urbanica,” 239
• “永久拍拍”，222
• “perma-pats,” 222
• 波斯人，132
• Persians, 132
• 秘鲁, 187
• Peru, 187
• 慈善事业、下一代计划以及，69–70
• philanthropy, next-gen programs and, 69–70
• 菲律宾, 199
• Philippines, 199
• 查尔斯·皮尔特尔，1–2
• Pirtle, Charles, 1–2
• 柏拉图，261
• Plato, 261
• 波兰, 50 , 119 , 121
• Poland, 50, 119, 121
• 政治认同，63-90。另见 民族主义
  • 由于政治而加速流动，14-17
  • 世界公民以及, 68 , 71–72
  • 气候难民与政治难民，20
  • 作为灵性的交流活动，85–87
  • 就业和搬迁意愿，87–90
  • 美国的种族多样性，107–110
  • 欧盟作为社会民主福利国家，115-119（另见 欧盟（EU）和同化）
  • 从主权演变为管理权，267-270
  • 作为力量塑造流动性，1-2
  • 作为世代与国家， 63–67、64、72
  • 亚洲移民的地缘政治影响，202–204
  • 全球公民，68–71
  • 移民和住房决定，107–114
  • 金融稳定的代际竞争，64–67 , 73–75
  • 大熔炉城市，80–85
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，75–80
• political identity, 63–90. See also nationalism
  • accelerated mobility due to politics, 14–17
  • citizens of the world and, 68, 71–72
  • climate refugees vs. political refugees, 20
  • communing events as spirituality, 85–87
  • employment and willingness to move, 87–90
  • ethnic diversity in US and, 107–110
  • EU as social democratic welfare state, 115–119 (See also European Union (EU) and assimilation)
  • evolving from sovereignty to stewardship, 267–270
  • as force shaping mobility, 1–2
  • as generational vs. national, 63–67, 64, 72
  • geopolitical influence of Asian migrants, 202–204
  • global citizens and, 68–71
  • immigration and housing decisions, 107–114
  • intergenerational competition for financial stability and, 64–67, 73–75
  • melting pot cities and, 80–85
  • youth-government tension, 75–80
• 民粹主义和反移民政策，38、50-51、129-130。另见民族主义
• populism and anti-immigration policies, 38, 50–51, 129–130. See also nationalism
• 葡萄牙, 123 , 235
• Portugal, 123, 235
• 骄傲的男孩，108
• Proud Boys, 108
• 弗拉基米尔·普京, 75–76 , 147 , 150
• Putin, Vladimir, 75–76, 147, 150
• 生活质量，239–262
  • 蓝色区域，241
  • 循环能量和饮食，244–248
  • 公共城市，256–259
  • 能源和空调，248–254
  • 绿色区域, 16 , 239–242
  • “Pax Urbanica”，239
  • 智能生活，259–262
  • 社会进步指数 (SPI), 242, 242–243
  • 可持续发展指数 (SDI), 243 , 243
  • 旅游业，254–255
• quality of life, 239–262
  • blue zones, 241
  • circular energy and diet, 244–248
  • communal cities, 256–259
  • energy and air conditioning, 248–254
  • green zones, 16, 239–242
  • “Pax Urbanica” for, 239
  • smart living, 259–262
  • Social Progress Index (SPI), 242, 242–243
  • Sustainable Development Index (SDI), 243, 243
  • tourism and, 254–255
• 量子人，221–238
  • 人口老龄化，228–230
  • 数字移动性, 222–228 , 256–259
  • 全球“护照”，230–233
  • 住房需求, 94 , 221–222 , 228–230（另见 住房）
  • 移民投资者/投资者居住权，233–238
  • 动机，221–222
  • “永久拍拍”，222
  • 永久流动性为常态，5
  • 人的量子流动性，定义，22-25
• quantum people, 221–238
  • aging population as, 228–230
  • digital mobility of, 222–228, 256–259
  • global “passport” for, 230–233
  • housing needs of, 94, 221–222, 228–230 (See also housing)
  • migrant investors/investor residency, 233–238
  • motivation of, 221–222
  • “perma-pats,” 222
  • perpetual mobility as norm, 5
  • quantum mobility of people, defined, 22–25
• 种族和种族主义
  • 黑人的命也是命，78
  • 美国的种族多样性，107–110
  • 亚洲人的遗传多样性，200–202
  • 非裔美国人大迁徙，98
  • 异族婚姻, 81 , 109–110 , 201
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，78
• race and racism
  • Black Lives Matter, 78
  • ethnic diversity in US, 107–110
  • genetic diversity of Asians, 200–202
  • Great Migration of African Americans, 98
  • interracial marriage, 81, 109–110, 201
  • youth-government tension, 78
• 拉福德·诺亚，227
• Raford, Noah, 227
• 兰德公司，56
• RAND Corporation, 56
• 恩斯特·格奥尔格·拉文斯坦，7 岁
• Ravenstein, Ernst Georg, 7
• 约翰·罗尔斯，273
• Rawls, John, 273
• 重新造林计划, 114 , 145 , 151 , 157 , 271
• reforesting programs, 114, 145, 151, 157, 271
• 难民、气候与政治, 20 , 141
• refugees, climate vs. political, 20, 141
• 区域要塞情景，25–28，26
• Regional Fortress scenario, 25–28, 26
• 宗教。另见 伊斯兰教
  • 作为灵性的交流活动，85–87
  • 移民和宗教认同，54–55，60–61
  • 全世界基督徒和穆斯林人口60
  • 美国和以色列的犹太人口，202 n
• religion. See also Islam
  • communing events as spirituality, 85–87
  • migration and religious identity, 54–55, 60–61
  • population of Christians and Muslims, worldwide, 60
  • population of Jews in US and Israel, 202n
• 《理想国》（柏拉图），261
• The Republic (Plato), 261
• 革命，105
• Revolution, 105
• 人权（潘恩），70
• The Rights of Man (Paine), 70
• 罗马，135
• Roma, 135
• 罗马尼亚, 46 , 119
• Romania, 46, 119
• 保罗·罗默，260
• Romer, Paul, 260
• 英国皇家特许测量师协会，88
• Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 88
• 伯特兰·罗素，55–56
• Russell, Bertrand, 55–56
• 俄罗斯
  • 文明国家概念，53
  • 塑造流动性的力量，3
  • 前苏联加盟共和国和, 143–146 , 152–158
  • 小冰河时代，162
  • 蒙古的邻近地区，151–152
  • 民族主义和征兵，57
  • 对移民劳动力的需求，146–151
  • 北主义情景和, 165 , 277
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，75–76
• Russia
  • civilizational state concept, 53
  • forces shaping mobility, 3
  • former Soviet republics and, 143–146, 152–158
  • Little Ice Age in, 162
  • Mongolia’s proximity to, 151–152
  • nationalism and conscription in, 57
  • need for immigrant labor by, 146–151
  • Northism scenario and, 165, 277
  • youth-government tension, 75–76
• 房车行业协会，93
• RV Industry Association, 93
• 保罗·萨洛佩克，24 岁
• Salopek, Paul, 24
• 马泰奥·萨尔维尼, 45 , 51
• Salvini, Matteo, 45, 51
• 萨米人，166
• Sami people, 166
• SAP，131
• SAP, 131
• 萨尔基相，阿尔门，145–146
• Sarkissian, Armen, 145–146
• 沙特阿拉伯, 45 , 177 , 178 , 250–251 , 255
• Saudi Arabia, 45, 177, 178, 250–251, 255
• 萨维里斯，纳吉布，124
• Sawiris, Naguib, 124
• 斯堪的纳维亚。查看各个国家/地区
• Scandinavia. See individual countries
• 苏格兰，138–139
• Scotland, 138–139
• 罗伊·斯克兰顿，18 岁
• Scranton, Roy, 18
• 沙法克·埃利夫，80 岁
• Shafak, Elif, 80
• 西伯利亚，气候变化，147–151
• Siberia, climate change in, 147–151
• 人行道实验室，260
• Sidewalk Labs, 260
• 塞拉能源公司，247
• Sierra Energy, 247
• 新加坡, 40 , 81 , 208–209 , 225 , 248 , 251–254
• Singapore, 40, 81, 208–209, 225, 248, 251–254
• 歌手彼得，274
• Singer, Peter, 274
• 斯堪斯卡，95
• Skanska, 95
• #斯科利巴士，93
• #skooliebus, 93
• 斯洛文尼亚，134
• Slovenia, 134
• 足球, 86–87 , 131
• soccer, 86–87, 131
• 社会进步指数 (SPI), 242, 242–243
• Social Progress Index (SPI), 242, 242–243
• 太阳城，258
• SolarCity, 258
• 索马里，124
• Somalia, 124
• 松岛, 36
• Songdo, 36
• 南美洲。查看各个国家/地区
• South America. See individual countries
• 韩国
  • 207年中国移民
  • 青年就业情况，67
  • 能源使用，245
  • 75 代际间对资源的金融竞争
  • 民族主义和征兵, 57 , 58
  • 人口下降和劳动力，36
  • 日本的韩国移民，216–217
• South Korea
  • Chinese immigrants in, 207
  • employment of youth in, 67
  • energy use, 245
  • intergenerational financial competition for resources in, 75
  • nationalism and conscription in, 57, 58
  • population decline and workforce, 36
  • South Korean immigrants in Japan, 216–217
• “南方”（南半球），175–191
  • 非洲国家、气候变化和经济问题，181–184
  • 南极洲和气候变化，188
  • 阿拉伯国家和经济问题，175–180
  • 澳大利亚，气候变化和经济问题，188–191
  • 气候变化和流离失所预测，184-185
  • 气候变化和潜在的地下生活方式，180–181
  • 南美洲、气候变化和经济问题，185–188
  • 腾出的州，270
• “The South” (southern hemisphere), 175–191
  • African countries, climate change, and economic issues, 181–184
  • Antarctica and climate change, 188
  • Arab countries and economic issues, 175–180
  • Australia, climate change, and economic issues, 188–191
  • climate change and displacement projection, 184–185
  • climate change and potential underground lifestyle, 180–181
  • South America, climate change, and economic issues, 185–188
  • vacated states of, 270
• 苏联加盟共和国（前），143-158。另请参阅各个国家/地区
  • 亚美尼亚和移民到俄罗斯，143 , 145–146
  • 阿塞拜疆的经济/环境趋势和移民，143–145
  • 中亚，152–158
  • 格鲁吉亚的经济发展和移民，143–144
  • 蒙古的邻近地区，151–152
  • 俄罗斯对移民劳动力的需求，146–151
  • 苏联解体，10
• Soviet republics (former), 143–158. See also individual countries
  • Armenia and emigration to Russia, 143, 145–146
  • Azerbaijan’s economic/environmental trends and immigration, 143–145
  • of Central Asia, 152–158
  • Georgia’s economic development and immigration, 143–144
  • Mongolia’s proximity to, 151–152
  • Russia’s need for immigrant labor, 146–151
  • Soviet Union collapse and, 10
• 西班牙, 36–37 , 77 , 122–124 , 235 , 245 , 254–255
• Spain, 36–37, 77, 122–124, 235, 245, 254–255
• 斯里兰卡, 195 , 243
• Sri Lanka, 195, 243
• 斯里尼瓦桑、巴拉吉, 104 , 165
• Srinivasan, Balaji, 104, 165
• 格洛丽亚·斯泰纳姆，93
• Steinem, Gloria, 93
• 苏丹, 124 , 179 , 184
• Sudan, 124, 179, 184
• 可持续发展指数 (SDI), 243 , 243
• Sustainable Development Index (SDI), 243, 243
• 瑞典，139–142、225、241 _ _ _
• Sweden, 139–142, 225, 241
• 瑞士, 56 , 133–134 , 173
• Switzerland, 56, 133–134, 173
• 协同，70
• Synergos, 70
• 叙利亚, 10 , 24 , 124 , 130 , 140 , 171
• Syria, 10, 24, 124, 130, 140, 171
• 塔吉克斯坦，155
• Tajikistan, 155
• 税收
  • 在欧盟，117–118
  • 住房决定，105-106
  • 代际间对资源的金融竞争，73–75
  • 避税天堂，236–238
  • “WhatsApp 税”，178
• taxes
  • in EU, 117–118
  • housing decisions and, 105–106
  • intergenerational financial competition for resources, 73–75
  • tax havens, 236–238
  • “WhatsApp tax,” 178
• 技术
  • 加速流动性，因为，14-17
  • 澳大利亚和气候变化，189–191
  • 区块链和全球“护照”，230–233
  • 公共城市，256–259
  • 作为信仰的交流，85–86
  • 数字移动性和, 222–228 , 256–259（另见 量子人）
  • 在欧盟，125 , 141
  • 作为力量塑造流动性，1–2 , 4–5
  • 作为亚洲移民的推动力，194–198
  • 互联网接入（伊朗），76
  • 日本作为高科技熔炉，215–220
  • 在熔炉城市，83–84
  • 北主义情景和，170–174
  • 生产过程和，89–90
  • 远程工作和住房决定，104–107、221–228
  • 罗马尼亚作为技术中心，119
  • 智能生活，259–262
  • 苏联加盟共和国和移民模式，148
• technology
  • accelerated mobility due to, 14–17
  • Australia and climate change, 189–191
  • blockchain and global “passports,” 230–233
  • communal cities, 256–259
  • communing as faith and, 85–86
  • digital mobility and, 222–228, 256–259 (See also quantum people)
  • in EU, 125, 141
  • as force shaping mobility, 1–2, 4–5
  • as impetus for Asian migration, 194–198
  • Internet access (Iran), 76
  • Japan as high-tech melting pot, 215–220
  • in melting pot cities, 83–84
  • Northism scenario and, 170–174
  • production process and, 89–90
  • remote work and housing decisions, 104–107, 221–228
  • Romania as technology hub, 119
  • smart living, 259–262
  • of Soviet republics and migration patterns, 148
• 传送，224
• Teleport, 224
• 特勒，阿斯特罗，172
• Teller, Astro, 172
• 泰国, 77 , 208–209 , 213 , 229
• Thailand, 77, 208–209, 213, 229
• 这可能是家（Iyer），71
• This Could Be Home (Iyer), 71
• 托尔工业，92–93
• Thor Industries, 92–93
• 格蕾塔·桑伯格, 79 , 141
• Thunberg, Greta, 79, 141
• 抖音，57 岁
• TikTok, 57
• 小房子，93
• tiny houses, 93
• 阿尔文·托夫勒，256
• Toffler, Alvin, 256
• 旅游
  • 竞争，254–255
  • Covid 大流行，以及，233
  • 医疗旅游, 83 , 229
  • 在北欧，141
  • 在俄罗斯，151
• tourism
  • competition for, 254–255
  • Covid pandemic and, 233
  • medical tourism, 83, 229
  • in northern Europe, 141
  • in Russia, 151
• 阿诺德·汤因比，265
• Toynbee, Arnold, 265
• 丰田，247
• Toyota, 247
• 皮埃尔·特鲁多，110–111
• Trudeau, Pierre, 110–111
• 特朗普、唐纳德
  • Antifa 运动，78
  • 关于移民，35–37、112、195、226 _ _ _ _
  • 印裔美国人人口，203
  • 民族主义，49
• Trump, Donald
  • Antifa movements and, 78
  • on immigration, 35–37, 112, 195, 226
  • Indian-American population and, 203
  • nationalism and, 49
• 克里斯·塔克，276
• Tucker, Chris, 276
• 彼得·图尔钦，76 岁
• Turchin, Peter, 76
• 火鸡
  • 文明国家概念，53
  • 欧洲移民/同化，126–128，132
  • 前苏联加盟共和国和移民模式，143
  • 民族主义和征兵，57–58
  • 叙利亚人，24
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，75
• Turkey
  • civilizational state concept, 53
  • European immigration/assimilation, 126–128, 132
  • former Soviet republics and migration patterns, 143
  • nationalism and conscription in, 57–58
  • Syrians in, 24
  • youth-government tension, 75
• 2219（庞）, 253
• 2219 (Pang), 253
• 维吾尔族穆斯林、中国和, 60 , 154
• Uighurs Muslims, China and, 60, 154
• 乌克兰, 151 , 179–180
• Ukraine, 151, 179–180
• 地下生活，作为气候变化的应对措施，180–181
• underground living, as climate change response, 180–181
• 阿拉伯联合酋长国 (UAE)
  • 海水淡化，247
  • 迪拜, 83–84 , 226–227 , 248–250
  • 阿拉伯国家的经济问题，以及，177
  • 能源和冷却，249–250
  • 居住在193–194 年的印第安人
  • 流动人口157
  • 政治认同，82–84
• United Arab Emirates (UAE)
  • desalination by, 247
  • Dubai, 83–84, 226–227, 248–250
  • economic issues of Arab countries and, 177
  • energy and cooling, 249–250
  • Indians living in, 193–194
  • migrant population of, 157
  • political identity in, 82–84
• 英国（UK）
  • 亚裔欧洲人，119
  • 英国脱欧, 23 , 37–38 , 72 , 80 , 137–139 , 236
  • 236的公民投资者
  • 移民/同化，125–126，137–139
  • 印度人口，203
  • 代际间对资源的金融竞争，74–75
  • 国际学生, 41 , 43 , 43
  • 80-81的熔炉城市
  • 民族主义，49
  • 北主义情景和，277
  • 71-72 年青年的政治认同
  • 作为首要移民目的地，52
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系, 77 , 78
• United Kingdom (UK)
  • Asian-Europeans in, 119
  • Brexit, 23, 37–38, 72, 80, 137–139, 236
  • citizen investors of, 236
  • immigration/assimilation, 125–126, 137–139
  • Indian population in, 203
  • intergenerational financial competition for resources in, 74–75
  • international students in, 41, 43, 43
  • melting pot cities in, 80–81
  • nationalism in, 49
  • Northism scenario and, 277
  • political identity of youth in, 71–72
  • as top immigrant destination, 52
  • youth-government tension, 77, 78
• 联合国，12、29、63、185 _ _ _ _ _
• United Nations, 12, 29, 63, 185
• 美国（US）
  • 阿富汗和伊拉克战争，56 , 175
  • 出生率（2020-2021），34
  • 气候变化，97–104
  • “做一些新的事情”（白宫广告委员会），88
  • 青年就业情况，67
  • 环境保护署 (EPA), 98 , 164
  • 种族多样性，107–110
  • 1882 年排华法案，107
  • 居住在欧盟的外籍人士，118–119
  • 美联储，65
  • 涉及移民的地缘政治，202-204
  • 1965 年移民法，10
  • 移民政策, 35–37 , 112 , 195 , 226
  • 国际学生, 40–43 , 43
  • 异族通婚，109–110
  • 就业增长，22
  • 民族主义, 49 , 56
  • 北主义情景和, 159–160 , 163–164 , 277
  • NSSM-200：“全球人口增长对美国安全和海外利益的影响” 29
  • 曲速行动，59
  • 区域移民模式，12
  • 居住在国外的退休人员，228–230
  • 小企业管理局，22
  • 税和, 105–106 , 237–238
  • 作为首要移民目的地，52
  • 旅游业, 254
  • 与中国的贸易，207
  • 交通和住房，96
  • 美国选举调查，49
  • 劳动力和移民，47–48
• United States (US)
  • Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, 56, 175
  • birth rate (2020–2021), 34
  • climate change in, 97–104
  • “Do Something New” (White House Ad Council), 88
  • employment of youth in, 67
  • Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 98, 164
  • ethnic diversity in, 107–110
  • Exclusion Act of 1882, 107
  • expatriates living in EU, 118–119
  • Federal Reserve, 65
  • geopolitics involving migrants in, 202–204
  • Immigration Act of 1965, 10
  • immigration policy, 35–37, 112, 195, 226
  • international students in, 40–43, 43
  • interracial marriage in, 109–110
  • job growth in, 22
  • nationalism in, 49, 56
  • Northism scenario and, 159–160, 163–164, 277
  • NSSM-200: “Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests,” 29
  • Operation Warp Speed, 59
  • regional migration patterns and, 12
  • retirees living abroad, 228–230
  • Small Business Administration, 22
  • taxes and, 105–106, 237–238
  • as top immigrant destination, 52
  • tourism in, 254
  • trade with China, 207
  • transportation and housing, 96
  • US Election Survey, 49
  • workforce and emigration, 47–48
• 世界联合学院 (UWC) 运动，68
• United World College (UWC) movement, 68
• 世界人权宣言（联合国），12
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations), 12
• 乌尼克里希南，迪帕克，83
• Unnikrishnan, Deepak, 83
• 城市人口。另请参阅 住房
  • 柏林, 129 , 130 , 132 , 133
  • 出生率，31
  • 城市间外交，239–242
  • “18小时城市” 105
  • 特大城市，已定义，7
  • 大熔炉城市，80–85
  • 北向城市群作为潜在情景，168, 169–174（另见 北向（北半球））
  • 小国家的小城市是理想的，225
  • 城市青年的民族主义，49
  • 大城市的暴力和资源压力，24
• urban population. See also housing
  • in Berlin, 129, 130, 132, 133
  • birth rate and, 31
  • diplomacy among cities, 239–242
  • “18-hour cities,” 105
  • megacities, defined, 7
  • melting pot cities, 80–85
  • Northism urban clusters as potential scenario, 168, 169–174 (See also Northism (northern hemisphere))
  • small cities in small countries as desirable, 225
  • urban youth on nationalism, 49
  • violence and resource stress in megacities, 24
• 乌兹别克斯坦, 151 , 154 , 156
• Uzbekistan, 151, 154, 156
• 委内瑞拉，186–187
• Venezuela, 186–187
• 越南，213，216–217 _
• Vietnam, 213, 216–217
• 沃尔特·斯蒂芬，269
• Walt, Stephen, 269
• 艾薇薇，133
• Weiwei, Ai, 133
• 斯宾塞·威尔斯，48 岁
• Wells, Spencer, 48
• 维塔数码，223
• Weta Digital, 223
• WeWork, 118 , 257
• WeWork, 118, 257
• 白宫广告委员会，88
• White House Ad Council, 88
• 威尔逊，EO，269
• Wilson, E. O., 269
• 妇女和流动性。另请参阅 出生率
  • 亚洲移民和妇女权利，195
  • 征募妇女入伍，58
  • 移动房屋社区中的女性，93
  • 劳动力中的女性, 39–40 , 44–45 , 58 , 215
• women and mobility. See also birth rate
  • Asian emigration and women’s rights, 195
  • military recruitment of women, 58
  • women in mobile home communities, 93
  • women in workforce, 39–40, 44–45, 58, 215
• 劳动力，29-61
  • 反移民政策，37–40、50–51、129–130 _
  • 阿拉伯国家和失业问题，175–180
  • 亚洲在全球医疗保健系统中的代表性，198-199
  • 自动化，21-22
  • 在公共城市，256–259
  • 移民对劳动力构成威胁，45–48
  • 就业机会和搬迁意愿，87–90
  • 欧盟就业/新冠疫情应对措施，116–117
  • 欧盟移民/同化，137
  • 欧盟对移民的激励措施，122–123
  • 住房决定和, 92 , 104–107
  • 工业革命和, 9–10 , 30–31
  • 国际学生, 40–43 , 43, 190–191 , 206
  • 军人作为雇主，56
  • 流动性（参见 住房）
  • 民族主义和征兵，55–59
  • 民族主义与全球主义，48-55
  • 人类巅峰，29–35 , 32, 33 , 35
  • 富裕国家人口下降，35–37
  • 65–67所需的便携式技能
  • 宗教认同和, 54–55 , 60–61
  • 远程工作，103–107，221–228 （另见量子人）
  • 农村与城市工资差距，7
  • 工资和生活成本（20世纪90年代至今），65–67
  • 39–40 岁、44–45 岁、58 岁、215 岁的女性
  • 青年与政府的紧张关系，78
• workforce, 29–61
  • anti-immigration policies and, 37–40, 50–51, 129–130
  • Arab countries and unemployment issues, 175–180
  • Asian representation in worldwide healthcare systems, 198–199
  • automation and, 21–22
  • in communal cities, 256–259
  • emigration as threat to workforce, 45–48
  • employment opportunities and willingness to move, 87–90
  • EU employment/Covid response, 116–117
  • EU immigration/assimilation, 137
  • EU incentives for immigrants, 122–123
  • housing decisions and, 92, 104–107
  • Industrial Revolution and, 9–10, 30–31
  • international students and, 40–43, 43, 190–191, 206
  • military as employer, 56
  • mobility for (See housing)
  • nationalism and conscription, 55–59
  • nationalism vs. globalism, 48–55
  • peak humanity and, 29–35, 32, 33, 35
  • population decline in wealthy countries, 35–37
  • portable skills needed for, 65–67
  • religious identity and, 54–55, 60–61
  • remote work, 103–107, 221–228 (See also quantum people)
  • wage gap, rural vs. urban, 7
  • wages and cost of living (1990s–present), 65–67
  • women in, 39–40, 44–45, 58, 215
  • youth-government tension, 78
• 世界检查，224 n
• World-Check, 224n
• 世界未来理事会，245
• World Future Council, 245
• 世界自然基金会，268–269
• World Wildlife Fund, 268–269
• 约翰·科特兰·赖特，279
• Wright, John Kirtland, 279
• 习近平，75岁
• Xi Jinping, 75
• 也门，178
• Yemen, 178
• 赞比亚，184
• Zambia, 184
• 泽克，马耳他，221
• Zeeck, Malte, 221
• “零日”缺水，18
• “zero day” water shortages, 18
• 津巴布韦，184
• Zimbabwe, 184